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REPORTABLE    

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 364 OF 2005  

All India Council for Technical Education      …. Appellant  

          Versus  

Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding  House’s College of Architecture & Ors.        …. Respondents  

 WITH  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8506 OF 2019  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/2011)  

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8507 OF 2019  

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 8443/2011)    

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8511 OF 2019  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20460/2011)  

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8509 OF 2019  

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17006/2016)    

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8508 OF 2019  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005/2016)  

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8510 OF 2019  

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 28121/2018)    

            J U D G M E N T  

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.  

        Delay condoned in SLP(C)No.17005 of 2016 and  

SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016. Leave is granted in all the six  

petitions for special leave to appeal.

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2. This set of appeals mainly involves the question as  

to whether the mandate of the Council of Architecture  

(CoA) or that of the All India Council for Technical  

Education (AICTE) would prevail on the question of  

granting approval and related matters to an institution  

for conducting architectural education course, if there is  

any contradiction in the opinions of these two bodies.  

Both of them are regulatory bodies constituted by  

Parliamentary legislations having power to approve or  

recognize and thereafter monitor working of such an  

institution.   

3. The CoA owes its origin to the provisions of Section  

3 of the Architects Act, 1972 (the 1972 Act).  AICTE has  

also been constituted under the provisions of Section 3 of  

the All India Council of Technical Education Act, 1987  

(the 1987 Act). As the preambles of these two statutes  

suggest, the former has been enacted to provide for  

registration of Architects and for matters connected  

therewith. The object of the latter statute is to provide for  

a Council with a view to proper planning and coordinated  

development of the technical education system  

throughout the country, promotion of qualitative

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improvements of such education in relation to planned  

quantitative growth and the regulation and proper  

maintenance of norms and standards in the technical  

education system and for matters connected therewith.  

Section 2(g) of the 1987 Act stipulates:-  

“technical education” means programmes of  education, research and training in engineering  

technology, architecture, town planning,  management, pharmacy and applied arts and crafts  and such other programme or areas as the central  

government may, in consultation with the Council,  by notification in the official Gazette, declare;”  

4. Though the preamble of the 1972 Act projects the  

aim of the legislation to provide for registration of  

architects, this statute also deals with educational aspects  

of a course in architecture. Duties of CoA under the 1972  

Act includes undertaking steps for recognizing  

qualifications for the purposes of the said Act. Such  

recognition, as, contemplated by the Act, is at two levels.  

There is a schedule to the Act which lists diplomas and  

degrees awarded by named Indian and foreign institutes  

or bodies.  Section 14 of the 1972 Act describes them as  

authorities. These degrees and diplomas are recognized  

qualifications under the said statute. There is also  

provision for amendment of the schedule, so as to  

incorporate therein architectural qualification granted by

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any authority in India. The CoA under the said Act however  

has not been conferred with the power to directly recognise  

the architectural qualification. The Central government is  

the authority to undertake that exercise. CoA under the  

1972 statute is a consulting body. The effect of recognition  

by the Central Government is that such recognised  

qualification shall be sufficient for enrollment in the  

register of architects maintained under the said Act. After  

such registration, a person can claim to be an architect  

under the law.  Section 25 of the 1972 Act prescribes three  

modes for entry into the register, the main one being  

holding a recognised qualification. Sub-clause (b) of the  

said provision preserves the right of practising architects  

at the time of initial preparation of the register.  The said  

sub-clause is not relevant so far the subject-controversy is  

involved.  Section 25 (c) prescribes as a condition for  

entering one’s name in the register, possession of such  

other qualifications as may be prescribed by the Rules.   

But no such Rule providing for any additional qualification  

has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel  

appearing for the parties.

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5. On the question of qualification of architects,  

Section 2 (d) of the 1972 Act defines “recognised  

qualification” to mean any qualification in architecture for  

the time being included in the Schedule or notified under  

Section 15 thereof. The lis in this set of appeals does not  

relate to the provisions of Section 15 of the 1972 Act, which  

is in respect of qualification from a foreign educational  

body.            

6.  The expression “approval”, however, is not  

employed in the 1972 Act.  This Act deals with recognition  

of qualification in architecture. Section 14 of the 1972 Act  

stipulates: -  

“14.   Recognition of qualifications granted by         

authorities in India.— (1)  The  qualifications                     

included  in the Schedule or notified under Section  

15 shall be recognised qualifications for the                        

purposes of this Act.  

(2) Any authority in India which grants an                 

architectural qualification not included in the  

Schedule may apply to the  Central Government to  

have such qualification recognised, and the Central  

Government, after consultation with the Council,  

may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend  

the Schedule so as to include such qualification  

therein, and any such notification may also direct  

that an entry shall be made in the Schedule against  

such architectural qualification declaring that it  

shall be a recognised qualification only when  

granted after a specified date:  

Provided that until the first Council is                    

constituted, the Central Government shall, before                 

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issuing any notification as aforesaid, consult an                 

Expert Committee consisting of three members to be  

appointed by the Central Government by notification  

in the Official Gazette.”  

7.    The power to amend the schedule is vested with the  

Central Government under Section 16 of the 1972 Act. This  

provision reads:-  

“16. Power of Central Government to amend  

Schedule.—Notwithstanding anything contained in  

sub-section (2) of Section 14, the Central Government,  

after consultation with the Council, may, by  

notification in the Official Gazette, amend the  

Schedule by directing that an entry be made therein  

in respect of any architectural qualification.”  

8.     So far as the 1987 Act is concerned, Section 10 thereof,  

inter-alia, specifies: -  

“POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL  

10. It shall be the duty of the Council to take all  

such steps as it may think fit for ensuring coor-

dinated and integrated development of    tech-

nical education and maintenance of standards  

and for the purposes of performing its functions  

under this Act, the Council may:-  

 xxx  xxx  xxx   

xxx  xxx  xxx   

(i) lay down norms and standards for courses,  

curricula, physical and instructional facilities,  

staff pattern, staff qualifications, quality instruc-

tions, assessment and         examinations;  

(j) fix norms and guidelines for charging tuition  

and other fees;  

(k) grant approval for starting new technical in-

stitutions and for introduction of new courses or

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programmes in consultation with the agencies  

concerned;  

xxx  xxx  xxx   

(m) lay down norms for granting autonomy to  

technical institutions;  

xxx  xxx  xxx   

(o) provide guidelines for admission of students  

to technical institutions and Universities                  

imparting  technical education;  

(p) inspect or cause to inspect any technical in-

stitution;  

(q) withhold or discontinue grants in respect of  

courses, programmes to such technical institu-

tions which fail to comply with the directions  

given by the Council within the stipulated period  

of time and take such other steps as may be nec-

essary for ensuring compliance of the directions  

of the Council;”  

9. In this judgment, altogether seven appeals shall be  

dealt with, all of which involve the dispute outlined in the  

first paragraph. The main appeal which has been argued  

before us in detail is Civil Appeal No.364 of 2005. The  

appellant in this proceeding is AICTE and its appeal is  

against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay  

High Court delivered on 8th September 2004 in Writ  

Petition No.5942 of 2004. Dispute in this matter pertains  

to intake capacity of an institution by the name of Shri  

Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of  

Architecture. The CoA, on carrying out inspection of the  

college in the year 2004 chose to restore the intake

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capacity of 40 students per year which was reduced to 30  

students for two earlier academic years, 2003-2004 and  

2004-2005. Such reduced intake capacity was based on a  

joint inspection undertaken by CoA and AICTE on 25th  

April 2003.  The CoA had decided to restore the intake  

capacity to 40 students by a communication on 18th May  

2004 upon being satisfied with a compliance report filed  

by the institution followed by inspection.  For the  

Academic Year 2004-05 the Director of Technical  

Education, however, fixed the intake capacity of 30  

students in respect of same institution on the basis of  

norms and standards fixed by the AICTE. Questioning  

legality of such action, the institution and the trust which  

ran the latter, brought an action under Article 226 of the  

Constitution of India before the High Court.  The Bench of  

the High Court framed the question for adjudication in the  

following terms:  

“3…..whether the All India Council of Technical  Education Act, 1987 (for short, ‘AICTE Act’ )  

overrides the provisions of the Architects Act,  1972 in the matter of prescribing and regulating  norms and standards of architectural  

institutions. In other words, whether the AICTE  Act which is a later Act has impliedly repealed  

the provisions of the Architects Act…..”  

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10. The Bench of the Bombay High Court found, on  

examination of the scheme of both the statutes that the  

1972 Act was specially designed to deal with the architects  

and maintenance of the standards of architectural  

education and profession with recognized qualifications.  

The scope of the AICTE Act, in the opinion of the Bench,  

covered various programmes of education, research and  

training in wide range of subjects including architecture.  

The Bench held that the 1972 Act was not impliedly  

repealed by the 1987 Act and quashed the order of the  

AICTE authorities reducing the intake capacity.  Relying,  

inter alia, on a decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court  

in the case of Bharathidasan University and Another vs.  

All India Council for Technical Education & Others,1   

the High Court upheld the power of regulatory body under  

the 1972 Act as the final authority for the purpose of fixing  

the norms and standards of institutions running course  

on architecture. In the judgment appealed against, it was  

observed, after referring to different authorities: -  

“20…….. It is obvious that the legislature never  intended to confer on the AICTE a super power  undermining the status, authority and  

autonomous functioning of the existing statutory  bodies in areas and spheres assigned to them  

under the respective legislations. There is    

1  (2001) 8 SCC 676

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nothing in the AICTE Act to suggest a legislative  intention to belittle and destroy the authority or  

autonomy of Council of Architecture which is  having its own assigned role to perform. The role  

of the AICTE vis-à-vis the Council of Architects  is advisory and recommendatory and as a  guiding factor and thereby subserving the cause  

of maintaining appropriate standards and  qualitative norms. It is impossible to conceive  that the Parliament intended to abrogate the  

provisions of the Architects Act embodying a  complete code for architectural education,  

including qualifications of the architects by  enacting a general provision like section 10 of the  AICTE Act. It is clear that the Parliament did  

have before it the Architects Act when it passed  AICTE Act and Parliament never meant that the  

provisions of the Architects Act stand pro tanto  repealed by section 10 of the AICTE Act. We,  therefore, hold that the provisions of the  

Architects Act are not impliedly repealed by the  enactment of AICTE Act because in so far as the  Architecture Institutions are concerned, the final  

authority for the purposes of fixing the norms  and standards would be the Council of  

Architecture. Accordingly, we quash and set  aside the order of the Deputy Director reducing  the intake capacity of the petitioner college of  

architecture from 40 to 30. Rule is accordingly  made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and  (b) with no order as to costs.”   

11. SLP(C) No.5400 of 2011 also originates from a  

similar controversy and the appellant in this proceeding is  

Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidayalaya. This  

appeal arises out of a judgment delivered by a Division  

Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a Writ Petition  

brought by a Society (Bhartiya Vidya Mandir Shiksha  

Samiti) running a college of Architecture. The said writ  

petition was registered as W.P. No.315 of 2011 and the

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judgment was delivered on 2nd February, 2011. In this  

case, the institution had been granted permission by the  

AICTE to conduct B. Arch Degree course with intake of 80  

students for the academic sessions 2010-2011 and it was  

seeking affiliation from the said University. The Directorate  

of Technical Education had allotted 16 students to the  

institute upon conducting online counselling. The CoA,  

however, had mandated that the said institution ought to  

have a separate building, independent school or college of  

architecture and it should have separate infrastructure  

facilities for the aforesaid purpose. The appellant  

University (respondent No.2 in the Writ Petition) informed  

the institution that it could grant affiliation to them after  

approval of the programme B. Arch. by the CoA. This was  

contained in clause 2 of a communication issued by the  

University, dated 6th September 2010. In course of hearing  

before the High Court, as recorded in the judgment under  

appeal, it was submitted on behalf of the institution that it  

would construct their own building for the purpose of B.  

Arch. Degree course within a period of one year. The Bench  

of Madhya Pradesh High Court directed the appellant  

University to consider the matter with regard to grant of  

temporary affiliation to the institution without insisting

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upon compliance of condition No.2 in the letter dated 6th  

September 2010. The Bench, however, directed  

compliance of aforesaid condition of the CoA within a  

period of one year for conducting the said course and if no  

such compliance was made, and the institution could not  

get approval from AICTE (respondent No.3 in that  

proceeding) within the stipulated period, admission of  

students for B. Arch. course in future was made  

impermissible. In this decision, co-existence of power of  

both the regulatory bodies was in substance accepted. One  

of the questions on which the University wants decision of  

this Court in this appeal is whether the various regulations  

framed in pursuance of the 1972 Act could be overlooked  

by the Bench of the High Court in issuing such directions.  

12. SLP(Civil) No. 8443 of 2011 is an appeal by the  

institution concerned, being Bhartiya Vidya Mandir  

Shiksha Samiti, assailing the same judgment of the  

Madhya Pradesh High Court, delivered in Writ Petition No.  

315 of 2011 on 2nd February 2011.  In this appeal also, the  

question of conflict of powers in deciding admission norms  

between CoA and AICTE has been raised. The power of the

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CoA to direct construction of a separate building is  

specifically questioned in this appeal.  

13. The same judgment has also been assailed by the  

CoA in SLP(Civil) No. 20460 of 2011. One of the grievances  

of the CoA in this appeal is that it was not made a party in  

the Writ Petition in which the High Court had directed  

granting of temporary affiliation to the institution without  

insisting on approval of Council of Architecture. On 18th  

July 2011, a Bench comprising of two Judges of this Court  

granted permission to CoA to file this SLP.  The direction  

of the High Court in the judgment under appeal was  

conditional in that the respondent-institution was  

required to construct and create separate building and  

infrastructure within a period of one year. That was the  

specific requirement of CoA so far as Bhartiya Vidya  

Mandir Shiksha Samiti is concerned.  

14. SLP(Civil) No.17006 of 2016 has been instituted by  

AICTE challenging the legality of a common judgment and  

order passed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High  

Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of 2013 and Writ Appeal  

No.112 of 2013. The dispute in these two appeals, inter-

alia, was over contradictory directives issued by the CoA

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and AICTE in relation to admission of two students for the  

academic session 2011-2012 beyond the intake capacity  

by an institution operated by one BMS Educational Trust.  

The intake capacity so far as course of architecture was  

concerned for the applicable academic session was 80  

students. The appellate committee of the AICTE had  

recommended that excess admission fee, five times that of  

total fee collected per student, ought to have been levied in  

each case of admission beyond the intake capacity. On the  

other hand, CoA had given its approval for intake of  

additional two students during the academic year 2011-

2012 on condition that the institution would admit two  

students less than that of its intake capacity of 80 for the  

next academic session i.e. 2012-2013. In the writ petition,  

the  learned Single Judge, referring to a decision of the  

Bombay High Court in the case of Khayti Girish Purnima  

Kulkarni Vs. College of Architecture & Ors.2,  had held  

that approval of CoA was sufficient and it was not  

necessary that the petitioners (the aforesaid Trust) had to  

seek approval from the AICTE. In the appeal preferred by  

the AICTE before an Appellate Bench of the same Court, it  

 2  2012 (4) AIR BOM R 371

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was held in substance by the Division Bench that the  

decision of the learned Single Judge would be ultimately  

subject to outcome of the pending appeal before this Court  

on the same point. That appeal, we are apprised, is the  

first case in this batch of appeals. In the case of  Khayti  

Girish Purnima Kulkarni (supra), the judgment of the  

Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shri Prince  

Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s Council of  

Architecture,  Kolhapur  Vs. State of Maharashtra and  

Ors. was referred to and followed.  

15. SLP(Civil) No.17005 of 2016 is also against same  

judgment by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High  

Court by which two writ appeals stood disposed of.  AICTE  

is the appellant in this appeal. The origin of this appeal lies  

in the writ petition instituted by BMS School of  

Architecture. Legality of a circular issued by the  

Visvesvaraya University dated 19th September, 2011  

mandating all institutions teaching architecture to secure  

approval of the AICTE was questioned in that writ petition.  

Also assailed in the writ petition was an order issued by  

the State Government on 21st September, 2011 in  

substance directing compliance of the same requirement.

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The main point involved in this appeal is if AICTE norms  

can be made applicable in respect of architecture course  

or not.  

16. SLP(Civil) No.28121 of 2018 (Muslim Educational  

Association Vs. The University of Calicut & Ors.) arises  

out of a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of  

Kerala.  In this decision, it has been held that approval of  

AICTE is necessary for starting a new college of  

architecture. The petitioner in that case before the High  

Court was the said Association, which had obtained  

approval of the CoA for starting the college. The affiliating  

university – the University of Calicut had declined  

approval. One of the reasons for that was that the  

Association had not obtained approval from AICTE.  The  

Association approached the High Court invoking its writ  

jurisdiction questioning legality of the decision of the  

university declining its affiliation. In the judgment  

delivered on 29th August 2018 (in W.P.(Civil) No. 25412 of  

2018) the High Court primarily addressed the question as  

to whether approval of AICTE was necessary in addition to  

the recognition or approval granted by the CoA. Following  

an earlier decision of the same Court in the case of  Thejus

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College of Architecture Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. in  

W.P.(C) No.23858 of 2018, decided on 6th August 2018, the  

Bench dismissed the Writ Petition, inter-alia, on the  

reasoning that it did not have approval of the AICTE.    

17. In some of the cases involved in these proceedings  

appeal, the CoA has been prescribing certain measures for  

individual institutions to undertake to bring them at par  

with CoA norms. The specific provision of the 1972 Act or  

the regulations framed thereunder does not specifically  

provide for prescribing such corrective measures.  Such  

directives, however, in our opinion, are incidental to the  

regulatory powers conferred upon the CoA.  

18. There are specific provisions in the 1972 Act dealing  

with setting standards and norms for institutions dealing  

with the education of architecture. Some of these  

provisions have been referred to earlier in this judgment.  

There are also provisions for monitoring quality of  

education being imparted by the respective institutions.  

The CoA has also the power to make representation to the  

Central government in the event there are breaches of  

norms or standards prescribed by the regulations, which  

may ultimately result in withdrawal of such recognition.

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The decision making hierarchy within the CoA for making  

representations to the Central Government has also been  

statutorily prescribed, running up from inspectors to  

Executive Committee and ultimately the Council.  

19. Both the regulatory authorities under the respective  

statutes have power to frame regulations for giving effect  

to the provisions of the respective Acts. Power to make  

rules in respect of certain areas covered by the statutes  

have been vested in the Central Government both under  

the 1972 Act and the 1987 Act. So far as CoA is concerned,  

their power to make regulations is derived from Section 45  

of the 1972 Act. The said provision stipulates: -  

"45. Power of Council to make regulations.  

(1) The Council may, with the approval of the Cen- tral    Government, [by notification in the Official  Gazette] make regulations not inconsistent with the  

provisions of this Act, or the rules made thereunder  

to carry out the  purposes of this Act.  

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the                 generality of the foregoing power, such regulations  

may provide for—  

(a) the management of the property of the Coun-

cil;  

(b) the powers and duties of the President and  

the Vice-President of the Council;  

(c) the summoning and holding of meetings of the  Council and the Executive Committee or any  other committee constituted under Section 10,  

the times and places at which such meetings  shall be held, the conduct of business thereat  and the number of persons necessary to consti-

tute a quorum;

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(d) the functions of the Executive Committee or  of any other committee constituted under Sec-

tion 10;  

(e) the courses and periods of study and of                

practical training, if any, to be undertaken,  the subjects of examinations and standards of                

proficiency therein to be obtained in any col- lege or institution for grant of recognised                 

qualifications;  

(f) the appointment, powers and duties of                  

inspector;  

(g) the standards of staff, equipment,                           accommodation, training and other facilities  

for architectural education;  

(h) the conduct of professional                                

examinations, qualifications of examiners  and the conditions of admission to such                         

examinations;  

(i) the standards of professional conduct and             etiquette and code of ethics to be observed by                   

architects; and  

(j) any other matter which is to be or may be                    provided by regulations under this Act and in                    

respect of which no rules have been made.”  

(3) Every regulation made under this section shall  

be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before  each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for  a total period of thirty days which may be                         

comprised in one session or in two or more                     successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the  

session immediately following the session or the  successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree  in     making any modification in the regulation or  

both Houses agree that the regulation should not  be made, the  regulation shall thereafter have effect  only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the  

case may be; so, however, that any such                  modification or annulment shall be without               

prejudice to the validity of anything previously done  

under that regulation.” (emphasis supplied).  

20. The power to frame regulations by the AICTE  

originates from Section 23 of the 1987 Act.  This section  

stipulates:-

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“23.  Power to make regulations.—(1) The Council  may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make                    

regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of  this Act, and the rules generally to carry out the                   

purposes of this Act.  

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the gener-

ality of the foregoing power, such regulations may  provide for all or any of the following matters,  

namely:—  

(a) regulating the meetings of the Council and the             

procedure for conducting business thereat;  

(b) the terms and conditions of service of the of-

ficers and employees of the Council;  

(c) regulating the meetings of the Executive Com- mittee and the procedure for conducting busi-

ness thereat;  

(d) the area of concern, the constitution, and  

powers and functions of the Board of Studies;  

(e) the region for which the Regional Committee  

be      established and the constitution and func-

tions of such Committee.”  

21. Under the 1987 Act, the power of Central  

Government to make rules is derived from Section 22 of  

the Act.  The said provision stipulates:-  

“22. Power to make rules.—  

(1) The Central Government may, by notification in  

the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the pur-

poses of this Act.  

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the gener- ality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide  

for all or any of the following matters, namely:—  

(a) the procedure to be followed by the members  

in the discharge of their functions;  

(b) the inspection of technical institutions and       

Universities;  

(c) the form and manner in which the budget and       

reports are to be prepared by the Council;

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(d) the manner in which the accounts of the  

Council are to be maintained; and  

(e) any other matter which has to be, or may be,        

prescribed”  

22. Similar power on the Central Government has been  

conferred under Section 44 of the 1972 Act, which lays  

down:-  

“44. Power of Central Government to make rules.-

(1) The Central Government may, by notification in  the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the pur-

poses of this Act.  

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the gener- ality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide  

for all or any of the following matters, namely—  

(a) the manner in which elections under Chapter  II shall be conducted, the terms and conditions  of service of the members of the Tribunal ap- pointed under sub-section (2) of Section 5 and  

the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal;  

(b) the procedure to be followed by the expert  committee constituted under the proviso to sub- section (2) of Section 14 in the transaction of its  

business and the powers and duties of the expert  committee and the travelling and daily allow-

ances payable to the members thereof;  

(c) the particulars to be included in the register  of                 architects under sub-section (3) of  

Section 23;  

(d) the form in which a certificate of registration  is to be issued under sub-section (7) of Section  

24, sub-section (4) of Section 26 and Section 33;  

(e) the fee to be paid under Sections 24, 25, 26,  27, 28, 32 and 33;  

(f) the conditions on which a name may be                     restored to the register under the proviso to sub-

section (2) of Section 27;  

(g) the manner of endorsement under                           sub-section (3) of Section 27;  

(h) the manner in which the Council shall hold  an enquiry under Section 30;

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(i) the fee for supplying printed copies of the reg- ister under Section 34; and  

(j) any other matter which is to be or may be                  

provided by rules under this Act.  

(3) Every rule made under this Section shall be laid,  

as soon as may be after it is made, before each House  of     Parliament, while it is in session, for a total pe- riod of thirty days which may be comprised in one  

session or in two or more successive sessions, and if,  before the expiry of the session immediately following  

the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both  Houses agree in making any modification to the rule  or both Houses agree that the rule should not be  

made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in  such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may  be; so, however, that any such modification or annul-

ment shall be without prejudice to the validity of an-

ything previously done under that rule.”  

23. In course of hearing before us, on behalf of AICTE  

three Regulations have been brought to our notice by Mr.  

Pandey, learned counsel representing this body. The first  

one carries the title “All India Council for Technical  

Education (Grant of approval for starting new technical  

institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and  

approval of intake capacity of seats for the courses or  

programmes) Regulations, 1994.” This Regulation has  

been framed by the AICTE in exercise of power under  

Section 23(1) of the 1987 Act and became effective on 31st  

October, 1994.  Another Regulation, framed also in  

exercise of power under Section 23(1) read with Sections  

10 and 11 of the 1987 Act of the year 2016 in supersession

23  

of earlier regulations has also been referred to. But so far  

as the present appeals are concerned, the respective  

causes of action predates this regulation of 2016 except in  

the case of the Muslim Educational Association, i.e.  

S.L.P.(Civil) No.28121 of 2018. The other Regulation is  

titled “All India Council for Technical Education (Norms  

and Guidelines for Fees and guidelines for admission in  

Professional Colleges) Regulations, 1994, framed in  

exercise of powers conferred under Section 23(1) and  

Sections 10 (j) and (o), 1987 Act.  This one is dated 20th  

May, 1994. No other regulation or rule has been brought  

to our notice in course of hearing on behalf of AICTE.  

24. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel  

representing the CoA has referred to Minimum Standard  

of Architectural Education Regulations, 1983, framed by  

CoA in exercise of powers conferred by clauses (e), (g), (h)  

and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21  

of the 1972 Act. Another document which was produced  

before us by Dr. Dhavan is the annual report of CoA for  

the year 2017-2018. So far as this document is concerned,  

its relevance for adjudication of these appeals would be the  

content recorded under following two sub-heads therein:-

24  

“14.0 APPROVAL OF NEW INSTITUTIONS IN  

THE  ACADEMIC SESSION 2017-18:-  

During the year under the report 22 new institutions  were granted approval to impart Bachelor of Architecture  

Courses and 6 existing institutions were granted                        

approval for imparting PG Courses.  

With this, the total number of institutions imparting     recognized courses in architecture in the year 2017-18  

with the approval of Council are 468.  

The annual intake of students sanctioned by the Council  

at Undergraduate level is approximately 24741, Post-

graduate level is 1640.  

15.0 EXTENSION OF APPROVAL FOR THE     

ACADEMIC SESSION 2017-18 ONWARDS:  

The Council granted extension of approval or otherwise for  

UG and PG Courses for the academic session 2017-18 as  

under:-  

i) Institutions granted extension of approval for B.Arch.  

Course: 408  

ii) Institutions granted extension of approval for M. Arch.  

Course: 64  

iii) Institutions put on ‘No Admission’ : 12  

iv) Institution put on ‘withdrawal of approval’ : NIL  

The Council also initiated the process of inspection for the  academic session 2018-2019 which were due for                 

inspections.”  

Reporting on these subjects demonstrate CoA’s  

continued engagement in the process of recognition of  

“authorities” granting architectural qualification.  

25. We find that both the statutes have provisions for  

approval and monitoring of architecture courses run by  

institutions. So far as the 1972 Act is concerned, the  

expression employed is recognition of qualification and the

25  

ultimate authority for granting or withdrawing recognition  

to degree or diploma courses in architectural education by  

different academic institutions is the Central Government.   

The CoA under the statutory scheme however has  

significant role in such decision making process. AICTE  

has also been empowered under the 1987 Act to lay down  

standards and norms for courses on architecture along  

with other subjects coming within the term “technical  

education”. We have extracted relevant parts of Section 10  

of the 1987 Act earlier in this judgment. Both the Councils  

also appear to have had proceeded with this  

understanding. In the decision of the Bombay High Court  

delivered in the case of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha  

Boarding House’s Council of Architecture, (supra), it is  

recorded in the judgment under appeal that joint  

inspection was held in respect of the institution involved  

in that proceeding by AICTE and CoA. Moreover, under  

Section 3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have  

two persons nominated by the AICTE. On the other hand,  

Section 3 (4) (m) of the 1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is  

to consist of representatives of various bodies, including a  

member to be appointed by the Central Government to  

represent the CoA.  Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires

26  

AICTE to grant approval in consultation with the agencies  

concerned.   

26. Though both the enactments deal with several  

aspects of the main subject matter of the respective  

legislations, on the aspect of setting norms for  

architectural education and for monitoring the institutions  

engaged in imparting architectural education, there are  

overlapping powers of these two Councils. Section 14 of  

the 1972 Act has been reproduced earlier in this judgment.  

On the aspect of recognising any architectural  

qualification, Sections 18 and 19 thereof stipulate:  

“18. Power to require information as to courses  

of study and examinations.- Every authority in  India which grants a recognised qualification shall  furnish such information as the Council may, from  

time to time, require as to the courses of study and  examinations to be undergone in order to obtain  such qualification, as to the ages at which such  

courses of study and examinations are required to  be undergone and such qualification is conferred  

and generally as to the requisites for obtaining  such qualification.  

19. Inspection of examinations.-  

1.  The Executive Committee shall, subject to  regulations, if any, made by the Council, appoint  

such number of inspectors as it may deem requisite  to inspect any college or institution where  

architectural education is given or to attend any  examination held by any college or institution for  the purpose of recommending to the Central  

Government recognition of architectural  qualifications granted by that college or institution.  

2.  The inspectors shall not interfere with the  

conduct of any training or examination, but shall  report to the Executive Committee on the adequacy

27  

of the standards of architectural education  including staff, equipment, accommodation,  

training and such other facilities as may be  prescribed by regulations for giving such education  

or on the sufficiency of every examination which  they attend.  

3.  The Executive Committee shall forward a copy  of such report to the college or institution and shall  

also forward copies with remarks, if any, of the  college or institution thereon, to the Central  Government.”  

27. Section 20 of the 1972 Act deals with withdrawal of  

recognition of an authority listed in the Schedule to the  

Act. The process involves a report by the Executive  

Committee of the CoA.  On the basis of such report, if it  

appears to the Council that the courses of study and  

examination held in any college or institution or the staff,  

equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities  

for staff and training provided in such college or institution  

do not conform to the standards prescribed by the  

regulations then the CoA is empowered to make a  

representation for withdrawal of recognition to the  

appropriate Government. Section 21 of the 1972 Act also  

empowers the Council to prescribe minimum standards of  

architectural education required for granting recognized  

qualifications by colleges or institutions in India.  

28. From the nature of the dispute giving rise to these  

seven appeals, it is apparent that the shortcomings

28  

pointed out by the two regulatory bodies relate primarily  

to infrastructural facilities of the respective institutions.  

The power of the CoA to examine such infrastructural  

facilities at the time of considering the application for  

recognition or monitoring the quality of an institution  

recognized by the Council stems from Sections 18, 19, 20  

and 21 of the 1972 Act.   

29. A Regulation has been framed by the CoA with the  

approval of the Central Government titled as the Council  

of Architecture Regulations, 1982. Part VIII of the 1982  

Regulations deals with inspection of educational  

institutions of Architecture. Clauses 29 and 30 thereof  

stipulate:  

“29. Inspection of educational institutions  and their examinations.- The inspection of  

architectural institutions and the attendance  at the time of training and examination under  section 19 shall be carried out in accordance  

with the following manner, namely : -  

(1) each institution imparting instruction in  architecture shall be inspected by the  

inspectors once in five years:  

(2) the Registrar shall fix the date of  inspection in consultation with the  inspector or inspectors and the institution;  

(3) the Executive Committee shall appoint  such number of inspectors as may be  deemed necessary to inspect an institution  

or to attend any examinations and to report  thereon:  

29  

Provided that the minimum number of  inspectors for such inspection shall be two.  

(4) (a) every inspector shall receive from the  

Chairman, Executive Committee, a formal  commission in writing under the seal of the  

Council;  

(b) the instructions of the Chairman shall  specify the institution or institutions,  courses of studies and scheme of  

examination or examinations or training  programme or educational standards  

including staff, equipments,  accommodation, training and other  facilities which are required to be inspected  

or attended;  

(c)  the Chairman shall inform the inspector  that he is to report to the Executive  

Committee who shall submit their final  report with recommendations to the Council  in accordance with these regulations;  

(d) the Registrar shall provide the inspector  

with a copy of the documents and of the  recommendations of the Council in regard  to recognition of the qualifications or  

educational standards and improvements  to be made thereon and of the resolutions  

with regard to architectural education.”  

“30. Powers and duties of Inspectors.-   

(1) It shall be the duty of the inspector: -  

(a) to make himself acquainted with such  previous reports, if any, on the institution  

or institutions which he is appointed to  inspect as the Executive Committee may  direct and with the observations of the  

University or examining body and the report  of the Council thereon;  

(b) to attend personally institution or  

examination or training which he is  required to inspect but not to interfere with  the conduct thereof;  

(c) to inspect the institution which provides  

a recognized course of study or has applied  for the recognition of its course of study and  

scheme of examination and to see that the  course is in conformity with the regulations

30  

relating to education and the standards laid  down by the Council;  

(d) to report to the Executive Committee his  

opinion as to the sufficiency or insufficiency  of standards of education or examination or  

institution inspected by him;  

(e) to set forth in his report, in order, all the  necessary particulars as to the question  proposed in the written, oral or practical  

parts of each examination attended by him,  the sessional and class work submitted by  

the candidates at the time of practical or  viva-voce examination, the arrangements  made for invigilation, the method and scales  

of making, the standard of knowledge  shown by the successful candidates and  

generally all such details as may be required  for adjudicating on the scope and character  of the examination;  

(f) to set forth in his report necessary  

particulars in respect of institutions so as to  enable the Executive Committee to assess  

the existing facilities for teaching as well as  the extent to which the recommendations of  the Council regarding professional  

education have been given effect to;   

(g) to compare, on receipt from the  Registrar, proof copy of any of his reports,  the proof with the original and correct, sign  

and return it to the Registrar for  preservation in the records of the Council as  

the authentic copy of such report.  

(2) Every report of the inspector or inspectors  shall be signed and submitted to the Executive  Committee.  

(3) The reports of inspectors shall be deemed  

confidential, unless in any particular case the  Executive Committee otherwise directs.  

(4) Copies of the report by inspectors marked  

confidential shall be forwarded to the  University or the examining body concerned  as well as the institution with a request that  

the authority should furnish to the Executive  Committee within six months from the date of  

dispatch, such observations thereon as they  may think necessary.  

(5) A confidential copy of report of an inspector  or inspectors, with the observations of the

31  

University or the examining body or the  institution thereon, shall be supplied to each  

member of the Council and shall be  considered together with comments of the  

Executive Committee by the Council along  with the observations thereon of the Executive  Committee for consideration by the Council at  

their next meeting.  

(6) A copy of every report by the inspector or  inspectors, with the observations of the  University or the examining body and the  

institution concerned and the opinion of the  Executive Committee thereon, shall, after  

approval by the Council, be forwarded to the  Central Government and State Government  concerned.”  

30. The Minimum Standards of Architectural Education  

Regulations 1983 in particular, deals with the academic  

and infrastructural features of architecture courses.  

Clause (5) of the said Regulations provides:-  

“5 Intake and Migration:-  

(1)  The sanctioned intake of candidates at  the first year level shall not exceed a  maximum of 40 in a class. If more than 40  candidates are admitted, separate classes  

shall be organized.  

(2)  The institutions may permit, at their  discretion, migration of students from one  institution to another subject to the  maximum number of students not  

exceeding the permitted maximum intake in  a class.”  

Clause 8 of the 1983 Regulations further provides:-  

“8. Standards of staff, equipment,  

accommodation, training and other  facilities for technical education  

(1) The institutions shall maintain a  

teacher/student ratio of 1:8.

32  

(2) The institutions shall have a minimum  number of 12 faculty members for a student  

strength of 100.  

(3) The institution with the maximum intake of  40 in a class may have the faculty pattern as  

prescribed in Appendix-B.  

(4) The institutions shall encourage the faculty  members to involve in professional practice  including research.  

(5) The institutions shall provide facilities as  

indicated in Appendix-C.  

(6) The institutions shall encourage exchange of  faculty members for academic programmes.  

Notwithstanding anything contained in these  

regulations, the institutions may prescribe  minimum standards of Architectural Education  provided such standards does not, in the  

opinion of the Council, fall below the minimum  standards prescribed from time to time by the  

Council to meet the requirements of the  profession and education thereof.”  

31. Appendix B to these Regulations deal with  

designation, pay-scale and qualification required to be  

prescribed for faculty positions. The content thereof is not  

being reproduced in this judgment as for the purpose of  

determining the issues involved in these appeals, the  

stipulations barring those contained in Appendix C are not  

of much significance. Appendix C thereof reads: -  

“APPENDIX-C  

Physical Facilities  

The Institution of Architecture should be  located in a building to have a floor area of  

about 15 sq.m.m. per student. The building  should include class rooms and at least 5  studios, adequate space for faculty members,  

library, workshop, materials museum,

33  

laboratories, exhibition/conference room,  office accommodation and common area for  

students and staff. The space requirements  per student for architectural education  

whether in the Institution or in the Hostel are  apt to be more than for most other types of  professional courses like engineering and  

medicine because of the large space required  for preparation of drawings. This factor should  be borne in mind in the design of Hostels and  

Studios.  

Facilities may also be provided for extra- curricular activities and sports.  

The equipment in the workshop/laboratories  

has also to be provided to meet with the  special requirement for architectural  education. It is desirable to provide locker  

facilities in the studios for students.  

The Library, Workshops, Laboratories and  Photography unit should be managed by  

professionally qualified staff with adequate  supporting staff to assist the students and  faculty members in their academic  

programmes. There should also be  administrative supporting staff to run the  

Architectural Institutions.  

It is desirable to provide hostel  accommodation and residential  accommodation for staff and students in close  

proximity of the institution.”  

32. So far as the two Regulations of 1994 under the  

1987 Act produced before us on behalf of AICTE, the  

Regulations dated 20th May, 1994 contemplates fixing  

approval norms and intake capacity to professional  

colleges.  Clause 2 of this Regulation however exempts  

universities, university departments or colleges,  

government colleges, aided colleges and certain other  

institutions from its application. The next one has been

34  

made applicable to all new technical institutions including  

universities and subsisting technical institutions and lays  

down a detailed approval process through multi-tier  

decision making structure. The AICTE appears to have  

made subsequent Regulations time to time superseding  

the earlier ones in respect of the approval process, but  

barring the Regulations made in 2016, no other  

regulations has been produced before us.  None of the  

Regulations produced before us however specify the actual  

norms but refer to standards and norms to be laid down  

for approval of technical institutions, which include  

institutions imparting architectural education.  

33. Clause 6 of the 1994 regulations dated 31st October,  

1994 deals with conditions for grant of approval, which  

stipulates:  

“6. Conditions for grant of approval.- Every  application under sub-regulation (1) of  regulation 4 shall be considered subject to the  

fulfilment of the following conditions, namely:-  

(i) The financial position of the applicant  shall be sound for investment in developed  land and in providing related infrastructure  and instructional facilities as per the norms  

and standards laid down by the Council from  time to time and for meeting annual recurring  

expenditure:  

(ii) The courses or programmes shall be  conducted as per the assessed technical  

manpower demands;

35  

(iii) The admissions shall be made  according to the regulations and directions of  the Council for such admissions in the  

respective technical institution or university;  

(iv) The tuition and other fees shall be  charged with the overall criteria as may be laid  

down by the Council;  

(v) The staff shall be recruited as per the  norms and standards specified by the Council  from time to time;  

(vi) the governing Body in case of private  technical institutions shall be as per the  norms as specified by the council;  

34. Appearing on behalf of AICTE in Civil Appeal No.364  

of 2005, the fact that there are overlapping provisions on  

the question of grant of approval and subsequent  

monitoring of architectural education under both these  

Acts, has not been seriously disputed by Mr. Pandey. His  

main submission is that the 1987 Act being a later statute,  

covering common field, the provisions of the 1972 Act, to  

the extent the same deals with architectural education,  

shall be deemed to have been repealed by implication. The  

judgment of this Court relied upon on this point is the case  

of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others Vs. Union of India  

and Others3  His further submission is that the power of  

AICTE under the 1987 Act has already been upheld by this  

Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs.   

 3  (1984) 3 SCC 127

36  

Adhiyaman Educational Research Institute and  

Others4  On the same point, another judgment of this  

Court in the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation  

Limited Vs. Rabi Sankar Patro and Others,5 has also  

been relied upon by him. The other authority he has cited  

in support of his submission that the Rules and  

Regulations framed by the AICTE has the force of law and  

binding is the case of Parshvnath Charitable Trust and  

Others Vs. All India Council for Technical Education  

and Others6  In the case of Varun Saini & Ors. Vs. Guru  

Govind Singh Indraprastha University 7  also, the  

necessity on the part of the technical institutions for  

taking prior approval of AICTE has been highlighted.  

35. Primacy of AICTE on the question of giving approval  

to a technical institution and subsequent monitoring  

thereof have been discussed in the cases of Orissa Lift  

Irrigation Corporation Limited (supra) and Parshvanath  

Charitable Trust and Others (supra). But in these two  

cases, the question of inter-se primacy between the rival  

regulatory bodies covering the same subject did not arise.  

 4  (1995) 4 SCC 104  5  (2018) 1 SCC 468  6  (2013) 3 SCC 385  7  (2014) 16 SCC 330

37  

In the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra), the  

dispute was on the question as to whether shifting of  

location of college running courses on technical education  

could be effected without obtaining a ‘No Objection  

Certificate’ (NOC) from the AICTE. The Handbook of  

Approval Process, 2008 provides for obtaining NOCs from  

the State Government, UT administration and affiliating  

bodies concerned with the AICTE as per laid down  

procedure subject to the fulfilment of norms and  

standards of AICTE. The college concerned had changed  

location without adhering to the aforesaid procedure and  

it was held by this Court in that decision that withdrawal  

of approval by the AICTE was valid, there being no  

compliance with the legal requirements and binding  

conditions of recognition, inter-alia, by the AICTE. The lis  

in the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited  

(supra) arose out of a dispute pertaining to service  

conditions of engineers including junior engineers of the  

said Corporation. In that case, a diploma holder in  

electrical engineering had joined the Corporation as junior  

engineer (electrical) and while in service he acquired  

B.Tech. (Civil) degree from a deemed university. The said  

deemed university did not have approval of the AICTE.

38  

That University had started its distance education  

programme without taking approval from any of the  

regulatory authorities including University Grants  

Commission (UGC) and AICTE.  In this decision also,  

judgment in the case of Bharathidasan University (supra)  

was taken note of.  It was however held that deemed  

universities, whose courses were subject of dispute in the  

aforesaid cases were required to abide by the provisions of  

the AICTE Regulations and could not introduce courses  

leading to award of degrees in engineering without the  

approval of AICTE.  

36. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Another  

Vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and  

Others8, the controversy arose out of certain overlapping  

provisions between the 1987 Act and Madras University  

Act, 1923.  The disputes were mainly on the aspects of  

prescribing terms and conditions for affiliation of different  

institutions including engineering colleges. It was held  

that in respect of the subjects specified under Section 10  

of the 1987 Act in respect of institutions imparting  

technical education, it would not be the University Act but  

 8  (1995) 4 SCC 104

39  

the Central Act and the Council created under it would  

have the jurisdiction to that extent. It was held that after  

coming into operation of the Central Act, the provisions of  

the University Act would be deemed to have become  

unenforceable. In case of technical colleges like  

engineering colleges, this view was taken by this Court,  

having regard to the fact that the Central statue had been  

enacted by the Parliament under Entry 66 of List I as well  

as Entry 25 of List III.  It was also held in that judgment  

that the provisions of the University Act regarding  

affiliation of technical colleges like the engineering colleges  

and the conditions for grant and continuation of such  

affiliation by the University was to remain operative but  

the conditions that are prescribed by the University for  

grant and continuance of affiliation will have to be in  

conformity with the norms and guidelines prescribed by  

the Council in respect of matters entrusted to it under  

Section 10 of the Central Act.  

37. Learned counsel representing the AICTE has  

referred to a communication emanating from the Ministry  

of Human Resource Development, Government of India,

40  

bearing No.F.17 11/2003 TS.IV. This communication  

specifically deals with this conflict and specifies:    

“The mandate given to the AICTE is to coordinate  

the development of technical education in the  country at all levels. Grants of approval for  

starting new technical educational institutions  and for introduction of new courses or  Programmes in consultations with the agencies  

concerned. Although, the Council of Architecture  deals with mainly architect profession and the  

Architect Act may be taken as a Special Act  dealing with profession of architecture, the overall  planning and coordination of technical education  

falls within the ambit of AICTE. For starting new  courses, increase in intake, setting up of new  technical institutions, the power is vested with  

AICTE under Section 10(k) of the AICTE Act. In  that process AICTE has to inspect institutions,  

look into their infrastructure, set up norms and  standards as per the power provided in the AICTE  Act. The Architect Act does not have any power to  

set up any institute or grant approval to new  courses or increase in intake. For the benefit of  the profession, the Architect Act provides the  

council the authority to prescribe minimum  standards of architectural education for the  

colleges or institutions in India. Regulations  framed under Architect Act, 1972, also provides  for inspection of institution once in five year and  

make recommendation to the central government.  The ministry therefore feels that there is no  

overlapping of power between the two statutory  bodies in so far as inspections of institutions are  concerned. The architecture education is to be  

governed under AICTE Act and CoA should  maintain register for recognition of architects who  have completed full time Programmes/courses as  

approved by the AICTE or qualifications  mentioned in the schedule of CoA Act.  

The matter regarding implementation of  

various provisions, under the Architect Act, 1972  and the AICTE Act, 1987 has been considered in  the ministry and after careful examination the  

ministry is of the view that all aspect of  architectural education shall be concern of the  

AICTE and CoA would look into the architect  profession and ethics for maintaining its  professionalism in the field of Architecture.”

41  

38. It is brought to our notice by Mr. Pandey, referring to  

Section 25 of the 1987 Act, that it is the Central Government  

which is the ultimate authority deciding on issues in giving  

effect to the provisions of the 1987 Act and hence the  

aforesaid memorandum ought to be given effect to while  

construing the conflict arising from these two statutes.   

Section 25 of the 1987 Act stipulates:-   

“25. Power to remove difficulties.—(1) If any                 

difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of  this Act, the Central Government may, by order,  published in the   Official Gazette, make such                  

provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of  this Act as may appear to be     necessary for               removing the difficulty:  

Provided that no order shall be made under this  section after the expiry of two years from the                    commencement of this Act.  

(2) Every order made under this section shall be  

laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each  House of Parliament.”  

39. Similar provision is there under Section 43 of the  

1972 Act. But no case has been made out that the  

memorandum to which reference has been made, has been  

published in the official gazette.  This memorandum does  

not meet the requirement of valid exercise of power under  

the aforesaid two provisions by the Central Government so  

as to make it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be  

treated to be an advisory of the Ministry not having  

enforceable effect. Moreover, the aforesaid memorandum

42  

has been issued beyond the timeframe laid down under  

the provisions of the statutes reproduced in the said two  

sections of the respective Acts.  The memorandum also  

cannot be treated to be an executive order under Article 77  

of the Constitution of India.   

40. Main submission of Dr. Dhavan has been that since  

the 1972 statute specifically deals with architectural  

education along with certain other areas pertaining to  

regulating the profession of architects, the provisions of  

the said Act ought to prevail over the provisions of the  

1987 Act. This statute, according to him is “architect” and  

“architectural education” specific. On the point of implied  

repeal, his submission is that as a proposition of law,  

implied repeal of an earlier statute under the normal  

circumstances ought not to be presumed merely because  

a subsequent legislation having common subjects of  

legislation comes into operation unless there is express  

provision to that effect. The decisions relied upon in  

support of this proposition is the case of M/s. Mathra  

Parshad and Sons Vs. State of Punjab and Others9. This  

judgment is an authority for the proposition that in  

 9  1962 Supp (1) SCR 913.  

43  

absence of express provision no repeal can be implied  

unless the two statutes cannot stand together.  He also  

referred to another authority i.e. A.B. Abdulkadir Vs.  

State of Kerala10. Relying on the latter authority, he has  

argued that in the event the later Act deals with  

substantially the same subject as that of a former Act, then  

the principle of repeal could be applied. In the case A.B.  

Abdulkadir (supra), however, the subsequent statute,  

being Finance Act, a Central legislation had specific  

provision for repeal of the corresponding laws.    

41. He has also referred to several authorities to  

contend that the definition clause has to be construed with  

caution and a particular definition given in such clause  

may have to be reversed, if the statutory context otherwise  

requires.  According to him, the context can be external  

and can relate to another existing legislation. CoA’s case  

on this point is that though architecture is included in the  

definition of “technical education” in the 1987 Act,  

coverage of the said subject in terms of the regulatory  

 10  1962 Supp (2) SCR 741

44  

framework created thereunder cannot be automatically  

inferred.  The rationale behind this submission of CoA is  

that the 1972 Act covers architecture education  

specifically in all its aspects. The authorities cited for this  

proposition are:-  

Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India11;  

Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks12;  K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal 13 ;Printers  (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. CTO; 14Pushpa Devi v.  Milkhi Ram.15  

42. The distinction or difference between Technical  

institutions and Technical education as contained in the  

1987 statute has been dealt with by the two Judge  

Benches of this Court in the cases of Bharathidasan  

University (supra) and Association of Management of  

Private Colleges (supra).  On the same point, two other  

authorities have been cited on behalf of CoA dealing with  

the repugnancy between a State Act and a Central Act  

under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. These are  

Municipal Council Palai Vs. T.J. Joseph16  and Tika  

 11 (2005) 1 SCC 679  12 (1998) 8 SCC 1  13 , (1997) 2 SCC 53  14 (1994) 2 SCC 434;  15  (1990) 2 SCC 134  16  (1964) 2 SCR 87

45  

Ramji Vs. State of U.P.17  He has further argued that  

under ordinary circumstances, special law ought to  

override the general law. According to him, the 1972 Act is  

a special law, dealing with, inter alia, recognition of  

institutions conducting architectural education.  The 1987  

Act, in his submission is a general law dealing with  

technical education as a whole. It is his case that technical  

education may include degree or diploma in architecture.  

In these appeals, there is specific legislation dealing with  

architectural education.  In the event there is conflict  

between the norms and standards set under the general  

law, which, according to him is the 1987 Act and law  

specifically dealing with architectural education being  

1972 Act, he has argued that proper course would be to  

proceed on the basis that the intention of the legislature  

was to keep out the provisions relating to standards and  

norms pertaining to architectural education from the 1987  

Act and Regulations framed thereunder and mandate  

following the norms and standards stipulated in the 1972  

Act and connected Regulations. Other authorities relied on  

for this proposition are: R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of  

 17  ((1956) 1 SCR 393

46  

Karnataka18 ;   LIC Vs. D.J. Bahadur19  ;  U.P. State  

Electricity Board Vs. Hari Shankar Jain20; and J.K.  

Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of  

U.P. 21   These are all authorities in support of the  

proposition of law that a general provision should yield to  

the special provision, if two statutes are in direct conflict.  

43. His main reliance is on the case of Bharathidasan  

University (supra), in support of his argument that so far  

as education in Architecture is concerned, the 1972 Act  

ought to survive and not eclipsed by the 1987 legislation.  

In the case of Bharathidasan University, the main point  

involved was as to whether a university in order to start a  

course on technical education was required to obtain prior  

approval of the AICTE or not. The University in question in  

that case was constituted under Bharathidasan University  

Act 1981 with its specified area of operation over three  

districts in the State of Tamil Nadu. The university  

commenced courses in technology related subjects such  

as Information Technology, Management, Bioengineering  

and Technology, Petrochemical Engineering and  

 18 (1992) 1 SCC 335  19 (1981) 1 SCC 315  20  (1978) 4 SCC 16  21  (1961) 3 SCR 185

47  

Technology, Pharmaceutical Engineering and Technology  

etc. The AICTE had objected to running of such courses  

without their prior approval. It filed a writ petition before  

the Madras High Court to prevent the University  

authorities from running/conducting any course or  

programme in technical education. The University took a  

plea that it would not fall within the definition of technical  

institution contained in Section 2 (h) of the 1987 Act and  

thus was outside the purview of Section 10 (k) thereof.  

Section 2 (h) of the 1987 Act stipulates:-       

“(h) “Technical institution” means an  institution, not being a university which offers  courses or programmes of technical education,  

and shall include such other institutions as  the Central Government may, in consultation  

with the Council, by notification in the Official  Gazette, declare as technical institutions.”  

It was held in this judgment :-  

“15. To put it in a nutshell, a reading of  

Section 10 of the AICTE Act will make it  clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a  “university”, the same has been specifically  

provided in the provisions of the Act. For  example, while under clause (k) of Section  10 only “technical institutions” are referred  to, clause (o) of Section 10 provides for the  guidelines for admission of students to  

“technical institutions” and “universities”  imparting technical education. If we look at  

the definition of a “technical institution”  under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is clear that  a “technical institution” cannot include a  

“university”. The clear intention of the  legislature is not that all institutions  

whether university or otherwise ought to be

48  

treated as “technical institutions” covered  by the Act. If that was the intention, there  

was no difficulty for the legislature to have  merely provided a definition of “technical  

institution” by not excluding “university”  from the definition thereof and thereby  avoided the necessity to use alongside both  

the words “technical institutions” and  university in several provisions in the Act.  The definition of “technical institution”  

excludes from its purview a “university”.  When by definition a “university” is  

excluded from a “technical institution”, to  interpret that such a clause or such an  expression wherever the expression  

“technical institution” occurs will include a  “university” will be reading into the Act what  

is not provided therein. The power to grant  approval for starting new technical  institutions and for introduction of new  

courses or programmes in consultation with  the agencies concerned is covered by  Section 10(k) which would not cover a  “university” but only a “technical  institution”. If Section 10(k) does not cover  a “university” but only a “technical  institution”, a regulation cannot be framed  

in such a manner so as to apply the  regulation framed in respect of “technical  institution” to apply to universities when  

the Act maintains a complete dichotomy  between a “university” and a “technical  institution”. Thus, we have to focus our  

attention mainly to the Act in question on  the language adopted in that enactment. In  

that view of the matter, it is, therefore, not  even necessary to examine the scope of  other enactments or whether the Act  

prevails over the University Act or effect of  competing entries falling under Entries 63  

to 65 of List I vis-à-vis Entry 25 of List III of  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  

16. The fact that initially the Syndicate of  the appellant University passed a resolution  

to seek for approval from AICTE and did not  pursue the matter on those lines thereafter  

or that other similar entities were adopting  such a course of obtaining the same and  that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M.  Sambasiva Rao case [(1997) 1 An LT 629

49  

(FB)] had taken a particular view of the  matter are not reasons which can be  

countenanced in law to non-suit the  appellant. Nor such reasons could be  

relevant or justifying factors to draw any  adverse finding against and deny relief by  rejecting the claims of the appellant  

University. We also place on record the  statement of the learned Senior Counsel for  the appellant, which, in our view, even  

otherwise is the correct position of law, that  the challenge of the appellant with reference  

to the Regulation in question and claim of  AICTE that the appellant University should  seek and obtain prior approval of AICTE to  

start a department or commence a new  course or programme in technical education  

does not mean that they have no obligation  or duty to conform to the standards and  norms laid down by AICTE for the purpose  

of ensuring coordinated and integrated  development of technical education and  maintenance of standards.”  

44. In the case of Association of Management of  

Private Colleges Vs. All India Council of Technical  

Education and Others22, the dispute was between private  

colleges, including certain colleges affiliated to  

Bharathidasan University on one side and AICTE on the  

other, broadly on the same question which engaged this  

Court in the case of Bhartidasan University. In this  

decision, referring to certain portions of the judgment of  

this Court in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust  

(supra), it was held:-  

“52.  The italicised portions from the said  

 22  (2013) 8 SCC 271

50  

decision in Parshvanath Charitable Trust  case [Parshvanath Charitable Trust v. All  India Council for Technical Education, (2013)  3 SCC 385] referred to supra would make it  

clear that the AICTE Act does not contain any  evidence of an intention to belittle and  

destroy the authority or autonomy of other  statutory bodies which they are assigned to  perform. Further, the AICTE Act does not  

intend to be an authority either superior or  to supervise or control the universities and  

thereby superimpose itself upon the said  universities merely for the reason that it is  laying down certain teaching standards in  

technical education or programmes  formulated in any of the department or units.  It is evident that while enacting the AICTE Act,  

Parliament was fully alive to the existence of  the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956  

particularly, the said provisions extracted  above. Therefore, the definition of “technical  institution” in Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act  which authorises AICTE to do certain things,  special care has consciously and deliberately  

been taken to make specific mention of  university, wherever and  whenever AICTE alone was expected to  

interact with a university and its  departments as well as constituent  institutions and units. It was held after  

analysing the provision of Sections 10, 11  and 12 of the AICTE Act that the role of the  

inspection conferred upon AICTE vis-à-vis  universities is limited to the purpose of  ensuring proper maintenance of norms and  

standards in the technical education system  so as to conform to the standards laid down  

by it with no further or direct control over  such universities or scope for any direct  action except bringing it to the notice of UGC.  

In that background, this Court  in Bharathidasan University  case [Bharathidasan University v. All India  Council for Technical Education, (2001) 8 SCC  676] made it very clear by making the  observation that it has examined the scope of  the enactment as to whether the AICTE Act  

prevails over the UGC Act or the fact of  competent entries fall in List I Entry 66 vis- à-vis List III Entry 25 of Schedule VII of the  

Constitution.  

51  

53. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid  paragraphs of Bharathidasan University  case [Bharathidasan University v. All India  Council for Technical Education, (2001) 8 SCC  676] which are extracted above makes it very  clear that this Court has exempted  

universities, its colleges, constituent  institutions and units from seeking prior  approval from AICTE. Also, from the reading  

of paras 19 and 20 of Parshvanath Charitable  Trust case [Parshvanath Charitable  Trust v. All India Council for Technical  Education, (2013) 3 SCC 385] it is made clear  after careful scanning of the provisions of  the AICTE Act and the University Grants  Commission Act, 1956 that the role  

of AICTE vis-à-vis universities is only advisory,  recommendatory and one of providing  

guidance and has no authority empowering  it to issue or enforce any sanctions by itself.    

54. It is rightly pointed out from the affidavit  filed by UGC as directed by this Court in  these cases on the question of affiliated col-

leges to the university, that the affidavit is  very mechanical and it has simply and gra- tuitously without foundation, added as tech-

nical institutions including affiliated colleges  without any legal foundation. Paras 13, 14,  15 and 19 of the affidavit filed by UGC and  

the assertion made in Para 23 is without any  factual foundation, which reads as under:  

“That it is further submitted that  affiliated colleges are distinct and  different than the constituent colleges.  Thus, it cannot be said that constituent  

colleges also include affiliated colleges.”  

 Further, the assertion of UGC as rightly  

pointed out by Dr Dhavan in the written  submission filed on behalf of the appellant in  CA No. 1145 of 2004 that the claim that UGC  

does not have any provision to grant approval  of technical institution, is facile as it has  

already been laid down by this Court that the  AICTE norms can be applied to the affiliated  colleges through UGC. It can only advise  

UGC for formulating the standards of  education and other aspects to UGC. In view  of the law laid down in Bharathidasan  University [Bharathidasan University v. All  India Council for Technical Education, (2001)

52  

8 SCC 676] and Parshvanath Charitable Trust  [Parshvanath Charitable Trust v. All India  Council for Technical Education, (2013) 3 SCC  385] cases, the learned Senior Counsel Dr  

Dhavan has rightly submitted for rejection of  the affidavit of UGC, which we have to accept  

as the same is without any factual  foundation and also contrary to the intent  and object of the Act.”   

45. Learned counsel appearing for different institutions  

in this set of appeals have broadly supported the  

arguments advanced on behalf of CoA. Learned counsel for  

the Muslim Educational Association [the appellant in  

SLP(C) No.28121 of 2018] has assailed the decision of the  

Calicut University refusing to give affiliation to the said  

institution. Reference has been made to regulation 15(3) of  

the Minimum Standards of Architectural Education  

Regulation, 2015, which gives 3 years to provide the  

building for different infrastructural facilities for a college  

coming within the ambit of the said Act. In fact, it has been  

argued on behalf of the said institution that the University  

could not demand AICTE approval and within the State of  

Kerala, there were many institutions imparting  

architectural education solely on the basis of recognition  

granted under the 1972 Act.   

46. In the case of Bharathidasan University (supra),  

this Court found that in the 1987 Act, there is a distinction

53  

made by the legislature between a technical institution per  

se and certain other kinds of institutions over which some  

other kind of monitoring or supervision is there by properly  

constituted universities. That would be apparent from the  

definition of technical institution under the 1987 Act.  

Sections 10 (k) and (m) of the 1987 Act also specifically  

deal with technical institution. Thus the 1987 Act  

recognises the distinguishing feature of a technical  

institution not being a university. The Council constituted  

under it has supervisory and monitoring power over  

technical institutions not being a university imparting  

courses in technical education. This was one of the main  

reasoning as to why it was found by this Court in the case  

of Bharathidasan University (supra) that the said  

university would remain out of the regulatory ambit of the  

AICTE.  Broadly the same logic was followed in the other  

authority, Association of Management of Private  

Colleges (supra). The case of Adhiyaman Educational  

and Research Institute and Others (supra), was  

distinguished in this decision and the relevant paragraphs  

in that regard have been referred to earlier in this  

judgment.  None of the authorities cited on behalf of the  

AICTE, however, deals with a situation where there is a

54  

pre-existing Central legislation dealing with overlapping  

power on the same subject coming within the definition of  

“technical education”.   

47. CoA in these appeals wants to establish its pre-

dominance on the ground that the 1972 Act is a special  

Act and AICTE’s stand on the other hand is that the 1987  

Act having come to the statue book on a later date, the  

provisions thereof ought to prevail when the same are in  

conflict with an earlier statute. As a proposition of law, we  

accept AICTE’s stand that there need not be complete  

identity in the subject-matters of the two rival statutes  

being tested in the yardstick of point of time of their  

commencement of operation. Again, as a proposition of  

law, the principle of law canvassed by the rival bodies are  

accepted tools of construction. But they require  

application having regard to the specific circumstances of  

a given case. It is not an absolute proposition of law that a  

later Act would always prevail over the former in the event  

there are clashing provisions even if there is no express  

provision of repeal.  In the case of Ajoy Kumar Banerjee  

(supra), it was held, referring to Maxwell on the  

Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition:-

55  

“39.  From the text and the decisions, four tests are  deducible and these are :(i) the Legislature has the  

undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated  through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law  

may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later  general law by an express provision, (iii) A later  general law will override a prior special law if the  

two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot  co-exist even though no express provision in that  behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only  

in the absence of a provision to the contrary and of  a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain  

wholly unaffected by a later general law.”  

48. We shall examine now as to whether the 1972 Act  

fits the description of a special legislation so as to prevail  

over a subsequent enactment covering its field or area of  

operation.  A special law implies a statute covering a  

particular subject specifically.  The subject of conflict in  

the present proceedings is architectural education. The  

1972 Act however does not solely deal with architectural  

education.  The Act intends to control or regulate the  

profession of architects.  It has two main features, one part  

dealing with regulating the profession of architect and the  

other part regulating architectural education. Significant  

portion of the statute deals with formation of the CoA but  

the function of that body is essentially to regulate and  

monitor the other two areas of this statue. So far as effect  

of recognition is concerned, Section 17 of the 1972 Act  

stipulates:-    

56  

“17. Effect of recognition.- Notwithstanding  anything contained in any other law, but subject  

to the provisions of this Act, any recognised  qualification shall be a sufficient qualification for  

enrolment in the register.”  

49. The 1987 Act deals with technical education and in  

particular the methodology for approval technical  

institutions and their monitoring.  The dispute has arisen  

in these proceedings as architecture has been included  

with other subjects in the definition of “technical  

education” [Section 2 (g)].  Dr. Dhavan wants us, in effect,  

to exclude the subject of architecture from the said  

definition clause while construing the applicability of the  

Regulations for approval of a technical institution and its  

subsequent monitoring.  He has referred to the opening  

sentence of Section 2 of the 1987 Act, which contains the  

definitions and reads:-  

 “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires..”     

Such context, according to him can be external, outside  

the specific statute and includes other subsisting  

legislations. Before we deal with this submission, we shall  

refer to certain other key features of the two enactments.   

50. The provisions of 1987 Act have not been  

immunised by a non-obstante clause like the one

57  

employed in Section 17 of the 1972 Act.  Having regard to  

the scheme and provisions of these two statutes, ex-facie  

it is difficult to label either of them as special law or general  

law. The 1987 Act has certain features of a special law  

being devoted to setting up, supervision and monitoring of  

institutions imparting technical education. But the said  

statute does not cover technical education imparted by all  

types of institutions.  The exceptions have been clearly  

mentioned in Section 2(h) of the act and explained in the  

cases of Bharathidasan University (supra) and  

Association of Management of private colleges (supra).   

So far as the 1972 Act is concerned, its application is not  

confined to architecture education alone. This enactment  

contemplates establishing the Council of Architecture,  

recognizing degrees and diplomas in architecture and  

regulating the profession of architects.  But there is inter-

link between architecture education and registration of  

architects, on which aspect we shall dilate later in this  

judgment.  

51. Under both the statutes there are overlapping areas  

under which the respective Councils could make  

Regulations. Though these Acts, by themselves, do not

58  

come into direct conflict the inconsistencies have surfaced  

in implementing the power given to the Councils  

constituted under the respective enactments. AICTE  

contends that the later statute ought to prevail and as a  

corollary the regulations framed under the later statute  

should prevail. CoA wants its power to eclipse AICTE’s  

dominant role as a regulator in relation to architectural  

education on the strength of the 1972 Act being a special  

Act. The three regulations under the 1987 Act which have  

been brought to our notice do not directly lay down any  

specific norm or standard which ought to be followed.  

Such norms appear to have been set by the AICTE in  

pursuance of the aforesaid regulations. The two  

Regulations of 1994 do not lay down specifically such  

norms. The 2016 regulations has provision for Approval  

Process Hand Book which may be published from time to  

time laying down the manner in which approval shall be  

given.   

52. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and Another  

(supra), conflict was between State Legislations, being  

Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and

59  

Madras University Act 1923 and the provisions of 1987  

Act. In this judgment it was, inter-alia, held :-    

“30. A comparison of the Central Act and the University  

Act will show that as far as the institutions imparting  technical education are concerned, there is a conflict  

between and overlapping of the functions of the Council  and the University. Under Section 10 of the Central Act, it  is the Council which is entrusted with the power,  

particularly, to allocate and disburse grants, to evolve  suitable performance appraisal systems incorporating  

norms and mechanisms for maintaining accountability of  the technical institutions, laying down norms and  standards for courses, curricula, staff pattern, staff  

qualifications, assessment and examinations, fixing norms  and guidelines for charging tuition fee and other fees,  granting approval for starting new technical institutions or  

introducing new courses or programmes, to lay down  norms or granting autonomy to technical institutions,  

providing guidelines for admission of students, inspecting  or causing to inspect colleges, for withholding or  discontinuing of grants in respect of courses and  

programmes, declaring institutions at various levels and  types fit to receive grants, advising the Commission  constituted under the Act for declaring technical  

educational institutions as deemed universities, setting up  of National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct  

evaluation on the basis of guidelines and standards  specified and to make recommendations to it or to the  Council or the Commission or other bodies under the Act  

regarding recognition or de-recognition of the institution  or the programme conducted by it. Thus, so far as these  

matters are concerned, in the case of the institutes  imparting technical education, it is not the University Act  and the University but it is the Central Act and the Council  

created under it which will have the jurisdiction. To that  extent, after the coming into operation of the Central Act,  the provisions of the University Act will be deemed to have  

become unenforceable in case of technical colleges like the  engineering colleges. As has been pointed out earlier, the  

Central Act has been enacted by Parliament under Entry  66 of List I to coordinate and determine the standards of  technical institutions as well as under Entry 25 of List III.  

The provisions of the University Act regarding affiliation of  technical colleges like the engineering colleges and the  

conditions for grant and continuation of such affiliation by  the University shall, however, remain operative but the  conditions that are prescribed by the University for grant  

and continuance of affiliation will have to be in conformity  with the norms and guidelines prescribed by the Council

60  

in respect of matters entrusted to it under Section 10 of  the Central Act.”  

53. The case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation  

Limited (supra) also gives primacy to the AICTE on the  

question of necessity for an engineering college to obtain  

approval from the AICTE. In this case, question arose on  

the point as to whether engineering degree courses  

operated by colleges could be conducted by open  

universities through distance learning mode in absence  

of approval by the AICTE. This case and the case of  

Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others (supra) have  

been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. These  

authorities cited on behalf of the AICTE however do not  

deal with conflict arising from two Regulations framed  

under two Central statutes, both conferring regulatory  

powers over a particular subject in the field of technical  

education on two different statutory bodies. The ratio of  

the decision in the case of Bharathidasan University  

(supra), expanded by the two Judge Bench judgment in  

the case of Association of Management of Private  

Colleges (supra) have been cited in support of CoA’s  

contention that the 1972 Act should be treated as a

61  

special statute and Regulations framed thereunder  

should override those framed under the 1987 Act.  

54. For the sole reason of there being overlapping  

subjects, Courts straightaway may not get into an  

exercise to find out if one statute intends to eclipse the  

other. But in the present set of appeals, intention of the  

legislature to override one by the other can be examined  

by analyzing the provisions of the two statutes.  The duty  

of the regulatory bodies in a situation of this nature would  

be to come out with a unified regime, which this Court  

expected in the case of Municipal Council, Palia (supra).   

The two regulatory bodies in the field of architectural  

education however have not taken this approach and on  

the other hand have engaged themselves in a dispute over  

turf-control. In such a situation, under normal  

circumstances attempt should be made first at  

reconciliation of the competing statutory instruments. If  

that exercise fails, then the aim would be to find out what  

is the dominant purpose or principal subject-matter of a  

particular statute and then construe the conflicting  

provisions of the respective Regulations to match the  

dominant statutory purpose.   In the case of L.I.C. Vs.

62  

D.J. Bahadur (supra), it has been observed by a three  

Judge Bench of this Court: -  

“ 52. In determining whether a statute is a special  

or a general one, the focus must be on the principal  subject-matter plus the particular perspective.  For  

certain purposes, an Act may be general and for  certain other purposes it may be special and we  cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer  

points of law.  In law, we have a cosmos of  relativity, not absolutes-so too in life.”  

55. On the subject of implied repeal, the course to be  

followed by the Court has been explained in the                  

well-known text “Principles of Statutory Interpretation”,  

by Justice G.P. Singh (14th Edition). We give below the  

following quotation from page 737 of this text:-   

“There is a presumption against a repeal by  implication; and the reason of this rule is based  

on the theory that the Legislature while enacting  a law has complete knowledge of the existing  

laws on the same subject-matter, and therefore,  when it does not provide a repealing provision, it  gives out an intention not to repeal the existing  

legislation. When the new Act contains a  repealing section mentioning the Acts which it  expressly repeals, the presumption against  

implied repeal of other laws is further  strengthened on the principle expressio unius est  exclusio alterius. Further, the presumption will  be comparatively strong in case of virtually  

contemporaneous Acts. The continuance of  existing legislation, in the absence of an express  provision of repeal, being presumed, the burden  

to show that there has been a repeal by  implication lies on the party asserting the same.  The presumption is, however, rebutted and a  

repeal is inferred by necessary implication when  the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent  

with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier  Act ‘that the two cannot stand together’. But, if  the two may be read together and some

63  

application may be made of the words in the  earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred.”       

56. Having regard to the disputes involved in each of  

these appeals, proper course for us would be to find out  

the decision of which of these two regulatory bodies ought  

to prevail. For this purpose, it is necessary to ascertain the  

dominant purpose of the two legislations covering the field  

of architectural education. Section 10 of the 1987 Act  

mandates the AICTE to undertake the duties on the  

subjects specified therein. But it has already been held by  

two Benches of this Court comprising of two Judges each  

in the cases of Bharathidasan University (supra) and  

Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra)  

that a university or its affiliate colleges could run courses  

in technical education without approval of the AICTE.    

57. The process of recognition and effect thereof are  

more expansive under the 1972 Act. All “authorities”  

require recognition by the Central Government to conduct  

any degree or diploma course in architecture education to  

qualify for being recognised qualification. The CoA under  

the said Act plays a key role in the process of recognition.  

There is no exclusion or exemption of any institution from  

undergoing such recognition process except the subsisting

64  

ones at the time the Act became operational.  The CoA has  

also wide monitoring power under Section 18 and 19 of the  

Act of every authority which grants recognized  

qualification under the said Act.   

58. Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a  

non-obstante clause. The implication of the said clause in  

Section 17 of the 1972 Act is that to be on the register of  

architects in India, recognized qualification would be  

sufficient.  There is no provision under the 1972 Act or in  

any Rule thereunder which would entitle a person trained  

from an AICTE approved technical institution in  

architecture to describe himself as an architect or get  

himself registered as such without recognised qualification  

under the 1972 Act.  This would be apparent from the  

provisions of Section 35 of the Act, which stipulates:-  

“35. Effect of registration.—(1) Any reference in  any law for the time being in force to an architect  shall be deemed to be a reference to an architect  

registered under this Act.  

(2) After the expiry of two years from the date ap- pointed under sub-section (2) of Section 24, a per-

son who is registered in the register shall get pref- erence for appointment as an architect under the  Central or State Government or in any other local  

body or institution which is supported or aided from  the public or local funds or in any recognised by the  Central or State Government.”

65  

Sub-section (2) of the said provision is not of much  

relevance for adjudication of the subject dispute. The  

scheme of the Act thus demonstrates that lack of  

recognized qualification under the 1972 Act would in  

substance disentitle a person from being registered as an  

architect. He would not be able to legally represent himself  

as an architect in India. This being the statutory mandate,  

CoA’s role in the process of recognition of qualification of  

an architect cannot be said to have been obliterated by the  

1987 Act. It is a fact that 1987 Act is primarily concerned  

with setting-up and running of a technical institution and  

not with regulating the professions of individuals  

qualifying from such institutions. But under the 1972 Act,  

conducting a course on architectural education and  

regulating the profession of architect are statutorily  

interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas in  

architecture cannot be amputated from the said Act and  

held to have been replaced by the 1987 Act. That would  

render the 1972 enactment unworkable.  

59. The third distinguishing element of the 1972 Act is  

that the CoA is not the ultimate decision-making authority  

but it is the Central Government in relation to process of

66  

recognition of degree or diploma in architectural education  

or withdrawal thereof.  Such decision is required to be  

taken after consultation with the CoA. But since CoA has  

been conferred with power to make regulations in relation  

to, inter-alia, recognition norms and monitoring of  

institutions imparting architectural education, CoA’s role  

in such process is critical. The approval power of AICTE is  

direct. But in the event AICTE’s norms come into conflict  

with that of CoA, any report or representation the CoA may  

make to the Central Government would be dependent  

upon the decision of the Central Government. The Central  

Government’s decision, taken under the provisions of the  

1972 Act in such a case would obviously prevail, the latter  

being an authority superior to both the Councils  

constituted under the two statutes.  

60. AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions  

imparting architectural education on the strength of  

definition of technical education, which has been defined  

to mean programmes of education, research and training  

in architecture. The duty of the AICTE to regulate  

“technical education” is derived from the provisions of  

Section 10 of the 1987 Act. It has been contended on

67  

behalf of the CoA, referring to the provisions of Section 2  

of the 1987 Act, that the context of regulating architecture  

education requires exclusion of the expression  

“architecture” from the definition of technical education.  

In the case of Pushpa Devi and others (supra), it has been  

held that it is permissible for the Court to refer to “internal  

and external context” while giving meaning to a definition  

contained in the interpretation clause of a statue. In this  

decision, it was observed that a word exhaustively  

expressed in the definition can have different meanings in  

different parts of a statute. Broadly, the same principle of  

construction has been adopted in the cases of Printers  

(Mysore) Ltd. and Another (supra) and Whirlpool  

Corporation (supra).  

In the case of K.V. Muthu (supra), it has been held:-  

“12. Where the definition or expression,  as in the instant case, is preceded by the  words “unless the context otherwise  requires,” the said definition set out in  the section is to be applied and given  effect to but this rule, which is the  normal rule may be departed from if  there be something in the context to  show that the definition could not be  applied.”  

61.   So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether  

exclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that

68  

expression, i.e. architecture would have to be dropped  

from the definition of technical education. In our opinion,  

if the issue is examined in the external context, which in  

this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a  

course would be inevitable. In the event AICTE’s stand is  

to be accepted and CoA’s role is eliminated from the  

recognition process of architectural qualification, then a  

person having a degree or diploma from an AICTE  

approved institution only would in effect not be entitled  

to enrollment in the register of architects and would not  

be able to represent himself as an architect. Secondly, in  

view of the decisions of this Court in the cases of  

Bharatidasan University (supra) and Association of  

Management of Private Colleges (supra), there would be  

two parallel authorities regulating architectural  

education. CoA would regulate universities and affiliated  

colleges imparting such education while AICTE would  

supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover, the authority  

of Central Government to recognize qualifications in  

architecture education would stand obliterated by a body,  

AICTE and that too in respect of certain categories of  

technical institutions only.

69  

62. The authorities we have referred to are for the  

proposition that a meaning different to what is ascribed  

in the definition clause can be given to a word in different  

parts of a statute if the context so demands. The subject-

dispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the  

word architecture from the definition of technical  

education. Such a course, in our opinion, is also a  

permissible tool of construction to prevent absurd or  

unworkable results flowing from a statute. Here we  

reproduce the following passage from “Bennion on  

Statutory Interpretation” by F A R Bennion, Fifth Edition  

published by Lexis Nexis (at page 972).  

“ Strained construction We have the authority of  

Lord Reid for the statement that, to avoid an  

unworkable result, a strained construction  

may be justified even where the enactment is  

not grammatically ambiguous. Lord Reid said  

that cases where it has properly been held that   

one word can be struck out of a statute and  

another substituted include the case where  

without such substitution the provision would  

be unworkable.”

70  

 63.   We are of the opinion that in respect of the  

provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987 Act, the definition  

of “technical education” would have to be given such a  

construction and the word “architecture” should be  

treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the  

AICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions  

undertaking technical education. There would however  

be no substitution because the context would not  

demand it. This construction of the definition clause is  

necessary as the external context requires it to prevent  

an unworkable outcome in implementation of the 1987  

Act. The principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far  

as the provisions relating to architecture education is  

concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become  

operational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972  

Act is recognition of qualifications on architecture. The  

registration of an architect is dependent upon  

acquisition of such recognised qualification. The said  

Act cannot be held to have been repealed by implication  

for the sole reason of inclusion of the word  

“architecture” in the definition of technical education.  

AICTE has failed to discharge its onus to establish the

71  

said provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by  

implication.   

  64. We accordingly hold that so far as recognition of  

degrees and diplomas of architecture education is  

concerned, the 1972 Act shall prevail. AICTE will not be  

entitled to impose any regulatory measure in connection  

with the degrees and diplomas in the subject of  

architecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and  

other specified authorities under the 1972 Act would  

have to be followed by an institution imparting  

education for degrees and diplomas in architecture.  

65.  Now we shall turn to the individual appeals –  

(a) We sustain the judgment of the Bombay High Court  

forming subject-matter of Appeal No.364 of 2005. The  

appeal of the All India Council of Technical Education  

is dismissed.          

(b) Three appeals arose from the judgment of the High  

Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench delivered on  

2nd February, 2011 in W.P. No. 315 of 2011.  These are  

Civil Appeal No……./2019 (arising out of SLP(C)  

No.5400/2011), Civil Appeal No……/2019 (arising out  

of SLP(C) No.8443/2011) and Civil Appeal No……/2019

72  

(arising out of SLP(C) No.20460/2011). Rajeev Gandhi  

Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalyalay is the appellant in the  

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 5400/2011. It  

wants compliance of the CoA norms and invalidation of  

the directive requiring it to grant temporary affiliation  

by the High Court without CoA’s approval.  The  

appellant in the second Civil Appeal (arising out of  

SLP(C)No.8443/2011) is the institution, Bharatiya  

Vidya Mandir Shiksha Samiti. It has questioned the  

necessity of obtaining CoA’s approval or the  

requirement of compliance with the conditions set by  

them. It wants compliance of AICTE norms to be treated  

as adequate.  For the reasons explained earlier in this  

judgment, we dismiss the appeal of Bharatiya Vidya  

Mandir Shiksha Samiti.  The High Court has directed  

in the judgment under appeal compliance of the  

conditions communicated by the CoA.  The academic  

session involved is 2010-2011.  This Court at the notice  

stage in the university’s appeal [SLP(C)No.5400 of  

2011] granted interim stay of the order of the High  

Court.  Subsequently, there were admissions from time  

to time with interim directions of this Court.  We  

accordingly dispose of this appeal of the Rajeev Gandhi

73  

Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya with direction that the  

process of recognition contained in the 1972 Act ought  

to be implemented in respect of the subject institution  

before any further admission takes place.  But so far as  

admissions already undertaken in terms of interim  

orders of this Court, we direct that such admissions  

ought not be disturbed.  We direct so, as we find the  

High Court itself had directed compliance of CoA norms  

in the judgment under appeal and compliance of  

building requirements set by CoA was to be effected  

within one year. Thus, in our opinion, CoA norms were  

substantially directed to be complied with. We also  

make it clear that the AICTE would not have any  

regulatory control over the concerned institution so far  

as architecture education is concerned. We are of the  

opinion that in the appeal arising out of SLP(C)  

No.20460 of 2011 that CoA ought to have been  

impleaded as a party respondent in the said writ  

petition. We are also of the opinion that decision of the  

High Court to issue the directions contained in the  

judgment under appeal in absence of CoA being added  

in the array of respondents was erroneous. But we do  

not issue any independent direction as these appeals

74  

were heard together as batch matters and the  

grievances of the CoA have been addressed to in our  

judgment. Having held that the 1972 Act shall prevail  

on the question of recognition of degrees and diplomas  

in architecture education, we dispose of this appeal of  

the CoA in the above terms.  

(c)  The Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 17005 of  

2016 and SLP(C)No.17006 of 2016 have been instituted  

by the AICTE against a common judgment of the  

Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No.110 of 2013  

and Writ Appeal No. 112 of 2013. The dispute in these  

matters relate to the question of obtaining mandatory  

approval from the AICTE for running course on  

architecture. The former appeal arose out of  

contradictory directives issued by AICTE and CoA over  

admission of two students beyond the intake capacity.    

The observation of the Karnataka High Court in a  

common judgment has been that the controversies  

would be subject to the outcome of the appeal arising out  

of the Bench decision of the Bombay High Court. That is  

the first appeal we have dealt with in this judgment. We  

accordingly dispose of these two appeals in terms of our

75  

decision contained in the preceding sub-paragraph (a).  

AICTE would not have any power to impose its regulatory  

measures on the concerned institution so far as  

architecture education is concerned.  

(d) The decision of the Kerala High Court in the Civil  

Appeal arising out of SLP(C)No. 28121 of 2018 is set  

aside. The appeal is allowed. The institution involved in  

this appeal shall be entitled to operate with recognition  

obtained under the 1972 Act.  

66. All interim orders passed in these appeals shall stand  

dissolved. All connected applications shall stand disposed of.    

There shall be no order as to costs.   

     .......................................CJI.  

                                    (Ranjan Gogoi)        

  ..........................................J.                                    (Deepak Gupta)  

                                                   ..........................................J.                    (Aniruddha Bose)  

 New Delhi   Dated: November 08, 2019.