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REPORTABLE   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 299 OF 2016

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2866 of 2011)

AMANULLAH AND ANR.                ………APPELLANTS

Vs.

STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.           ……RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted.

2.This  criminal  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  

against  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

08.12.2010 in Crl. Misc. No. 5777 of 2009 passed by  

the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Patna  whereby  it  

allowed  the  said  criminal  miscellaneous  petition  

filed by the respondent nos.2 to 9 herein, by setting  

aside the cognizance order dated 10.11.2008 passed by  

the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rosera,

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Bihar in Singhia Police Case No.37/2008 and quashed  

the criminal prosecution.

3.Brief  facts  of  the  case  are  stated  hereunder  to  

appreciate  the  rival  legal  contentions  urged  on  

behalf of the parties:

The  case  of  the  prosecution  is  that  on  

29.03.2008, the informant-Mukhtar went to the house  

of his relative at village-Navdega and stayed there.  

On 30.03.2008, at about 12.00 noon, his uncle Md.  

Hasim  informed  him  on  telephone  that  his  wife’s  

condition  was  serious  and  she  was  being  taken  to  

Singhia  for  treatment.  Mukhtar  was  asked  to  reach  

Singhia.  It  is  alleged  by  the  informant  that  on  

reaching Singhia, he neither found his wife nor his  

uncle. On enquiry from his uncle, he was informed  

about the death of his wife. Thereafter, he reached  

his house and saw the dead body of his wife. His  

uncle  disclosed  him  that  his  wife-Tamanna  Khatoon  

(since deceased) had gone to maize field wherein she  

was found lying with her mouth and nose tied with her

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dupatta. She was spotted by one Hira Sada (PW-2), who  

was  returning  with  her  daughter.  Upon  hearing  the  

noise made by the deceased she raised alarm and upon  

hearing the same informant’s uncle-Md. Hasim along  

with others reached the spot and took Tamanna Khatoon  

to  Singhia  for  treatment.  She  died  on  the  way  to  

Singhia.  On  30.03.2008  FIR  was  lodged  by  Mukhtar,  

husband  of  the  deceased  against  Md.  Raju  and  Md.  

Halim  @  Mangnu-  appellant  no.2  herein  for  the  

offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120B read  

with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short  

“IPC”).

4.During investigation, many witnesses deposed before  

the Judicial Magistrate, Rosera under Section 164 of  

the CrPC wherein it has been alleged that Mukhtar,  

husband of the deceased has killed his wife.  

5.On 30.09.2008 charge sheet no.111/2008 in respect of  

FIR  No.  37/2008  was  filed  in  the  Court  of  Chief  

Judicial  Magistrate  (CJM),  Rosera  by  the  police  

against Md. Hasim, Md. Noor Hasan, Md. Safique and

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Jhothi Sada.   

6.After  filing  of  the  charge  sheet,  Mukhtar  started  

threatening the witnesses. With a view to threaten  

the  appellant  no.1  on  17.10.2008,  he  reached  his  

house  with  pistol  and  dagger.  The  appellant  no.1  

raised hue and cry and upon hearing the same, co-

villagers caught Mukhtar with arms, after a chase.  

FIR No. 104/08 was registered against him for the  

offence punishable under Sections 25 and 26 of the  

Arms Act, 1959 at Singhia Police Station.  

7.On  31.10.2008,  a  supplementary  charge  sheet  

no.126/2008, in respect of FIR No. 37/2008 was filed  

before  the  learned  CJM  by  the  police  against  Md.  

Mukhtar @ Munna, Md. Nazre Alam and Md. Farukh.  

 8.The learned CJM after considering the material placed  

before  him  vide  order  dated  10.11.2008.took  

cognizance  under  Sections  302  and  120B  read  with  

Section  34  of  the  IPC  against  Mukhtar  and  other  

accused-persons.

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9.Aggrieved  by  the  cognizance  order  passed  by  the  

learned CJM in PS Case No. 37/2008, respondent nos. 2  

to 9 approached the High Court of Judicature at Patna  

by preferring Crl. Misc. No. 5777/2009 under Section  

482 of Cr.PC for quashing the order of learned CJM  

dated 10.11.2008.  

10. The  High  Court  by  its  order  dated  08.12.2010  

allowed  the  said  petition  by  setting  aside  the  

cognizance order passed by the learned CJM and also  

quashed the criminal prosecution. Aggrieved by the  

said order, the appellants herein, who are interested  

private  parties,  have  filed  this  appeal  urging  

various grounds.

11. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, the learned counsel for the  

appellants contended that the High Court has failed  

to  appreciate  that  the  FIR  and  the  charge  sheet  

establish a prima-facie case against the respondent  

nos. 2-9. He submitted that when the allegations made  

against the accused person show a prima-facie case,  

criminal proceedings ought not to have been quashed

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by  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its  power  under  

Section 482 of Cr.PC.

12. It was further contended that the High Court has  

erred in setting aside the cognizance order passed by  

the  learned  CJM  as  the  extraordinary  or  inherent  

powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction to act  

according to whim or caprice. He further submitted  

that the power of quashing criminal proceedings is to  

be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and  

that too in rarest of rare cases.

13. It was further contended by the learned counsel  

that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence  

it  would  not  be  proper,  simply  on  the  basis  of  

material  placed  before  the  court  by  investigating  

agency,  to  determine  whether  a  conviction  is  

sustainable  or  not.  The  High  Court  has  erred  in  

appreciating  the  same  by  quashing  the  cognizance  

order passed by the learned CJM. He further submitted  

that the inherent power to quash the proceedings can  

be exercised only in a case where the material placed

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before the court does not disclose any offence or the  

allegations  made  therein  are  found  frivolous,  

vexatious or oppressive. At this stage there should  

not be any meticulous analysis of the case, before  

the trial, to find out whether the case would end in  

conviction or acquittal.

14. It was further contended that in the instant case  

the  charge  sheet  and  FIR  clearly  establish  the  

involvement and active participation of the accused-

persons  which  the  High  Court  has  failed  to  

appreciate.

15. It was further submitted by the learned counsel  

that  the  appellants  have  locus  standi  to  maintain  

this appeal for the reason that the appellants have  

connection with matter at hand as appellant no.1 was  

threatened  by  the  informant-Mukhtar  and  appellant  

no.2 was falsely implicated by the informant-Mukhtar  

in  the  case  of  murder  of  his  wife.  Both  the  

appellants are aggrieved by the impugned order passed  

by the High Court setting aside the cognizance order

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passed  by  the  Trial  Court.  In  support  of  the  

aforesaid he placed reliance upon the Constitution  

Bench decision of this Court in the case of  P.S.R  

Sadhanantham  v. Arunanchalam1.  He  further  placed  

reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Ramakant  

Rai v.  Madan Rai & Ors2,  Esher Singh v.  State of  

A.P.3,  Ramakant Verma v.  State of U.P.4 and  Ashish  

Chadha v. Asha Kumari & Ors5.

16. Per  contra,  Mr.  Shishir  Pinaki,  the  learned  

counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  

contended  that  the  answering  respondents  have  not  

been named in the FIR. The FIR in this case is based  

on  the  statement  of  Mukhtar  against  two  persons,  

namely Md. Raju and Md. Halim for the murder of his  

wife and it was registered under Sections 302 and  

120B  read  with  Section  34  of  the  IPC.  He  further  

submitted that on 11.04.2008, the informant-Mukhtar  

1   (1980) 3 SCC 141

2   (2003) 12 SCC 395

3   (2004) 11 SCC 585

4   (2008) 17 SCC 257

5   (2012) 1 SCC 680

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filed  a  protest  petition  before  the  learned  CJM,  

Rosera. In the said protest petition it was brought  

to the notice of the court that originally he had  

given a written complaint to the police about the  

murder of his wife against five persons, namely Md.  

Raju, Md. Halim @ Mangnu, Khalid Gulab, Abu Quaiyum  

and Md. Amid Hussain for offences under Sections 376,  

302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. However, the  

local police in collusion with the accused-persons  

dropped the names of three accused persons and also  

dropped charge under Section 376 of the IPC against  

them  knowingly  and  intentionally.  The  course  of  

investigation  was  diverted  in  wrong  direction  to  

falsely implicate the respondent nos. 2-9.  

17.  It was further contended by the learned counsel  

that  the  instant  case  is  a  unique  case  as  the  

accused-persons  are  made  prosecution  witnesses  and  

apart from them another set of tutored witnesses have  

been  introduced  in  the  case,  who  are  not  eye  

witnesses  to  the  incident  and  have  in  their  

deposition under Section 164 of the CrPC, before the  

Judicial  Magistrate  deposed  that  the  informant-

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husband might have killed his wife. The High Court  

has rightly taken a very serious view of the whole  

matter and after proper scrutiny of the documents and  

material placed on record has come to an appropriate  

finding that the case against the respondent nos.2-9  

is merely based on suspicion and therefore, it has  

rightly quashed the proceedings against them.

18.  He  further  submitted  that  after  the  incident  

Manjoor Alam father of the deceased in his statement  

before the police did not blame Mukhtar husband of  

the deceased for the murder of his daughter. As far  

as other respondents are concerned, apart from the  

informant, they all are strangers to the matter and  

have been falsely implicated in this case by the  

local  police  at  the  behest  of  the  real  accused  

persons.  

19.  It was further submitted by the learned counsel  

that  the  father  and  mother  of  the  deceased  have  

given their statement on a stamp paper before the  

Notary  Public  that  their  daughter  was  having  a

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cordial matrimonial life with her husband and she  

was not being tortured by her husband or his family  

members in connection with any dowry demand.   

20. By placing reliance upon the decision of this  

Court  in  J.K.  International v.  State  (Govt.  of  

Delhi) and Ors6 and HDFC Bank Ltd. & Anr. v. Nagpur  

District  Security  Guard  Board  &  Anr.7,  it  was  

further submitted by the learned counsel that the  

appellants have failed to disclose their bonafide  

connection with the cause of action, to be precise  

with the victim and thus, have no locus standi to  

maintain  this  appeal.  Therefore,  this  appeal  

deserves to be dismissed on this score.

21. While concluding his contentions he submitted  

that the order passed by the High Court is a well  

reasoned order and the same does not suffer from  

any ambiguity. The decision of the High Court is  

also  justified  in  the  light  of  decision  of  this  

Court in the case of  State of Haryana  v. Bhajan  

6   (2001) 3 SCC 462

7   2008 Cri. L.J. 995

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Lal8. Therefore, no interference of this Court is  

required in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

22. After considering the rival legal contentions  

urged  on  behalf  of  both  the  parties,  following  

issues would arise for our consideration:

1.Whether this appeal is maintainable by the  

appellants on the ground of the locus standi?

2.Whether the High Court, in the instant case,  

has  exceeded  its  jurisdiction  while  

exercising its inherent power under Section  

482 of the CrPC?

3.What order?

 Answer to Point No.1 23. The term ‘locus standi’ is a latin term, the  

general meaning of which is ‘place of standing’.  

The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edn., at  

8   1992 Supp(1) SCC 335

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page 834, defines the term ‘locus standi’ as the  

right or capacity to bring an action or to appear  

in a court. The traditional view of ‘locus standi’  

has  been  that  the  person  who  is  aggrieved  or  

affected has the standing before the court, i.e.,  

to say he only has a right to move the court for  

seeking justice. Later, this Court, with justice-

oriented  approach,  relaxed  the  strict  rule  with  

regard to ‘locus standi’, allowing any person from  

the society not related to the cause of action to  

approach the court seeking justice for those who  

could  not  approach  themselves.  Now  turning  our  

attention  towards  the  criminal  trial,  which  is  

conducted, largely, by following the procedure laid  

down in the CrPC. Since, offence is considered to  

be  a  wrong  committed  against  the  society,  the  

prosecution against the accused person is launched  

by the State. It is the duty of the State to get  

the  culprit  booked  for  the  offence  committed  by  

him. The focal point, here, is that if the State  

fails in this regard and the party having bonafide  

connection  with  the  cause  of  action,  who  is  

aggrieved by the order of the court cannot be left

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at the mercy of the State and without any option to  

approach the appellate court for seeking justice.  

In  this  regard,  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  

Court  in  the  case  of  P.S.R.  Sadhanantham’s case  

(supra) has elaborately dealt with the aforesaid  

fact situation. The relevant paras 13, 14 and 25 of  

which read thus:

“13.  It  is  true  that  the  strictest  vigilance over abuse of the process of the  court,  especially  at  the  expensively  exalted level of the Supreme Court, should  be  maintained  and  ordinarily  meddlesome  bystanders should not be granted “visa”. It  is  also  true  that  in  the  criminal  jurisdiction  this  strictness  applies  a  fortiori since an adverse verdict from this  Court may result in irretrievable injury to  life or liberty.

14. Having  said  this,  we  must  emphasise  that  we  are  living  in  times  when  many  societal pollutants create new problems of  unredressed  grievance  when  the  State  becomes the sole repository for initiation  of criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermic  indifference of bureaucratic officials, at  other  times  politicisation  of  higher  functionaries may result in refusal to take  a case to this Court under Article 136 even  though  the  justice  of  the  lis  may  well  justify it. While “the criminal law should  not  be  used  as  a  weapon  in  personal  vendettas between private individuals”, as  Lord Shawcross once wrote, in the absence  of  an  independent  prosecution  authority  easily accessible to every citizen, a wider  connotation of the expression “standing” is

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necessary  for  Article  136  to  further  its  mission. There are jurisdictions in which  private individuals — not the State alone —  may  it  statute  criminal  proceedings. The  Law Reforms Commission (Australia) in its  Discussion Paper No. 4 on “Access to Courts  — I Standing: Public Interest Suits” wrote:

“The  general  rule,  at  the  present  time,  is  that  anyone  may  commence  proceedings  and  prosecute  in  the  Magistrate  court. The  argument for  retention  of  that  right  arises  at  either  end  of  the  spectrum  —  the  great cases and the frequent petty  cases.  The  great  cases  are  those  touching  Government  itself  —  a  Watergate  or  a  Poulson.  However  independent they may legally be any  public  official,  police  or  prosecuting  authority,  must  be  subject  to  some  government  supervision  and  be  dependent  on  Government funds; its officers will  inevitably have personal links with  government. They will be part of the  ‘establishment’. There may be cases  where a decision not to prosecute a  case having political ramifications  will be seen, rightly or wrongly, as  politically motivated. Accepting the  possibility of occasional abuse the  Commission  sees merit  in retaining  some right of a citizen to ventilate  such a matter in the courts.”

Even the English System, as pointed by the  Discussion Paper permits a private citizen  to  file  an  indictment.  In  our  view  the  narrow limits set in vintage English Law,  into  the  concept  of  person  aggrieved  and  “standing”  needs  liberalisation  in  our  democratic  situation.  In  Dabholkar  case  this Court imparted such a wider meaning.  The  American  Supreme  Court  relaxed  the

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restrictive attitude towards “standing” in  the  famous  case  of  Baker v.  Carr.  Lord  Denning,  in  the  notable  case  of  the  Attorney-General  of  the  Gambia v.  Pierra  Sarr N’jie, spoke thus:

“...  the  words  “person  aggrieved”  are of wide import and should not be  subjected  to  a  restrictive  interpretation. They do not include,  of course, a mere busybody who is  interfering in things which do not  concern him;”

Prof. S.A. de Smith takes the same view:

“All  developed  legal  systems  have  had to face the problem of adjusting  conflicts between two aspects of the  public  interest —  the desirability  of  encouraging  individual  citizens  to  participate  actively  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law,  and  the  undesirability  of  encouraging  the  professional  litigant  and  the  meddlesome interloper to invoke the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  in  matters that do not concern him.”

Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note: “In other words, certiorari is not  confined by a narrow conception of  locus standi. It contains an element  of  the  actio  popularis.  This  is  because it looks beyond the personal  rights  of  the  applicant;  it  is  designed  to  keep  the  machinery  of  justice in proper working order by  preventing  inferior  tribunals  and  public  authorities  from  abusing  their powers.”

In  Dabholkar case, one of us wrote in his  separate opinion:

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“  The  possible  apprehension  that    widening  legal  standing  with  a  public  connotation  may  unloose  a  flood  of  litigation  which  may  overwhelm  the  Judges  is  misplaced  because  public  resort  to  court  to  suppress  public  mischief  is  a  tribute to the justice system.”

This view is echoed by the Australian Law  Reforms Commission.              XX            XX             XX

25. In India also, the criminal law envisages  the State as a prosecutor. Under the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  the  machinery  of  the  State  is  set  in  motion  on  information  received  by  the  police  or  on  a  complaint  filed  by  a  private  person  before  a  Magistrate. If the case proceeds to trial and  the accused is acquitted, the right to appeal  against  the  acquittal  is  closely  circumscribed.  Under  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, 1898, the State was entitled to  appeal to the High Court, and the complainant  could do so only if granted special leave to  appeal by the High Court. The right of appeal  was not given to other interested persons.  Under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973,  the right of appeal vested in the States has  now been made subject to leave being granted  to  the  State  by  the  High  Court.  The  complainant continues to be subject to the  prerequisite condition that he must obtain  special  leave  to  appeal.  The  fetters  so  imposed on the right to appeal are prompted  by the reluctance to expose a person, who has  been  acquitted  by  a  competent  court  of  a  criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension  of a further examination of the case, even  though it is held by a superior court. The  Law Commission of India gave anxious thought  to this matter, and while noting that the  Code recognised a few exceptions by way of  permitting  a  person  aggrieved  to  initiate

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proceedings in certain cases and permitting  the  complainant  to  appeal  against  an  acquittal  with  special  leave  of  the  High  Court, expressed itself against the general  desirability  to  encourage  appeals  against  acquittal.  It  referred  to  the  common  law  jurisprudence obtaining in England and other  countries  where  a  limited  right  of  appeal  against acquittal was vested in the State and  where  the  emphasis  rested  on  the  need  to  decide a point of law of general importance  in  the  interests  of  the  general  administration and proper development of the  criminal  law.  But  simultaneously  the  Law  Commission also noted that if the right to  appeal  against  acquittal  was  retained  and  extended  to  a  complainant  the  law  should  logically cover also cases not instituted on  complaint. It observed:

“Extreme  cases  of  manifest  injustice,  where  the  Government  fails  to  act,  and  the  party  aggrieved has a strong feeling that  the  matter  requires  further  consideration,  should  not,  in  our  view, be left to the mercy of the  Government. To inspire and maintain  confidence in the administration of  justice, the limited right of appeal  with leave given to a private party  should  be  retained,  and  should  embrace  cases initiated  on private  complaint  or  otherwise  at  the  instance of an aggrieved person.”

However, when the Criminal Procedure Code,  1973  was  enacted  the  statute,  as  we  have  seen, confined the right to appeal, in the  case  of  private  parties  to  a  complainant.  This is, as it were, a material indication of  the policy of the law.”

           (emphasis supplied by this Court)

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24. Further, this Court in the case of  Ramakant  

Rai’s case (supra) has held thus:

“12. A  doubt  has  been  raised  about  the  competence  of  a  private  party  as  distinguished from the State, to invoke the  jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136  of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short  “the  Constitution”)  against  a  judgment  of  acquittal by the High Court. We do not see  any  substance  in  the  doubt.  The  appellate  power vested in this Court under Article 136  of  the  Constitution  is  not  to  be  confused  with the ordinary appellate power exercised  by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals  under  specific  statutes.  It  is  a  plenary  power,  “exercisable  outside  the  purview  of  ordinary law” to meet the pressing demands of  justice (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj  Singh).  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  neither confers on anyone the right to invoke  the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits  anyone  from  invoking  the  Court’s  jurisdiction.  The  power  is  vested  in  this  Court  but  the  right  to  invoke  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  is  vested  in  no  one.  The  exercise of the power of this Court is not  circumscribed by any limitation as to who may  invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by  the  High  Court  has  led  to  a  serious  miscarriage  of  justice,  this  Court  cannot  refrain from doing its duty and abstain from  interfering  on  the  ground  that  a  private  party  and  not  the  State  has  invoked  the  Court’s  jurisdiction.  We  do  not  have  slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals  against judgments of acquittal by the High  Court at the instance of interested private  parties  also.  The  circumstance  that  the  Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short “the  Code”) does not provide for an appeal to the  High Court against an order of acquittal by a

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subordinate  court,  at  the  instance  of  a  private  party,  has  no  relevance  to  the  question  of  the  power  of  this  Court  under  Article 136. We may mention that in Mohan Lal  v.  Ajit Singh this Court interfered with a  judgment of acquittal by the High Court at  the  instance  of  a  private  party.  An  apprehension  was  expressed  that  if  appeals  against  judgments  of  acquittal  at  the  instance  of  private  parties  are  permitted  there may be a flood of appeals. We do not  share the apprehension. Appeals under Article  136 of the Constitution are entertained by  special leave granted by this Court, whether  it  is  the  State  or  a  private  party  that  invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, and  special leave is not granted as a matter of  course  but  only  for  good  and  sufficient  reasons, on well-established practice of this  Court.”

              In  Esher Singh’s case (supra), it has been held by  

this Court that Article 136 of the Constitution of  

India neither confers on anyone the right to invoke  

the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone  

from invoking it. The relevant para 29 of the case  

reads thus:

“29. A  doubt  has  been  raised  in  many  cases  about  the  competence  of  a  private  party  as  distinguished  from  the  State,  to  invoke  the  jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of  the  Constitution  against  a  judgment  of  acquittal by the High Court. We do not see any  substance  in  the  doubt.  The  appellate  power  vested in this Court under Article 136 of the  Constitution  is  not  to  be  confused  with  ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate  courts and appellate tribunals under specific

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statutes. It is a plenary power “exercisable  outside the purview of ordinary law” to meet  the  pressing  demands  of  justice.  (See  Durga  Shankar Mehta v.  Raghuraj Singh.)  Article 136  of the Constitution neither confers on anyone  the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this  Court  nor  inhibits  anyone  from  invoking  the  Court’s jurisdiction. The power is vested in  this Court but the right to invoke the Court’s  jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise  of the power of this Court is not circumscribed  by  any  limitation  as  to  who  may  invoke  it.  Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court  has led to a serious miscarriage of justice,  this Court cannot refrain from doing its duty  and abstain from interfering on the ground that  a private party and not the State has invoked  the Court’s jurisdiction. We do not have the  slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals  against  judgments  of  acquittal  by  the  High  Court  at  the  instance  of  interested  private  parties also. The circumstance that the Code  does  not  provide  for  an  appeal  to  the  High  Court  against  an  order  of  acquittal  by  a  subordinate court, at the instance of a private  party, has no relevance to the question of the  power of this Court under Article 136. We may  mention that in  Mohan Lal v.  Ajit Singh this  Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal  by the High Court at the instance of a private  party. An apprehension was expressed that if  appeals against judgments of acquittal at the  instance  of  private  parties  are  permitted,  there may be a flood of appeals. We do not  share the apprehension. Appeals under Article  136  of  the  Constitution  are  entertained  by  special leave granted by this Court, whether it  is the State or a private party that invokes  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court,  and  special  leave is not granted as a matter of course but  only  for  good  and  sufficient  reasons,  well  established by the practice of this Court.”

             (emphasis supplied by this Court)

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Further, in Rama Kant Verma’s case (supra) this Court  

has reiterated the aforesaid view that the appellate  

power  of  this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the  

Constitution  of  India  is  not  just  an  ordinary  

appellate  power  exercised  by  appellate  courts  and  

appellate tribunals under specific statutes. It is a  

plenary  power  which  can  be  exercised  outside  the  

purview of ordinary law to meet the ends of justice.  

The relevant para 16 of the case reads thus:

“16. In  Ramakant  Rai v.  Madan  Rai it  was  inter alia observed as follows: (SCC p. 402,  para 12)

“12. A doubt has been raised about the  competence  of  a  private  party  as  distinguished from the State, to invoke  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  1950  (in  short  ‘the  Constitution’)  against  a  judgment  of  acquittal by the High Court. We do not  see  any  substance  in  the  doubt.  The  appellate  power  vested  in  this  Court  under Article 136 of the Constitution is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  ordinary  appellate  power  exercised  by  appellate  courts  and  Appellate  Tribunals  under  specific  statutes.  It  is  a  plenary  power, ‘exercisable outside the purview  of  ordinary  law’  to  meet  the  pressing  demands  of  justice  (see    Durga  Shankar    Mehta   v.   Thakur Raghuraj Singh  ). Article    136 of the Constitution neither confers  on  anyone  the  right  to  invoke  the  jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits

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anyone  from  invoking  the  Court’s  jurisdiction.  The  power  is  vested  in  this Court but the right to invoke the  Court’s  jurisdiction  is  vested  in  no  one. The exercise of the power of this  Court  is  not  circumscribed  by  any  limitation  as  to  who  may  invoke  it.  Where  a  judgment  of  acquittal  by  the  High  Court  has  led  to  a  serious  miscarriage  of  justice,  this  Court  cannot refrain from doing its duty and  abstain from interfering on the ground  that a private party and not the State  has invoked the Court’s jurisdiction. We  do not have slightest doubt that we can  entertain  appeals  against  judgments  of  acquittal  by  the  High  Court  at  the  instance  of  interested  private  parties  also. The circumstance that the Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973  (in  short  ‘the  Code’) does not provide for an appeal to  the  High  Court  against  an  order  of  acquittal by a subordinate court, at the  instance  of  a  private  party,  has  no  relevance to the question of the power  of this Court under Article 136. We may  mention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh  this Court interfered with a judgment of  acquittal  by  the  High  Court  at  the  instance  of  a  private  party.  An  apprehension  was  expressed  that  if  appeals  against  judgments  of  acquittal  at the instance of private parties are  permitted  there  may  be  a  flood  of  appeals.  We  do  not  share  the  apprehension. Appeals under Article 136  of the Constitution are entertained by  special  leave  granted  by  this  Court,  whether  it  is  the  State  or  a  private  party that invokes the jurisdiction of  this  Court,  and  special  leave  is  not  granted as a matter of course but only  for  good  and  sufficient  reasons,  on  well-established  practice  of  this  Court.””

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   (emphasis supplied by this Court)

25.  After considering the case law relied upon by  

the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the  

respondents, in the light of the material placed on  

record, we are of the view that the appellants have  

locus  standi  to  maintain  this  appeal.  From  the  

material  placed  on  record,  it  is  clear  that  the  

appellants have precise connection with the matter at  

hand and thus, have locus to maintain this appeal.  

The learned counsel for the appellants has rightly  

placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgment  

of this Court, namely, P.S.R Sadhanantham (supra) and  

other decisions of this Court in Ramakant Rai, Esher  

Singh,  Ramakant  Verma  (supra).  Further,  it  is  

pertinent here to observe that it may not be possible  

to strictly enumerate as to who all will have locus  

to  maintain  an  appeal  before  this  Court  invoking  

Article 136 of the Constitution of India, it depends  

upon the factual matrix of each case, as each case  

has its unique set of facts. It is clear from the  

aforementioned  case  law  that  the  Court  should  be  

liberal in allowing any third party, having bonafide

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connection with the matter, to maintain the appeal  

with a view to advance substantial justice. However,  

this power of allowing a third party to maintain an  

appeal should be exercised with due care and caution.  

Persons,  unconnected  with  the  matter  under  

consideration  or  having  personal  grievance  against  

the accused should be checked. A strict vigilance is  

required to be maintained in this regard.

 Answer to Point No.2

26.   A careful reading of the material placed on  

record reveals that the learned CJM took cognizance  

of the offences alleged against the accused-persons  

after a perusal of case diary, chargesheet and other  

material placed before the court. The cognizance was  

taken, as a prima facie case was made out against the  

accused-persons. It is well settled that at the stage  

of taking cognizance, the court should not get into  

the merits of the case made out by the police, in the  

chargesheet filed by them, with a view to calculate  

the success rate of prosecution in that particular  

case. At this stage, the court’s duty is limited to

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the extent of finding out whether from the material  

placed before it, offence alleged therein against the  

accused is made out or not with a view to proceed  

further  with  the  case.  The  proposition  of  law  

relating  to  Section  482  of  the  CrPC  has  been  

elaborately dealt with by this Court in Bhajan Lal’s  

case (supra). The relevant paras 102 and 103 of which  

read thus:  

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation  of  the  various  relevant  provisions  of  the  Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles  of law enunciated by this Court in a series  of decisions relating to the exercise of the  extraordinary power under Article 226 or the  inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code  which we have extracted and reproduced above,  we give the following categories of cases by  way of illustration wherein such power could  be exercised either to prevent abuse of the  process of any court or otherwise to secure  the ends of justice, though it may not be  possible  to  lay  down  any  precise,  clearly  defined  and  sufficiently  channelised  and  inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and  to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of  cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  first information report or the complaint,  even if they are taken at their face value  and  accepted  in  their  entirety  do  not  prima facie constitute any offence or make  out a case against the accused. (2)  Where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information report and other materials, if  any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose  a  cognizable  offence,  justifying  an

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investigation  by  police  officers  under  Section 156(1) of the Code except under an  order of a Magistrate within the purview  of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)  Where  the  uncontroverted  allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or  complaint  and  the  evidence collected in support of the same  do  not  disclose  the  commission  of  any  offence and make out a case against the  accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do  not  constitute  a  cognizable  offence  but  constitute only a non-cognizable offence,  no investigation is permitted by a police  officer without an order of a Magistrate  as  contemplated  under  Section  155(2)  of  the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR  or complaint are so absurd and inherently  improbable  on  the  basis  of  which  no  prudent  person  can  ever  reach  a  just  conclusion that there is sufficient ground  for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar  engrafted in any of the provisions of the  Code or the concerned Act (under which a  criminal proceeding is instituted) to the  institution  and  continuance  of  the  proceedings  and/or  where  there  is  a  specific  provision  in  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act,  providing  efficacious  redress for the grievance of the aggrieved  party. (7)  Where  a  criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly attended with mala fide and/or  where  the  proceeding  is  maliciously  instituted  with  an  ulterior  motive  for  wreaking vengeance on the accused and with  a  view  to  spite  him  due  to  private  and  personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the  effect that the power of quashing a criminal  proceeding should be exercised very sparingly

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and with circumspection and that too in the  rarest of rare cases; that the court will not  be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as  to  the  reliability  or  genuineness  or  otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR  or the complaint and that the extraordinary  or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary  jurisdiction on the court to act according to  its whim or caprice.”

Further, this Court in the case of  Rajiv Thapar  v.  

Madan Lal Kapoor9 has laid down certain parameters to  

be followed by the High Court while exercising its  

inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, in the  

following manner:

“29. The issue being examined in the instant  case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under  Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the  initiation of the prosecution against an accused  at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage  of committal, or even at the stage of framing of  charges.  These  are  all  stages  before  the  commencement  of  the  actual  trial.  The  same  parameters  would  naturally  be  available  for  later stages as well. The power vested in the  High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages  referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching  consequences  inasmuch  as  it  would  negate  the  prosecution’s/complainant’s  case  without  allowing  the  prosecution/complainant  to  lead  evidence. Such a determination must always be  rendered with caution, care and circumspection.  To  invoke  its  inherent  jurisdiction  under  Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully  satisfied  that  the  material  produced  by  the  

9   (2013) 3 SCC 330

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accused  is  such  that  would  lead  to  the  conclusion that his/their defence is based on  sound,  reasonable,  and  indubitable  facts;  the  material produced is such as would rule out and  displace the assertions contained in the charges  levelled against the accused; and the material  produced is such as would clearly reject and  overrule  the  veracity  of  the  allegations  contained  in  the  accusations  levelled  by  the  prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient  to rule out, reject and discard the accusations  levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without  the  necessity  of  recording  any  evidence.  For  this the material relied upon by the defence  should not have been refuted, or alternatively,  cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of  sterling  and  impeccable  quality.  The  material  relied upon by the accused should be such as  would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss  and condemn the actual basis of the accusations  as  false.  In  such  a  situation,  the  judicial  conscience of the High Court would persuade it  to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to  quash such criminal proceedings, for that would  prevent  abuse  of  process  of  the  court,  and  secure the ends of justice.

30. Based  on  the  factors  canvassed  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs,  we  would  delineate  the  following steps to determine the veracity of a  prayer for quashment raised by an accused by  invoking  the  power  vested  in  the  High  Court  under Section 482 CrPC:

30.1.     Step  one  :  whether  the  material    relied  upon  by  the  accused  is  sound,  reasonable,  and  indubitable  i.e.  the  material is of sterling and impeccable  quality? 30.2.     Step  two  :  whether  the  material    relied  upon  by  the  accused  would  rule  out  the  assertions  contained  in  the  charges  levelled  against  the  accused  i.e.  the  material  is  sufficient  to

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reject  and  overrule  the  factual  assertions  contained  in  the  complaint  i.e.  the  material  is  such  as  would  persuade a reasonable person to dismiss  and  condemn  the  factual  basis  of  the  accusations as false? 30.3.     Step three  : whether the material    relied upon by the accused has not been  refuted by the prosecution/complainant;  and/or  the  material  is  such  that  it  cannot  be  justifiably  refuted  by  the  prosecution/complainant? 30.4.     Step four  : whether proceeding with    the trial would result in an abuse of  process  of  the  court,  and  would  not  serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is  in  the  affirmative,  the  judicial  conscience  of  the  High  Court  should  persuade  it  to  quash  such  criminal  proceedings in exercise of power vested  in  it  under  Section  482  CrPC.  Such  exercise of power, besides doing justice  to  the  accused,  would  save  precious  court  time,  which  would  otherwise  be  wasted in holding such a trial (as well  as  proceedings  arising  therefrom)  specially when it is clear that the same  would not conclude in the conviction of  the accused.”

             (emphasis supplied by this Court)

27.  After considering the rival legal contentions  

urged by both the parties, case law referred to supra  

and the material placed on record, we are of the view  

that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction  

under  Section  482  of  the  CrPC.  It  has  erred  in  

quashing the cognizance order passed by the learned

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CJM without appreciating the material placed before  

it in correct perspective. The High Court has ignored  

certain important facts, namely, that on 17.10.2008,  

the appellant no.1 was allegedly threatened by the  

accused-Mukhtar  for  which  FIR  No.  104/08  was  

registered against him for offences punishable under  

Sections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act, 1959. Further,  

there are statements of various witnesses made under  

Section  164  of  the  CrPC,  before  a  judicial  

magistrate, to the effect that the deceased has been  

murdered by none other than her husband-Mukhtar. The  

evidence  collected  by  the  I.O.  by  recording  the  

statement of prosecution witnesses, filed alongwith  

the chargesheet was duly considered by the learned  

CJM before taking cognizance and therefore, the same  

should  not  have  been  interfered  with  by  the  High  

Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section  

482 of the CrPC.   

 28.  Further, the High Court has failed to take into  

consideration another important aspect that the case  

at hand relates to the grave offence of murder and  

that the criminal proceedings related thereto should

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not  lightly  be  interfered  with,  which  is  a  well  

settled proposition of law.  

Answer to Point No.3 29.  Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court is  

of the view that the High Court in the instant case  

has failed to appreciate the material placed before  

it in the light of law laid down by this Court in  

Bhajan  Lal’s case  (supra)  and  has  exceeded  its  

jurisdiction while exercising its power under Section  

482 of the CrPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment and  

order passed by the High Court is liable to be set  

aside by this Court.  

30. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court  

is  set  aside  and  the  matter  is  remitted  to  the  

learned CJM for proceeding further in accordance with  

law. The appeal is allowed.

                                    ………………………………………………………J.                         [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

                                            ………………………………………………………J.                                  [UDAY UMESH LALIT]      New Delhi,

12th April, 2016