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‘  REPORTABLE’   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3198 OF 2007

Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee ……… Appellant

Versus

Bannama (D) by LRs.                      ……..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M.Y. EQBAL, J.

This  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  against  the  

judgment and order dated 17.10.2003 passed by the High  

Court  of  Karnataka  in  R.S.A.No.556  of  1997,  whereby  the  

appeal  preferred  by  plaintiff-respondent  no.1  was  allowed  

setting aside the judgment and decree of the appellate court  

in  RA  No.12  of  1994  and  confirming  the  judgment  and  

decree of the trial court.

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2. The brief facts of the case of the plaintiff-respondent  

no.1,  as  set  out  in  the  trial  court  judgment,  are  that  the  

plaintiff  was  an  agriculturist  and  old  lady  residing  at  

Saidapur  village.   Whereas,  respondent  no.2  (defendant  

no.2) was none other than the son of the plaintiff and was  

vice president of the appellant-first defendant society, which  

is  a  statutory  body constituted  and functioning  under  the  

Karnataka  Agricultural  Produce  Marketing  Committee  

(Regulation)  Act.    The  suit  land  bearing  Sy.No.58/1  

measuring 7 acres 19 guntas situated at Saidapur village of  

Yadgir Taluk, for which Smt. Bannamma – plaintiff filed a suit  

for  declaration  of   title  claiming  that  the  property  was  

inherited  by  her  from her  father  and  it  was  her  stridhan  

property, which is alleged to be standing in the name of the  

plaintiff  since 1954-55.   The land Sy.No.58-B has got  two  

hissas  as  Hissa  Nos.1  and 2,  each  measuring  7  acres  18  

guntas  and  its  khasra  pahani  numbers  are  131  and  132  

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respectively.   The  property  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  is  

Sy.No.58/A bearing Khasra No.131.   

3. The plaintiff being an old lady, allowed her son second  

defendant to look after and manage the suit property on her  

behalf.   It  is  pleaded that  taking advantage of  the same,  

second defendant, without the knowledge and consent of the  

plaintiff, got mutated the suit land in his name on the basis  

of the release deed.  It is contended that second defendant  

sold the entire suit land to the appellant-first defendant, who  

purchased  the  same without  verifying  the  title  of  second  

defendant  and  got  a  registered  sale  deed  on  

28.12.1978(Ex.P.24).  The suit land has also been converted  

into  non-agriculture  land.   The first  defendant,  thereafter,  

notified the plots in the property for sale by public auction on  

22.12.1989 and 23.1.1990, which came to the information of  

the plaintiff and consequently she moved the court by filing  

suit  for  declaration  of  title  and  possession  of  land  and  

declaration regarding the sale deed.

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4. The  trial  court  decreed  the  suit  holding  that  the  

plaintiff-Bannamma was the owner and directed delivery of  

possession of the suit land.   

The trial court also directed second defendant to refund the  

purchase  price  to  the  appellant-first  defendant,  who,  by  

preferring  an  appeal,  challenged  the  decree  granted  in  

favour of plaintiff.   The second defendant filed a separate  

appeal  challenging  the  direction  to  refund  the  sale  price.  

The  appeals  of  the  defendants  were  allowed  and  the  

judgment and decree passed by the trial court was set aside,  

holding that Nagi Reddy-second defendant was the owner of  

the suit property with title to sell the property.  It is evident  

from  the  record  that  Nagi  Reddy-second  defendant  died  

during the pendency of the appeal and his children, who are  

grandchildren of Bannamma-plaintiff were brought on record  

as Lrs. of Nagi Reddy.

5.  Aggrieved  by  the  decision  of  the  Appellate  Court,  

Bannamma-plaintiff  preferred regular  second appeal  being  

RSA No.556 of 1997.  The High Court reversed the finding  

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recorded  by  the  Appellate  Court  and  allowed  the  regular  

second  appeal  decreeing  the  suit  of  plaintiff-Bannamma  

holding that plaintiff  has title to the suit property and her  

son-defendant no.2 could not have sold the property.  The  

second defendant remained absent before the High Court.  

The  first  defendant  contended  that  second  defendant  in  

collusion  with  plaintiff  brought  the  suit.   The  plea  of  

limitation was also raised.  In the impugned judgment, the  

High Court found that the sale deed was obtained by the first  

defendant  in  December,  1978 and the  suit  is  filed  during  

April,  1990 before the expiry of 12 years.  Learned Single  

Judge of the High Court further observed that merely by the  

fact that the plaintiff came to know about the execution of  

sale deed cannot be inferred as an effective threat to the  

title.  Even otherwise, in case of relief of possession based  

on title, a person can always maintain an action within 12  

years from the date of  the dispossession.   In  the present  

case, within 12 years from the date of Ex.P.24, the suit was  

filed.   It  is  not really necessary for  the plaintiff  to seek a  

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declaration that the sale deed is void.  On the proof of title,  

the plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action for recovery of  

possession.

6. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the impugned  

judgment further held that there is no evidence to show that  

the  plaintiff  had  expressly  or  tacitly  allowed  the  second  

defendant to execute the sale under Ex.P.24 in favour of first  

defendant.   The fact that the first  and second defendants  

were residing together is  not sufficient by itself  to infer a  

collusion or a fraud when the revenue records indicated that  

the property was standing in the name of the plaintiff.  In  

that view of the matter, regular second appeal preferred by  

the plaintiff is allowed by the High Court.

7. Aggrieved  by  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  

Court,  defendant  no.1  has  preferred  present  appeal  by  

special leave in which on 20.7.2007, leave was granted and  

interim  order  to  maintain  status  quo  with  regard  to  

possession  was  continued.   During  the  pendency  of  the  

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appeal,  respondent  no.1-plaintiff  also  died  and  her  legal  

heirs namely Shailaja, Prabhavati and Prakash, who are also  

legal heirs of respondent no.2-second defendant Nagi Reddy,  

were brought on record by this Court on 17.10.2012.

8.  We  have  heard  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant.  Mrs.  Anjana  Chandrashekhar,  learned  advocate  

appearing for the appellant, assailed the findings of the High  

Court on various grounds which were taken before the first  

appellate court  including that  the plaintiff  in her evidence  

admitted that she along with her son-defendant No.2 were  

living  in  the  same house,  but  nowhere  she  stated  in  her  

evidence as to in which year she acquired the suit land as  

stridhan. Learned  counsel  put  reliance  on  exhibit  P-20,  

P-21 and P-22 to establish that defendant No.2 Nagi Reddy,  

was shown as owner of the property.

9. We do not find much force in the submissions made by  

the  counsel.  The first  appellate  court,  while  reversing  the  

finding of the trial court, has not considered most relevant  

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documents  which  were  relied  upon  by  the  trial  court  in  

coming to the conclusion that the suit property was owned  

by the plaintiff.   The High Court elaborately discussed the  

evidence  adduced  by  the  parties,  both  oral  and  

documentary, and affirmed the finding of facts recorded by  

the  trial  court.   From  perusal  of  the  facts  and  evidence  

available  on record,  we do  not  find  any perversity  in  the  

judgment passed by the High Court.

10. Mrs.  Anjana  Chandrashekhar,  learned  counsel  

appearing for  the appellant,  however,  raised an additional  

ground which is interesting and needs to be discussed.  

11. As  noticed  above,  during  the  pendency  of  the  first  

appeal  before  the  District  Court  the  son  of  the  plaintiff  

(defendant  No.2),  died  and his  legal  representatives  were  

substituted in his place.  Thereafter, during the pendency of  

this appeal the original plaintiff-respondent No.1 also died on  

17.5.2010 leaving behind the children of her son Nagi Reddy  

as legal representatives, who have been brought on record  

in different capacity.

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12. In  these  backgrounds,  Mrs.  Anjana  Chandrashekhar,  

learned counsel for the appellant submitted that assuming  

for a moment, Nagi Reddy had no title to the property as his  

mother-original plaintiff was the absolute owner, as held by  

the  High  Court,  the  grand  children  being  the  legal  

representatives of Nagi Reddy would step into the shoes of  

plaintiff as title holders.  Since Nagi Reddy having no title to  

sell  the  property,  his  children  got  the  title  on  account  of  

death of grandmother through her son Nagi Reddy.  In this  

regard,  learned  counsel  referred  Section  15  of  the  Hindu  

Succession  Act  and  submitted  that  on  the  death  of  the  

original  plaintiff  the  grand  children  having  been  claimed  

through their father Nagi Reddy, the principle of feeding the  

grant by estoppel  would come into operation and the sale  

executed by Nagi  Reddy in  favour  of  the appellant  would  

become validated  by  virtue  of  the  death  of  the  plaintiff’s  

mother.  Learned counsel in this regard referred Section 43  

of the Transfer of Property Act.

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13.  We do not find any substance in the contention made  

by  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant.  The  

doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel as contemplated  

under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as  

under:-

“43.   Transfer by unauthorised person who  subsequently  acquires  interest  in  property  transferred.—Where a person fraudulently or  erroneously represents that he is authorised  to transfer certain immoveable property and  professes  to  transfer  such  property  for  consideration,  such  transfer  shall,  at  the  option  of  the  transferee,  operate  on  any  interest which the transferor may acquire in  such property at any time during which the  contract of transfer subsists.       Nothing in this section shall impair the  right  of  transferees  in  good  faith  for  consideration without notice of the existence  of the said option.”  

14. The  doctrine  is  based  on  the  principle  of  law  of  

estoppel.   It  simply  provides  that  when  a  person  by  

fraudulent  or  erroneous  representation  transfers  certain  

immovable  property,  claiming himself  to  be  the  owner  of  

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such property, then such transfer will subsequently operate  

on any interest  which the transferor  may acquire  in  such  

property during which the contract of transfer subsists.  This  

doctrine known in English law has form part of Roman Dutch  

law, according to which where a granter has purported to  

grant an interest in the land which he did not at the time  

possess,  but  subsequently  acquires,  the  benefit  of  his  

subsequent  acquisition  goes  automatically  to  the  earlier  

grantee.  In other words, where a vendor sells without title in  

the  property,  but  subsequently  acquires  title  then a  right  

accrues  to  the  purchaser  to  claim  interest  in  the  said  

property  and  it  automatically  goes  in  favour  of  the  

transferor.

15. In  the  peculiar  facts  of  the  instant  case,  in  our  

considered opinion, the appellant would not be entitled to  

take the benefit of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel.  The  

finding of  facts  recorded by the  two courts  based on  the  

records  that  the  original  plaintiff  was  the  owner  and title  

holder  of  the  said  property  but  by  making  false  and  

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fraudulent  representation  by  her  son  that  the  property  

belonged  to  him,  transferred  the  same  in  favour  of  the  

appellant.  During the pendency of the first appeal before  

the district  court,  the vendor (son of  the original  plaintiff)  

died.  Although on the death, his children did not inherit or  

succeeded  any  interest  in  the  property,  through  their  

deceased  father,  but  they  were  impleaded  as  legal  

representatives  in  the  appeal.  However,  during  the  

pendency  of  this  appeal,  the  original  plaintiff,  namely,  

Bannamma died.  After her death, the respondents being the  

grand  children  inherited  and  acquired  interest  in  the  suit  

property.   Admittedly,  the  deceased  son  of  the  original  

plaintiff, namely Nagi Reddy never acquired any interest in  

the suit property owned by his mother during his life time.  

In  the  aforesaid  premises,  the  doctrine  of  feeding  the  

estoppel would not come into operation as against the grand  

children of the original plaintiff.  Section 43 in our considered  

opinion applies when the transferor having no interest in the  

property  transfers  the  same  but  subsequently  acquires  

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interest in the said property, the purchaser may claim the  

benefit of such subsequent acquisition of the property by the  

transferor.  Had it  been a case where the son Nagi  Reddy  

during his life time succeeded or inherited the property but-  

died subsequently, then to some extent it could have been  

argued  that  the  heirs  of  Nagi  Reddy  who  inherited  the  

property on the death of their father would be bound by the  

principle of estoppel.  We have, therefore, no doubt in our  

mind that in a case where a transferor never acquired by  

succession,  inheritance  or  otherwise  any  interest  in  the  

property during his life time then the provision of Section 43  

will  not  come  into  operation  as  against  the  heirs  who  

succeeded the stridhan property of their grandmother.

16. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in this  

appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.

………………………………J. (Ranjan Gogoi)

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………………………………J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

New Delhi July 25, 2014

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