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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 32-33 OF 2017 (@ S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 7694-7695 of 2016)

Ajay Singh and Anr and Etc. …Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh and Anr.         …Respondent(s)

  J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

Dipak Misra, J.

Performance of  judicial duty in the manner prescribed

by  law  is  fundamental  to  the  concept  of  rule  of  law  in  a

democratic State. It has been quite often said and, rightly so,

that the judiciary is the protector and preserver of rule of law.

Effective  functioning  of  the  said  sacrosanct  duty  has  been

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entrusted to the judiciary and that entrustment expects the

courts  to  conduct  the  judicial  proceeding  with  dignity,

objectivity and rationality and finally determine the same in

accordance  with  law.  Errors  are  bound  to  occur  but  there

cannot  be  deliberate  peccability  which  can  never  be

countenanced.  The plinth of justice  dispensation system is

founded on the faith, trust and confidence of the people and

nothing can be allowed to contaminate and corrode the same.

A litigant who comes to a court of law expects that inherent

and  essential  principles  of  adjudication  like  adherence  to

doctrine  of  audi  alteram  partem,  rules  pertaining  to

fundamental  adjective and seminal  substantive law shall  be

followed  and  ultimately  there  shall  be  a  reasoned  verdict.

When the accused faces a charge in a court of law, he expects

a fair trial. The victim whose grievance and agony have given

rise to the trial  also expects that  justice should be done in

accordance with law. Thus, a fair trial leading to a judgment is

necessitous in law and that is the assurance that is thought of

on both sides.  The exponent on behalf of the accused cannot

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be  permitted  to  command  the  trial  as  desired  by  his

philosophy of trial on the plea of fair trial and similarly, the

proponent  on  behalf  of  the  victim  should  not  always  be

allowed to ventilate the grievance that his cause has not been

fairly dealt with in the name of fair trial. Therefore, the concept

of expediency and fair trial is quite applicable to the accused

as well as to the victim.  The result of such trial is to end in a

judgment as required to be pronounced in accordance with

law. And, that is how the stability of the creditability in the

institution is maintained.

2.    The above prefatory note has relevance, a significant

one,  to  the  case  at  hand.  To  appreciate  the  controversy,

certain facts are requisite to be noted.  The marriage between

the  appellant  No.  1  and  Ruby  Singh,  the  deceased,  was

solemnized  according  to  Hindu  rites  on  22.06.1997.  She

committed suicide at her matrimonial  home on 01.12.1998.

Kameshwar Pratap lodged FIR No.  194/98 at Police Station

Lakhanpur,  Distt.  Sarguja  against  Ajay  Singh  (husband),

Sureshwar  Singh  (father-in-law),  Dhanwanti  Devi

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(mother-in-law)  and  Kiran  Singh  (sister-in-law)  for  offences

punishable under Section 304B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code

(IPC)  and  other  offences.  After  the  criminal  law  was  set  in

motion,  investigating  agency  after  commencement  of

investigation  and after  completion thereof  laid  charge  sheet

under Sections 304B, 498A/34, 328 IPC read with Section 3/4

of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against the accused persons

before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur, who,

in turn,  committed the matter  to the  Court  of  Session and

eventually the matter was tried by Second Additional Sessions

Judge, Ambikapur. We are, in the present case, not concerned

with how many witnesses were examined by the trial court or

how the trial continued.  What needs to be stated is that the

learned trial  Judge passed an order in the order sheet that

recorded that the accused persons had been acquitted as per

the judgment separately typed, signed and dated.  

3. A member of the State Bar Council sent a complaint to

the  Registry  of  the  High  Court  of  Chhattisgarh,  Bilaspur

alleging  that  learned  trial  judge  had  acquitted  the  accused

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persons but no judgment had been rendered.  The Registrar

(Vigilance)  of  the  High Court  issued a  memorandum to  the

District  and  Sessions  Judge,  Surguja  at  Ambikapur  on

18.02.2008 to inquire into the matter  and submit a report.

The  concerned  District  and  Sessions  Judge  submitted  the

report  to  the  High Court  on the  same date  stating  that  no

judgments were found in the records of such cases. It has also

been brought to the notice of the High Court that in sessions

trials being Sessions Trial No. 148 of 1999 and Sessions Trial

No. 71 of 1995 though the same trial judge had purportedly

delivered the judgments but they were not available on record

as  the  judgments  had  not  actually  been  dictated,  dated  or

signed.  Thereafter the matter was placed before the Full Court

of the High Court on 04.03.2008 on which date a resolution

was  passed  placing  the  concerned  trial  judge  under

suspension in contemplation of a departmental inquiry.  At the

same time,  the Full  Court took the decision to transfer  the

cases in question from the concerned trial judge to the file of

District  and  Sessions  Judge,  Surguja  at  Ambikapur  for

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rehearing  and  disposal.  It  is  worthy  to  note  here  that  the

concerned  officer  was  put  under  suspension  and  after

completion of  inquiry  was imposed with  the  punishment  of

compulsory retirement on 22.03.2011. We make it clear that

we are not concerned with the said punishment in the case.

4. After the decision was taken for transferring the cases by

the Full Court for rehearing, three writ petitions forming the

subject matter of Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 2796 of 2008,

2238 of  2008 and 276 of  2010 were  filed.  The  accused  in

Sessions Trial No. 148 of 1999 filed Writ Petition (Criminal)

Nos. 2796 of 2008 and 2238 of 2008 and accused in Sessions

Trial  No. 71 of 1995 filed the other writ petition, that is, Writ

Petition (Criminal) No. 276 of 2010.

5. The  controversy  really  centers  around  two  issues,

namely, whether the learned trial judge had really pronounced

the judgment of acquittal on 31.10.2007 and whether the High

Court  could  have  in  exercise  of  its  administrative  power

treated the trial as pending and transferred the same from the

Court of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur to the

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Court of District and Sessions Judge, Surguja at Ambikapur

for rehearing and disposal.   

6. It is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the

nature  of  order  passed  by  the  learned  trial  judge  would

amount  to  a  judgment  and  in  the  absence  of  any  appeal

preferred by the State there could not have been a direction for

rehearing of the sessions case as such action runs contrary to

the provisions of CrPC.  Learned counsel would submit that

the High Court in exercise of  power of  the superintendence

could not have transferred the case treating it as pending on

its administrative side.  To bolster the said submission he has

placed  reliance  on  Ouseph Mathai  & others  v.  M.  Abdul

Khadir1, Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar2 and Surya Dev Rai

v. Ram Chander Rai and others3.  

7. Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the State submitted

that the approach of the High Court is absolutely infallible and

does not warrant any interference by this Court.

1 (2002) 1 SCC 319 2 (2002) 8 SCC 400 3 (2003) 6 SCC 675

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8. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to refer to

the  order  sheet  in  Sessions  Trial  No.  71 of  1995.  The trial

judge on 28.1.2008 had passed the following order:-

“28.1.2008: State represented by Shri Rajesh Tiwari, A.G.P. Accused  along  with  their  Counsel  Shri  Arvind Mehta, Advocate The judgment has been typed separately.  The same has been dated, signed and announced. Resultantly, Accused T.P. Ratre is acquitted of the charge under Section 306 IPC. A  copy  of  this  judgment  be  sent  to  the  District Magistrate, Surguja (Ambikapur) through A.G.P. Proceedings completed. The result be noted in the register and the record be sent to the Record Room.”

Be  it  noted,  in  the  other  Sessions  Trial,  i.e.,  Sessions

Trial No. 148 of 1999 almost similar order has been passed.

Be it stated, apart from the aforesaid order, as per the enquiry

conducted by the learned District Judge, there was nothing on

record.   The trial  judge had not  dictated the order in open

court.  In such a situation, it is to be determined whether the

judgment had been delivered by the trial judge or not.

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9. Chapter XVIII of CrPC provides for trial before a court of

session. Section 227 empowers the trial judge to discharge the

accused after hearing the submissions of the accused and the

prosecution and on being satisfied that there is no sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused.  The key words of

the Section are “not sufficient ground for proceeding against

the  accused”.  Interpreting  the  said  provision,  the  Court  in

P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and another4 has held that

the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the

behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind

to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case

for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing

this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros

and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of

evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the

court, after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the

Judge  has  merely  to  sift  the  evidence  in  order  to  find  out

whether  or  not  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding

against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground 4 (2010) 2 SCC 398

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would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded

by  the  police  or  the  documents  produced  before  the  court

which  ex  facie disclose  that  there  are  suspicious

circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge

against him.

10. Section  228  empowers  the  trial  judge  to  frame  the

charge.  Section 229 provides if the accused pleads guilty, the

Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict

him thereon.  Section 230 provides for date for prosecution

evidence.  Section 231 deals with the evidence for prosecution.

Section 232 provides that if, after taking the evidence for the

prosecution,  examining  the  accused  and  hearing  the

prosecution the defence on the point, the Judge considers that

there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,

the  Judge  shall  record  an  order  of  acquittal.  Section  233

stipulates  that  where  the  accused  is  not  acquitted  under

Section 232 he shall be called upon to enter on his defence

and  adduce  any  evidence  he  may  have  in  support  thereof.

Section  234  provides  for  arguments.  Section  235  which

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provides  for  judgment  of  acquittal  or  conviction  reads  as

follows:-

“235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction. – (1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case. (2)  If  the  accused  is  convicted,  the  Judge  shall, unless  he  proceeds  in  accordance  with  the provisions of section 360, hear the accused on the question  of  sentence,  and  then  pass  sentence  on him according to law.”

11. Chapter  XXIV  provides  for  general  provisions  as  to

inquiries and trials. Chapter XXVII deals with the judgment.

Section 353 lays down the procedure for  pronouncement of

the judgment. The said provision reads as follows:-

“353. Judgment -  (1) The  judgment  in  every  trial  in  any  Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open  Court  by  the  presiding  officer  immediately after  the  termination  of  the  trial  or  at  some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders,- (a) by delivering the whole of the judgment; or (b) by reading out the whole of the judgment; or (c) by reading out the operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by the accused or his pleader. (2) Where the judgment is delivered under clause (a) of sub-section (1), the presiding officer shall cause it to be taken down in short-hand, sign the transcript and every page thereof as soon as it is made ready,

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Code (Sankatha Singh v.  State of  U.P.6).  It  is  true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is “otherwise provided by this Court or by any other law  for  the  time  being  in  force”.  Those  words, however,  refer  to  those  provisions  only  where the court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other  law  to  alter  or  review  its  judgment.  The inherent power of the court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.”

We have referred to the aforesaid decision to illustrate

that the CrPC confers absolute sanctity to the judgment once

it  is  pronounced.   It  does  not  conceive  of  any  kind  of

alteration.

15. Section 363 provides copy of judgment to be given to the

accused  and  other  persons.   Section  364  provides  for  the

situation where the judgment requires to be translated.  

16. It is apposite to note that though CrPC does not define

the  term  “judgment”,  yet  it  has  clearly  laid  down  how  the

judgment is to be pronounced. The provisions clearly spell out

that it is imperative on the part of the learned trial judge to

pronounce the judgment in open court by delivering the whole

6 AIR 1962 SC 1208

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of the judgment or by reading out the whole of the judgment or

by  reading  out  the  operative  part  of  the  judgment  and

explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which

is understood by the accused or his pleader.  

17. We  have  already  noted  that  the  judgment  was  not

dictated in open court.  Code of Criminal Procedure provides

reading of the operative part of the judgment. It means that

the trial judge may not read the whole of the judgment and

may read operative part of the judgment but it does not in any

way suggest that the result of the case will be announced and

the  judgment  would  not  be  available  on  record.  Non-

availability  of  judgment,  needless  to  say,  can  never  be  a

judgment  because  there  is  no  declaration  by  way  of

pronouncement in the open court that the accused has been

convicted  or  acquitted.   A  judgment,  as  has  been  always

understood,  is  the  expression  of  an  opinion  after  due

consideration  of  the  facts  which  deserve  to  be  determined.

Without  pronouncement  of  a  judgment  in  the  open  court,

signed and dated, it  is difficult to treat it  as a judgment of

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conviction as has been held in  Re. Athipalayan and Ors7.

As  a  matter  of  fact,  on  inquiry,  the  High  Court  in  the

administrative side had found there was no judgment available

on record.  Learned counsel for the appellants would submit

that in the counter affidavit filed by the High Court it has been

mentioned that an incomplete typed judgment of 14 pages  till

paragraph No. 19 was available.  The affidavit also states that

it  was  incomplete  and  no  page  had  the  signature  of  the

presiding officer.  If the judgment is not complete and signed,

it cannot be a judgment in terms of Section 353 CrPC.  It is

unimaginable  that  a  judgment  is  pronounced  without  there

being a judgment.  It is gross illegality. In this context, we may

refer  to  a  passage  from  State  of  Punjab   and  others  v.

Jagdev Singh Talwandi8 wherein expressing the opinion for

the Constitution Bench, Chandrachud, C.J. observed thus:-

“30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing  the  final  order  without  a  reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the  High  Court  intends  to  pass  should  not  be

7 AIR 1960 Mad 507 8 (1984) 1 SCC 596

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announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the other,  or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute  is  unconstitutional  or,  as  in  the  instant case, that a detenu be released from detention.  If the  object  of  passing  such  orders  is  to  ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by  the  High  Court.  That  places  this  Court  in  a predicament  because,  without  the  benefit  of  the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The  result  inevitably  is  that  the  operation  of  the order passed by the High Court  has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment.

31. It may be thought that such orders are passed by this Court and therefore there is no reason why the High Courts should not do the same. We would like to point out respectfully that the orders passed by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them. The Supreme Court is the final court in the hierarchy of our courts. Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment are  passed by this  Court  very rarely,  under  exceptional  circumstances.  Orders passed  by  the  High  Court  are  subject  to  the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of  the  Constitution  and  other  provisions  of  the concerned  statutes.  We  thought  it  necessary  to make  these  observations  in  order  that  a  practice which is not very desirable and which achieves no useful  purpose  may  not  grow  out  of  its  present infancy.”

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 18. We have reproduced the aforesaid two passages as the

larger  Bench  has  made  such  observations  with  regard  to

unreasoned  judgments  passed  by  the  High  Courts.  The

learned  Chief  Justice  had  noted  that  the  practice  is  not

desirable  and  does  not  achieve  any  useful  purpose  and  it

should not grow out of its present infancy.  Despite the said

observations, sometimes this Court comes across judgments

and orders where the High Courts have announced the result

of the case by stating “reasons to follow”. We can only reiterate

the observations of the Constitution Bench.  

19.  Having stated that, as is evincible in the instant case,

the judgment is not available on record and hence, there can

be  no  shadow  of  doubt  that  the  declaration  of  the  result

cannot tantamount to a judgment as prescribed in the CrPC.

That leads to the inevitable conclusion that the trial in both

the cases has to be treated to be pending.

20. The next issue that emerges for consideration is whether

the  High  Court  on  its  administrative  side  could  have

transferred  the  case  from  the  Second  Additional  Sessions

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any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”

The aforesaid Article  confers  power  of  superintendence

on the High Court over the courts and tribunals within the

territory of the State. The High Court has the jurisdiction and

the authority to exercise suo motu power.

21. In  Achutananda Baidya v.  Prafullya Kumar Gayen

and others9 a two-Judge Bench while dealing with the power

of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 has

opined that the power of superintendence of the High Court

under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  is  not  confined  to

administrative superintendence only but such power includes

within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and

duty  of  the  High  Court  under  Article  227  is  essentially  to

ensure that the courts and tribunals, inferior to High Court,

have done what they were required to do. Law is well settled

by various decisions of  this  Court that  the High Court  can

interfere  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  in  cases  of

erroneous  assumption  or  acting  beyond  its  jurisdiction,

9 (1997) 5 SCC 76

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refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record

as  distinguished  from  a  mere  mistake  of  law,  arbitrary  or

capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in

procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on

no material, or resulting in manifest injustice.

22. We  have  already  stated  that  the  Division  Bench while

concurring with the opinion of the learned single Judge has

also  quashed  the  order  by  the  learned  trial  judge  on  the

ground that  there was no judgment  on record.  There is  no

dispute about the fact that the Full Court of the High Court

after  coming  to  a  definite  conclusion  that  the  learned  trial

judge had really not passed any judgment, resolved that the

matter should be heard by the learned Sessions Judge and

accordingly  the  Registrar  General  of  the  High  Court

communicated the decision to the concerned learned Sessions

Judge.  The  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant is that such a power could not have been exercised

by the Full Court on the administrative side, for in exercise of

administrative authority, the High Court cannot transfer the

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case. The contention is that High Court can only transfer the

case in exercise of power under Section 407 and that too on

the  judicial  side.  Our  attention  has  also  been  drawn  to

Section  194 of  CrPC.  Section  194 empowers  the  Additional

and Assistant Sessions Judges to try cases made over to them.

The said provision reads as follows:-

“194. Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges to try cases made over to them.― An Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant  Sessions Judge shall try such cases as the Sessions Judge of the division may, by general or special order, make over to him for trial or as the High Court may, by special order, direct him to try.”

23. It  is  argued that  Section 194 can be  exercised on the

administrative side before the commencement of the trial and

not thereafter, whereas Section 407 can be taken recourse to

on the judicial side and a case can be transferred on the basis

of parameters laid down for transfer of a criminal trial. In this

regard,  we  may  usefully  refer  to  the  authority  in  Ranbir

Yadav  v.  State  of  Bihar10 wherein  under  certain

circumstances  the  High Court  had  transferred  the  sessions

trial  from  the  court  of  one  Additional  Sessions  Judge  to 10 (1995) 4 SCC 392

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another by an administrative order at a stage when the trial

had commenced.  It was contended before this Court that the

trial  that  took place before  the  transferee  court  was wholly

without  jurisdiction  and  consequently  the  conviction  and

sentence recorded by that court were null and void and were

not  curable  under  Section  465 CrPC.   To  sustain  the  said

proposition  of  law,  reliance  was  placed in A.R.  Antulay v.

R.S. Nayak and another11.  The two-Judge Bench perusing

the material on record came to the conclusion that the order

was  passed  by  the  High  Court  in  its  administrative

jurisdiction. Thereafter, it proceeded to opine thus:-

“Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India every High Court has superintendence over all courts and tribunals  throughout  the  territories  in  relation  to which  it  exercises  jurisdiction  and it  is  trite  that this  power  of  superintendence  entitles  the  High Court to pass orders for administrative exigency and expediency. In the instant case it appears that the High Court had exercised the power of transfer in the  context  of  the  petition  filed  by  some  of  the accused from jail complaining that they could not be accommodated in the courtroom as a result of which  some  of  them  had  to  remain  outside.  It further appears that the other grievance raised was that the court was so crowded that even clerks of the  lawyers  were  not  being  allowed  to  enter  the

11 (1988) 2 SCC 602

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courtroom to carry the briefs. Such a situation was obviously created by the trial of a large number of persons.  If  in  the  context  of  the  above  facts,  the High  Court  exercised  its  plenary  administrative power to transfer the case to the 5th Court, which, we assume had a bigger and better arrangement to accommodate  the  accused,  lawyers  and  others connected with the trial no exception can be taken to the same, particularly by those at whose instance and for whose benefit the power was exercised.”

Proceeding further, the Court held that:-

“So long as power can be and is exercised purely for administrative  exigency  without  impinging  upon and prejudicially affecting the rights or interests of the parties to any judicial proceeding we do not find any reason to hold that administrative powers must yield place to judicial powers simply because in a given circumstance they coexist.  On the contrary, the  present  case  illustrates  how  exercise  of administrative  powers  were  more  expedient, effective  and  efficacious.  If  the  High  Court  had intended to exercise its judicial powers of transfer invoking  Section  407  of  the  Code  it  would  have necessitated  compliance  with  all  the  procedural formalities  thereof,  besides  providing  adequate opportunities  to  the  parties  of  a  proper  hearing which, resultantly, would have not only delayed the trial  but  further  incarceration  of  some  of  the accused. It is obvious, therefore, that by invoking its power  of  superintendence,  instead  of  judicial powers,  the  High  Court  not  only  redressed  the grievances  of  the  accused  and  others  connected with the trial but did it with utmost dispatch.”

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24. The Court distinguished the authority in  A.R. Antulay

case (supra) on the basis that in the said case the Court was

dealing with a situation where this Court had transferred the

case to the High Court which was not authorized by law and

the Court could not  have conferred the jurisdictions on the

High Court as it did not possess such jurisdiction under the

scheme  of  the  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act,  1952.   The

controversy the two-Judge Bench was dealing with pertained

to  transfer  of  the  case  to  the  learned  Additional  Sessions

Judge  who  was  competent  under  the  CrPC  to  conduct  the

sessions  trial  and,  therefore,  the  Court  in  Ranbir  Yadav’s

case (supra) ruled that the order of transfer to another court

did not suffer from any legal infirmity.

25. In the case at hand, the High Court on the administrative

side had transferred the case to the learned Sessions Judge by

which it has conferred jurisdiction on the trial court which has

the jurisdiction to try the sessions case under CrPC.  Thus, it

has done so as it has, as a matter of fact, found that there was

no judgment on record. There is no illegality.  Be it noted, the

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Division Bench in the appeal preferred at the instance of the

present appellants thought it appropriate to quash the order

as there is no judgment on record but a mere order-sheet. In a

piquant  situation  like  the  present  one,  we  are  disposed  to

think that the High Court was under legal obligation to set

aside the order as it had no effect in law.  The High Court has

correctly done so as it  has the duty to see that  sanctity of

justice is not undermined.   The High Court has done so as it

has felt that an order which is a mere declaration of result

without the judgment should be nullified and become extinct.  

26. The case at hand constrains us to say that a trial Judge

should remember that  he has immense responsibility  as he

has  a  lawful  duty  to  record  the  evidence  in  the  prescribed

manner  keeping  in  mind  the  command  postulated  in

Section  309  of  the  CrPC  and  pronounce  the  judgment  as

provided under the Code. A Judge in charge of the trial has to

be extremely diligent so that no dent is created in the trial and

in its eventual conclusion. Mistakes made or errors committed

are to be rectified by the appellate court in exercise of “error

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jurisdiction”.  That is a different matter. But, when a situation

like the present one crops up, it causes agony, an unbearable

one,  to  the  cause  of  justice  and  hits  like  a  lightning  in  a

cloudless sky.  It hurts the justice dispensation system and no

one, and we mean no one, has any right to do so. The High

Court by rectifying the grave error has acted in furtherance of

the  cause  of  justice.   The accused persons  might  have  felt

delighted in acquittal and affected by the order of rehearing,

but  they  should  bear  in  mind  that  they  are  not  the  lone

receivers of justice.  There are victims of the crime.  Law serves

both and justice looks at them equally.  It does not tolerate

that the grievance of the victim should be comatosed in this

manner.   

27. Consequently, appeals are dismissed. The trial court to

whom the cases have been transferred is directed to proceed in

accordance with law.  

.............................J.                                                                 [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; .............................J. January  06, 2017          [Amitava Roy]