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REPORTABLE

          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1171 OF 2016 (  ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO.3338 OF 2015  )

AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL     .…APPELLANT

VERSUS

SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS.         ....RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.

The assail is of the verdict dated 10.04.2015 rendered by the

High Court, setting at naught the order dated 27.5.2014 passed by

the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Gandhinagar,  whereby  the  Trial

Court had allowed the application filed by the appellant, the original

informant, under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (for short, hereinafter referred to as “the Code/1973 Code”) for

further investigation by the police.

2. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel for

the appellant and M/s.  Zakir Hussain, Nitya Ramakrishan,  and

Shamik Sanjanwala, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1,2

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and 3 respectively.

3. The facts indispensable for the present adjudication, portray

that the appellant had lodged a First Information Report (for short

hereafter  referred  to  as  “FIR”)  against  the  respondents  under

Sections  406,  420,  426,  467,  468,  471,  477B and  120B of  the

Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short  also  referred  to  as  “IPC”).   The

materials offered in the FIR and the investigation by the police that

followed,  divulged  that  there  was  a  dispute  between  the  parties

relating to agricultural land and that the appellant/informant had

alleged forgery of the signatures and thumb impression of his as

well  as of  his  family  members in the register  maintained by the

Notary (Public).  After the charge-sheet was submitted, charge was

framed  against  the  respondents  and  they  stood  the  trial

accordingly, as they denied the imputations.  As would be gleanable

from the records, the oral evidence of the appellant/first informant

was concluded on 03.07.2012 followed  by that of the investigating

officer  of  the  case  on  10.09.2013.   Subsequent  thereto,  the

statements  of  the  respondents  were  recorded under  Section 313

Cr.PC on 03.12.2013,  whereafter  an application was filed at  the

culminating stages of the trial by the appellant/informant seeking a

direction  under  Section  173(8)  from  the  Trial  Court  for  further

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investigation by the police and in particular to call for a report from

the Forensic Science Laboratory as regards one particular page of

the  register  of  the  Notary  (Public),  which  according  to  the

appellant/informant was of debatable authenticity, as it appeared

to  have  been  affixed/pasted  with  another  page  thereof.   To  be

precise,  this application was filed at  a stage when the case was

fixed for final arguments.  

4. The Trial Court, however, by the order impeached before the

High Court granted the prayer made and issued a direction to the

police for further investigation. Significantly, prior thereto in Special

Leave Petition being SLP (Crl.)  No.9106 of  2010,  this  Court  had

directed expeditious disposal of  the trial.  It is also worthwhile to

record that the application filed by the appellant/informant under

Section  173(8)  of  Cr.PC  had  been  opposed  by  the  respondents

herein, who being dissatisfied with the order of the Trial Court, thus

impugned the same before the High Court.

5. The  High  Court,  as  the  impugned  decision  would  disclose

exhaustively  examined  the  purport  of  Section  173(8)  in  the

particular context of the scope of further investigation by the police

after it had submitted a charge sheet and the Trial Court had taken

cognizance on the basis thereof and had proceeded with the trial,

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following the appearance of the accused persons. It, amongst others

took note of the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India which

after reflecting on the oftly adopted view of the Courts that once a

final report under Section 173 had been submitted by the police,

the  latter  could  not  touch  the  case  again  and  reopen  the

investigation,  recommended that  it  ought  to  be  made  clear  that

under the said provision of the Code, it was still permissible for the

police to examine any evidence even after  the submission of  the

charge-sheet and to submit a report to the Magistrate.  Thus, the

Law Commission's emphasis was to obviate any hindrance in the

way of  the  investigating  agency,  which in certain  fact  situations

could be unfair to the prosecution as well as to the accused.  

6. The High Court having regard to this recommendation and the

incorporation of Section 173(8) as a sequitur thereof held that it

was permissible for the investigating officer or the officer-in-charge

of the police station to undertake a further investigation even after

the filing of  the charge sheet,  but neither the informant nor the

accused could claim as a matter of right, any direction from the

Court directing such further investigation under the said provision

after a charge-sheet was filed.  The High Court traced the law as

expounded by this Court from its renderings in Ram Lal Narang v.

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State  (Delhi  Administration), (1979)  2  SCC  322 vis-à-vis  the

scope  and purport  of  Section 173 of   Cr.P.C.  in  particular,  qua

further  investigation  by  the  police  after  it  had  submitted

charge-sheet in a case. The exposition by this Court in  Ram Lal

Narang  (supra) that neither Sections 173 nor 190 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 did suggest exhaustion of the power of

the police to further investigate even after the Magistrate had taken

cognizance  of  the  offence  already  on  record  and  that  the  police

could  exercise  such  right  as  often  as  necessary  when  fresh

information  would  come to  light  and  it  desired  to  make  further

investigation was noted. However, while doing so, it was observed

that in deference to the Court, the police ought to ordinarily seek its

formal permission to make further investigation. The High Court in

this perspective,  observed that a further investigation could in a

given factual setting, sub-serve the interest of the prosecution and

even of the defence.  

7. The High Court in its verdict also adverted to the decision of

the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR

1945  PC18  which  stressed  upon  the  restraint  of  the  judiciary

against interference with the police in matters which were within its

province,  holding  that  the  roles  of  these  two  institutions  were

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complementary and not overlapping, subject however to the right of

the Courts to intervene in an appropriate case for directions in the

nature of habeas corpus.  

8. The  decision of  this  Court  in  Abhinandan Jha & Ors.  v.

Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 to the effect that the Magistrate

could not direct the police  the course of investigation or to submit

a charge-sheet when it had already submitted a final report, was

referred to as well.  Reference to the explication of law laid down by

this  Court  in  Randhir  Singh  Rana  v.  State  (Delhi

Administration), (1997)1 SCC 361 on the powers available  to a

Magistrate at different stages of a case before him in the singular

context  of  its  competence  to  direct  further  investigation  with

reference  thereto,  was  relied  upon.  It  was  noted  as  well  that  a

Magistrate, of his own, could not order further investigation after an

accused, pursuant to the process issued against him on the basis of

the charge-sheet already submitted, had appeared in the case.  

9. The  pronouncement  of  this  Court  in  Hasanbhai  Valibhai

Qureshi  v. State of Gujarat and others, (2004) 5 SCC 347 ruling

that the police had the power to conduct further investigation de

hors  any  direction  from  the  Court  even  after  it  had  taken

cognizance was relied upon to reinforce its conclusion.

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10. The enumeration of this Court in Reeta Nag v. State of West

Bengal  & Ors., (2009)  9  SCC 129 also  to  the  same effect  was

adverted  to.  The  High  Court  thus  deduced  on  the  basis  of  an

in-depth survey of the state of law, as above, on the import and

ambit of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. that in absence of any application or

prayer made by the investigating authority for further investigation

in the case, the Trial Court had erred in allowing the application

filed by the appellant/informant for the same.  

11. Without prejudice to this finding, the High Court was further

of the view that having regard to the sequence of events and the

delay on the part of the informant to make such a prayer at the

closing stages of the trial, it was not entertainable.  In arriving at

this determination,  the High Court,  amongst  others marked that

the evidence of the appellant/informant had been recorded in the

year 2012 when he did have sufficient opportunity to scrutinise the

document in question but for inexplicable reasons did wait for more

than two years to register the prayer for further investigation. It was

of the view that the attendant factual setting did not demonstrate

any  defective  investigation  which  demanded  curation  through  a

further drill and that in any view of the matter, additional report

from the Forensic Science Laboratory had not been called for. This

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is more so, as in the view of the High Court, the entire register of

the Notary (Public) had been seized by the investigating officer and

that any unusual or suspicious feature therein would have been

certainly examined by the FSL and findings in connection therewith

recorded.  The  High  Court  thus  interfered  with  the  order  of  the

Magistrate permitting further investigation by the police in the case

and ordered for expeditious disposal of the trial.

12. Whereas  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  has

strenuously urged that the impugned order is patently indefensible,

inasmuch as, if  maintained, it  would result in travesty of justice

and that not only the Trial Court was within its competence to order

further investigation in the attendant facts and circumstances but

also the same was essential  to unravel the truth bearing on the

charge  levelled  against  the  respondents-accused,  the  impugned

order has been endorsed on behalf of the respondents pleading that

the  same  has  been  in  abidance  of  the  consistent  judicially

pronounced  postulations  qua  the  scope  and  purport  of  Section

173(8) Cr.P.C. and that no interference therewith is warranted.

13. Having  regard  to  the  contentious  assertions,  expedient  it

would be to retrace the law propounded by this Court on the import

and  impact  of  Section  173   Cr.PC,  with  particular  reference  to

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sub-Section (8) thereof.  For immediate reference, the afore-stated

provision is extracted in full as hereunder:

“173. Report of police officer on completion of investigation.- (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.

(1A) The  investigation  in  relation  to  rape  of  a child may be completed within three months from the date on which the information was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station.

(2) (i)  As soon as it  is  completed,  the  officer  in charge  of  the  police  station  shall  forward  to  a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating-

(a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be  acquainted  with  the  circumstances  of the case; (d) whether  any  offence  appears  to  have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether  he  has  been  released  on  his bond and,  if  so,  weather  with or  without sureties; (g) whether  he  has  been  forwarded  in custody under section 170; (h)  whether  the  report  of  medical examination  of  the  woman  has  been attached where investigation relates to an offence  under  section  376,  376A,  376B, 376C or 376D of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

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Government,  setting  forth  the  names  of  the parties, the nature of the information and the names  of  the  persons  who  appear  to  be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, and stating whether the accused  (if arrested) has been forwarded in custody,  or  has  been released on his bond, and, if so, whether with or without  sureties, and  

(b) communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed  by  the  State  Government,  the action taken by him to the person, if any,  by whom  the  information  relating  to  the commission of the  offence was first given.  

(2) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section  158, the report shall, in any cases in which the State Government by general  or  special   order  so  directs,  be submitted through that  officer,  and he  may, pending the orders  of  the Magistrate,  direct the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police-station  to make further  investigation.  

(3)  Whenever  it  appears  from  a  report forwarded under this section that  the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall  make such order  for   the  discharge  of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.  

(4)   After  forwarding   a  report  under  this section,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the police-station shall, before the commencement of the inquiry or trial, furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused, free of cost, a copy of the report forwarded under sub-section (1) and of the first information report recorded under section  154  and  of  all  other  documents  or relevant  extracts  thereof,  on  which  the prosecution  proposes  to  rely,  including  the statements  and confessions, if  any recorded under  section  164  and  the  statements

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recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of  all  the  persons   whom  the  prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.

(5)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in sub-section  (4),  if  the  police-officer  is  of opinion  that  any  part  of  any  statement recorded under sub-section (3)  of section 161 is  not  relevant  to  the  subject-matter  of  the inquiry  or  trial  of  that  its  disclosure  to  the accused  is  not  essential  in  the  interests  of justice  and  is  inexpedient  in  the  public interests, he shall  exclude such part from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused and in such a cause, he shall make a report to the  Magistrate  stating  his  reasons   for excluding such part.

Provided  that  at  the  commencement  of  the inquiry  or  trial,  the  Magistrate,  shall  after perusing the part so excluded and considering the  report  of  the  police-officer,  pass  such orders as he thinks fit and if he so directs, a copy of the part so excluded or such portion thereof,  as  he  thinks  proper,  shall  be furnished to the accused.    

15. A  plain  comparison  of  these  two  provisions  would  amply

demonstrate that though these relate to the report of a police officer

on  completion  of  investigation and  the  steps  to  ensue  pursuant

thereto, outlining as well the duties of the officer in-charge of the

concerned  police  station,  amongst  others  to  communicate,  the

action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom the information

relating to the commission of offence was first given, it is explicit

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that  the  recast  provision  of  the  1973  Code  did  incorporate

sub-clause 8 as a significant addition to the earlier provision.   

16. The  Forty-first  Report  of  the  Law Commission  of  India  (for

short,  hereinafter  to  be  referred to  as  “the  Commission”)  on the

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1898  dealt  with  the  aspect  of

reopening of investigation in the context of the existing Section 173

of the Code 1898 and recommended in the following terms:

“14.23: A report under section 173 is normally the  end  of  the  investigation.  Sometimes, however, the police officer after submitting the report under section 173 comes upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. We should have thought that the police officer can  collect  that  evidence  and  send  it  to  the magistrate concerned. It appears, however, that courts  have  sometimes taken the  narrow view that once a final report under section 173 has been  sent,  the  police  cannot  touch  the  case again  and  cannot  re-open  the  investigation. This view places a hindrance in the way of the investigating agency, which can be very unfair to the prosecution and, for that matter, even to the accused.  It should be made clear in section 173 that  the  competent  police  officer  can  examine such  evidence  and  send  a  report  to  the magistrate.   Copies  concerning  the  fresh material  must  of  course  be  furnished  to  the accused.”       

17. The Commission in the above perspective proposed a revision

of Section 173 of Code 1898 in the following terms:

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“14.24: We propose that section 173 should be revised as follows:-  I73. (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.

(2)  As  soon  as  it  is  completed,  the  officer  in charge of  the police station shall  forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a po1ice-report a report, in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating-

(a) the names of the parties;

(b) the nature of the information;

(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;

(d)  whether  any  offence  appears  to  have  been committed, and if so, by whom;

(e) whether the accused has been arrested;

(f)  whether  he  has  been  released  on  his  bond under  section 169,  and,  if  so,  whether  with  or without sureties,-

(g)  whether  he has been forwarded in custody under section 170.

The officer shall also communicate, in such manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  State Government,  the  action  taken  by  him  to  the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.

(3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under section 158, the report shall, in any  cases  in  which  the  State  Government  by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that  officer,  and he may,  pending the orders  of  the  Magistrate,  direct  that  officer  in

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charge  of  the  police-station  to  make  further investigation.

(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under  this  section that  the  accused  has  been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order  for  the  discharge  of  such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.

(5)  When such report is  in respect of  a case to which section 170 applies, the police-officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report-

(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which  the  prosecution  proposes  to  rely  other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and

(b) the statements recorded under.....section 161 of all persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.

(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of  any  such  statement is  not  relevant  to  the subject-matter  of  the  proceedings  or  that  its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests  of  justice  and  is  inexpedient  in  the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement  and  append  a  note  requesting  the Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be  granted  to  the  accused  and  stating  his reasons for making such request.

(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude  further  investigation in  respect  of an offence  after  a  report  under  sub-section (2)  has  been  forwarded  to  the  Magistrate. Where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of  the police station obtains further evidence,  oral  or  documentary  he  shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form

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prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2)  to  (5)  shall,  as  far  as  may be,  apply  in relation  to  such  report  or  reports  as  they apply  in  relation  to  a  report  under sub-section (2).”

18. The  Bill  to  consolidate  and  amend  the  law relating  to

criminal procedure followed and was circulated in the Gazette of

India, Extraordinary, Part II, published on December 10, 1970

proposing,  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1970.  The

Statement  of  Objects  and Reasons  clearly  disclosed that  the

recommendations of the Commission to overhaul the Code 1898

as  made  were  accepted  and  vis-a-vis  Section  173,  which

corresponded to Section 176 in the aforementioned report, the

amendment proposed was to facilitate collection of evidence by

the police after filing the charge-sheet and production thereof

before  the  Court,  subject  to  the  accused  being  given  usual

facilities for copies. The remodelled Section 173 was identical in

form and substance to the one, as proposed by the Commission

in chime with its recommendation as contained in the Report.

Sub-clause  (7)  of  the  new  Section  173,  as  proposed  by  the

Commission  and  integrated  in  the  Bill,  however  eventually

appeared as sub-clause (8) to the Section under Code 1973.  

19. The  newly  added  sub-section  (8),  as  its  text  evinces,

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permits further investigation by the concerned officer in-charge

of the police station in respect of an offence after a report under

sub-section 2 had been forwarded to the Magistrate and also to

lay  before  the  Magistrate  a  further  report,  in  the  form

prescribed,  whereafter  such investigation,  he  obtains  further

evidence, oral or documentary. It is further ordained that on

submission of such further report, the essentialities engrafted

in sub-sections 2 to 6 would apply also in relation to all such

report or reports.  

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20. The  integration  of  sub-section  8  is  axiomatically

subsequent to the 41st Report of the Law Commission Report of

India conveying its recommendation that after the submission

of a final report under Section 173, a competent police officer,

in the event of availability of evidence bearing on the guilt or

innocence of the accused ought to be permitted to examine the

same and submit a further report to the Magistrate concerned.

This  assumes  significance,  having  regard  to  the  language

consciously applied to design Section 173(8) in the 1973 Code.

Noticeably, though the officer in-charge of a police station, in

categorical  terms,  has  been  empowered  thereby  to  conduct

further  investigation  and  to  lay  a  supplementary  report

assimilating  the  evidence,  oral  or  documentary,  obtained  in

course  of  the  said  pursuit,  no such authorization has been

extended  to  the  Magistrate  as  the  Court  is  seisin  of  the

proceedings.  It  is,  however  no  longer  res  integra  that  a

Magistrate, if exigent to do so, to espouse the cause of justice,

can  trigger  further  investigation  even  after  a  final  report  is

submitted  under  Section  173(8).  Whether  such  a  power  is

available suo motu or on the prayer made by the informant, in

absence of request by the investigating agency after cognizance

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has been taken and the trial is in progress after the accused

has appeared in response to the process issued is the issue

seeking scrutiny herein.   

21. Though  noticeably  the  High  Court,  in  the  decision

impugned, has aptly referred to and relied upon the relevant

pronouncements  of  this  Court  on  the  issue  involved,  the

authorities cited at the Bar in course of the arguments demand

recapitulation.

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22. In Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr.,

(1985) 2 SCC 537, a three Judge Bench of this Court was seized

with  the  poser  as  to  whether  in  a  case  where  the  First

Information  Report  is  lodged  and  after  completion  of  the

investigation initiated on the basis thereof, the police submits a

report that no offence has been committed, the Magistrate if is

inclined to accept the same, can drop the proceeding  without

issuing notice to the first informant or to the injured or in case

where the incident has resulted in death, to the relatives of the

deceased.   This  Court  in  its  adjudicative  pursuit,  embarked

upon a scrutiny of the provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C.,

dealt  with  Sections  154,  156,  157  thereof  before  eluding  to

Section 173 of the Code. It noticed that under sub-Section (1) of

Section 154, every information relating to the commission of a

cognizable offence,  if  given orally  to an officer in-charge of  a

police station has to be reduced into writing by him or under

his direction and is to be read over to the informant and every

such information whether given in writing or reduced to writing,

shall be signed by the person giving it and that a copy thereof

shall be given forthwith to the informant, free of cost.  It noticed

that  under  Section  156(1),  the  officer  in-charge  of  a  police

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station is vested with the power to investigate any cognizable

case without the order of the Magistrate and that sub-Section

(3)  authorized  the  Magistrate  empowered  under  Section  190

Cr.P.C. to order an investigation, as mentioned in sub-Section

(1).  The prescription under Section 157(1) requiring the officer

in-charge of a police station to forthwith send a report of the

information to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of

such offence upon a police report,  in case he has reason to

suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered

under  Section  156  to  investigate,  was  taken  note  of.   The

mandate  of  Section 157(2)  for  the police  officer  to notify  the

informant, in case he was of the view that no sufficient ground

for entering on an investigation had been made out, was also

referred to.

23. It noted as well that under Section 173(2)(i), the officer

in-charge, as soon as the investigation is completed, is required

to  forward  to  the  Magistrate  empowered,  a  report  in  the

prescribed form so as to enable the Court to take cognizance of

the offence based thereon.  This Court also adverted to Section

190 enumerating the modes of taking cognizance of an offence

by a Magistrate, as specified therein, either upon receiving a

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complaint of  facts which constituted such offence or upon a

police report of such facts or upon information received from

any  person  other  than  a  police  officer  or  upon  his  own

knowledge that such offence had been committed.  

24. In the conspectus of the provisions of Cr.P.C. traversed,

this Court held the view that an informant who lodges the first

information report does not fade away therewith and is very

much  concerned  with  the  action  initiated  by  the  officer

in-charge of the police station pursuant thereto, so much so,

that not only a copy of the said report is to be supplied to him

free of cost and in case, no investigation is intended, he has to

be notified of such decision. The reason, in the contemplation

of  this  Court,  for  the  officer  in-charge of  a  police  station to

communicate the action taken by him to the informant and a

report to the Magistrate under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was that

the  informant,  who  sets  the  machinery  of  investigation  into

motion,  was  required  to  know  what  was  the  result  of  the

exercise initiated on the basis thereof, as he would be vitally

interested therein and hence, the obligations cast by law on the

officer in-charge.  

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25. This Court assayed the courses open to the Magistrate on

receipt  of  a  report  by  the  police  on  the  completion  of  the

investigation.  It was enunciated that  if  the report submitted

by  the  police  divulged  that  no  offence  had  been  committed,

there again, the Magistrate would be left at liberty to adopt one

of the three courses, namely; he could accept the report and

drop the proceeding, or he could disagree with the report and

taking the view that there was sufficient ground for proceeding

further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or he

could  direct  further  investigation  to  be  made  by  the  police

under sub-Section (3) of Section 156.  Noticeably, these three

courses referred to hereinabove are at the pre-cognizance stage

and  can  be  opted  for  by  the  Magistrate  depending  on  his

satisfaction on an assessment of the materials then on record.

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26. Be that as it may, this Court held that whereas neither

the informant nor the injured nor the relative of the deceased in

case  of  death,  would  be  prejudicially  affected  in  case  the

Magistrate  decides  to  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  and  to

issue a process, they would certainly be prejudiced in case, the

Court  holds  the  view  that  there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for

proceeding  further  and  is  inclined  to  drop  the  proceeding.

Having regard to the scheme of Sections 154, 157 and 173 in

particular  of  the  Cr.P.C  and the  pattern  of  consequences  to

follow in the two contingencies referred to herein above, this

Court propounded that in case the Magistrate is not inclined to

take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant

must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can

make  his  submissions  to  persuade  the  Magistrate  to  take

cognizance  of  the  offence  and  issue  process.  Qua  the

requirement of issuance of such notice to the injured person or

to a relative of the deceased, in case of death, who is/are not

the informant(s) who had lodged the first information report, it

was elucidated that it would be open for the Magistrate in the

exercise of his discretion, if he thinks fit, to give such notice.

However, the locus standi of the injured person or any relative

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of the deceased, though not entitled to notice on the Magistrate

to apply for the Court at the time of consideration of the report,

if  he/they  otherwise  come  to  know  of  such  stage  of  the

proceeding, was recognized, so much so that in case he/they

would  want  to  advance  any  submission  with  regard  to  the

report, the Magistrate would be bound to hear him/them as the

case may be.  

27. This  verdict  in  re  the  issue  presently  involved  is

significant, so far as it outlines the different modes of taking

cognizance  of  an  offence  by  a  Magistrate  and  also  the

procedures and powers available to him on the submission of a

police  report  following  the  completion  of  investigation.  This

decision is  pellucid in its  statement that  the Magistrate,  on

receipt of the report, at that stage before taking cognizance of

the  offence  alleged,  may  direct  further  investigation  under

sub-Section (3) of Section 156  Cr.P.C. and require the police

to make further report and that such power can be exercised

suo  motu,  contingent  on  its  satisfaction  of  the  necessity

thereof to espouse the cause of justice.

28. The question that  fell  for  appraisal  in  Randhir Singh

Rana (supra) was as to whether a judicial  Magistrate,  after

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taking cognizance of an offence, on the basis of a police report

and  after  appearance  of  the  accused  in  pursuance  of  the

process issued, can order of its own, further investigation in

the case. The significantly additional feature of this query is

the stage of the proceedings for directing further investigation

in  the  case  i.e.  after  the  appearance  of  the  accused  in

pursuance of the process already issued.  This Court reiterated

that such power was available to the police, after submission

of  the  charge-sheet  as  was  evident  from  Section  173(8)  in

Chapter XII of the Code, 1973. That it was not in dispute as

well that before taking cognizance of the offence under Section

190  of  Chapter  XIV,  the  Magistrate  could  himself  order

investigation as contemplated by Section 156(3)  of  the Code

was noted as well.  This Court also noticed the power under

Section 311 under Chapter XXIV to summon any person as a

witness at any stage of an inquiry/trial or other proceedings, if

the same appeared to be essential to the just decision of the

case.   

29. It recalled its earlier rendering in Tula Ram and others

v.  Kishore Singh, (1977)  4  SCC 459 to  the  effect  that  the

Magistrate could order investigation under Section 156(3) only

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at the pre-cognizance stage under Sections 190, 200 and 204

Cr.P.C and that after he decides to take cognizance under the

provisions of Chapter XIV, he would not be entitled in law to

order  any  investigation  under  Section  156(3),  and  further

though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202,

he  could  order  such  investigation  by  the  police,  the  same

would be in the nature of an inquiry only as contemplated by

Section 202.   

30. This Court also recounted its observations in  Ram Lal

Narang (supra) to  the  effect  that  on  the  Magistrate  taking

cognizance  upon  a  police  report,  the  right  of  the  police  to

further  investigate  even  under  the  1898  Code  was  not

exhausted and it could exercise such right often as necessary,

when  fresh  information  would  come  to  light.  That  this

proposition was integrated in explicit terms in sub-Section (8)

of Section 173 of the new Code, was noticed. The desirability of

the police to ordinarily inform the Court and seek its formal

permission  to  make  further  investigation,  when  fresh  facts

come to light, was stressed upon to maintain the independence

of the judiciary, the interest of the purity of administration of

criminal justice and the interest of the comity of the various

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agencies  and  institutions  entrusted  with  different  stages  of

such dispensation.  

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31. The  pronouncement  of  this  Court  in  Devarapalli

Lakshminarayana Reddy and others v. V. Narayana Reddy

and others, (1976) 3 SCC 252 emphasizing on the distinction

in the power to order police investigation under Section 156(3)

and under Section 202(1) of the Cr.P.C, was referred to. It was

ruled that the two powers operate in separate distinct spheres

at  different  stages,  the  former  being  exercisable  at  the

pre-cognizance stage and the latter at the post-cognizance stage

when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. It was underlined

that in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a

cognizable  offence,  the  power  under  Section 156(3)  could  be

invoked by the  Magistrate  before  he takes cognizance  of  the

offence under Section 190(1)(a),  but once such cognizance is

taken  and  he  embarks  upon  the  procedure  embodied  in

Chapter  XV,  he  would  not  be  competent  to  revert  to  the

pre-cognizance stage and avail Section 156(3).   On the other

hand, it was observed that Section 202 would be invocable at a

stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate

in  the  proceedings  under  Chapter  XV,  but  is  deemed  to  be

insufficient to take a decision as to the next step and in such

an event,  the Magistrate would be empowered under Section

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202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that provision,

an investigation for  the  purpose  of  deciding  whether  or  not,

there is sufficient ground for proceeding.  It was thus exposited

that the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to

initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate

in  completing  the  proceedings  already  instituted  upon  a

complaint before him. It was thus concluded on an appraisal of

the curial postulations above referred to, that the Magistrate of

his own, cannot order further investigation after the accused

had entered appearance pursuant to a process issued to him

subsequent to the taking of the cognizance by him.

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32. The scope of the judicial audit in Reeta Nag (supra), to

reiterate, was whether, after the charge-sheet had been filed by

the  investigating  agency  under  Section  173(2)  Cr.P.C,  and

charge had been framed against some of the accused persons

on  the  basis  thereof,  and  other  co-accused  had  been

discharged, the Magistrate could direct the investigating agency

to  conduct  a  re-investigation  or  further  investigation  under

sub-Section (8) of Section 173. The recorded facts revealed that

the  Magistrate  had  in  the  contextual  facts  directed  for

re-investigation and to submit a report, though prior thereto, he

had taken cognizance of the offences involved against six of the

original  sixteen  accused  persons,  discharging  the  rest.   The

informant had thereafter filed an application for re-investigation

of the case and the prayer was acceded to. This Court referred

to its earlier decisions in Sankatha Singh and others v. State

of  Uttar  Pradesh, AIR  1962  SC  1208  and  Master

Construction  Company  (P)  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Orissa  and

another, AIR  1966  SC  1047  to  the  effect  that  after  the

Magistrate  had  passed  a  final  order  framing  charge  against

some  of  the  accused  persons,  it  was  no  longer  within  his

competence or jurisdiction to direct a re-investigation into the

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case.   The decision in  Randhir  Singh Rana (supra), which

propounded as well that after taking cognizance of an offence on

the  basis  of  a  police  report  and after  the  appearance  of  the

accused,  a  Magistrate  cannot  of  its  own  order  further

investigation,  though such  an order  could  be  passed  on the

application of the investigating authority, was recorded.  It was

reiterated  with  reference  to  the  earlier  determination  of  this

Court in  Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI, (2007) 8 SCC 770 that the

power  of  the  investigating  officer  to  make  a  prayer  for

conducting further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of

the Code was not taken away only because a charge-sheet had

been filed under Section 173(2) and a further investigation was

permissible  even  if  cognizance  had  been  taken  by  the

Magistrate. This Court, therefore summed up by enouncing that

once a charge-sheet was filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C and

either  charges  have  been  framed  or  the  accused  have  been

discharged,  the  Magistrate  may  on  the  basis  of  a  protest

petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the

application made by the investigating authority, permit further

investigation  under  Section  173(8),  but  he  cannot  suo  motu

direct a further investigation or order a re-investigation into a

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case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code.  It was

thus held that as the investigating authority did not apply for

further investigation and an application to that effect had been

filed by the defacto complainant under Section 173(8), the order

acceding  to  the  said  prayer  was  beyond  the  jurisdictional

competence of the Magistrate. It was, however observed, that a

Magistrate  could,  if  deemed  necessary,  take  recourse  to  the

provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C at the stage of trial.  

33. This decision reinforces the view that after cognizance is

taken by the Magistrate on the basis of a report submitted by

the police on the completion of the investigation, no direction

for  further  investigation  can  be  made  by  the  Magistrate  suo

motu and it would be permissible only if such a request is made

by the investigating  authority  on the  detection of  fresh facts

having  bearing  on  the  case  and  necessitating  further

exploration thereof in the interest of complete and fair trial.

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34. The query in  Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak &

Ors., (2013)  5  SCC  762  was  whether  in  exercise  of  powers

under Section 173  Cr.P.C, the Trial Court has the jurisdiction

to ignore any of the police reports, where there was more than

one,  whether  by  the  same or  different  investigating  agencies

submitted  in  furtherance  of  the  orders  of  a  Court.   The

respondents therein were sought to be prosecuted by filing a

First Information Report under Sections 120B, 121 and 122 of

the IPC read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 4

and 5 of Explosives Substance Act, 1908. The FIR was filed by

the Special Cell of Delhi Police, which the respondents alleged

had been lodged to falsely implicate them. Being aggrieved, the

respondents challenged this action before the High Court and

inter  alia  prayed  that  the  investigation  in  the  case  be

transferred to the CBI.  As the High Court did not, though it

had issued notice in the writ  petition,  stay the investigation,

eventually the Special Cell of Delhi Police did file a charge-sheet

before the Trial Court. The High Court finally, while disposing of

the  writ  petition  and  being  satisfied,  directed  the  CBI  to

undertake  an  inquiry  into  the  matter  and  submit  a  report.

Subsequent  thereto  the  CBI  filed  its  report  indicating  in

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substance that the recoveries, amongst others made from the

respondents in course of the inquisition made by the Special

Cell of Delhi Police did not inspire confidence and that further

investigation was needed.  

35. The CBI, after detailed investigation, submitted a closure

report, whereafter one of the respondents filed an application

before  the  Trial  Court  seeking  discharge.  This  prayer  was

declined by the Trial Court as pre-matured, observing that no

definite conclusion could be drawn at that stage to ascertain

the truthfulness of  the version of  the two different agencies.

The High Court,  being approached under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C by one of the respondents, seeking to quash the First

Information Report,  it  disposed of  the  same by holding  that

once  the  report  had  been  filed  by  the  CBI,  it  ought  to  be

construed as a investigating agency, and thus its closure report

should be considered by the Trial Court and thus remanded

the  case  by  observing  that  in  undertaking  the  exercise,  as

directed, the Trial Court should not be influenced by the report

of the Special Cell of Delhi Police. This order formed the subject

matter of challenge before this Court.

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36. After referring to Section 156(3) in particular and Section

190  Cr.P.C, this Court reverted to Section 173 and ruled that a

very  wide  power  was  vested  in  the  investigating  agency  to

conduct further investigation after it had filed its report in terms

of  sub-Section  (2)  thereof.  It  held  on  an  elucidation  of  the

contents  of  Section  173(8)  that  the  investigating  agency  was

thus competent  to  file  a  report  supplementary  to  its  primary

report and that the former was to be treated by the Court in

continuation of the latter, and that on an examination thereof

and following the application of  mind,  it  ought  to proceed to

hear the case in the manner prescribed. It was elaborated that

after taking cognizance of the offence, the next step was to frame

charge in terms of  Section 228 of  the Code unless the Court

found,  upon consideration of  the  record  of  the  case  and the

documents  submitted  therewith,  that  there  did  exist  no

sufficient ground to proceed against  the accused, in which case

it would discharge him on reasons to be recorded in terms of

Section 227 of the Code.  Alluding to the text of Section 228 of

the Code which is to the effect that if a Judge is of the opinion

that  there  is  ground  for  presuming  that  the  accused  had

committed an offence,  he could  frame a charge and try  him,

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this Court propounded that the word “presuming” did imply that

the opinion was to be formed on the basis of the records of the

case  and  the  documents  submitted  therewith  along  with  the

plea of the defence to a limited extent, if offered at that stage.

The view of this Court in  Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander

and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 underlining the obligation of

the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents

submitted therewith to form an opinion as to whether there did

exist or not any sufficient ground to proceed against an accused

was  underlined.  This  aspect  was  dilated  upon  logically  to

respond to the query in the contextual facts as to whether both

the reports submitted by the Special Cell  of the Delhi Police and

the CBI were required to be taken note of by the Trial Court.

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37. Additionally, this Court also dwelt upon the three facets

of  investigation  in  succession  i.e.  (i)  initial  investigation  (ii)

further investigation and (iii) fresh or de novo or reinvestigation.

Whereas initial investigation was alluded to be one conducted in

furtherance of  registration of  an FIR leading to a final  report

under Section 173(2) of  the Code, further investigation was a

phenomenon where the investigating officer would obtain further

oral or documentary evidence after the final report had already

been submitted, so much so that the report on the basis of the

subsequent  disclosures/discoveries  by  way  of  such  evidence

would be in consolidation and in continuation of the previous

investigation  and  the  report  yielded  thereby.  “Fresh

investigation” “reinvestigation” “de novo investigation”, however

is an exercise, which it was held, could neither be undertaken

by the investigating agency suo motu nor could be ordered by

the Magistrate and that it was essentially within the domain of

the  higher  judiciary  to  direct  the  same  and  that  too  under

limited  compelling  circumstances  warranting  such  probe  to

ensure  a  just  and  fair  investigation  and  trial.  Adverting  to

Section  173  of  the  Code  again,  this  Court  recalled  its

observations in  State of Punjab v. CBI and others, (2011) 9

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SCC 182 that  not  only  the  police  had  the  power  to  conduct

further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code, even

the  Trial  Court  could  direct  further  investigation  in

contradistinction  to  fresh investigation even where  the  report

had been filed.

38. The decisions in Minu Kumari and another v. State of

Bihar and others, (2006) 4 SCC 359 and Hemant Dhasmana

v. CBI and another, (2001) 7 SCC 536 to the effect that a Court

could  order  further  investigation  under  Section 173(8)  of  the

Code even after a report had been submitted under Section 173

(2) thereof, was adverted to.   

39. Noticeably, none of these decisions, however pertain to a

situation  where  after  the  final  report  had  been  submitted,

cognizance had been taken, accused had appeared and trial is

underway, the Court either suo motu or on the prayer of the

informant  had  directed  further  investigation  under  Section

173(8)  in  absence  of  a  request  to  that  effect  made  by  the

concerned investigating officer.     

40. The rendition in Bhagwant Singh (supra) was also relied

upon. It was eventually held, by drawing sustenance from the

pronouncement in  Bhagwant Singh (supra) that a Magistrate

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before whom a report under Section 173(2) of the Code had been

filed, was empowered in law to direct further investigation and

require the police to submit a further or a supplementary report.

To reiterate,  in  Bhagwant Singh (supra),   this Court had in

particular dealt with the courses open to a Magistrate, once a

charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted on the completion

of investigation under Section 173(2) of the Code and thus did

essentially  concentrate  at  the  pre-cognizance  stage  of  the

proceedings.  

41. From the issues sought to be answered in this decision

and having regard to the overall text thereof, it is not possible to

discern  that  the  power  of  the  Magistrate,  even  at  the  post

cognizance stage or after the accused had appeared in response

to the process issued, the suo motu power of the Magistrate to

direct  further  investigation  was  intended  to  be  expounded

thereby. Significantly, the adjudication was essentially related to

the pre-cognizance stage.

42. In  Chandra  Babu  alias  Moses v.  State  through

Inspector  of  Police  and  others,  (2015)  8  SCC  774,  the

appellant had filed a FIR with the Kulasckaram Police Station

against  the  respondents-accused  alleging  unlawful  assembly

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and  assault  resulting  in  multiple  injuries.  After  the  initial

investigation,  the  same was  transferred  to  the  District  Crime

Branch Police, Kanyakumari which eventually filed a final report

in favour of  the respondents-accused,  which was accepted by

the  learned  Magistrate.  Meanwhile,  however  the

appellant/informant filed a protest petition before the Magistrate

praying for a direction to the CBCID to reopen the case and file a

fresh report. As before any decision on this protest petition, the

final report filed by the police had already been accepted, the

appellant approached the High Court, which called for the report

from the learned Magistrate and finally interfered with the order

accepting the final report and directed the Magistrate to consider

the same along with the protest petition. The Magistrate next

held that there was no justification for ordering reinvestigation

of the case and directed that the protest petition be treated as a

separate private complaint.  

43. This order being challenged again before the High Court,

the  matter  was  remanded  to  the  learned  Magistrate  with  a

direction to consider the final report and the other materials on

record and pass appropriate orders after hearing both the public

prosecutor and the de facto complainant. This time, the learned

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Magistrate  returned  a  finding  that  the  investigation  by  the

District Crime Branch was a biased one and that the final report

was not acceptable and consequently forwarded the complaint

for  further investigation by the CBCID, which was a different

investigating agency. The matter was taken to the High Court by

one  of  the  respondents/accused,  whereupon  it  annulled  the

direction of the learned Magistrate for  reinvestigation, holding

that not only there were material discrepancies in the evidence

brought  on  record,  but  also  there  was  no  exceptional

circumstance for such a course to be adopted by the Magistrate.

It  was  also  of  the  view,  having  regard  to  the  scheme  of  the

Section  173(8)  of  the  Code  that  the  investigating  officer  only

could request for further investigation.

44. While  disapproving  the  approach of  the  High Court  in

reappreciating  the  facts  in  the  exercise  of  its  revisional

jurisdiction, this Court adverting, amongst others to the three

Judge Bench exposition in Bhagwant Singh (supra) reiterated

that a Magistrate could disagree with the police report and take

cognizance  and  issue  process  and  summon  the  accused,  if

satisfied as deemed fit in the attendant facts and circumstances.

The rendition in  Vinay Tyagi  (supra) was also alluded to.  It

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was ultimately expounded that the learned Magistrate had really

intended  to  direct  further  investigation,  but  as  a  different

investigating agency had been chosen, the word re-investigation

had  been  used.  This  Court  thus  construed  the  direction  for

investigation by the CBI to be one for further investigation and

upheld  the  same,  but  nullified  the  selection  of  a  new

investigating agency therefor.  As a corollary,  the investigating

agency that had investigated the case earlier and had submitted

the final report, was directed by this Court to undertake further

investigation to be supervised by the Superintendent of Police

and  to  submit  a  report  before  the  learned  Chief  Judicial

Magistrate to be dealt with in accordance with law.  

45. This  decision too  was concerned with a  fact  situation,

pertaining to the pre-cognizance stage of the proceedings before

the  learned  Magistrate  and  therefore,  does  not,  in  our

comprehension, further the case of the appellant.

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46. As  adumbrated  hereinabove,  Chapter  XIV  of  the  Code

delineates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings

before a Magistrate.  Section 190, which deals with cognizance

of offences by Magistrate,  sets out that any Magistrate of  the

first  Class  and  any  Magistrate  of  the  second  class  specially

empowered,  as  contemplated,  may  take  cognizance  of  any

offence  either  upon  receiving  a  complaint  of  facts  which

constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts or

upon information received from any person other than the police

officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been

committed. Section 156, which equips a police officer with the

power  to  investigate  a  cognizable  case  mandates  vide

sub-section  3  thereof  that  any  Magistrate  empowered  under

Section 190 may order such an investigation. The procedure for

dealing with complaints to Magistrate is lodged under Chapter

XV of the Code. Section 202 appearing therein predicates that

any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which

he is authorized to take cognizance or which had been made

over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit and shall in

a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area

in  which  he  exercises  his  jurisdiction,  postpone  the  issue  of

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process against  the accused and either enquire into the case

himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer

or by  such other person as he thinks fit  for  the purpose of

deciding  whether  or  not  there  is  sufficient  ground  for

proceeding.  The contents of this text of Section 202(1) of the

Code unmistakeably  attest  that  the  investigation that  can be

directed by the Magistrate, to be undertaken by a police officer

would essentially be in the form of an enquiry for the singular

purpose of enabling him to decide whether or another there is

sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  with  the  complaint  of  an

offence,  of  which  he  is  authorised  to  take  cognizance.   This

irrefutably  is  at  the  pre-cognizance  stage  and  thus  logically

before  the  issuance  of  process  to  the  accused  and  his

attendance in  response thereto.   As  adverted to  hereinabove,

whereas   Section 311 of  the  Code empowers a  Court  at  any

stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon any

person  as  a  witness,  or  examine  any  person  in  attendance,

though not  summoned as a witness, or recall  and re-examine

any person already examined, if construed to be essential to be

just  decision  of  the  case,  Section  319 authorizes  a  Court  to

proceed against any person, who though not made an accused

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appears, in course of the inquiry or trial, to have committed the

same and can be  tried  together.  These  two provisions of  the

Code explicitly accoutre a Court to summon a material witness

or examine a person present at any stage of any inquiry, trial or

other proceeding,  if  it  considers it  to  be essential  to  the just

decision  of  the  case  and  even  proceed  against  any  person,

though not an accused in such enquiry or trial,  if  it appears

from the evidence available that he had committed an offence

and  that  he  can  be  tried  together  with  the  other  accused

persons.

47. On an overall survey of the pronouncements of this Court

on the scope and purport of Section 173(8) of the Code and the

consistent trend of explication thereof, we are thus disposed to

hold that though the investigating agency concerned has been

invested  with  the  power  to  undertake  further  investigation

desirably  after informing the Court thereof, before which it had

submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power

is available therefor to the learned Magistrate after cognizance

has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has

been issued and accused has entered appearance in response

thereto.  At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu

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nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant direct

further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the

request  of  the  investigating  agency  and  that  too,  in

circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection

of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial,

the life purpose of the adjudication in hand.   

48. The  un-amended  and  the  amended  sub-Section  (8)  of

Section  173  of  the  Code  if  read  in  juxtaposition,  would

overwhelmingly  attest  that  by  the  latter,  the  investigating

agency/officer  alone  has  been  authorized  to  conduct  further

investigation  without  limiting  the  stage  of  the  proceedings

relatable  thereto.  This  power  qua  the  investigating

agency/officer is thus legislatively intended to be available at

any stage of the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law

Commission in its 41st Report which manifesting heralded the

amendment,  significantly  had  limited  its  proposal  to  the

empowerment of the investigating agency alone.  

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49. In  contradistinction,  Sections  156,  190,  200,  202  and

204 of the Cr.P.C clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate

and the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing

investigation,  taking  of  cognizance,  framing  of  charge,  etc.

Though  the  Magistrate  has  the  power  to  direct  investigation

under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a

charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance

is taken and the accused person appears pursuant thereto, he

would  be  bereft  of  any  competence  to  direct  further

investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer

of the complainant/informant. The direction for investigation by

the  Magistrate  under  Section  202,  while  dealing  with  a

complaint,  though is  at  a  post-cognizance  stage,  it  is  in  the

nature of  an inquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether the

proceedings  initiated  ought  to  be  furthered  or  not.  Such  a

direction  for  investigation  is  not  in  the  nature  of  further

investigation,  as  contemplated  under  Section  173(8)  of  the

Code.  If  the  power  of  the  Magistrate,  in  such  a  scheme

envisaged by the Cr.P.C to order further investigation even after

the cognizance is taken, accused persons appear and charge is

framed,  is  acknowledged  or  approved,  the  same  would  be

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discordant with the state of law, as enunciated by this Court

and  also  the  relevant  layout  of  the  Cr.P.C.  adumbrated

hereinabove.  Additionally  had  it  been  the  intention  of  the

legislature  to  invest  such  a  power,  in  our  estimate,  Section

173(8)  of  the  Cr.P.C would have  been worded accordingly  to

accommodate  and  ordain  the  same  having  regard  to  the

backdrop of the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of the

three options open to the Magistrate, after a report is submitted

by the police on completion of the investigation, as has been

amongst  authoritatively  enumerated  in  Bhagwant  Singh

(supra),  the  Magistrate,  in  both  the  contingencies,  namely;

when  he  takes  cognizance  of  the  offence  or  discharges  the

accused, would be committed to a course, whereafter though

the investigating agency may for good reasons inform him and

seek his  permission to  conduct  further  investigation,  he  suo

motu cannot embark upon such a step or take that initiative on

the request or prayer made by the complainant/informant. Not

only such power to the Magistrate to direct further investigation

suo  motu  or  on  the  request  or  prayer  of  the

complainant/informant  after  cognizance  is  taken  and  the

accused person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is

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discharged  is  incompatible  with  the  statutory  design  and

dispensation,  it would even otherwise render the provisions of

Sections 311 and 319 Cr.P.C., whereunder any witness can be

summoned by a Court and a person can be issued notice to

stand trial  at any stage, in  a way redundant. Axiomatically,

thus  the  impugned  decision  annulling  the  direction  of  the

learned  Magistrate  for  further  investigation  is  unexceptional

and does not merit any interference.  Even otherwise on facts,

having  regard  to  the  progression of  the  developments  in  the

trial,  and  more  particularly,  the  delay  on  the  part  of  the

informant in making the request for further investigation, it was

otherwise not entertainable as has been rightly held by the High

Court.

50. In the result, the appeal, being devoid of any merit, fails

and is dismissed.   

.............................................J.  (DIPAK MISRA)

         …...........................................J. (AMITAVA ROY)

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 02, 2017.