REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1706-1708 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 364-366 of 2010)

Arun Kumar Aggarwal                  …….. Appellant

versus

State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.                      ……..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These  appeals,  by  special  leave,  are  directed  against  the  

Judgment  and  Order  dated  22.4.2009  passed  by  the  High  

Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  in  Criminal  Revision  No.  821  of  

2005,  Criminal  Revision  Petition   No.  966  of  2005  and  

Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005, whereby the High Court has  

allowed the revision  application  and  inter  alia quashed the  

Order dated 26.4.2005 in case diary of Crime No. 165 of 2002  

passed  by  the  First  Additional  Sessions  Judge  and  Special

Judge,  Katni  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “learned  Special  

Judge”).

3. The brief factual matrix relating to this appeal is as follows:  

The  respondent  no.  2,  Shri.  Raghav  Chandra,  who  is  a  

Commissioner  of  M.P.  Housing  Board,  Bhopal  along  with  

respondent  no.  3,  Shri.  Shahjad Khan,  posted  as  the  then  

Collector,  Katni,  Jabalpur  and respondent  no.  4,  Shri.  Ram  

Meshram,  posted  as  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  M.P.  

Housing  Board,  Bhopal,  whilst,  discharging  their  functions,  

had allegedly entered into conspiracy and made a secret plot  

with Shri. B.D. Gautam, the Director of Olphert Company and,  

subsequently,  purchased  the  land  belonging  to  Olphert  

Company at higher rates for the M.P. Housing Board, thereby,  

caused a financial loss of over  `4 Crores to the Government.  

The appellant reported this alleged transaction of purchase of  

land by the M.P. Housing Board, alleging financial loss to the  

Government,  to  the  Lokayukta,  Bhopal.  Subsequently,  the  

Special  Police  Establishment  (Lokayukta),  Jabalpur  

(hereinafter referred to as “the Lokayukta Police”) registered  

an FIR No. 165 of 2002 against accused respondent nos. 2 to  

4, as the alleged act or conduct of the accused respondents,  

all working as Government Servants, amounts to  an offence  

under  Section  13  (1-d)  and  13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  

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Corruption Act,  1988 (hereinafter  referred to as “the PCA”)  

and  Section  120-B  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (hereinafter  

referred to as “the IPC”). Accordingly a Criminal Case No. 165  

of 2002 was registered against respondent nos. 2 to 4 in the  

Court of learned Special Judge. However, the sanction of the  

Government was necessary as mandated by Section 19 of the  

PCA  in  order  to  prosecute  the  said  accused  respondents.  

Acting  upon  the  complaint  of  the  appellant,  the  Lokayukta  

Police,  after  conducting  the  investigation,  had  exonerated  

respondent nos. 2 to 4 of all the charges leveled against them  

and submitted final closure report, under Section 169 of the  

Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.  

P.C.”),  to the learned Special  Judge,  Katni  as  no case had  

been  made  out  to  prosecute  respondents.  Thereafter,  the  

learned Special  Judge, Katni  after hearing the respondents,  

appreciating the evidence on record and perusing the  case  

diary,  had rejected the closure report  vide his  Order dated  

26.4.2005.  The  operative  portion  of  the  order  dated  

26.4.2005 passed by the learned Special Judge is extracted  

below:

“31. In this way from above record produced,  even prima facie, it is evident that the accused  had made secrete  plot  (durabhi  sandhi)  with  Shri  B.D.  Gautam  the  Director  of  Olphert  Company with conspiracy and purchased land  of Olphert Company on higher rate and caused  

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financial  loss  over  four  crores  to  the  Government which there are sufficient grounds  for  taking  cognizance  against  the  accused  persons.  

32. Accused person Shri Raghav Chandra is  posted as Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board  and  Shri  Ram  Meshram  is  posted  as  Land  Acquiring  Officer  in  M.P.  Housing  Board  and  Shri Shahjaad Khan while remaining posted as  Collector,  all  above  accused  persons  working  as Government servant, while discharging their  government  duties,  committed  above  crime- under section 19 of Anti Corruption Act 1988, it  is  necessary  to  obtain  sanction  to  prosecute  Government Servant U/S 13 of Anti-Corruption  Act. Therefore matter may be taken up seeking  necessary  sanction  to  prosecute  the  accused  persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram  and Shahjaad Khan to prosecute them under  Section  13 (1-d),  13 (2)  Anti  Corruption  Act  and  under  Section  120-B  I.P.C.  and  for  necessary further action, case be registered in  the criminal case diary.”

4. Aggrieved by the above observation, respondent nos. 2  to 4  

preferred Criminal Revision Petitions under Section 482 of the  

Cr.P.C.  before  the High Court.  The  High Court  allowed the  

revision petitions and quashed the Order dated 26.4.2005 of  

the learned Special Judge on the ground that the Order of the  

learned  Special  Judge  is  illegal  and  without  jurisdiction,  in  

view of the decision of this Court in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh  

Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117, as the Magistrate cannot impinge  

upon the jurisdiction of the police by directing them to change  

their opinion when the closure report had been submitted by  

the police under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C. The reliance is also  

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placed on the observation made by this Court in the case of  

Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat AIR 1997  

SC 3400 wherein it is observed that:

“19.  Since the validity of  “Sanction” depends  on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning  authority of the facts of the case as also the  material  and  evidence  collected  during  investigation  it  necessarily  follows  that  the  sanctioning  authority  has  to  apply  its  own  independent  mind  for  the  generation  of  genuine  satisfaction  whether  prosecution  has  to  be  sanctioned  or  not.   The  mind  of  the  sanctioning  authority  should  not  be  under  pressure  from  any  quarter  nor  should  any  external  force  be  acting  upon  it  to  take  a  decision  one  way  or  the  other.  Since  the  discretion  to  grant  or  not  to  grant  sanction  vests  absolutely  in  the  sanctioning authority,  its  discretion  should  be  shown  to  have  not  been affected by any extraneous consideration.  It is shown that the sanctioning authority was  unable to apply its independent mind for any  reason whatsoever or was under an obligation  or  compulsion  or  constraint  to  grant  the  sanction, the order will be bad for the reason  that  the  discretion  of  the  authority  “not  to  sanction”  was  taken  away  and  it  was  compelled to act mechanically to sanction the  prosecution.”

5. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us in this appeal.

6. The issue involved in the present appeal for our consideration  

is:  Whether  the  High  Court  is  justified  in  treating  the  

operative portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge as  

a direction issued to the sanctioning authority to sanction the  

prosecution of the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 4.  

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7.  We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis  

and perused the record.  

8. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Special  

Judge, vide his Order dated 26.4.2005, refused to accept the  

closure report submitted before him by the Lokayukta Police  

as he found it to be not reasonable and finally rejected it. The  

other portion of the Order, wherein the learned Special Judge  

observed  particularly  about  the  initiation  of  Challan  

proceedings,  is  a  mere  observation  or  passing  remark.  In  

other words, the learned counsel submits that this portion of  

the Order, dealing with Challan proceedings, can, at the most,  

be treated as expression of his personal opinion. He further  

submits that wholistic reading of this Order clearly suggests  

that the learned Special Judge’s remark pertaining to Challan  

proceedings is in the nature of mere obiter dicta and could  

not qualify to be treated as a direction of the Court even by  

any stretch of imagination. The learned counsel contends that  

the Order of the learned Special Judge cannot be treated as  

direction issued to the sanctioning authority to prosecute the  

respondents  as  this  Order  nowhere  addresses  sanctioning  

authority  and  moreover,  nowhere  directs  sanctioning  

authority to do any affirmative action or abstain from doing  

anything.   Therefore,  the  High  Court  is  not  justified  in  

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quashing the Order of the learned Special Judge and treating  

it  to be a direction issued to the sanctioning  authority to  

prosecute   the  accused  respondent nos.2 to 4.

9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits  

that the Order of the learned Special Judge is in the nature of  

command  and  amounts  to  a  direction  to  the  sanctioning  

authority to prosecute respondent nos. 2 to 4.  Therefore, this  

Order  of  the  learned  Special  Judge  is  illegal  and  without  

jurisdiction.  The  learned  counsel  further  supported  the  

impugned Order and Judgment of the High Court.  

10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties before us.  

The short point in issue before us is based on the nature of  

the  Order  passed  by the  learned Special  Judge  whether  it  

amounts to a direction issued by the Court to the concerned  

authority or mere observation of the Court.  

11. We will first discuss the nature and scope of the expression  

‘direction’  issued  by  the  Court.  This  Court  in  Rameshwar  

Bhartia  v.  The  State  of  Assam,  1953  SCR  126 whilst  

distinguishing the expression ‘Sanction’ from the ‘Direction’,  

for the purpose of initiating the prosecution has held:

“15.  But  where  a  prosecution  is  directed,  it  means  that  the  authority  who  gives  the  direction is satisfied in his own mind that the  case  must  be  initiated.  Sanction  is  in  the  

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nature of a permission, while a  direction is in  the  nature  of  a  command.”  (Emphasis  supplied).

12. In Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan  

Das,  Lakhimpur  kheri,  (1964)  6  SCR  411,  this  Court  has  

observed that the expression “direction” cannot be construed  

in vacuum, but must be collated to the directions which the  

Assistant Appellate Commissioner can give under Section 31  

of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.  

13. This Court in Rajinder Nath v. CIT, (1979) 4 SCC 282, while  

considering  the  meaning  of  expression  ‘finding’  and  

‘direction’, occurring in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Income Tax  

Act, 1961, has held:  

“11. … As regards the expression “direction” in  Section  153(3)(ii)  of  the  Act,  it  is  now well   settled  that  it  must  be  an  express  direction  necessary for the disposal of the case before  the  authority  or  court.  It  must  also  be  a  direction  which  the  authority  or  court  is  empowered  to  give  while  deciding  the  case  before  it. The  expressions  “finding”  and  “direction”  in  Section  153(3)(ii)  of  the  Act  must  be  accordingly  confined.”  (Emphasis  supplied).  

14. In  Kanhiya Lal  Omar v.  R.K. Trivedi  & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC  

628, this Court has observed that “A direction may mean an  

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order  issued  to  a  particular  individual  or  a  precept  which  

many may have to follow. It may be a specific or a general  

order.”

15. In Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 391,  

this Court, whilst considering the direction issued by the High  

Court  in  a  Public  Interest  Litigation,  has observed that  the  

directions  should  not  be  vague,  sweeping  or  affected  by  

sarcasm  which  are  not  capable  of  being  implemented.  It  

should  be  specific,  just  and  proper  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case. This Court further held:

“10. It appears to us that when the High Court  was not in a position to precisely discern what  was  the  complaint  alleged  by  the  petitioner  and when the High Court was of the view that  the prayer made by the petitioner was absurd  and  it  also  held  that  the  officers  who  were  alleged  to  have  been  carrying  on  nefarious  activities were more imaginary than real, the  direction  in  general  and  sweeping  terms  to  sack erring officers (whomsoever they may be)  and overhaul the administration by recruiting  only conscientious and devoted people like the  petitioner in order to satisfy the vanity of the  petitioner, should not have been made. If the  High  Court  intends  to  pass  an  order  on  an  application presented before it by treating it as  a public interest litigation, the High Court must  precisely  indicate  the  allegations  or  the  statements contained in such petition relating  to public interest litigation and should indicate  how public interest was involved and only after   ascertaining the correctness of the allegation,  

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should give specific direction as may deem just  and proper in the facts of the case.

11. It appears to us that the application was  disposed of by the Division Bench of Madhya  Pradesh High Court in a lighter vein and the  order  dated  27-2-1992  is  couched  in  veiled  sarcasm.  Such  course  of  action,  to  say  the  least,  is  not  desirable  and  the  High  Court  should  not  have  issued  mandate  in  general  and sweeping terms which were not intended  to  be implemented  and  were not  capable  of   being implemented because of utter vagueness  of the mandate and of its inherent absurdity.”  (Emphasis supplied)  

16. The Blacks  Law Dictionary  (9th ed.  2009)  defines  the  term  

‘Direction’ as an order; an instruction on how to proceed.

17. The meaning of expression “Direction” has been discussed in  

Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 26A, at pg. 955-956 as thus:

“The word “direction” is of common usage, and  is  defined  as  meaning  the  act  of  governing,   ordering,  or  ruling;  the  act  of  directing,   authority  to  direct  as  circumstances  may  require;  guidance;  management;  superintendence;  “prescription;”  also  a  command, an instruction,  an order,  an order  prescribed,  either  verbally  or  written,  or  indicated  by  acts;  that  which  is  imposed  by  directing,  a  guiding  or  authoritative  instruction; information as to method.”

18. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd  

ed. 2005) the word ‘Direction’ means: address of letter, order  

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or instruction as to what one has to do. A direction may serve  

to direct to places as well as to persons. Direction contains  

most  of  instruction  in  it  and  should  be  followed.  It  is  

necessary  to  direct  those  who  are  unable  to  act  for  

themselves.  Directions  given  to  servants  must  be  clear,  

simple and precise.

19. According to the Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.  

12A,  the  term ‘Direction’  means  a  guiding  or  authoritative  

instruction, prescription, order, command.  

20. To sum up, the direction issued by the Court is in the nature  

of a command or authoritative instruction which contemplates  

the  performance  of  certain  duty  or  act  by  a  person  upon  

whom it  has been issued.  The direction should be specific,  

simple, clear and just and proper depending upon the facts  

and circumstances of the case but it should not be vague or  

sweeping.   

21. At this stage, it is pertinent to consider the nature and scope  

of a mere observation or obiter dictum in the Order of the  

Court. The expression obiter dicta or dicta has been discussed  

in American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 20, at pg. 437 as thus:

“74. –Dicta

Ordinarily,  a  court  will  decide  only  the  questions  necessary  for  determining  the  

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particular  case  presented.  But  once  a  court  acquires jurisdiction, all material questions are  open for its decision; it may properly decided  all questions so involved, even though it is not   absolutely  essential  to  the  result  that  all   should  be  decided.  It  may,  for  instance,  determine the question of the constitutionality  of  a  statute,  although  it  is  not  absolutely   necessary to the disposition of the case, if the  issue of constitutionality is involved in the suit  and its settlement is of public importance.  An  expression  in  an  opinion  which  is  not  necessary to support the decision reached by  the court is dictum or obiter dictum.

“Dictum”  or  “obiter  dictum:  is  distinguished  from the “holding of the court in that the so- called  “law of  the  case”  does  not  extend  to  mere  dicta,  and  mere  dicta  are  not  binding  under the doctrine of stare decisis,

As applied to a particular opinion, the question  of whether or not a certain part thereof is or is  not a mere dictum is sometimes a matter of   argument. And while the terms “dictum” and  “obiter  dictum”  are  generally  used  synonymously with regard to expressions in an  opinion which are not necessary to support the  decision,  in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis,  a  distinction  has  been  drawn  between mere obiter and “judicial  dicta,” the  latter being an expression of opinion on a point  deliberately  passed  upon  by  the  court.”  (Emphasis supplied).  

Further at pg. 525 and 526, the effect of dictum has been  

discussed:

“190. Decision on legal point; effect of dictum

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… In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, a  distinction is  made between a holding and a  dictum. Generally stare decisis does not attach  to such parts of an opinion of a court which are   mere  dicta.  The  reason  for  distinguishing  a  dictum from a holding has been said to be that  a  question  actually  before  the  court  and  decided  by  it  is  investigated  with  care  and  considered  in  its  full  extent,  whereas  other  principles, although considered in their relation  to  the  case  decided,  are  seldom  completely  investigated  as  to  their  possible  bearing  on  other  cases.  Nevertheless  courts  have  sometimes  given  dicta  the  same  effect  as  holdings, particularly where “judicial dicta” as  distinguished from “obiter dicta” are involved.”

22. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd  

ed.  2005),  the  expression  “observation”  means  a  view,  

reflection;  remark;  statement;  observed  truth  or  facts;  

remarks  in  speech  or  writing  in  reference  to  something  

observed.

23. The Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th Ed. 1993) defines term ‘obiter  

dictum’  as  an  opinion  not  necessary  to  a  judgment;  an  

observation as to the law made by a judge in the course of a  

case, but not necessary to its decision, and therefore of no  

binding effect; often called as obiter dictum, ; a remark by  

the way.

24. The Blacks Law Dictionary, (9th ed, 2009) defines term ‘obiter  

dictum’ as a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial  

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opinion,  but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the  

case  and  therefore  not  precedential  (although  it  may  be  

considered persuasive). — Often shortened to dictum or, less  

commonly,  obiter.  “Strictly  speaking an ‘obiter  dictum’ is  a  

remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision  

upon  a  cause,  ‘by  the  way’  —  that  is,  incidentally  or  

collaterally,  and  not  directly  upon  the  question  before  the  

court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the judge or  

court  merely  by  way  of  illustration,  argument,  analogy,  or  

suggestion....  In  the  common  speech  of  lawyers,  all  such  

extrajudicial  expressions of  legal  opinion are referred to as  

‘dicta,’  or  ‘obiter  dicta,’  these  two  terms  being  used  

interchangeably.”

25 The Word and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 29 defines the  

expression ‘obiter dicta’ or ‘dicta’ thus:  

“Dicta  are  opinions  of  a  judge which  do not   embody the resolution or determination of the  court,  and  made  without  argument  or  full  consideration  of  the  point,  are  not  the  professed  deliberate  determinations  of  the  judge himself; obiter dicta are opinions uttered  by  the  way,  not  upon  the point  or  question  pending, as if turning aside for the time from  the  main  topic  of  the  case  to  collateral   subjects; It is mere observation by a judge on  a legal question suggested by the case before  him, but not arising in such a manner as to  require  decision  by  him;  “Obiter  dictum”  is  made as argument or illustration, as pertinent  

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to  other  cases  as  to  the  one  on  hand,  and  which may enlighten or convince, but which in  no sense  are  a  part  of  the  judgment  in  the  particular  issue,  not  binding  as  a  precedent,  but entitled to receive the respect due to the  opinion  of  the  judge  who  utters  them;  Discussion  in  an  opinion  of  principles  of  law  which are not pertinent, relevant, or essential   to  determination  of  issues  before  court  is   “obiter dictum”

26. The concept of  “Dicta”  has also been considered in Corpus  

Juris Secundum, Vol. 21, at pg. 309-12 as thus:

“190. Dicta

a. In General

A Dictum is an opinion expressed by a court,   but  which,  not  being  necessarily  involved  in  the case, lacks the force of an adjudication; an  opinion expressed by a judge on a point not  necessarily arising in the case; a statement or   holding  in  an  opinion  not  responsive  to  any  issue and noty necessary to the decision of the  case; an opinion expressed on a point in which  the judicial mind is not directed to the precise  question necessary to be determined to fix the  rights of the parties; or an opinion of a judge  which  does  not  embody  the  resolution  or  determination of the court, and made without  argument,  or  full  consideration  of  the  point,  not the professed deliberate determination of  the  judge  himself.  The  term  “dictum”  is  generally  used  as  an  abbreviation  of  “obiter   dictum”  which  means  a  remark  or  opinion  uttered by the way.

Such an expression or  opinion,  as  a general   rule, is not binding as authority or precedent  within  the stare  decisis  rule,  even on courts  

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inferior  to  the  court  from  which  such  expression emanated, no matter how often it   may  be  repeated.  This  general  rule  is   particularly  applicable  where  there  are  prior  decisions  to  the  contrary  of  the  statement  regarded as  dictum;  where  the  statement  is   declared,  on rehearing,  to be dictum; where  the dictum is  on a question which the court   expressly  states  that  it  does  not  decide;  or  where  it  is  contrary  to  statute  and  would  produce an inequitable result. It has also been  held that a dictum is not the “law of the case,”  nor res judicata.”

27. The concept of “Dicta” has been discussed in Halsbury’s Laws  

of England, Fourth Edition (Reissue), Vol.  26, para. 574 as  

thus:

“574.  Dicta.  Statements  which  are  not  necessary  to  the  decision,  which  go  beyond  the  occasion  and  lay  down  a  rule  that  it  is  unnecessary  for  the  purpose  in  hand  are  generally termed “dicta”. They have no binding  authority on another court, although they may  have some persuasive efficacy.  Mere passing  remarks  of  a  judge  are  known  as  “obiter  dicta”,  whilst  considered  enunciations  of  the  judge’s  opinion  on  a  point  not  arising  for  decision, and so not part of the ratio decidendi,  have been termed “judicial dicta”. A third type  of  dictum  may  consist  in  a  statement  by  a  judge as to what has been done in other cases   which have not been reported.  

…  Practice  notes,  being  directions  given  without argument, do not have binding judicial   effect. Interlocutory observations by members  of  a  court  during  argument,  while  of   persuasive  weight,  are  not  judicial   pronouncements and do not decide anything.”

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28. In  Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1  

SCC  101 and  Divisional  Controller,  KSRTC  v.  Mahadeva  

Shetty, (2003) 7 SCC 197, this Court has observed that “Mere  

casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing  

expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an  

ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority.”

29. In State of Haryana v. Ranbir, (2006) 5 SCC 167, this Court  

has discussed the concept of the obiter dictum thus:

“A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for   what it decides and not what can logically be  deduced therefrom. The distinction between a  dicta and obiter is well known. Obiter dicta is   more or  less  presumably unnecessary to the  decision.  It  may  be  an  expression  of  a  viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding  effect. See ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla.  It  is  also  well  settled  that  the  statements  which  are  not  part  of  the  ratio  decidendi   constitute  obiter  dicta  and  are  not  authoritative.  (See  Divisional  Controller,  KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty)”

30. In Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555,  

this Court has held:  

“Thus, observations of the Court did not relate  to any of the legal questions arising in the case  and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the  part of ratio decidendi. Hence, in light of the  aforementioned  judicial  pronouncements,  which  have  well  settled  the  proposition  that  

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only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding  or authoritative precedent, it is clear that the  reliance placed on mere general observations  or casual  expressions of the Court,  is  not of  much avail to the respondents.”

31. In view of above, it is well settled that obiter dictum is a mere  

observation  or  remark made by the court  by way of  aside  

while  deciding  the  actual  issue  before  it.  The  mere  casual  

statement or observation which is not relevant, pertinent or  

essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the part of  

the judgment of the Court and have no authoritative value.  

The expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is  

just a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering  

the  actual  issues  pending  before  the  Court.  These  casual  

remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the  

authoritative or operative part of the judgment.

32. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of  

the opinion that the refusal of the learned Special Judge, vide  

its Order dated 26.4.2005, to accept the final closure report  

submitted by Lokayukta Police is the only  ratio decidendi of  

the Order. The other part of the Order which deals with the  

initiation  of  Challan  proceedings  cannot  be  treated  as  the  

direction issued by the learned Special  Judge. The relevant  

portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge dealing with  

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Challan Proceeding reads as “Therefore matter may be taken  

up  seeking  necessary  sanction  to  prosecute  the  accused  

persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram and Shahjaad  

Khan to prosecute them under Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti  

Corruption  Act  and  under  Section  120-B  I.P.C  and  for  

necessary further action, case be registered in the criminal  

case diary.”  The wordings of this Order clearly suggest that it  

is  not  in  the  nature  of  the  command  or  authoritative  

instruction. This Order is also not specific or clear in order to  

direct or address any authority or body to perform any act or  

duty. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, this Order can  

be  considered  or  treated  as  the  direction  issued  by  the  

learned Special  Judge.   The wholistic  reading of  this  Order  

leads to only one conclusion, that is,  it  is  in the nature of  

‘Obiter Dictum’ or mere passing remark made by the learned  

Special  Judge,  which  only  amounts  to  expression  of  his  

personal  view.  Therefore,  this  portion  of  the  Order  dealing  

with  Challan  proceeding,  is  neither  relevant,  pertinent  nor  

essential, while deciding the actual issues which were before  

the learned Special Judge and hence, cannot be treated as the  

part of the Judgment of the learned Special Judge.

33. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion  

that,  the portion of the Order of the learned Special  Judge  

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which  deals  with  the  Challan  proceedings  is  a  mere  

observation or remark made by way of aside.  In view of this,  

the High Court had grossly erred in considering and treating  

this  mere  observation  of  the  learned  Special  Judge  as  the  

direction of the Court.  Therefore, there was no occasion for  

the  High  Court  to  interfere  with  the  Order  of  the  learned  

Special Judge.  

34. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned Order  

and Judgment of the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 821  

of  2005,  Criminal  Revision  Petition  No.  966  of  2005  and  

Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005 dated 22.4.2009 is set aside.  

We  restore  the  Order  of  the  learned  Special  Judge  dated  

26.4.2005.

35. We direct the respondents to comply with the order passed by  

the Trial Court within two months from this date.    

         …………………… …J.

                                                                      [G.S. SINGHVI]

                                                                       …………………… …J.

                                                             [H.L. DATTU] New Delhi, September 02, 2011.         

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