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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.71 OF 2012

RUPALI DEVI … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.      … RESPONDENTS

WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 619 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5695/2010]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 620 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 8246/2010]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 621 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 7387/2011]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 622 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5052/2014]

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 623 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5139/2014]

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, CJI

1. “Whether a woman forced to leave her matrimonial home on account of

acts and conduct that constitute cruelty can initiate and access the legal process

within the jurisdiction of the courts where she is forced to take shelter with the

parents or other family members”.  This is the precise question that arises for

determination in this group of appeals.  

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2. The opinions of this Court on the aforesaid question being sharply divided,

the present reference to a larger Bench has been made for consideration of the

question indicated hereinabove.   

3. In

(i) Y.  Abraham  Ajith  and  Others  v.  Inspector  of  Police, Chennai and Another (2004) 8 SCC 100.

(ii) Ramesh and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 3 SCC  507.

(iii) Manish Ratan and Others v.  State  of  Madhya Pradesh and Another (2007) 1 SCC 262.

(iv) Amarendu Jyoti and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh and  Others (2014) 12 SCC 362.

a view has been taken that if  on account of cruelty committed to a wife in a

matrimonial home she takes shelter in the parental home and if no specific act of

commission of cruelty in the parental home can be attributed to the husband or

his relatives, the initiation of proceedings under Section 498A in the courts having

jurisdiction  in  the  area  where  the  parental  home  is  situated  will  not  be

permissible.  The core fact that would be required to be noted in the above cases

is that there were no allegations made on behalf of the aggrieved wife that any

overt act of cruelty or harassment had been caused to her at the parental home

after she had left the matrimonial home.  It is in these circumstances that the view

had been expressed in the above cases that the offence of cruelty having been

committed in the matrimonial home the same does not amount to a continuing

offence committed in the parental home to which place the aggrieved wife may

have later shifted.

4. In  Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997) 5 SCC 30;

Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar and Another (2011) 11 SCC 301  and

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State  of  M.P.  v.  Suresh  Kaushal  &  Anr.  (2003)  11  SCC 126  a  seemingly

different view has been taken.  However, the said view may appear to be based

in the particular facts of each of the cases in question.  For instance, in  Sujata

Mukherjee  (Supra) there  was  a  specific  allegation  that  the  husband,  after

committing acts of cruelty in the matrimonial home, had also gone to the parental

house of the wife where she had taken shelter and had assaulted her there.  On

the said facts this court in Sujata Mukherjee (Supra) held that the offence is a

continuing  offence  under  Section  178  (c)  of  the  Cr.P.C.   In  Sunita  Kumari

Kashyap  (Supra),  there  was an allegation  that  the  wife  was  illtreated  by  her

husband who left her at her parental home and further that the husband had not

made any enquiries about her thereafter.   There was a further allegation that

even when the wife had tried to contact the husband, he had not responded.  In

the said facts,  this  court  took the view that  the consequences of  the offence

under Section 498A have occurred at the parental home and, therefore, the court

at that place would have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence alleged in

view of Section 179 of the Cr.P.C.  Similarly in State of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal

(Supra) as  the miscarriage was caused to  the wife  at  Jabalpur,  her  parental

home, on account of cruelty meted out to her in the matrimonial home, it was held

that the court at the place of the parental home of the wife would have jurisdiction

to entertain the complaint under Section 179 Cr.P.C.

5. The above two views which the learned referring bench had considered

while making the present reference, as already noticed, were founded on the

peculiar facts of the two sets of cases before the Court.  It may be possible to

sustain both the views in the light of the facts of the cases in which such view

was rendered by this court.   What confronts the court  in  the present case is

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however different.  Whether in a case where cruelty had been committed in a

matrimonial home by the husband or the relatives of the husband and the wife

leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter in the parental home located at a

different place, would the courts situated at the place of the parental home of the

wife have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 498A.  This is in a

situation where no overt act of cruelty or harassment is alleged to have been

committed by the husband at the parental home where the wife had taken shelter.

6. A look at the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (Cr.P.C) dealing with the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court in inquires and

trials  will  now  be  required.   Section  177  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure

contemplates that “every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a

Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed”.  It is, therefore, clear that

in the normal course, it is the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence is

committed that would have the power and authority to take cognizance of the

offence in question.   

7. Sections 178 and 179 are exceptions to the above rule and may be set out

hereinunder:

“178.Place of inquiry or trial.-  

(a)  When  it  is  uncertain  in  which  of  several  local  areas  an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

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“179.  Offence  triable  where  act  is  done  or  consequence ensues.- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local  jurisdiction  such  thing  has  been  done  or  such consequence has ensued.”

8. Section  178  creates  an  exception  to  the  “ordinary  rule”  engrafted  in

Section 177 by permitting the courts in another local area where the offence is

partly committed to take cognizance.  Also if the offence committed in one local

area continues in  another  local  area,  the  courts  in  the  latter  place would  be

competent to take cognizance of the matter.  Under Section 179, if by reason of

the consequences emanating from a criminal  act an offence is occasioned in

another jurisdiction, the court in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take

cognizance.  Thus, if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in

another; or if the offence is a continuing offence or where the consequences of a

criminal act result in an offence being committed at another place, the exception

to the “ordinary rule” would be attracted and the courts within whose jurisdiction

the criminal act is committed will cease to have exclusive jurisdiction to try the

offence.

9. At this stage it may also be useful to take note of what can be understood

to a continuing offence.  The issue is no longer res integra having been answered

by this court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890.  Para 5

may be usefully noticed in this regard.

“5. A  continuing  offence  is  one  which  is  susceptible  of continuance  and  is  distinguishable  from  the  one  which  is committed once and for all.  It is one of those offences which arises  out  of  a  failure  to  obey  or  comply  with  a  rule  or  its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues  until  the  rule  or  its  requirement  is  obeyed  or

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12. Section 498A of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  was introduced by  the  Criminal  Law

(second amendment) Act, 1983.  In addition to the aforesaid amendment in the Indian

Penal Code, the provisions of Sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973  relating  to  inquiries  by  police  in  case  of  death  by  suicides  and  inquiries  by

magistrates into cause of such deaths were also amended.   Section 198A was also

inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to prosecution of offences under

Section 498A.  Further by an amendment in the first schedule to the Cr.PC  the offence

under  Section  498A  was  made  cognizable  and  non-bailable.   Of  considerable

significance is the introduction of Section 113A in the Indian Evidence Act by the Criminal

Law (second amendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment of suicide

by a married woman to be drawn if such suicide had been committed within a period of

seven  years  from  the  date  of  marriage  of  the  married  woman  and  she  had  been

subjected to cruelty.  Section 113A is in the following term:  

“113-A.  Presumption  as  to  abetment  of  suicide  by  a married  woman.–  When  the  question  is  whether  the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of  seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative  of  her  husband  had  subjected  her  to  cruelty,  the Court  may  presume,  having  regard  to  all  the  other circumstances  of  the  case,  that  such  suicide  had  been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.– For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  “cruelty” shall  have  the  same meaning  as  in  section  498-A of  the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

13. The object behind the aforesaid amendment,  undoubtedly,  was to combat the

increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives of the husband on the wife

which leads to commission of suicides or grave injury to the wife besides seeking to deal

with harassment of the wife so as to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any

unlawful  demand for  any property,  etc.   The above stated object  of  the amendment

cannot be overlooked while answering the question arising in the present case.  The

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judicial  endeavour  must,  therefore,  always  be  to  make  the  provision  of  the  laws

introduced  and  inserted by  the Criminal  Laws (second  amendment)  Act,  1983  more

efficacious  and  effective  in  view of  the  clear  purpose  behind the introduction  of  the

provisions in question, as already noticed.

14.  “Cruelty”  which  is  the  crux  of  the  offence under  Section  498A IPC is

defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to mean “The intentional and malicious infliction

of  mental  or  physical  suffering  on  a  living  creature,  esp.  a  human;  abusive

treatment; outrage (Abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)”.  Cruelty can be both

physical or mental cruelty.  The impact on the mental health of the wife by overt

acts on the part of the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of

being driven away from the matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to

the same home for fear of being illtreated are aspects that cannot be ignored

while understanding the meaning of the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section

498A of the Indian Penal Code.  The emotional distress or psychological effect on

the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatize the wife even

after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental home.

Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in the matrimonial house may have

ceased and such acts do not occur at the parental home,  there can be no doubt

that the mental trauma and the psychological distress cause by the acts of the

husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leave

the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continue to persist

at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and

humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the parental home even though

there may not be any overt act of physical cruelty at such place.  

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15. The  Protection  of  Women  from  Domestic  Violence  Act,  as  the  object

behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide a civil  remedy to victims of

domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal law which is what is provided

under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The definition of the Domestic

Violence  in  the  Protection  of  Women  from  Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005

contemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-

being,  whether  mental  or  physical,  as  well  as  emotional  abuse.   The  said

definition would certainly, for reasons stated above, have a close connection with

Explanation A & B to Section 498A, Indian Penal Code which defines cruelty.  The

provisions contained in  Section 498A of  the  Indian Penal  Code,  undoubtedly,

encompasses both mental as well as the physical well-being of the wife.  Even

the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress

and mental agony.  Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directly

attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial

home would, undoubtedly,  be the consequences of the acts committed at the

matrimonial  home.   Such  consequences,  by  itself,  would  amount  to  distinct

offences committed at  the  parental  home where  she has taken shelter.   The

adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of

the  acts  committed  in  the  matrimonial  home  would,  in  our  considered  view,

amount  to  commission  of  cruelty  within  the  meaning  of  Section  498A at  the

parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial

home results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home.  This is

the  kind  of  offences  contemplated  under  Section  179  Cr.P.C  which  would

squarely be applicable to the present case as an answer to the question raised.

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16. We,  therefore,  hold  that  the  courts  at  the  place  where  the  wife  takes

shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts

of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the

factual  situation,  also  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  complaint  alleging

commission of offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

17. All the appeals are disposed of in terms of the above.  

………………………..…..,CJI  [RANJAN GOGOI]

...……………………..…….,J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

………………………..…….,J.          [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

NEW DELHI; APRIL 09, 2019.