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        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.5817 OF 2012

Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao              ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.     .…Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This  appeal  by  certificate  is  filed  by  the

plaintiff against the final judgment and order dated

28.10.2011 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra

Pradesh  at  Hyderabad in  Appeal  Suit  No.4141  of

2003 whereby the  High Court  allowed the  appeal

preferred  by  the  defendants(respondents  herein)

and reversed the final  judgment and decree dated

22.09.2003  of  the  Additional  Senior  Civil  Judge,

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Narasaraopet in Original Suit No. 98 of 1998.

2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in the

appeal,  which  lies  in  a  narrow  compass,  it  is

necessary to state few relevant facts taken from the

appeal paper books.

3) The  appellant  is  the  plaintiff  whereas  the

respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out

of which this appeal arises.

4) The  subject  matter  of  this  appeal  is  an

agriculture  land  measuring  Ac.13.38  cents  in

Survey No. 436 and Ac. 9.38 cents in Survey No.

826  (total  land-22  acres  76  cents)  situated  in

-Agnigundala  Village  of  Ipur  Mandal,  District

Guntur Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as

the "suit land”).   

5) The  appellant  owned  several  acres  of

agriculture lands, which also included the suit land.

The  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Reforms  (Ceiling  on

Agricultural  Holdings)  Act,  1973  (for  short,   “the

Act”) was enacted on 01.01.1973.  It came into force

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on 01.01.1975.  The appellant being a  "person" as

defined  under  Section  3(o)  of  the  Act  and  was

holding the land in excess of the limits prescribed

under the Act filed a declaration in respect of  his

holding  before  the  Tribunal  as  required  under

Section 7 of  the  Act.  During the  pendency of  his

case before the Tribunal, the appellant sold the suit

land  vide  sale  deed  dated  16.07.1975  to  the

respondents. The sale deed,  inter alia, recited that

the appellant  has also delivered possession of the

suit land to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 then

mortgaged the suit land along with his other lands

to  the  State  Bank  of  India  and  obtained  loan

wherein the appellant had stood as the guarantor.

6) The Tribunal, on 21.08.1976, passed an order

in CC No.2311/VKD/75 under Section 7 of the Act

and held  inter alia that the appellant was holding

the  land in excess of  the  limits  prescribed in the

Act. It was further held that so far as the transfer of

the suit land made by the appellant in favour of the

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respondents  vide  sale  deed  dated  16.07.1975  is

concerned,  the  same  was  void  because  it  was

effected by the appellant after the Act had come into

force which was prohibited under Section 7(2) read

with  Section  17  of  the  Act.  The  appellant  was,

therefore, directed to surrender the excess land held

by him in favour of the State as provided in the Act.  

7) In 1995-1998, i.e., almost after 2 decades from

the date of the order of the Tribunal (21.08.1976),

another litigation began between the appellant and

the respondents in relation to the suit  land.  This

was  under  the  provisions  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh

Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971

(for short, "the Act of 1971 ") wherein the issue was

whose name - the appellant or the respondents be

entered in the Pass Book in relation to the suit land

as  Pattadar.  This  litigation  ended  in  appellant's

favour by the orders of the revisionary Court.  

8) On 29.10.1998, i.e., almost after 22 years from

the  date  of  the  Tribunal’s  order  (21.08.1976)  the

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appellant filed a civil suit (O.S.No. 98/1998) against

the respondents before the Additional  Senior Civil

Judge, Narsaraopet out of which this appeal arises.

The suit was for permanent injunction in relation to

the  suit  land  against  the  respondents.  It  was

essentially  founded  on  the  allegations  that  the

appellant  is  the  owner  of  the  suit  land  to  the

exclusion of all persons including the respondents,

who  have  no  right  to  interfere  in  the  appellant's

possession over the suit land. It was averred that

the appellant has been and continues to remain in

possession  of  the  suit  land  and  since  the

respondents  are  threatening  the  appellant  to

dispossess him from the suit  land,  hence he was

constrained to file the civil suit seeking permanent

injunction against the respondents restraining them

from interfering in appellant’s  peaceful  possession

over the suit land.  

9) The respondents filed  written statement.  They

denied the appellant's  claim and set up a title  in

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themselves  over  the  suit  land.   It  was contended

that the respondents purchased the suit land from

the appellant vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 and

since then they have been in its possession. It was

contended that the respondents on purchase of the

suit  land  obtained  the  loan  from  S.B.I  and

mortgaged it with the Bank by way of security for

the  loan  taken.  It  was  also  contended  that  the

appellant  is  estopped from raising any contention

once he sold the suit land to the respondents and

stake any claim over the suit land.

10) The  Trial  Court,  on  the  basis  of  pleadings,

framed  two  issues  viz.,  (1)  whether  the  plaintiff

(appellant) is in lawful possession of the suit land;

and (2) whether the plaintiff  (appellant)  is entitled

for injunction as prayed for?  

11) The  Trial  Court  vide  judgment/decree  dated

22.09.2003 decreed the plaintiff's suit. It was held

that  the  sale  made  by  the  appellant  to  the

respondent  of  the  suit  land  vide  sale  deed  dated

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16.07.1975  (Ex-B-1)  is  null  and  void  being  in

contravention of Section 17 of the Act. It was held

that  such sale,  even if  made,  did not  convey any

right,  title  and  interest  in  respondents’  favour.  It

was  further  held  that  the  plaintiff  is  in  lawful

possession of the suit land as he was able to prove

his  actual  possession  on  the  basis  of  evidence

adduced  by  him  and  hence  was  entitled  to  seek

permanent  injunction  against  the  respondents

restraining  the  respondents  not  to  dispossess  the

appellant from the suit land.  

12) Felt  aggrieved,  the  defendants  (respondents)

filed  first  appeal  before  the  High  Court.  By

impugned judgment and order, the Single Judge of

the High Court allowed the appeal and while setting

aside  the  judgment/decree  of  the  Trial  Court

dismissed the suit. The plaintiff (respondent before

the  High  Court)  then  orally  prayed  to  the  Single

Judge  to  grant  leave  to  file  appeal  to  this  Court

(Supreme Court) as provided under Article 134-A(b)

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of  the  Constitution.   The   Single  Judge  granted

"leave" to the plaintiff  as prayed. This is how this

appeal is brought before this Court on the strength

of the certificate  granted by the High Court.

13) Heard Mr.  V.V.S.Rao,  learned senior  counsel

for  the  appellant  and  Mr.  B.  Adinarayana  Rao,

learned senior counsel for the respondents.  We also

perused  the  written  submissions  filed  by  the

parties.   

14) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant

(plaintiff),  while  assailing  the  legality  and

correctness of  the impugned judgment,  contended

that the High Court (Single Judge) erred in reversing

the judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court. The

submission  of  the  learned  counsel,  in  substance,

was that the judgment of the Trial Court, which had

rightly  decreed  the  appellant’s  suit,  should  be

restored.  It  is  this  submission,  which  learned

counsel  elaborated  by  pointing  out  various

provisions  of  the  two  Acts  and  the  exhibits  and

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findings of the two courts below.        

15) In  reply,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

respondents supported the impugned judgment and

contended that no case is made out to interfere in

the impugned order and hence appeal deserves to

be dismissed.

16) Before we consider the merits of the case, it is

apposite  to  deal  with  one  question  which  though

arises, was not argued by pointing out the relevant

provisions governing the question.

17) As mentioned above, this appeal is filed on a

certificate granted by the High Court (Single Judge)

on  the  oral  application  made  by  the  appellant

immediately  after  the  pronouncement  of  the

impugned  judgment  as  provided  under  Article

134-A  of  the  Constitution.    The  order  granting

certificate is a part of the impugned judgment in its

concluding Para which reads thus:

“Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  seeks leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against this judgment.

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Accordingly, leave is granted.”

18) What is the true interpretation of Articles 133

and 134-A of the Constitution and who can grant

the certificate of  fitness to appeal to the Supreme

Court remains no more  res integra. It is settled by

the decision of this Court in  State Bank of India &

Anr. Vs. S.B.I. Employees’ Union & Anr., 1987 (4)

SCC 370.  

19) The facts of this case and the one involved in

the SBI case (supra) are somewhat similar wherein

Their Lordships examined the issue as to whether

the  certificate  granted  by  the  High  Court  (Single

Judge)  satisfied  the  requirements  contained  in

Articles 133 and 134-A. Justice Venkataramiah (as

His  Lordship  then  was  and  later  became  CJI)

speaking for the Bench held thus:

2. The certificate contemplated under Article 134-A  of  the  Constitution  can  only  be  a certificate which is referred to in clause (1) of Article 132 or in clause (1) of Article 133 or in sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 of the Constitution. This is quite obvious from the  language  of  Article  134-A  of  the

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Constitution.  This  case  does  not  fall  either under Article 132(1) or under sub-clause (c) of Article  134(1)  as  it  neither  involves  a substantial  question  of  law  as  to  the interpretation of the Constitution nor it is a criminal proceeding. It can only fall, if at all, under  Article  133(1)  of  the  Constitution. Article 133 of the Constitution reads thus:

“133. (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme  Court  from  any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in  the  territory  of  India  if  the High Court certifies under Article 134-A— (a)  that  the  case  involves  a substantial  question  of  law  of general importance; and (b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  in Article  132,  any  party  appealing to  the  Supreme  Court  under clause (1) may urge as one of the grounds  in  such  appeal  that  a substantial  question of law as to the  interpretation  of  this Constitution  has  been  wrongly decided. (3)  Notwithstanding  anything  in this  article,  no  appeal  shall, unless  Parliament  by  law otherwise  provides,  lie  to  the Supreme  Court  from  the judgment, decree or final order of one judge of a High Court.”

3. Clause  (3)  of  Article  133  says  that notwithstanding anything in that article  no appeal  shall,  unless  Parliament  by  law otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of one  judge  of  the  High  Court.  Before  the introduction  of  Article  134-A  of  the

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Constitution by the Forty-fourth Amendment of  the  Constitution  there  was  no  express provision in Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution regarding the time and manner in  which  an  application  for  a  certificate under  any  of  those  articles  could  be  made before the High Court. There was also a doubt as to the power of the High Court to issue a certificate  suo  motu  under  any  of  those articles. Article 134-A was enacted to make good the said deficiencies. Article 134-A does not  constitute  an  independent  provision under which a certificate can be issued. It is ancillary to Article 132(1), Article 133(1) and Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is the reason for the use of words “if the High Court certifies under Article 134-A” in Article 132(1) and Article 133(1) and for the use of the  words  certifies  under  Article  134-A  in Article 134(1)(c). The High Court can issue a certificate only when it is satisfied that the conditions  in  Article  132 or  Article  133 or Article  134 of  the Constitution as the case may be are satisfied. In the instant case such a certificate could not have been issued by reason  of  clause  (3)  of  Article  133  of  the Constitution by the learned Single Judge.

4. The fact that in a similar case a certificate had been issued by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of two judges in a case decided  by  the  Division  Bench  did  not empower  the  Single  Judge  to  issue  the certificate  under  Article  133(1)  of  the Constitution in a case decided by him. The restriction placed by clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution could not be got over by relying upon the order of the Division Bench.

5. We, therefore, revoke the certificate. This petition of appeal may, however, be treated as a special leave petition under Article 136 of  the  Constitution  and  posted  for preliminary hearing.”

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20) In our considered opinion, the law laid down in

S.B.I case (supra) would squarely apply to the case

at  hand  because  in  the  instant  case  also,  the

impugned judgment and the certificate of fitness to

file an appeal was passed by the  Single Judge of

the High Court.  

21) As held in  S.B.I.  case,  such certificate/leave

could not have been issued/granted by the  Single

Judge by reason of clause (3) of Article 133 of the

Constitution.  In  other  words,  the  Single  Judge of

the  High  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  grant

certificate  in  the  light  of  restrictions  contained  in

clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution.

22) We, therefore, revoke the certificate granted by

the  Single Judge of the High Court.  However, this

appeal is treated as a special leave petition under

Article 136 of the Constitution as was done by this

Court in  S.B.I case (supra).   Leave is accordingly

granted.

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23)  Coming  now to  the  merits  of  the  case,  the

short  question,  which  arises  for  consideration  in

this appeal and which was also debated before the

two Courts below, is who was in possession of the

suit land- the appellant or the respondents on the

date of filing of the suit and whether the appellant

(plaintiff)  was  entitled  to  claim  permanent

injunction  against  the  respondents(defendants)  in

relation to the suit land.  

24) The Trial Court held the appellant (plaintiff) to

be in possession of  the suit  land and accordingly

granted  permanent  injunction  restraining  the

respondents  (defendants)  from  interfering  in  the

appellant's  possession over  the  suit  land whereas

the  High  Court  in  an  appeal  filed  by  the

respondents reversed the finding of the Trial Court

and dismissed the suit giving rise to filing of  this

appeal by the plaintiff on certificate.

25) One cannot dispute the legal proposition being

well  settled  that  the  question  as  to  who  is  in

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possession  of  the  suit  property  is  essentially  a

question  of  fact.  Such  question  is  required  to  be

decided on appreciation of evidence adduced by the

parties  in  support  of  their  respective  contentions.

Once the Trial Court renders a finding either way

and  the  same  is  then  appreciated  by  the  first

appellate  Court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate

jurisdiction, such finding is usually held binding on

the second appellate Court and this Court.  

26) It is only when such finding of fact is found to

be against the pleading or evidence or any provision

of law or when it is found to be so perverse or/and

arbitrary to the extent that no judicial person of an

average capacity can ever record, the same would

not  be  binding  on the  higher  Courts  and may in

appropriate case call for interference.  

27) Coming to the facts of the case, we are of the

considered  opinion,  that  the  appellant  (plaintiff)

simply abused the process of law in filing the suit

for permanent injunction in relation to the suit land

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against the respondents. The suit, in our opinion,

was misconceived and deserved dismissal on facts

and  in  law  on  the  grounds,  which  are  indeed

apparent on the face of  the record of the case as

mentioned below.

28) Firstly, the legal effect of the coming into force

of the Act was that on and after 01.01.1975 (notified

date), the appellant being the holder of agriculture

lands had no right to sell or/and transfer the suit

land  whether  for  consideration  or  otherwise.  In

other words, the sale/transfer of agriculture land by

the holder of the land was prohibited on and after

-01.01.1975 by virtue of the provisions of the Act. In

this  view  of  the  matter,  the  sale  made  by  the

appellant vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 in favour

of the respondents in relation to the suit land was

null and void.

29)  Secondly, the Tribunal having rightly held in

the order dated 21.08.1976 that the sale deed dated

16.07.1975 executed by the appellant in favour of

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the respondents was null and void because it was

made in contravention of the provisions of the Act

and secondly, having held that the appellant's total

holding was in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed

in the Act,  the suit land was not available to the

appellant for its disposal. Indeed its disposal could

be done only in accordance with the provisions of

the Act with the intervention of the State.  

30) That apart, one of the legal effects that ensued

consequent  upon  passing  of  the  order  by  the

Tribunal dated 21.08.1976 was that the character of

the suit land had changed. It was then in the nature

of  "surrendered" or  "deemed surrendered" land in

favour of the State as prescribed under Sections 10

and 11 and other related provisions of the Act.

31) Thirdly,  the  litigation,  which  had  ensued

during  1995-98  between  the  appellant  and  the

respondents under  "The Act of 1971" in relation to

the  entries  of  their  names  in  the  revenue  record

(Pass Book) pertaining to the suit land was neither

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of any consequence and nor was of any significance

and nor had any impact on the present litigation. It

was for the reason that Section 28 of the Act that

gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Act on

all  those  laws,  which  are  inconsistent  with  the

provisions of the Act, had applied to this case. The

Act  of  1971  is  one  such  law  and,  therefore,  any

order passed under the Act of 1971 in relation to

the suit land was of no avail to any party and nor it

could  have  been  made  basis  for  determining  the

issue of possession of any party over the suit land

while considering the grant of injunction.  

32) In other words, no benefit of the order(s), even

if passed, under  the Act 1971 could be taken by the

parties  either  way  against  each  other  in  these

proceedings  by  virtue  of  Section  28  of  the  Act.

Moreover,  in  our  considered  view,  no  proceedings

under the Act 1971 could either be initiated or be

pursued by the appellant/respondents in relation to

the  suit  land  after  the  Act  had  come  into  force

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(01.01.1975). Even the proceedings under the Act of

1971  were  subject  to  the  final  outcome  of  the

proceedings under the Act.  

33) Fourthly,  the  appellant  did  not  come  to  the

Civil  Court  with  clean  hands  inasmuch  as  he

suppressed the  material  fact  that  he  had already

sold the suit land much prior to filing of the Suit to

the respondents and, therefore,  had no subsisting

interest  in the suit  land.  Indeed filing of  the civil

suit by the appellant (29.10.1998) almost after 22

years from the date of passing of the order by the

Tribunal  (21.08.1976)  was  totally  uncalled  for.  In

fact,  it  was  a  collusive  suit  filed  to  frustrate  the

rights  of  the  State  which  had  accrued  in  State’s

favour in the suit land by virtue of the order dated

21.08.1976  read  with  the  provisions  of  the  Act.

Such  frivolous  suit,  in  our  considered  opinion,

deserved rejection at its threshold.

34) Fifthly,  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court

having  held  on  the  strength  of  Tribunal's  finding

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recorded  in  the  order  21.08.1976  which  has

attained  finality  that  the  appellant  was  not  the

owner of the suit land, the respondents too did not

acquire any right, title and interest in the suit land

through  sale  deed  dated  16.07.1975.  It  being  a

settled principle of law that a person can transfer

only those rights, which he has in the property and

cannot transfer any rights, which he does not have

would apply to this case.  

35) In  other  words,  when  the  appellant  was

prohibited  to  transfer  any  of  his  rights,  title  and

interest in the suit land by virtue of the provisions

of the Act to any person - a fortiori, the respondents

too could not acquire any rights, title and interest in

the suit land through sale deed dated 16.07.1975

from the appellant and he too was, therefore, in the

same position like that of the appellant.

36) Seventhly,  once  the  appellant's  rights  in  the

suit land stood determined by the Tribunal vide its

order dated 21.08.1976 under the Act, there did not

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arise  any occasion to  hold  the  appellant  to  be in

“lawful possession" of the suit land on the date of

filing of the suit (29.10.98) for considering grant of

injunction  over  the  suit  land  against  the

respondents.

37)  It is a settled principle of law that in order to

claim  prohibitory  (temporary  or  permanent)

injunction, it is necessary for the plaintiff to  prima

facie prove  apart  from  establishing  other  two

ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that

his possession over the suit land is "legal".  In this

case, it was not so and nor it could be for the simple

reason that as far back on 21.08.1976, the Tribunal

had already declared the land held by the plaintiff to

be in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed under

the  Act.  In  these  circumstances,  the  plaintiff  was

neither holding the land nor could he be held to be

in  its  lawful  possession  so  as  to  enable  him  to

exercise  any  ownership  rights  against  any  other

private party over the suit land. The appellant had

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then very limited rights  left  to  exercise under the

Act in relation to the suit land and such rights were

available to him only against the State. Such is not

the case here.

38) Lastly,  this  being  a  simple  suit  for  grant  of

permanent  injunction  between  the  two  private

parties  in  relation  to  the  land which was  subject

matter of  the State Ceiling Laws, was liable to be

dismissed  on  the  short  ground  apart  from  many

others as detailed above that any order that may be

passed by the Civil Court would adversely affect and

interfere in the rights of  the State  under the Act,

which had not been impleaded as party defendant.  

39) Learned counsel  for the appellant took us to

the  various  documents  including  orders  of  the

Revenue authorities to show that it was the plaintiff

who was in possession of the suit land on the date

of filing of the suit as was rightly held by the Trial

Court and, therefore, this Court should restore the

finding of the Trial Court.

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40)  We  are  afraid  we  cannot  re-appreciate  the

documentary  or/and  oral  evidence  again  in  our

appellate jurisdiction. Firstly,  it is not permissible

for  want of  any case made out  to that  effect  and

secondly, it is not considered necessary in the light

of what we have held above.   

41) Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  placed

reliance  on  several  decisions  in  support  of  his

submission such as Nagubai Ammal & Ors. vs. B.

Shama Rao & Ors.,  AIR 1956 SC 593,  Bhagwati

Prasad vs. Shri Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735,

Pinninti  Kishtamma  &  Ors.  vs.  Duvvada

Parasuram Chowdary & Ors. 2010 (2)  SCC 452,

State  of  Tamil  Nadu  vs.  Ramalinga  Samigal

Madam, 1985 (4) SCC 10, Annamreddi Bodayya &

Anr. vs. Lokanarapu Ramaswamy(Dead) by L.Rs.

1984 Suppl  SCC 391,  Anathula Sudhakar vs.  P.

Buchi  Reddy(D)  by  L.Rs.,  2008  (4)  SCC  594,

Rajendra Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.,

(1998) 7 SCC 654 and  Karnail Singh vs. State of

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Haryana & Anr., (1995) Suppl(3) SCC 376. We have

perused these  decisions  and find no quarrel  with

the general proposition of law laid down therein. In

our view, all the decisions cited are distinguishable

on facts and hence have no application to the facts

of this case.

42) It is pertinent to mention that in order to limit

filing of such frivolous suits by the private parties in

relation to agricultural land which are subjected to

the State  ceiling laws,  the State  of  M.P.  amended

the Code of Civil Procedure by Act No. 29 of 1984

w.e.f. 14.8.84. By this State amendment, Rule 3-B

was added in Order 1 Rule 10 making it obligatory

upon  the  plaintiff  to  implead  the  State  as  party

defendant  along  with  private  party  defendant  in

every such suit.  The amendment  further  provides

that  so long as the plaintiff  does not implead the

State as party defendant in the suit, the Court will

not  proceed with the  trial  of  the  Suit.  The object

behind  introducing  such  amendment  was  to  give

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notice  to  the  State  of  filing  of  such  suit  by  the

holder of the agricultural land which would enable

the State to defend their rights, which had accrued

in State's favour in the land under the Act.  

43) In the absence of any such rule in operation in

the State of A.P., the State remained unnoticed of

the suit proceedings, which continued in Courts for

last more than two decades.

44) In view of foregoing discussion, we uphold the

conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  on  our

reasoning  given  supra.  As  a  consequence,  the

appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.  

45) Before parting, we consider it apposite to state

that the appellant and the respondents made frantic

efforts to somehow retain the suit land to them and

keep the land away from the clutches of  The Act.

With  this  aim  in  view,  they  got  the  suit  land

involved in this litigation since 1976. All  this was

done without notice to the State Authorities.  

46) We, therefore,  direct the Tribunal to take up

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the  case  of  the  appellant  on  its  Board  and  pass

appropriate consequential order, if necessary under

the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976

of  the  Tribunal  passed in  CC No.  2311/VKD/75

and  take  all  remedial  steps  as  are  necessary  in

relation to the land held by the appellant including

the suit land.

47) Registry is directed to send a copy of this order

to the concerned Tribunal.

                                                                         …... ……..................................J.

        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

………...................................J. [NAVIN SINHA]

New Delhi; April 13, 2017  

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