REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5075 OF 2005

Amrik Singh Lyallpuri  ..Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Union of India & Others ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1.The principal question raised in this appeal is  

the constitutional validity of Section 347D of  

Delhi  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1957  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as,  ‘the  said  Act’).  

Similar provisions are also there in Section 256  

of  New  Delhi  Municipal  Council  Act,  1994  

(hereinafter referred to as, ‘the NDMC Act’).

1

2. The question was raised in a writ petition filed  

by  the  appellant  who  is  a  journalist  by  

profession and the editor of Urdu Weekly called  

‘Lalkar’.  In the petition it has been urged that  

one  Shri  B.S.  Mathur,  Additional  District  and  

Sessions  Judge  was  appointed  the  Presiding  

Officer  of  the  MCD/NDMC  Appellate  Tribunal  in  

terms of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 347  

of the said Act.  His appointment was made for  

deciding appeals preferred under Section 343 or  

Section 347B of the said Act.  Shri B.S. Mathur  

was appointed in Appellate Tribunal to hear and  

dispose of all appeals from the order passed by  

the Zonal Engineer (Buildings) of the respective  

zones of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and that  

of  New Delhi  Municipal Council.   However,  the  

grievance of the appellant is that orders of the  

Appellate  Tribunal  are  appealable  before  the  

Administrator of Delhi i.e. Lt. Governor under  

Section 347D of the said Act.  The main grievance  

in  the  public  interest  litigation  is  when  an  

2

appeal is decided by an Appellate Authority which  

is manned by a Judge of the Civil Court, appeal  

from  the decision  of such  authority cannot  be  

heard and by an executive authority, however high  

such executive authority may be.

3. In  order to  appreciate this  controversy it  is  

necessary  to  consider  the  relevant  statutory  

provisions. The provision for constitution of an  

Appellate Tribunal under Section 347A of the said  

Act are as follows:-

“347A.  Appellate  Tribunal  .  -  (1)  The  Central Government shall, by notification  in the Official Gazette, constitute one  or  more  Appellate  Tribunals  with  headquarters  at  Delhi,  for  deciding  appeals  preferred  under  section  343  or  section 347B.   

(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall consist  of  one  person  to  be  appointed  by  the  Central  Government  on  such  terms  and  conditions  of  service  as  may  be  prescribed by rules.    (3) A person shall not be qualified for  appointment as the presiding officer of  an Appellate Tribunal unless he is, or  has  been,  a  district  judge  or  an  additional district judge or has, for at  least ten years, held a judicial office  in India.  

(4) The Central Government may, if it so  thinks fit, appoint one or more persons  

3

having  special  knowledge  of,  or  experience  in,  the  matters  involved  in  such  appeals,  to  act  as  assessors  to  advise  the  Appellate  Tribunal  in  the  proceedings before it, but no advice of  the  assessors  shall  be  binding  on  the  Appellate Tribunal.  

(5)  The  Central  Government  shall,  by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  define  the  territorial  limits  within  which  an  Appellate  Tribunal  shall  exercise  its  jurisdiction,  and  where  different  Appellate  Tribunals  have  jurisdiction  over  the  same  territorial  limits, the Central Government shall also  provide  for  the  distribution  and  allocation  of  work  to  be  performed  by  such Tribunals.  

(6) For the purpose of enabling it to  discharge its functions under this Act,  every  Appellate  Tribunal  shall  have  a  Registrar and such other staff on such  terms and conditions of service as may be  prescribed by rules :  Provided that the Registrar and staff may  be employed jointly for all or any number  of such Tribunals in accordance with the  rules.”

4.For the purpose of deciding the controversy of  

this  case, the  provisions of  Sections 343  and  

347B  are not  relevant, but  Section 347C  which  

provides for the procedure before such Appellate  

Tribunal  is  relevant.   Particularly,  the  

provision  of  347C  sub-section  (7)  which  is  

4

relevant  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  the  

controversy is set out below:-

“Section  347C  -  Procedure  of  the Appellate Tribunal -       xxx   xxx   xxx  

(7) Every Appellate Tribunal, shall, in  addition to the powers conferred on it  under this Act, have the same powers as  are vested in a Civil Court while trying  a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  (5  of  1908),  in  respect  of  the  following matters, namely:--

(a)  summoning  and  enforcing  the  attendance of persons and examining them  on oath;

(b)  requiring  the  discovery  and  inspection of documents;  

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) requisitioning any public record or  copies thereof from any court or office;

(e)  issuing  commisisons  for  the  examination  of  witnesses  or  documents;  and (f)  any  other  matter  which  may  be  prescribed by rules, and every proceeding  of  an  Appellate  Tribunal  in  hearing  or  deciding an appeal or in connection with  execution of its order, shall be deemed to  be  a  judicial  proceeding  within  the  meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for  the purpose of section 196, of the Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of  1860),  and  every  Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a  

5

Civil  Court  for  the  purposes  of  section  195  and  Chapter  XXVI  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974).”

5. From a perusal of the provisions of Section 347A  

and 347C, sub-clause (7), it is clear that the  

said tribunal shall be manned by a person who is  

or has been a District Judge or an Additional  

District Judge or has, for at least ten years,  

held a judicial office in India [Section 347A,  

sub-clause  (3)].   Insofar  as  Section  347C  is  

concerned, it is very clear that such tribunal  

shall have in certain matters, the trappings of a  

Civil  Court  trying  a  suit  under  the  Civil  

Procedure Code.  Clause (f) of sub-section (7) of  

Section  347  further  provides  that  proceedings  

before  such  tribunal  shall  be  judicial  

proceedings within the meaning of Section 193 and  

Section 228 for the purpose of Section 196 of the  

Indian Penal Code and every Appellate Tribunal  

shall  be  deemed  to  be  a  Civil  Court  for  the  

purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure. 6

6. The provisions of Section 253 of the NDMC Act are  

virtually on the same lines.  Under sub-section  

(3)  of  Section  347A  and  sub-section  (3)  of  

Section 253 of the NDMC Act, a person shall not  

be  qualified  for  appointment  as  a  presiding  

officer of an Appellate Tribunal unless he is, or  

has  been,  a  District  Judge  or  an  Additional  

District Judge or has, for at least ten years,  

held a judicial office.  Similarly, Section 355  

of the NDMC Act virtually is pari materia with  

sub-section (7) of Section 347C of the said Act.  

Therefore,  on  a  reading  of  the  aforesaid  two  

provisions  it  is  clear  that  the  Appellate  

Tribunals  created  under  the  aforesaid  statutes  

are quasi judicial bodies with the trappings of  

the  Civil  Court  and  that  they  are  manned  by  

judicial officers of considerable experience. In  

discharging  their  functions,  such  bodies  are  

acting as a Civil Court in respect of some of its  

7

functions, and the proceedings before such bodies  

are judicial proceedings.   

7.However, an appeal is provided against the order  

of  such  Appellate  Tribunals  under  both  the  

statutes.

8.Under Section 347D of the said Act, such appeal  

shall  lie  to  the  Administrator.  The  relevant  

provision is set out below:-

“Section 347D - Appeal against orders of Appellate Tribunal -  (1) An appeal shall  lie to the Administrator against an order  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal,  made  in  an  appeal under section 343 or section 347B,  confirming,  modifying  or  annulling  an  order made or notice issued under this  Act.

(2)  The  provisions  of  sub-sections  (2)  and (3) of section 347B and section 347C  and the rules made thereunder, shall, so  far as may be, apply to the filing and  disposal of an appeal under this section  as they apply to the filing and disposal  of an appeal under those sections.  (3) An order of the Administrator on an  appeal  under  this  section,  and  subject  only  to  such  order,  an  order  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal  under  section  347B,  and  subject  to  such  orders  of  the  Administrator or an Appellate Tribunal,  an order or notice referred to in sub- section  (1)  of  that  section,  shall  be  final.”

8

9. Similarly,  under  Section  256  of  the  NDMC  Act,  

appeal also lies to the Administrator.  Both the  

sections, namely, Section 347D of the said Act  

and Section 256 of the NDMC Act are couched in  

similar  terms.  Under  both  the  Acts,  the  

jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred;  

vide Section 347E of the said Act and Section 257  

of the NDMC Act.  

10. The main question which was raised in the writ  

petition moved before the High Court was whether  

an appeal from an order of the Appellate Tribunal  

constituted under the aforesaid two Acts can be  

heard and decided by the Administrator.  The term  

“Administrator”  has  been  defined  under  Section  

2(1) of the said Act as follows:-

“Section 2 – Definitions.-  In this Act,  unless the context otherwise requires,--  (1) "Administrator" means the Lieutenant  Governor  of  the  National  Capital  Territory of Delhi;”

9

11. Under  Section  2(1)  of  the  NDMC  Act,  the  term  

“Administrator” has been defined as follows:-

“Section 2 – Definitions.-  In this Act,  unless the context otherwise requires,  (1)"Administrator"  means  the  Administrator  of  the  National  Capital  Territory of Delhi;”

12.On a comparison of the aforesaid definitions, it  

is clear that there is not much difference in the  

aforesaid two definitions and by Administrator is  

meant  “Lieutenant  Governor  of  the  National  

Capital Territory of Delhi”.

13. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, who on  

the request of the Court appeared as an Amicus  

Curie  in  this  matter,  contended  that  the  

aforesaid provision of hearing of the appeal by  

the Administrator from an order of the Appellate  

Tribunal is violative of the concept of judicial  

review  which  is  enshrined  in  our  Constitution.  

The learned counsel submitted that the order of  

the  Appellate  Tribunal  is  certainly  a  quasi  

judicial one being passed by Judicial Authority  10

which  has  the  trappings  of  the  Court  and  the  

appeal  from  such  an  order  cannot  lie  to  any  

authority except a judicial authority.

14. Under our constitutional scheme it was contended,  

an executive authority cannot entertain an appeal  

from an order passed by the judicial authority  

even though such judicial authority is acting in  

a  quasi-judicial  capacity.  In  support  of  this  

contention, reliance was placed on the judgment  

of this Court in the case of P. Sambamurthy and  others v.  State of Andhra Pradesh and another,  (1987) 1 SCC 362, wherein a Constitution Bench of  

this  Court  speaking  through  Chief  Justice  

Bhagwati examined the constitutional validity of  

Article 371D (5) of the Constitution, inserted by  

32nd Constitution  Amendment  Act,  1973.  In  P.  

Sambamurthy (supra), this Court was called upon  

to decide an issue similar to the one at hand.  

Clause  (3)  of  Article  371-D  provided  for  the  

creation  of  an  administrative  tribunal  for  the  

11

State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  so  as  to  exercise  

jurisdiction  with  respect  to  the  matters  

mentioned in sub clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clause  

(5) however, subjected the decision of the said  

administrative  tribunal  to  the  confirmation  of  

the  State  Government.  The  Court  held  it  as  

violative  of  the  principle  of  ‘rule  of  law’,  

insofar  it  placed  the  power  of  reviewing  the  

decision  of  a  quasi  judicial  tribunal  in  the  

hands of the executive which according to this  

Court,  contravened  the  principle  of  judicial  

review. This Court said:  

“…The State Government is given the power  to  modify  or  annul  any  order  of  the  Administrative Tribunal before it becomes  effective  either  by  confirmation  by  the  State Government or on the expiration of  the period of three months from the date  of the order….It will thus be seen that  the period of three months from the date  of the order is provided in clause (5) in  order  to  enable  the  State  Government  to  decide whether it would confirm the order  or  modify  or  annul  it.  Now  almost  invariably the State Government would be a  party  in  every  service  dispute  brought  before the Administrative Tribunal and the  effect  of  the  proviso  to  clause  (5)  is  that the State Government which is a party  

12

to  the  proceeding  before  the  Administrative Tribunal and which contests  the claim of the public servant who comes  before the Administrative Tribunal seeking  redress of his grievance against the State  Government,  would  have  the  ultimate  authority  to  uphold  or  reject  the  determination  of  the  Administrative  Tribunal….Such a provision is, to say the  least, shocking and is clearly subversive  of the principles of justice.” (See page  368)

15. This Court further explained that “…Now if the  

exercise of the power of judicial review can be  

set  at  naught  by  the  State  Government  by  

overriding  the  decision  given  against  it,  it  

would sound the death knell of the rule of law.  

The rule of law would cease to have any meaning,  

because  then  it  would  be  open  to  the  State  

Government to defy the law and yet to get away  

with it. The proviso to clause (5) of Article  

371-D is therefore clearly violative of the basic  

structure doctrine.”

16. In  a  subsequent  Constitution  Bench  decision  of  

this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India  13

and  others,  AIR  1997  SC  1125,  Chief  Justice  Ahmadi, after an analysis of different decisions  

of this Court, affirmatively held that judicial  

review  is  one  of  the  basic  features  of  our  

Constitution.  Such  a  finding  of  this  Court,  

obviously  means  that  there  cannot  be  an  

administrative review of a decision taken by a  

judicial or a quasi judicial authority which has  

the trappings of a court. Since judicial review  

has  been  considered  an  intrinsic  part  of  

constitutionalism, any statutory provision which  

provides for administrative review of a decision  

taken by a judicial or a quasi judicial body is,  

therefore,  inconsistent  with  the  aforesaid  

postulate and is unconstitutional.  

17. The learned senior counsel for the Union of India  

in this case has sought to support the impugned  

judgment  by  referring  to  the  decision  of  this  

Court in the case of Indo-China Steam Navigation  

Company  Limited v.  Jasjit  Singh,  Additional  

14

Collector of Customs, Calcutta, and Others (AIR  

1964 SC 1140). The said decision deals with the  

provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which is  

a  pre-Constitutional  law.  Apart  from  that,  the  

scheme of the Sea Customs Act would show that  

when a dispute is raised by an aggrieved party  

either  by  way  of  an  appeal  or  revision,  that  

dispute has to be decided in the light of the  

facts adduced in the proceedings. And this Court  

held  that  the  decision  of  such  an  authority  

amounts  to  a  decision  which  is  given  in  

accordance with the principles of natural justice  

and  such  proceedings  are  quasi  judicial  in  

nature. This Court also accepted that even though  

the status of the customs officer who adjudicates  

under Section 167 (12A) and Section 183 of the  

Act is not that of the tribunal, that does not  

make  a  difference  when  the  matter  reaches  the  

stage of appeal and revision. On the basis of  

such reasoning, this Court held that when such  

disputes are decided by appellate or revisional  

15

authority,  it  becomes  a  tribunal  within  the  

meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution and  

such tribunals being invested with the judicial  

power of the State are required to act judicially  

and that they are tribunals within the meaning of  

Article 136 of the Constitution.

18. In  the  instant  case,  the  issue  is  totally  

different.  Here  the  issue  is  whether  an  order  

passed by a quasi judicial authority, which has  

the trappings of a civil court, can be reviewed  

by  an  administrative  authority.  Therefore,  the  

ratio  in  Indo-China  Steam  Navigation  Company  

(supra) does not support the case of the Union of  

India.

19. Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel for the  

third  respondent  also  wanted  to  support  the  

impugned judgment by relying on the Constitution  

Bench  decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Harinagar  Sugar  Mills  Ltd., v.  Shyam  Sunder  16

Jhunjhunwala and others (AIR 1961 SC 1669). In  that  case  the  issue  raised  was  that  of  a  

company’s  power  to  refuse  registration  of  

transfer of share. On the refusal to register the  

transfer of shares, the aggrieved party has two  

remedies for seeking relief under the Companies  

Act.  One  was  to  apply  to  the  Court  for  

rectification of register and the other was to  

appeal  to  the  Central  Government  under  Section  

111  of  the  Act  against  the  resolution  of  the  

company refusing to register the share. In such a  

situation, this Court held that when Government,  

in exercise of its power of appeal under Section  

111 Clause (3) is acting it is invested with the  

judicial power of the State to decide disputes  

according to law. In such a case, the Central  

Government  is  acting  as  a  Tribunal  and  it  is  

amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under  

Article 136. (See paras 10 and 23 of the report).

17

20. As noted above, the issue in this case is not  

whether  the  administrator  under  the  aforesaid  

statutory provision is a tribunal under Article  

136 of the Act. The issue is, as discussed above,  

whether the administrative authority can sit in  

appeal over the decisions of a judicial or quasi  

judicial authority which has the trappings of the  

Civil Court. Therefore, the decision in Harinagar  (supra) cannot sustain the impugned judgment.  

21. Even though the Administrator under the aforesaid  

two Acts may be the Lieutenant Governor of the  

National Capital Territory of Delhi which may be  

a  high  constitutional  authority,  it  cannot  be  

disputed that the said authority is an executive  

authority.

22. Learned  senior  counsel  for  Delhi  Municipal  

Corporation argued by referring to the provisions of  

Article 239AA of the Constitution, where provisions  

in respect to Delhi have been made.  For a proper  

18

appreciation  of  this  question,  Article  239AA,  

sub-article (1) is set out below:-

“239AA. Special provisions with respect to  Delhi.-  (1)  As  from  the  date  of  commencement of the Constitution (Sixty- ninth  Amendment)  Act,  1991,  the  Union  territory of Delhi shall be called the  National  Capital  Territory  of  Delhi  (hereafter in this Part referred to as  the  National Capital Territory) and the  administrator  thereof  appointed  under  Article 239 shall be designated as the  Lieutenant Governor.”   

23. In  this  connection,  we  can  also  refer  to  the  

provision  of  Government  of  National  Capital  

Territory of Delhi Act, 1991, namely, Section 41  

and particularly Section 41(3). Section 41 runs  

as under:

“41. Matters in which Lieutenant Governor  to act in his discretion. (1) The Lieutenant Governor shall act in  his discretion in a matter-

(i) which falls outside the purview of  the  powers  conferred  on  the  Legislative  Assembly  but  in  respect  of  which  powers  or  functions  are  entrusted  or  delegated to him by the President;  or

(ii)in  which  he  is  required  by  or  under  any  law  to  act  in  his  

19

discretion  or  to  exercise  any  judicial  or  quasi-judicial  functions.

(2) If any question arises as to whether  any  matter  is  or  is  not  a  matter  as  respects which the Lieutenant Governor is  by or under any law required to act in his  discretion, the decision of the Lieutenant  Governor thereon shall be final.

(3) If any question arises as to whether  any  matter  is  or  is  not  a  matter  as  respects which the Lieutenant Governor is  required  by  any  law  to  exercise  any  judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the  decision  of  the  Lieutenant  Governor  thereon shall be final.

24. By referring to the aforesaid two provisions, the  

learned  counsel  argued  that  the  Administrator,  

who is none other than the Lieutenant Governor,  

has no connection with the State and is totally  

independent.   Therefore,  when  he  hears  the  

appeal, he does it as an independent appellate  

authority.  This Court is unable to accept the  

aforesaid contention.  It is not suggested for a  

moment  that  the  Administrator,  who  is  the  

Lieutenant  Governor  in  Delhi  is  not  acting  

independently.  The question is:  having regard  

20

to  the  concept  of  rule  of  law  and  judicial  

review,  whether  a  review  by  an  executive  

authority of a decision taken by the judicial or  

quasi-judicial authority which has the trappings  

of  the  Court  is  permissible.   In  view  of  the  

consistent opinion expressed by this Court in P.  Sambhamurty (supra) and L. Chandra Kumar (supra),  discussed  above,  we  are  unable  to  uphold  the  

constitutional validity of Section 347D of Delhi  

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Section 256  

of the NDMC Act. Both the aforesaid provisions  

are,  therefore,  declared  unconstitutional  being  

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  In  

a  recent  Constitution  Bench  judgment  of  this  

Court in Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President,  Madras Bar Association [(2010) 11 SCC 1], Justice  Raveendran,  speaking  for  the  unanimous  Bench  

held:-

“102. The  fundamental  right  to  equality  before  law  and  equal  protection  of  laws  guaranteed  by  Article  14  of  the  Constitution, clearly includes a right to  

21

have the person’s rights, adjudicated by a  forum which exercises judicial power in an  impartial  and  independent  manner,  consistent with the recognised principles  of adjudication. Therefore wherever access  to courts to enforce such rights is sought  to  be  abridged,  altered,  modified  or  substituted by directing him to approach  an alternative forum, such legislative Act  is open to challenge if it violates the  right  to  adjudication  by  an  independent  forum. Therefore, though the challenge by  MBA  is  on  the  ground  of  violation  of  principles  forming  part  of  the  basic  structure,  they  are  relatable  to  one  or  more  of  the  express  provisions  of  the  Constitution  which  gave  rise  to  such  principles.  Though  the  validity  of  the  provisions of a legislative Act cannot be  challenged on the ground it violates the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution,  it  can  be  challenged  as  violative  of  constitutional  provisions  which  enshrine  the  principles  of  the  rule  of  law,  separation of powers and independence of  the judiciary.”

25. In view of this decision by this Court, till a  

proper  judicial  authority  is  set  up  under  the  

aforesaid Acts, the appeals to the Administrator  

under  Section  347D  of  the  Delhi  Municipal  

Corporation Act, 1957 and also under Section 256  

of the NDMC Act shall lie to the District Judge,  

Delhi.   All  pending  appeals  filed  under  the  

erstwhile provisions, as aforesaid, shall stand  

22

transferred  to  the  Court  of  District  Judge,  

Delhi.  However, the decisions which have already  

been arrived at by the Administrator under the  

aforesaid two provisions will not be reopened in  

view of the principles of prospective overruling.  

26. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, set  

aside and the appeal is allowed.  There will be,  

however, no orders as to costs.  

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi April 21, 2011  

23