ARATHI BANDI Vs BANDI JAGADRAKSHAKA RAO .
Bench: SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000934-000936 / 2013
Diary number: 40797 / 2010
Advocates: KAILASH CHAND Vs
SANJAY JAIN
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.934-936 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10606-10608 of 2010)
Arathi Bandi …Appellant
VERSUS
Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao & Ors. …
Respondents
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.937 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3335 of 2012)
Bandi Jagadrakshak Rao & Ors. …Appellants
VERSUS
The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. …
Respondents
J U D G E M E N T
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
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2. These appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Crl.) No. 10606-10608 of 2010 are directed against
the judgment and final order dated 24th September,
2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature of
Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.
25479 of 2009 issuing a writ in the nature of Habeas
Corpus directing the petitioner to submit to the
jurisdiction of U.S. Courts. The petitioner also assails
the orders dated 3rd December, 2010 and 14th
December, 2010 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in W.P.M.P. No. 31378 of 2010 in W.P.
No. 25479 of 2010, directing the petitioner to
produce the child along with necessary documents to
give effect to the main judgment and order dated
24th September, 2010. The appellant has framed
three questions of law for the consideration of this
Court in the Special Leave Petition giving rise to
these appeals. They are as under:-
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“(A) Has not the Hon’ble High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under law in not considering the welfare and well being of the minor child before issuing the impugned directions ?
(B) Has not the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that when there is an order passed by foreign court, it is not necessary to go into the facts of the case?
(C) Is not the judgment of US Court “not conclusive” as between the parties and hence unenforceable in India for being in violation of Section 13(c) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?”
3. The relevant facts giving rise to the aforesaid
questions of law as narrated by the parties are as
under:-
(a) Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the
“husband”) invoked the Habeas Corpus jurisdiction
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India for production of
the minor child, i.e., Master Anand Saisuday Bandi
before the Court and permit him to take custody of
the minor child in compliance of the orders passed
in Case No.06-3-08145-9-KNT by the Superior
Court of Washington, County of King (hereinafter
referred to as “the U.S. Court”). Upon
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consideration of the entire facts and
circumstances, the High Court issued the following
directions:-
“ i) The petitioner shall obtain necessary travel tickets for the 7th respondent and the child for their visit to the place where U.S. Court is situated;
ii) On obtaining travel tickets, the petitioner shall intimate the same to the 7th respondent three weeks in advance of the date of departure to enable her to make necessary arrangements;
iii) The petitioner shall deposit a sum of $5000 (Five thousand American dollars) in the name of the 7th respondent for enabling her to engage an advocate in US and to submit to the jurisdiction of the US Court;
iv) The petitioner shall make necessary arrangements for the stay of the 7th respondent and the child for a period of fifteen (15) [sic] on their landing in USA.
v) On petitioner providing travel tickets, depositing the amount as ordered above, and intimating the date of departure, if 7th respondent fails to submit to the jurisdiction of the US Court along with the child, Master Anand Saisuday Bandi, in obedience to the orders passed in writ of Habeas Corpus by the US Court, she shall handover the custody of the child to the petitioner, who in turn shall produce the child before the US Court and custody of
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the child will abide by the decision of the US Court since the child is a citizen of USA.”
(b) The petitioner (hereinafter referred to either as
“the petitioner”, “the wife” or “the mother”),
aggrieved by the aforesaid directions, filed the
special leave petitions giving rise to the present
appeals.
Events/ Legal Proceedings in the U.S.A.:
(c) The marriage between the parties was solemnized
according to Hindu rights on 9th November, 2003
in Atlanta, USA. They were both divorcees. After
marriage, they had settled down in Seattle, USA.
Anand (hereinafter referred to either as “the
child”, “the minor child,” or “Anand”) was born on
5th June, 2005 in USA and, therefore, is a US citizen
by birth. On 30th October, 2006, respondent No.1
(hereinafter referred to as “respondent No.1”, “the
husband” or “the father”) filed a petition for
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dissolution of marriage in Superior Court of
Washington, County of King at Seattle. In these
proceedings, an ex parte order was issued
restraining the wife from leaving the State of
Washington. The husband was authorised to hold
on to the passport and Person of Indian Origin
Card (PIO Card) of Anand. Within days of the
husband petitioning for dissolution of marriage,
the wife on 13th November, 2006 submitted a
complaint of domestic violence in which the
Superior Court of Washington, Kent directed the
husband to move out of the matrimonial home.
Anand was to remain in the custody of wife with
limited visitation rights were granted to the
husband. The wife was, however, directed to pay
US $ 1500 for the husband’s expenses until the
regular hearing. On 4th December, 2006, further
orders were issued stipulating that the
wife/mother would occupy the family home with
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the child. Furthermore, the father was to bear half
of the mortgage on family home, child’s day care
expenses and insurance costs for the child and the
mother. The unsupervised visitation rights of the
father were increased from 9 hours to 12 hours
per week. Father’s attorney was required to hold
Anand’s U.S.A. passport. On 1st March, 2007, Ms.
Jennifer Keilin was appointed by the Superior Court
of Washington, Kent as Guardian ad litem to make
recommendations regarding the marriage and
child custody. On 22nd June, 2007, Parenting
Evaluation Report was submitted to the U.S. Court.
The wife/mother was found suitable for custody in
view of the problems of the husband/father at the
work place, alcohol dependency and smoking
addiction. It was also noted that the child Anand
has very serious food allergies. On 9th July, 2007,
the wife filed a motion before the Superior Court of
Washington, Seattle for an emergency hearing on
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her petition requesting travel to India for two
weeks. This was denied by the aforesaid court on
10th July, 2007. On the same day, the wife moved
the Superior Court of Washington, Kent seeking an
emergency hearing. This too was denied by the
Court. However, regular hearing was set for 24th
July, 2007. On 25th July, 2007, at the regular
hearing, the Superior Court of Washington, Kent
passed an order permitting the wife to travel to
India with the child. However, at the request of the
husband, the said order was stayed, until his
motion of reconsideration could be adjudicated.
On 17th August, 2007, the wife filed motion for
continuance of trial, permanent relocation to India
with the child and requesting the court to order
the father to undergo domestic violence
assessment. On 4th September, 2007, Superior
Court of Washington, Kent passed orders granting
request of the wife for continuance of trial,
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appointing Ms. Keilin to conduct another
evaluation to make recommendations regarding
relocation. However, the request of the wife to
order the husband to go through a further
domestic violence assessment was denied. On the
same day, i.e. 4th September, 2007, the appeal of
the father against the order dated 25th July, 2007,
permitting the wife to travel to India with the child,
was allowed.
(d) The trial in the main petition for dissolution of
marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown
of marriage commenced on 18th March, 2008 in
the Superior Court of Washington, Kent. On 19th
March, 2008, parenting plan was approved with
primary custody of Anand given to the mother and
limited visitation rights granted to the father.
During summer vacations of two weeks, each
parent was granted five consecutive days of
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residential time, at a time. Out of State or
International travel was permitted to both the
parties during the residential time. The attorney of
the husband was ordered by the Superior Court of
Washington to prepare final orders.
4. On 20th March, 2008, the motion of the wife for
relocation to India was denied. On 7th July, 2008, the
wife filed a motion petition before the Superior Court
of Washington, Kent requesting a clarification on final
parenting plan to permit 13 consecutive days
of vacation with the child for travelling to India. On
16th July, 2008, Superior Court of Washington denied
her motion. In violation of the aforesaid orders, the
wife travelled to India with Anand on 17th July, 2008.
On 22nd August, 2008, final orders were passed in the
petition filed by the husband for dissolution of
marriage. The order includes findings of fact and law
entered by the Superior Court of Washington. The
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Court specifically recorded the reasons that led to
the denial of the motion filed by the wife for
relocation on 20th March, 2008. On 23rd August, 2008,
divorce decree entered by the Superior Court of
Washington as part of final orders.
5. On the same day, i.e., 23rd August, 2008, the wife sent
an e-mail to the husband informing him that she will
return on 16th September, 2008 alongwith the child.
This E-mail also contained the confirmed itinerary.
Since the wife did not return with the child, the
husband moved an application in September, 2008
seeking modification of the final parenting plan on
the grounds of violation of earlier parenting plan
(19th March, 2008) and interference with his visitation
rights. On 9th December, 2008, Superior Court of
Washington, Kent modified the parenting plan. The
husband was made custodial parent and the wife was
granted visitation rights. On 12th
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December, 2008, Superior Court of Washington,
Seattle also issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, directing
the State and its officers to locate and take Anand
into immediate custody and deliver him to the
Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of Washington,
County of King. On 11th January, 2009, abduction
notices were issued against the wife. This was
followed by a Red Corner Notice. In the meantime,
the services of the husband were terminated by his
employer in February, 2009, due to the economic
downturn. Similarly, the wife was also affected by the
downturn and was not able to take up a new job in
the USA. Since the wife did not return with the child
on 13th March, 2009, Superior Court of Washington,
Kent issued bailable warrants against her for
Custodial Interference in the First Degree. In May,
2009, the husband sold the matrimonial house in
USA.
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Events and legal proceedings in India -
6. On 20th November, 2009, the husband filed a Habeas
Corpus petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
Since there was no representation from the wife, the
writ petition was admitted. Upon completion of the
proceedings, which according to the husband, were
deliberately delayed by the wife, the High Court
delivered the impugned judgment on 24th
September, 2010. A few days thereafter, the
husband filed W.P.M.P. No.31378 of 2010 on 29th
September, 2010, seeking inter alia custody of
Anand for producing him before the US Consulate in
Hyderabad; a direction to the Registrar (Judicial)
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to return his own
Indian Passport; and a direction to the wife for
providing her “current name”, “xerox copies of her
current passport”, “visa papers” and “PIO Card” of
Anand to the husband. On 3rd December, 2010, the
High Court directed the wife to be present along with
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Anand before it on the next date of hearing, i.e., 10 th
December, 2010. She was also directed to produce
her passport and visa papers and the PIO Card of
Anand, so as to enable the husband to comply with
the directions of the High Court issued in Writ
Petition No. 25479 of 2009 dated 24th September,
2010. It seems that on 10th December, 2010, another
Advocate, who replaced the earlier counsel,
appeared for the wife and sought some more time to
comply with the order dated 3rd December, 2010. On
14th December, 2010, the wife came to the High
Court, albeit without Anand and served the copy of
her Review Petition against the judgment dated 24th
September, 2010 to the petitioner/husband. On 18th
December, 2010, the present appeal was preferred
before this Court, by the wife. Meanwhile on 22nd
December, 2010, neither the wife nor Anand came to
the High Court and a death in the family at
Vijayawada was reported by her as the reason for the
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absence. Again on 28th December, 2010, the wife
and Anand absented themselves from the High
Court. The High Court, however, issued directions on
the same date to the Commissioner of Police,
Hyderabad City to produce Anand before the Court
on 17th January 2011. On 18th January, 2011, the
police could not locate
either wife or Anand. Upon this, the High Court
granted a week’s time to the police to produce
Anand. On 25th January, 2011, since the police could
not locate Anand, the High Court issued a non-
bailable warrant against wife and directed the matter
to be listed on 8th February, 2011. Meanwhile, this
Court on 31st January, 2011, issued notice in the Civil
Appeal filed by the wife and order dated 25th January,
2011 was stayed. The Review Petition pending before
the High Court appears to have been withdrawn by
the petitioner after the notice was issued by this
court in the present Civil Appeal.
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7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length.
8. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel appearing
for the wife has submitted that both the mother and
the child have been in India since July, 2008. The
mother has been looking after Anand single handedly
without any help from the father. She has got a well
paid job with IBM at Bangalore. Anand now lives in a
joint family and is happy. He enjoys the company of
his cousins. He is now 8 years of age and has
developed roots in India. He has emphasised that the
High Court has not considered the welfare of the
child in passing the impugned judgment. He has
submitted, by making exhaustive reference to the
Parenting Evaluation Report, that it would be for the
welfare of the child to remain with the mother in
India. Learned senior counsel submitted that this
Court would have to consider the benefits that would
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accrue to Anand if he is permitted to remain with her
in India as opposed to the undesirability of
compelling her to handover his custody to the father.
Learned senior counsel submits that the Parenting
Evaluation Report clearly notices that the father was
subjected to Urinalysis Testing for alcohol. The
mother had objected to her husband’s use of alcohol.
The husband frequently drank alcohol during the
evening. At the same time, he tried to hide his
alcohol dependency from his parents who were
staying with him. The wife had also narrated before
Ms. Jennifer Keilin who gave the Parenting Evaluation
Report that the husband drank while watching
television, consuming half a bottle of rum every
evening. His drinking had increased while she was
visiting India in April and May, 2004. She had also
claimed that the husband sometimes had difficulty in
waking up in the morning and after drinking he
suffered occasional hangovers. Mr. Shishodia also
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pointed out that the husband is also addicted to
cigarette smoking. He also has a history of
employment problems. This apart, the husband had
also admitted before the evaluator about his past
drug use. Referring to the Parenting Evaluation
Report, Mr. Shishodia pointed out the numerous
other difficulties which were being faced by both the
parties whilst they were married. On the basis of the
aforesaid, he submitted that the High Court erred in
law by not taking into consideration the relevant
factors whilst passing the impugned judgment. At
this stage, he relied on the judgment of this Court in
Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu Vs. Harbax Singh
Sandhu & Anr. 1 . He submitted that the High Court
has totally ignored the relevant facts for determining
what would be in the best interest of the child. He
also pointed out to the conclusion in the Parenting
Evaluation Report which is as under:
1 (1984) 3 SCC 698
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“In my opinion, Anand should reside primarily with Ms. Bandi. He should have regular, limited visitation with Mr. Rao, increasing at regular intervals. These intervals should be based on Mr. Rao completing and maintaining certain criteria as well as on Anand’s development needs. Mr. Rao should engage in specific services, including alcohol treatment and a parenting class, and both parents should participate in co-parent counseling.”
9. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the
High Court has totally misconstrued the principle of
Comity of Courts, as applicable in private
international law matters. The High Court has erred
in holding that it was not necessary to hold an
elaborate enquiry in the facts and circumstances of
this case. He submitted that the High Court has
misconstrued the principles of law laid down by this
Court in V. Ravi Chandran (Dr.) (2) Vs. Union of
India & Ors. 2 . He submitted that the observations
made by this Court in the case of Shilpa Aggarwal
(Ms.) Vs. Aviral Mittal & Anr.3 would not be
applicable in the facts and circumstances of this 2 (2010) 1 SCC 174 3 (2010) 1 SCC 591
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case. In fact, the matter is squarely covered by the
judgment of this Court in Dhanwanti Joshi Vs.
Madhav Unde 4 . Learned senior counsel also relied
on the judgment in Sarita Sharma Vs. Sushil
Sharma5 and Ruchi Majoo Vs. Sanjeev Majoo 6 .
Learned counsel pointed out that the High Court has
totally ignored some very important issues as to why
it would not be in the interest of Anand to be sent
back to USA to live with the father. He also pointed
out that the husband has lost his job in the USA and
has been living in India for the past three years. He
has also sold the family house in USA. Therefore,
Anand would have no family atmosphere if he is
taken back to the USA. He pointed out that initially
the custody of Anand had been given to the mother
on the basis of the recommendations made in the
parenting plan. However, subsequently, orders have
4 (1998) 1 SCC 112 5 (2000) 3 SCC 14 6 (2011) 6 SCC 479
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been passed granting custody to the respondent-
husband. It is these orders which are sought to be
enforced in the USA Courts which had led to the filing
of the Habeas Corpus petition in the Andhra Pradesh
High Court. He submitted that the mother had been
compelled to leave the USA due to the irrational
behaviour of the husband. Learned senior counsel
also pointed out even at the time of the marriage,
the plan was actually to settle in India. Subsequently,
however, the husband declined to return to India. He
also pointed out that the removal of Anand from USA
was neither thoughtless nor malicious. The wife had
to return to India due to the serious ailment and old
age of her parents. She is now looking after them in
India. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the wife
is trying to alienate the child from the husband.
10. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel, for the
respondent-husband submitted that the wife has
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come to India in violation of the parenting plan. It is
submitted that she participated in the proceedings in
USA, where some orders were passed in her favour
while the others were against her.
11. He submits that all efforts of the wife are simply to
alienate the child from the father. He emphasises
that the petitioner and respondent No.1 were
married in USA. At the time of marriage, they were
both divorcees. They had settled in Seattle, USA.
Anand was born in USA and is, therefore, a US citizen
by birth. Due to irreconcilable differences, the
husband was constrained to initiate proceedings in
the USA Court for dissolution of marriage. During the
pendency of the proceedings in the USA Court, the
wife had shown a consistent propensity to disobey
the orders of the Court. At the same time, she filed a
number of motions in the pending proceedings with
regard to domestic violence; independent occupation
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of the matrimonial home, at the same time
demanding that the husband bears half of the
mortgage of the family home and other expenses for
her as well as the child. Although both the parents
were allowed five days residential time with the child
during the two weeks summer vacation, the effort of
the wife was always to remove him from the country
of his birth. Her motion for permanent location to
India was ultimately denied on 16th July 2008. In
defiance of the said order, she travelled to India with
Anand on 17th July, 2008. The learned senior counsel
submits that the facts which have been narrated
above would clearly indicate that the petitioner has
little or no regard for the orders of the Court.
12. Mr. Patwalia further submitted that the conduct of the
petitioner in the courts in this country follows the
same pattern. In fact, the counsel for the petitioner
has admitted before the High Court the fact of US
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Court passing order for the custody of the child and
that it has not permitted the petitioner to remove the
child out of Washington. It was further admitted that
in spite of the aforesaid direction, the child was
removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts in which
he was born. The fact of issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus by the United States Superior Court
for production of the child was also admitted. Before
the High Court, a submission was made on behalf of
the petitioner-wife for grant of some time to submit
to the jurisdiction of the US Court and to enable her
to obtain necessary orders from the aforesaid court.
Relying on the aforesaid submissions of the
petitioner, the High Court had issued the directions
reproduced earlier in this judgment. After obtaining
such orders, the wife disappeared again from the
scene. Consequently, the respondent-husband had to
file a miscellaneous application seeking directions to
the petitioner to handover the custody of the child
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for producing before the US Consulate in Hyderabad.
On 3rd December, 2010, the High Court directed the
petitioner to be present before the Court on 10th
December, 2010 along with the child, so that the
husband could comply with the directions issued by
the Court on 24th September, 2010. On 14th
December, 2010, the wife appeared in Court but did
not produce the child, as directed. It was submitted
before the Court that she had filed a review petition
which ought to be taken up for hearing and sought
one week’s time for production of the child. Upon this
assurance, the Court again directed that the child be
produced on 22nd December, 2010. According to Mr.
Patwalia, she was all along misleading the Andhra
Pradesh High Court, whilst preparing to file the SLP
against the impugned judgment. The SLP was
actually filed on 18th December, 2010, challenging
three orders viz. orders dated 24th September, 2010
passed in W.P.No.25479 of 2009 and subsequent
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orders dated 3rd December, 2010 and 14 th
December, 2010 passed in W.P.M.P. No.31378 of
2010 in the aforesaid writ petition.
13. Mr. Patwalia points out that, in fact, the conduct of the
petitioner is noticed in the order dated 28th
December, 2010. The High Court noticed that in spite
of the directions having been given, the petitioner
has not produced the child in the Court. She had also
not produced necessary papers relating to the child.
On 14th December, 2010, she had undertaken to
produce the child on 22nd December, 2010. On 22nd
December, 2010, the counsel for the petitioner had
submitted that her maternal uncle had died and,
therefore, she had left for Vijayawada. But on 28th
December, 2010, it was brought to the notice of the
court that her maternal uncle had already died on
16th December, 2010. It was then represented before
the High Court that the petitioner was staying at
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Vijayawada because the child was unwell and
admitted in hospital. The High Court noticed that the
petitioner appears to have made a false statement
on the last date of hearing. Therefore, the directions
were issued to the Commissioner of Police,
Hyderabad to produce the child before the Court on
17th January, 2011 at 4.00 p.m. On 18th January,
2011, the Court was informed by the Assistant
Government Pleader that in spite of best efforts by
the police, the child could not be traced and she
sought further time to locate and produce the child in
Court. Since the petitioner was failing to assist the
authorities in locating the child, non-bailable
warrants were issued for her. The matter was posted
for further proceedings on 8th February, 2011. In the
meantime, this Court on 31st January, 2011 issued
notice in the SLP and stayed the
operation of the impugned orders.
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14. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the
petitioner is able to defy the orders issued by the
Court of Competent Jurisdiction in USA as India is not
a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1980 on
“Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction”. The
aforesaid Convention fully recognizes the concept of
doctrine of Comity of Courts in private international
law. He submits that taking note of the undesirable
effect of not being the signatory to the aforesaid
convention, the then Chairman of the Law
Commission of India recommended that India should
keep pace and change according to the changing
needs of the society. The Commission recommended
that the Government may consider that India should
become a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1980
which will, in turn, bring the prospect of achieving
the return to India of children who have their homes
in India. [See Law Commission of India Report
No.218 entitled “Need to accede to the Hague
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Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (1980)”]. Mr. Patwalia also submits that
the impugned order/judgment of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court is in consonance with the law as declared
by this Court in numerous judgments. In support of
his submission, the learned senior counsel relies on
the same judgments which were cited by Mr.
Shishodia.
15. Mr. Patwalia also pointed out that not only the
petitioner had made false statements before the
Court but she had denied the husband any contact
with the child. From 6th April, 2010, the husband was
entitled to see the child for 2½ hours. From 3rd
October, 2010, the period was increased to 4 hours.
Mr. Patwalia further submitted that the petitioner has
also filed a complaint in the Court of XIII Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad against
her husband, both his parents and his brother,
alleging commission of offences under Sections 498-
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A, 506 of IPC; and Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. The respondent and his
parents had filed Criminal Petition no. 6711 of 2009
under section 482 of Cr.P.C., before the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh seeking quashing of the criminal
complaint. In the said proceedings, the High Court,
vide order dated 23rd December 2011,
partly allowed the said criminal petition and directed
that the respondent husband and other co-accused
should not be prosecuted for offences said to have
taken place in USA without necessary permission
from the Central Government. However, the
proceedings emanating from the said complaint were
not quashed because the High Court was of the
opinion that there is sufficient prima facie material in
the complaint in the context of offences alleged to
have been committed in India. The said order is
under challenge before us, in Criminal Appeal arising
from S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3385 of 2012.
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16. In this context, Mr. Patwalia submits that the aforesaid
complaint is merely a counter blast to the divorce
and child custody proceedings initiated by the
husband against the wife.
17. We have anxiously considered the submissions made
by the learned senior counsel for the parties and
minutely perused the material on record.
18. From the facts narrated above, it becomes evident
that the wife has reached India in defiance of the
orders passed by the Courts of competent jurisdiction
in U.S. It is apparent that the appellant has scant
regard for the orders passed by the Andhra Pradesh
High Court also. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts
and circumstances, the Andhra Pradesh High Court
issued the directions which have been reproduced in
the earlier part of the judgment. Although the
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learned counsel for the parties have relied on a
number of judgments of this Court in support of their
respective submissions, in our opinion, the matter is
squarely covered by the ratio of law in the case of V.
Ravichandran (supra).
19. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court considered a
similar factual situation. The petitioner, who was of
Indian origin, was a citizen of the United States of
America. He married respondent No. 6 on 14th
December, 2000 at Tirupathi in India. On 1st July,
2002, child Aditya was born while they were in USA.
Subsequently, a dispute arose between the parties
regarding custody of Aditya, and the parties had
obtained consent order dated 18th June, 2007 from
the court of competent jurisdiction in USA under
which both the parents were to have alternate
custody of the child on weekly basis. However,
respondent No. 6, in violation of the said court's
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orders, removed the child to India on 28th June, 2007
for staying with her parents in Chennai. The
petitioner in turn moved the USA Court on 8th August,
2007 for modification of custody order and for taking
action against respondent No. 6 for violation of court
order. On that very day, the petitioner was granted
temporary sole legal and physical custody of the
minor child and respondent No. 6 was directed to
immediately turn over the minor child and his
passport to the petitioner. The order could not
however be implemented in USA because of illegal
removal of child by respondent No. 6 to India. The
petitioner thereafter filed habeas corpus petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme
Court for production of the minor child and for
handing over his custody to the petitioner along with
the child's passport. Despite orders of the Supreme
Court, the State Police could not produce the child for
two years, but CBI, on the directions of the Supreme
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Court, was able to trace and produce the child within
two months. The Court considered what would be an
appropriate order in the facts and circumstances,
keeping in mind the interests of the child and the
orders of the courts of the United States of America.
The Supreme Court while passing orders in this case
also took into consideration several concessions
which the petitioner husband made so that the wife
could return to USA and present her claim, if any,
over the child in the Courts in USA.
20. This Court partly allowed the writ petition with certain
observations which are very relevant in the decision
in the present case. We may notice the observations
made in different paragraphs of the judgment. In
Paragraph 25, the Court noticed the observation
made by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in the
case of Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu (supra),
particular notice was taken of the observations made
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in Paragraph 10 of the judgment, which are as
under:-
“10. In B's Settlement, In re, B. v. B. the Chancery Division was concerned with an application for custody by the father of an infant who had been made a ward of court. The father was a Belgian national and the mother a British national who took Belgian nationality on marriage to him. The infant was born in Belgium. The mother was granted a divorce by a judgment of the court in Belgium, but the judgment was reversed and the father became entitled to custody by the common law of Belgium. The mother, who had gone to live in England, visited Belgium and was by arrangement given the custody of the infant for some days. She took him to England and did not return him. The infant had been living with the mother in England for nearly two years. The father began divorce proceedings in Belgium, and the court appointed him guardian. Pending the proceedings, the court gave him the custody and ordered the mother to return the infant within twenty-four hours of service of the order on her. She did not return the infant. The correctional court in Brussels fined her for disobedience and sentenced her to imprisonment should the fine be not paid. The correctional court also confirmed the custody order.”
21. In our opinion, these observations leave no manner of
doubt that no relief could be granted to the appellant
in the present proceedings given her conduct in
removing Anand from U.S.A. in defiance of the orders
of the Court of competent jurisdiction. The Court has
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specifically approved the modern theory of Conflict
of Laws, which prefers the jurisdiction of the State
which has the most intimate contact with the issues
arising in the case. The Court also holds that
Jurisdiction is not attracted “by the operation or
creation of fortuitous circumstances”. The Court adds
a caution that to allow the assumption of jurisdiction
by another State in such circumstances will only
result in encouraging forum-shopping. The aforesaid
observations are fully applicable in the facts and
circumstances of this case.
22. Again in Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs. Arvand M.
Dinshaw & Anr. 7 , this Court reiterated the principle
that it was the duty of Courts in all countries to see
that a parent doing wrong by removing children out
of the country does not gain any advantage by his or
her wrongdoing. In Re
7 (1987) 1 SCC 42
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H. (Infants)8, the Court of Appeal in England had
also observed that the sudden and unauthorized
removal of children from one country to another is
far too frequent nowadays. Therefore, it is the duty
of all courts in all countries to do all they can to
ensure that the wrongdoer does not gain an
advantage by his wrongdoing. These observations
were also approved specifically by the Court in the
case of Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw (supra). In the
case of V. Ravichandran (supra), in Paragraph 29
and 30, this Court has concluded as follows:-
“29. While dealing with a case of custody of a child removed by a parent from one country to another in contravention of the orders of the court where the parties had set up their matrimonial home, the court in the country to which the child has been removed must first consider the question whether the court could conduct an elaborate enquiry on the question of custody or by dealing with the matter summarily order a parent to return custody of the child to the country from which the child was removed and all aspects relating to the child's welfare be investigated in a court in his own country. Should the court take a view that an elaborate enquiry is necessary, obviously the court is bound to consider the welfare and happiness of the child as the paramount consideration and go
8 (1966) 1 W.L.R. 381 (Ch & CA) ; (1966) 1 All ER 886
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into all relevant aspects of welfare of the child including stability and security, loving and understanding care and guidance and full development of the child's character, personality and talents. While doing so, the order of a foreign court as to his custody may be given due weight; the weight and persuasive effect of a foreign judgment must depend on the circumstances of each case.
30. However, in a case where the court decides to exercise its jurisdiction summarily to return the child to his own country, keeping in view the jurisdiction of the court in the native country which has the closest concern and the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case, the court may leave the aspects relating to the welfare of the child to be investigated by the court in his own native country as that could be in the best interests of the child. The indication given in McKee v. McKee that there may be cases in which it is proper for a court in one jurisdiction to make an order directing that a child be returned to a foreign jurisdiction without investigating the merits of the dispute relating to the care of the child on the ground that such an order is in the best interests of the child has been explained in L (Minors), In re and the said view has been approved by this Court in Dhanwanti Joshi. Similar view taken by the Court of Appeal in H. (Infants), In re has been approved by this Court in Elizabeth Dinshaw.”
23. In our opinion, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has
decided to exercise jurisdiction summarily and
directed the appellant to return the child to the
U.S.A. This course is absolutely permissible as is
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apparent from the observations made by this Court
in Paragraph 30 of the aforesaid judgment. This
Court also rejected the objection raised by
respondent No. 6 in the Counter Affidavit that the
American court, which passed the order/decree has
no jurisdiction and being inconsistent in Indian Laws
can not be executed in India. It was observed that
despite the fact that the respondent had been
staying in India for more than 2 years, she has not
pursued any legal proceeding for the sole custody of
the minor child or for the declaration that the orders
passed by the American courts concerning the
custody of minor child are null and void and without
jurisdiction. Similar are the facts in the present
case. The wife has not pursued any legal proceeding
for seeking custody of Anand. She has also not
sought a declaration that the orders passed by the
American Courts are null and void and are without
jurisdiction. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court
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of Andhra Pradesh can not be said to have acted
erroneously. In V.
Ravichandran’s case (supra), this court again
observed in Paragraph 35 as follows:-
“35. The facts and circumstances noticed above leave no manner of doubt that merely because the child has been brought to India by Respondent 6, the custody issue concerning minor child Adithya does not deserve to be gone into by the courts in India and it would be in accord with principles of comity as well as on facts to return the child back to the United States of America from where he has been removed and enable the parties to establish the case before the courts in the native State of the child i.e. the United States of America for modification of the existing custody orders. There is nothing on record which may even remotely suggest that it would be harmful for the child to be returned to his native country.”
24. These observations are squarely applicable in the
facts and circumstances of the present case. Mr.
Shishodia has, however, placed strong reliance on
the judgment of this Court in Ruchi Majoo (supra).
The aforesaid judgment would not be of any
assistance to the appellant in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. In that case, the
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respondent and wife had been living in America, the
child was born in America and was, therefore, an
American Citizen. The wife on account of husband’s
addiction to pornographic films, internet sex and
adulterous behavior during the couple's stay in
America took a decision to take the child to Delhi and
the husband consented to it. The parties had agreed
that the wife will stay with the minor child in India
and make the best arrangements for his schooling.
Subsequently, however, the husband objected to the
wife staying in India. On the other hand, the wife
had no intentions of returning to the country in the
foreseeable future especially after she has had a
very traumatic period on account of matrimonial
discord with the respondent husband. The wife had
taken out proceedings under Section 9 of the
Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 seeking custody of
the minor child. Shortly after the presentation of the
main petition, an application under Section 12 of the
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Guardian and Wards Act read with Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed by the
wife/mother of the child praying for an ex-parte
interim order restraining the respondent from
removing the minor from her custody and for an
order granting interim custody of the minor to the
Appellant. On the other hand, the husband had filed
a case against the appellant alleging that she had
abducted the minor child. On his application, a Red
Corner Notice was issued against the wife. In the
meantime, the Additional District Court at Delhi had
granted interim custody to the appellant by order
dated 4th April, 2009. This order was challenged by
the husband under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India before the High Court of Delhi. The Delhi High
Court accepted the petition, set aside the order of
the District Court and dismissed the custody case
filed by the mother primarily on the ground that the
Court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain the
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claim as the minor was not ordinarily residing at
Delhi. The High Court also held that all issues
relating to the custody of child ought to be
adjudicated by the Courts in America not only
because that Court had already passed an order to
that effect in favour of the father, but also because
all the three parties namely, the parents of the minor
and the minor himself were American citizens. The
High Court then buttressed its decision on the
principle of comity of courts and certain observations
made by this Court in the earlier decisions relied
upon by the husband. It was in these circumstances
that the appeal filed by the wife/mother against the
order of the High Court was allowed. This Court
specifically took note of the following circumstances:-
“34. The appellant’s case is that although the couple and their son had initially planned to return to USA, that decision taken with the mutual consent of the parties was changed to allow the appellant to stay back in India and to explore career options here. Master Kush was also according to that decision of his parents, to stay back and be admitted to a school in
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Delhi. The decision on both counts, was free from any duress whatsoever, and had the effect of shifting the “ordinary residence” of the appellant and her son Kush from the place they were living in America to Delhi. Not only this the respondent father of the minor, had upon his return to America sent e-mails, reiterating the decision and offering his full support to the appellant. This is, according to the appellant, clear from the text of the e-mails exchanged between the parties and which are self-explanatory as to the context in which they are sent.”
25. This Court accepted the submission of the appellant
that on the consent of the parties, the ordinary
residence of the minor had shifted to India. In
coming to the aforesaid conclusions, the Court
examined the e-mails exchanged between the
parties, which totally demolished the respondent’s
defence that his consent for shifting the residence of
the minor was obtained by coercion. In Paragraph 45
of the judgment, it is observed as follows:-
“45. It is difficult to appreciate how the respondent could in the light of the above communications still argue that the decision to allow the appellant and Master Kush to stay back in India was taken under any coercion or duress. It is also difficult to appreciate how the respondent could change his mind so soon after the above e-mails and rush to a court in US for
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custody of the minor accusing the appellant of illegal abduction, a charge which is belied by his letter dated 19-7-2008 and the e-mails extracted above. The fact remains that Kush was ordinarily residing with the appellant, his mother and has been admitted to a school, where he has been studying for the past nearly three years. The unilateral reversal of a decision by one of the two parents could not change the fact situation as to the minor being an ordinary resident of Delhi, when the decision was taken jointly by both the parents.”
26. The Court on facts rejected the contention of the
husband in that case that the minor child has been
removed from the jurisdiction of the American Courts
in contravention of the orders passed by them. In
Paragraph 64, the Court observed as follows:-
“64. Secondly, the respondent’s case that the minor was removed from the jurisdiction of the American courts in contravention of the orders passed by them, is not factually correct. Unlike V. Ravi Chandran case, where the minor was removed in violation of an order passed by the American court there were no proceedings between the parties in any court in America before they came to India with the minor. Such proceedings were instituted by the respondent only after he had agreed to leave the appellant and the minor behind in India, for the former to explore career options and the latter to get admitted to a school. The charge of abduction contrary to a valid order granting custody is, therefore, untenable.”
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27. These observations clearly are of no assistance to the
appellant herein. She had participated in the
proceedings in America for two years prior to fleeing
to India in the defiance of the orders passed by the
Court of competent jurisdiction restraining her from
taking the child to India for a period of more than 5
days. The appellant, therefore, can not be allowed to
take advantage of her own wrong. Therefore, the
present case would be squarely covered by the ratio
of law in the case of V. Ravichandran (supra).
28. The Courts have taken cognizance of growing practice
of children being removed from one country to
another just to put pressure/influence the legal
proceedings that are usually pending in these cases
in relation to irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In
the case of Re H. (Infants) (supra), Willmer, L.J., as
long as 1961, observed as follows :
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“…….The sudden and unauthorized removal of children from one country to another is far too frequent nowadays, and, as it seems to me, it is the duty of all courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that the wrongdoer does not gain an advantage by his wrongdoing.”
29. Further, in V. Ravichandran’s case (supra), even
though the Court had directed that the child will be
taken back to America, this Court took assurances
from the husband that he would bear all the
travelling expenses and make suitable arrangements
for respondent No.6 in the U.S.A. He had also given
an undertaking that he would take out necessary
application for the removal of the Red Corner Notice
so that the wife was not arrested on arrival in
America.
30. After the arguments in this matter had been
concluded, we interviewed at length the husband
and wife. The wife was prepared to go back to the
USA and live with her husband. However, the
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husband was not prepared to cohabit with the wife.
Sadly, therefore, there was no chance of
reconciliation between the parties. We are conscious
of the fact that the child has now been residing in
India since 17th July, 2008. He is now 8 years of age.
In spite of the manner in which the child has been
brought to India, it is quite evident that he has been
studying at one of the best English medium schools.
When we interviewed the child, it appeared that he
had been thoroughly brain washed against the
father. We, therefore, permitted the father to be
alone with the child for about three hours in the
chamber of Nijjar, J. and after the meeting the child
seemed to be not wholly averse to meeting the
father again. All said and done, in such
circumstances, the Court is left with making a very
unpleasant decision. Either way, certain collateral
damage being caused to the child can not be
avoided. The facts narrated above would clearly
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indicate that the mother is singularly responsible for
removal of the child from the jurisdiction of U.S.
Courts. In view of the above, we are constrained to
pass the following order:-
31. The directions issued by the High Court in the
impugned order are upheld with the following
additions and modifications:-
Direction No.(iv) of the High Court shall be substituted by the following :
“(iv) The petitioner shall make necessary arrangements for the stay of the respondent No.7 and the child in suitable accommodation in a locality according to her status prior to the dissolution of marriage for a period of three months on their landing in USA.”
Direction No.(vi) – Prior to making any travel arrangements for the 7th respondent and Anand, the petitioner shall move the Court of Competent Jurisdiction in USA for withdrawal of the bailable
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warrants issued against the respondent No.7 to enable her to attend the custody proceedings in the US Courts.
Direction No.(viii) – Upon the bailable warrants having been withdrawn, the petitioner shall personally escort respondent No.7 and Anand from India to the USA.
32. With these observations, the judgment of the High
Court is upheld and the Criminal Appeals No.934-936
of 2013 @ SLP(Crl.) Nos. 10606-10608 of 2010 are
hereby dismissed.
33. Before parting with this order, we may also notice
here that the respondent (husband) filed a Criminal
Appeal No. 937 of 2013 @ SLP(Crl.)No.3335 of 2012,
challenging the order dated 23rd December, 2011 of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. As noticed earlier,
the aforesaid order was passed in the criminal
petition filed by the respondent husband, seeking
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quashing of the criminal complaint filed by the
appellant/wife against the respondent himself and his
parents under Sections 498-A, 506 of IPC and
Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Since no arguments were advanced in the aforesaid
matter, let this appeal be listed for arguments
separately.
……………………………..J. [Surinder Singh Nijjar]
New Delhi ………………………………J. July 16, 2013 [Pinaki Chandra Ghose]
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