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PETITIONER: AMEERUNNISSA BEGUM AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHBOOB BEGUM AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/12/1952

BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. HASAN, GHULAM SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1953 AIR   91            1953 SCR  404  CITATOR INFO :  R          1953 SC 215  (19)  E          1955 SC 352  (9)  RF         1956 SC  60  (13)  F          1958 SC 538  (12)  D          1962 SC1100  (17)  R          1963 SC 222  (51)  R          1974 SC1044  (14)  R          1975 SC1069  (23)  RF         1992 SC   1  (132)  D          1992 SC1277  (85,91,96)

ACT: Waliuddowla  Succession Act, 1950-Act providing for  settle- ment  of disputes as to succession between  private  persons and prohibiting recourse to courts of  law-Validity-Equality of  the  law  Discrimination-Reasonableness-Constitution  of India, 1950, Art. 14 (1).

HEADNOTE:   The  continuance  of a dispute even for a long  period  of time between two sets of rival claimants to the property  of a  private  person  is not a circumstance  of  such  unusual nature  as Would invest a case with special  or  exceptional features  and  make  it a class  by  itself  justifying  its differentiation from all other cases of succession disputes, and the fact that a non-judicial authority had made a report against one set of the claimants is not a reasonable  ground for  depriving them by legislation of their ordinary  rights under  the  law and prohibiting them from having  resort  to courts of law for establishing their rights. A  nobleman of Hyderabad died in 1936 when it was under  the rule  of  the  Nizam, and disputes as  to  succession  arose between  his  legally married wife and two  ladies,  Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum, who claimed to be his wives.  After protracted proceedings before several non-judicial bodies  a report adverse to the latter was made in January, 1950,  but before the Nizam could issue a firman in accordance with it, Hyderabad  became  a  part  of  the  Indian  Union  and  the Constitution of India came into force.  An enactment  called

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the  Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950, was therefore  passed by  the  Hyderabad  Legislature which provided  that  "  the claims  of  Mahboob  Begum and Kadiran Begum  and  of  their respective  children to participate in the  distribution  of the  matrooka  of the late Nawab are hereby  dismissed"  and that the above decision "cannot be called in question in any court of law Held, that in singling out two groups of persons  consisting of two ladies and their children out of those who claimed to be  related  to  the late Nawab  and  preventing  them  from establishing  their  rights  under the  personal  law  which governed  the  community,  in Courts of  law,  the  Act  was discriminatory  ; that there was no rational  or  reasonable basis  for the discrimination, and the Act  contravened  the provisions  of  article  14  of  the  Constitution  and  was therefore void.  The analogy of private Acts of the British                             405 Parliament  is not helpful as the British Parliament  enjoys legislative  omnipotence  and there  are  no  constitutional limitations on its authority or power.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 63 of  1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 7th November, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (Siddique,  Rao and Deshpande JJ.) in Civil Case No. 9-A-5-1 of 1950. M.   C.  Setalvad,  Attorney-General for India,  and  C.  K. Daphtary,  Solicitor-General  for India (G.   N.  Joshi  and Ghulam Ahmad Khan, with them) for the appellants. B.   Somayya  and Akbar Ali Khan (B.  V.  Subharayudu,  with them) for the respondents.  1952.  December 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     MUKHERJEA J.-This appeal which has come before us on  a certificate  granted  by the High Court of  Hyderabad  under article  132 (1) of the Constitution is directed  against  a judgment  of  a Full Bench of that Court dated  November  7, 1950,  passed  on  a petition under article  226  of  ,  the Constitution.   By this judgment the learned Judges  of  the High  Court  declared  an  Act,  known  as  the  Waliuddowla Succession  Act  of 1950, void under article  13(2)  of  the Constitution  to the extent that it affected the ’rights  of the  present, respondents 1 to 12 who were the-  petitioners ’in the article 226 proceeding.  The object of the  impugned Act,  which  received  the assent of  H.E.H.  the  Nizam  as Rajpramukh of Hyderabad on April 24, 1950, was to put an end to   the  disputes  that  existed  at  the  time   regarding succession  to  the  matrooka or personal  estate  of  Nawab Waliuddowla’,  ’a wealthy nobleman and a high  dignitary  of Hyderabad,  and what, in substance, the Act provided was  to dismiss the claims of succession to the said properties  put forward by two of the alleged wives of the late Nawab, named Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum, and their children.   These two ladies as Well as their 406 children  filed a petition before the Hyderabad  High  Court under  article  226  of  the  Constitution  challenging  the validity  of the Act mentioned aforesaid inter  alia  on-the grounds that it conflicted with the petitioners’ fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 1419(1)(1) and 31(1) of the Constitution  and praying for appropriate reliefs by way  of declaration  and writs of certiorari and  prohibition.   The claim  was resisted by Ameerunnissa Begum, an admitted  wife

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of  the  late  Nawab, and her children,  and  they  are  the persons  who would primarily be benefited by the  provisions of the impugned Act.  The High Court ,substantially accepted the  contentions of the petitioners and declared the Act  to be  void so far as it affected them.  Against this  decision the  present  appeal  has  been  taken  to  this  court   by Ameerunnissa Begum and her children.  To appreciate the contentions that have been raised by the parties, a brief resume of the antecedent events leading  up to  the  passing  of  the  disputed  legislation  would   be necessary.   Nawab Waliuddowla, who was one of the Paigah noblemen  of Hyderabad  and  was  at  one  time,  the  President  of  the Executive  Council of the State, died at Medina on  February 22,  1935,  while  on  a  pilgrimage  to  Hedjaz.    Besides extensive jagir properties appertaining to the Paigah  which fetched him an annual income of nearly Rs. 1,36,000 he  left behind  him  matrooka  or personal  estate  of  considerable value.  As regards the surviving relations of the Nawab, who could  claim rights by inheritance to his estate, it is  not disputed  that  Ameerunnissa  Begum was one  of  the  legaly wedded wives of the Nawab and that she and the five children which the Nawab had by her are entitled to their  legitimate shares in the properties left by the deceased, There is also no dispute that the Nawab went through a legal marriage with a  lady named Fatima Begum who is still alive.  It  appears, however,  that she left her husband soon after marriage  and did  not  return  to him any time  thereafter.   During  the period, which is material for our present purpose, the 407       only  claim which she put forward against the  estate of  the   Nawab  was  one for recovery  of  her  dower  debt &mounting to one lakh of rupees.  The whole dispute  between the  parties  to this litigation really centered  round  the point  as  to whether the other two  ladies,  namely  Mahoob Begum  and Kadiran Begum,who are respectively respondents  I and  5 in this appeal, were, the lawfully married  wives  of the  late  Nawab  or were they merely  in  his  keeping  as. kavases  or  permanent concubines?  If there  was  no  legal marriage between them and the Nawab, it is not disputed that their  children, though admittedly begotten on them  by  the Nawab, would not be entitled to any share in the matrooka or personal estate left by the deceased., This  dispute first arose before the Paigah Trust  Committee whose  duty  it was to distribute the income of  the  Paigah estate amongst the heirs of the late Nawab.  In April, 1935, shortly  after Ameerunnissa Begum, who had  accompanied  her husband  to Mecca, returned to Hyderabad after the death  of the latter, the Committee addressed letters to  Ameerunnissa Begum,  Fatima  Begum and also to  Mahboob  Begum  enquiring about the wives and children left, by the Nawab.  No letter, it seems, was sent to Kadiran Bi.  On a consideration of the replies  given  by the several addressees and  also  of  the statements  made on their behalf at the hearings before  the Committee,  the latter submitted a report to  the  Executive Council of the Nizam.  The Paigah Committee proceeded on the footing  that the Nawab’s marriage with  Ameerunnissa  Begum was beyond dispute, but as Mahboob Begum did not produce her marriage  certificate  even after repeated  demands  by  the Committee,  she  as  well  as Kadiran  Bi  were  treated  as concubines.   The  Committee  recommended  that  the  annual income of the Paigah should be divided in the proportion  of 60  to 40 amongst the legitimate and illegitimate  relations of  the  Nawab 60% of the income was to go  to  Ameerunnissa Begum and her issues and the remaining 40% was to be paid to

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Mahboob and Kadiran as well as to 53 408 their children.  These recommendations were approved by  the Nizam in a Firman dated 9th July, 1936.  Previous  to this, express intimations were given  to  the surviving relations of Waliuddowla under orders of the Nizam that whatever disputes might exist among them regarding  the matrooka or personal estate of the Nawab, should be  decided by  proper  proceedings in a court of law and  pending  such decision the estate might be kept ’ under the supervision of the  Paigah Committee.  On the 8th February,  1938,  Mahboob Begum  and  her children filed a suit in  the  Dar-ul-Quaza, which  was  a court established under the law  for  deciding rights of succession, marriage, divorce etc. of the  Muslims in  the  Hyderabad  State, praying for  a  declaration  that Mahboob Begum was the legally married wife of the Nawab  and the  children  were his legitimate children  and  for  other consequential  reliefs in the shape of participation in  the matrooka  and recovery of the dower debt payable to  Mahboob Begum.  Both Ameerunnissa Begum and Kadiran Bibi as well  as their  children were among the defendants impleaded  in  the suit.  During the pendency of the suit and before it came on for actual hearing, there was a Firman issued by the  Nizara on   the   9th  February,  1937,  on  the   application   of Ameerunnissa  Begum,  directing the withdrawal of  the  suit from the Dar-ul-Quaza court and the appointment of a Special Commission  consisting  of Nawab Jiwan Yar  Jung,  the  then Chief  Justice  of Hyderabad and the Judge  of  Dar-ul-Quaza before whom the suit was pending, to investigate the  matter and  submit  a  report to the Nizam  through  the  Executive Council.   Proceedings  before the Special Commission  commenced  on 27th  March,1939.   Kadiran Bibi filed a plaint  before  the Commission  claiming on behalf of herself and  her  children the  identical reliefs which were claimed by  Mahboob  Begum and  her  children,  and though this  plaint  was  at  first rejected  by the Commission it was subsequently  entertained under specific orders of the Executive Council.  It  appears that Fatima Bibi also lodged a plaint in respect of                            409 her  Mahar against the estate of the Nawab and ,this  matter was also directed to be investigated by the Commission.  The enquiry  before the commission was a long affair in which  a large  volume  of evidence, both oral and  documentary,  was adduced.  The Commission submitted the report on October 16, 1944,  and  their  findings, in substance,  were  that  both Mahboob  Begum and Kadiran Begum were legally married  wives of Waliuddowla and hence they as well as their children were entitled  to have their legitimate shares in  the  matrooka. Fatima  Begum was also held to be a legally wedded  wife  of the Nawab, and as such entitled to the dower claimed by her. When  the report came up for consideration by the  Executive Council  the  Members of the Council were divided  in  their opinion.  A minority was in favour of accepting the findings of  the  Commission but the majority view was  that  further expert opinion should be taken in the matter.  Eventually on the  advice of the Council the Nizam directed by his  Firman dated  27th  August, 1945, that the report  of  the  Special Commission  should be scrutinised by an  Advisory  Committee consisting of three persons, namely, two Judges of the  High Court  and the Legal Adviser of the State.   This  Committee was  directed  to  examine fully the  bulky  report  of  the Special  Commission and submit their opinion with a view  to assist  the Executive Council in coming to  their  decision.

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They were not to take any fresh evidence or hear any further arguments   from  the  parties.   The   Advisory   Committee submitted  their  report  on 24th November,  1945,  and  the Committee held differing from the view taken by the  Special Commission that neither Mahboob Begum nor Kadiran Begum  was the legally wedded wife of Nawab Waliuddowla.  Despite  this report,  the majority of the Executive  Council  recommended that  the  findings  of the  Special  Commission  should  be accepted.  The Nizam accepted this recommendation and by his Firman dated 26th June, 1947, directed that the findings  of the  Special  Commission should be implemented at  an  early date. 410 There  was a proposal at the beginning that the  members  of the  Special  Commission  themselves  should  be  asked   to implement their findings, but eventually it was decided by a resolution  of the Executive Council dated  22nd  September, 1947, that the task of en forcing the recommendations of the Commission  should be entrusted to the Chief Justice of  the Hyderabad  High  Court.   It  appears  that  in   subsequent communications to the Executive Council the Nizam  expressed doubt  regarding  the status of Mahboob  Begum  and  Kadiran Begum  and suggested the replacement of the Firman  of  26th June,  1947,  by now orders in the nature of  a  compromise. The Executive Council, however, stuck to their decision  and on  17th June, 1948, the findings of the Special  Commission were transferred to the Chief Justice for executing the same as early as possible.  On 2nd July, 1948, another Firman was issued by the Nizam directing that the Chief Justice  before making the final distribution of the matrooka should  submit his  report  through the Executive Council  to  His  Exalted Highness for his sanction.  This direction was embodied in a resolution  of  the Executive Council dated  2nd  September, 1948.  The  police action in Hyderabad commenced soon after  that and it was on 25th September, 1948, after the police  action had terminated and a Military Governor was placed in  charge of  the Hyderabad State that a formal communication  of  the resolution  mentioned above was made to the  Chief  Justice. Soon  afterwards  on the application of  Ameerunnissa  Begum made  to  the Military Governor  the  execution  proceedings before the Chief Justice were stayed by an order dated  16th October,  1948.  This stay order was again cancelled on  5th November,  1948, and the execution proceedings were  allowed to  continue.   On  5th December, 1948,  the  Chief  Justice submitted  his  report  regarding the  distribution  of  the matrooka to the Executive Council.  Strangely, however, by a Firman  dated 24th February, 1949, the Nizam  purporting  to set under the advice of the Military                            411 Governor  directed  that  the  findings  of  the   three-men Advisory Committee, who differed from the views taken by the Special  Commission,  should be given effect to.   In  other words,  the claims of Mahboob Begum and Kadiran  Begum  were dismissed and Ameerunissa Begum was directed to pay one lakh of  rupees to Fatima, Begum as the dower due to the  latter. Protest was lodged against the decision by Mahboob Begum and Kadiran  Begum  and again a Firman was issued by  the  Nizam under  the  advice  of  the  Military  Governor  on  7th  of September,  1949.  By this Firman the earlier order of  24th February, 1949, was revoked and the whole case was  referred for  opinion  and  report to Sir George  Spence,  the  Legal Adviser  to the Military Governor, who was directed to  hear the parties and take such further evidence as he  considered necessary.  The enquiry then began before the Legal  Adviser

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but  neither party adduced any evidence.  Sir George  Spence submitted  his  report on 7th January, 1950.   The  material findings and recommendations in his report were as follows:- " 76.  My finding on the case is that neither Mahboob  Begum nor  Kadiran Begum was married to the Nawab with the  result that  these  ladies and their children are not  entitled  to participate in the distribution of the matrooka. 77.If  this finding is accepted, the order required for  its implementation  would be an order dismissing the  claims  of Mahboob  Begum  and  Kadiran  Begum  on  the  matrooka   and directing  Ameerunnissa Begum to pay one lakh of rupees  out of the matrooka to Fatima Begum on account of Haq Mahar."  The Constitution of India came into force on 26th January, 1960.  As Hyderabad was integrated with the Indian Union and the  Nizam lost the absolute power which he  could  exercise previously, it was no longer within his competence to  issue a Firman on the terms of the report of Sir George Spence and make it legally binding on the parties.  Recourse was 412 therefore  had  to legislation and on April 24,  1950,  this impugned   Act  was  passed  which  purported  to   give   a legislative  sanction to the findings in the report  of  Sir George  Spence.   The  material  provision  of  the  Act  is contained in section 2, clause (1), which *lays down that  " the  claims of Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum and of  their respective  children to participate in the  distribution  of the  matrooka  of  the late  Nawab  Waliuddowla  are  hereby dismissed".  The second clause of this section provides that a sum of one lakh of rupees shalt be paid to Fatima Begum on account  of her Haq Mahar.  Under section 3,  the  decisions affirmed  in section 2 cannot be called in question  in  any court  of law and finally section 4 provides that  the  High Court  of Hyderabad shall, on the application of any  person interested  in the decision affirmed in section  2,  execute the  said decision as if it were a decree passed  by  itself and  such person was a decree-holder.  It is this Act  which has  been  pronounced  to be invalid by the  High  Court  of Hyderabad  to  the extent that it dismisses  the  claims  of Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum as well as of their children to the personal estate of Nawab Waliuddowla.  It  may  be  conceded that before the  coming  in  of  the Constitution,  the  Nizam of Hyderabad  practically  enjoyed unfettered sovereign authority and however much the  various Firmans,  which  were issued by him in connection  with  the present dispute, may appear to be capricious and  arbitrary, strictly  speaking  they were not ’unconstitutional  in  the sense  that they were beyond his competence as  the  supreme legislature in the State.  After the Constitution came  into force  and  prior to the setting up of  a  duly  constituted legislature   in  the  Hyderabad  State,   the   legislative authority undoubtedly vested in the Nizam as the  Rajpramukh of  the  State  under the provision of article  385  of  the Constitution  read  with article 212-A (2) inserted  by  the President’s  (Removal  of Difficulties) Order No.  II  dated 26th January, 1950; but the legislative power exercisable by the Nizam was a strictly limited power.  The Rajpramukh                            413 was  not  only to act in conformity with  the  provision  of article  246 of the Constitution and keep within the  bounds of  the legislative sphere laid down with reference  to  the entries   in  the  different  legislative  lists,  but   the legislation  must  not  be  in  conflict  with  any  of  the fundamental  rights  guaranteed  under  Part&,  III  of  the Constitution. The impugned Act, as its title and preamble show, was passed

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with the avowed object of terminating the disputes  relating to succession to the estate of the late Nawab  Waliuddowala. Although in the report of Sir George Spence it was held that Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum were not the legally  wedded wives  of the Nawab and their children were not  legitimate, there  was  no  express declaration to that  effect  in  the operative portion of the Act which merely lays down that the claims  of these two ladies as well as of their children  to participate in the distribution of the matrooka of the  late Nawab are dismissed.  The legislation may be said to  relate to  succession and indirectly to marriage also and  as  such may  come  within the purview of entry 5, List  III  of  the Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution.  It  has  not  been argued  by  Mr. Somayya, who appeared for  the  respondents, that  a  legislation  on  these topics  must  be  a  general legislation;  but  it has not been disputed by  either  side that no valid legislation could be passed under these  heads which is discriminatory in its character and offends against the  equal protection clause embodied in article 14  of  the Constitution.   The  contention  of  the  learned  Attorney- General is that the legislation in the present case does not violate  the  principles of the equality clause and  he  has attempted to combat with much force the decision of the High Court on this point.  This is the main question in the  case which requires to be examined carefully.  The  nature and scope of the guarantee that is implied  in the  equal protection clause of the Constitution  have  been explained  and discussed in more than one decision  of  this court and do not require repetition. It is well settled that a legislature which 414 has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety  of  human relations must, of  necessity,  have  the power of making special laws to attain particular objects  ; and for that purpose it must have large powers of  selection or  classification of persons and ,*things upon  which  such laws are to operate.  Mere differentiation or inequality  of treatment  does not per so amount to  discrimination  within the  inhibition of the equal protection clause.  To  attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection  or differentiation is unreasonable or  arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view. The  learned Attorney-General in the course of his  argument laid considerable stress upon the decision of this court  in Chiranjit  Lal v. The Union of India(1) and he attempted  to call  in his aid the two propositions recognised and  relied upon  in that decision, namely, (1) that the presumption  is always  in favour of the constitutionality of an  enactment, and  (2) a law may be constitutional even though it  relates to  a  single individual, family or corporation.   The  pro- positions themselves may be well founded but whether or  not they would apply to a particular case would depend upon  the facts    and circumstances of that case. In Chiranjit  Lal’s case (1), it is to be noted, the circumstances were somewhat exceptional.   The  legislation in that case  related  to  a company  which  was  engaged in production  of  a  commodity vitally  essential  to  the community, and  in  judging  the reasonableness of the classification in such cases the court has  undoubtedly  to  look  to  the  social,  political  and economic interest of the community as a whole.  In doing so, as Prof Willis observed, the court will assume the existence of  any state of facts which can reasonably be conceived  of as  existing  at  the time of  legislation  and  capable  of sustaining the classification made by it(").

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 In the case before us what the legislature has done is to single out two groups of persons consisting of two (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869,  (2) Willis on constitutional Law, p. 580, 415 ladies and their respective children out of those who  claim to be related to the late Nawab Waliuddowla and prevent them from  getting  any  share in the personal  property  of  the latter to which they might be entitled under the general law of  the land.  They’ claim to be wives and children  of  the deceased  and,  as  such  entitled to  have  shares  in  his personal  -estate, and no competent court of law has as  yet negatived  their claims in this respect.  On what  principle then, it may be asked, was the disability imposed upon these persons  alone while the claim of the other  claimants  was, accepted  ? Nay, the legislation goes further than this  and denies  to  these specified individuals a right  to  enforce their  claim  in  a court of law,  in  accordance  with  the personal  law  that  governs the  community  to  which  they belong.  They, in fact, have been discriminated against from the  rest of the community, in respect of a  valuable  right which  the law secures to them all and the question  is,  on what  basis  this  apparently  hostile  and   discriminatory legislation can be supported. It is not suggested that it was for serving a public purpose or securing some advantage to the community as a whole  that the legislature chose in this case to interfere with private rights.   The  only purpose of the legislation,  as  appears from the preamble, was to end certain private disputes.   It is  true  that  the quarrel between the  two  rival  parties regarding succession to the estate of the deceased Nawab was going  on since, 1938; and after several  vicissitudes,  for which  the Nizam himself or his Legal Advisers -were  prima- rily  responsible, there was a report prepared by the  Legal Adviser to the State in a particular way, which, contrary to the  opinion  given  by  an  ’earlier’  Special  Commission, negatived the claims of these two ladies and their children. It  is  also true that because of the  introduction  of  the Constitution  it  was no longer possible for  the  Nizam  to issue  a  Firman  embodying this report.  That  may  be  the reason for passing this legislation but it would not furnish any rational basis 54 416 for  the discrimination that it made.  The continuance of  a dispute  even for a long period of time between two sets  of rival claimants tot he property of a private person is not a circumstance  of such unusual nature as would invest a  case with special or exceptional features and make it a class  by itself  justifying its differentiation from all other  cases of succession disputes.  As appears from the preamble to the Act, the only ground for depriving the two ladies and  their children  of  the benefits of the ordinary law is  the  fact that  there was an adverse report against them made  by  the State  Legal Adviser.  This ground is itself  arbitrary  and unreasonable.   The  dispute  regarding  succession  to  the estate of the Nawab was a legal dispute pure and simple  and without, determination of the points in issue by a  properly constituted  judicial tribunal a legislation based upon  the report  of  a nonjudicial authority and made  applicable  to specific  individuals, who are deprived thereby of  valuable rights which are enjoyed by all other persons occupying  the same  position as themselves, does, in our opinion,  plainly come within the constitutional inhibition of Article 14. The  analogy of private Acts of the British  Parliament,  to

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which reference was made by the learned Attorney-General  in the  course  of his arguments, is not at all  helpful.   The British Parliament enjoys legislative omnipotence and  there are  no  constitutional limitations upon  its  authority  or power.   There  were  indeed a few statutes  passed  by  the Provincial  Legislature-in India during British  days  which regulated  succession  to the estates  of  certain  princely families.  The Bijni Succession Act (Act.II of 1931)  passed by  the ’Assam Legislature is an enactment of this type  and it  did shut out the rights of certain persons  who  claimed the Bijni estate under the law of inheritance.  But at  that time  the  Governor-General of India had  express  authority under  the provisions of the Government of India Act,  1915, to  authorize  the  Provincial  Legislatures  to  make  laws regarding  subjects of a private nature.  Quite  apart  from this, no                            417 question  of infraction of the equal protection  rule  could arise in pre-Constitution days.  We are not unmindful of the fact   that   the   presumption  is   in   favour   of   the constitutionality of an enactment ; but when on the’ face of it  a  piece  of legislation is  palpably  unreasonable  and discriminatory  and the selection or classification made  by it  cannot  be  justified on  any  conceivable  or  rational ground, the court has got to invalidate the enactment on the ground of its violating the equal protection clause. The  learned Attorney-General contended before us  that  the High  Court was wrong in holding that there was a  concluded decree in the present case in favour of respondents 1 to  12 on   the  basis  of  the  recommendations  of  the   Special Commission,  and that this decree was a property within  the meaning of law of which these respondents have been deprived by  the  impugned legislation.  The point is not  free  from doubt,  and  much could be said on both  sides.   We  think, therefore,  that  it  would not be proper  on  our  part  to express,any  opinion  upon  it in the  present  appeal.   We understand  that  the respondents have  filed  an  execution application  in the City Civil Court of Hyderabad which  has ordered  that execution should proceed and  that  objections have   been  taken  to  this  application  by  the   present appellants  who have raised inter alia the point that  there is  no  final  and  effective decree  which  is  capable  of execution.   As  the point is still pending hearing  by  the Civil  Court  of Hyderabad, we do not  desire  to  influence their decision in any way by expressing any opinion on  this matter.   We only desire to state that  notwithstanding  the observations  made by the High Court referred to above,  the question shall be treated as an open one.  The applicability of  article 14 of the Constitution in the present  case  is, however, not at all dependent upon the fact as to whether or not  the respondents have already acquired property  in  the shape  of a decree.  Their claim to the estate of  the  late Nawab  which they wanted to assert under the general law  of the land is itself a valuable right, and 418 the  deprivation of that right by a piece of  discriminatory legislation would be sufficient to bring the case within the purview of article 14 of the Constitution.  Having  regard  to  the view that we  have  taken,  it  as unnecessary  to  consider whether the  impugned  Legislation violates  the provisions of article 31(1) or  article  19(1) (f)  of the Constitution.  The result is that the appeal  is dismissed with costs.    Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellants: Bajinder Narain.

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Agent for respondents Nos. 1- to 12               M. S. H.                          Sastri.