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PETITIONER: ADVOCATE GENERAL, STATE OF BIHAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/03/1980

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR  946            1980 SCR  (2)1172  1980 SCC  (3) 311  CITATOR INFO :  R          1983 SC1151  (3)  RF         1992 SC 904  (52)

ACT:      Criminal Contempt-Section  2(C)  of  the  Contempts  of Courts  Act,   1971,  Scope  of-Statutory  Limitation  under Section 20 of the Act, computation of.

HEADNOTE:      The respondents  were  the  successful  bidders  at  an auction of  forest coupes  in the  State of  Bihar. As  they defaulted in making the security deposit in respect of three coupes, the  agreements with  them were  determined  by  the Conservator of  Forests. The  respondents thereupon  filed a writ petition  in the  Calcutta High Court instead of in the Patna  High   Court  and   followed  it   up  with   several applications one  after another  both in  the  Calcutta  and Patna      High Courts  towards the  forest department  from preventing unauthorised  removal of  forest produce  by  the respondents.      Vexed by  the manner in which the respondent was filing repeated applications  and procuring  orders  of  a  learned single judge  of the  High Court necessitating the filing of as many  appeals to  the Division  Bench, the State of Bihar moved an  application for  committing  the  respondents  for contempt of  court, alleging  that,  by  their  conduct  the respondents were  obstructing the  administration of justice and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna  High Court held that the respondent’s conduct was most unscrupulous  and that  there was  gross abuse  of  the process of  the Court,  which could in certain circumstances amount  to  contempt  of  Court.  However,  the  High  Court dismissed the  application on  the ground that it was barred by limitation  as it was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by  section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court  held, on  a reading  of the contempt application that the  material allegation  in  regard  to  the  contempt committed by the respondents was that relating to the filing of the  application dated  April 7,  1971 before  the single judge of  the Calcutta  High Court to circumvent and nullify the order  dated March 29, 1971 of the Division Bench of the Patna High  Court. As the contempt application dated 18-7-73

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in OCM  7/73 was  filed more  than  a  year  later,  it  was timeshared. In  regard to  the allegation  relating  to  the filing of  the petition  dated December  14, 1972,  the High Court observed  that there  was no  specific allegation that any contempt  of court  was committed  by the filing of this application.   Though    the   respondents    tendered    an unconditional apology,  its acceptance was not considered as the application  was found  to be  beyond  time.  Hence  the appeal under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.      Allowing the State appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  Every abuse  of process  of the court may not necessarily amount to contempt of Court. Abuse of process of the Court  calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceeding or  the orderly  administration of  justice is  a contempt of Court. [1178A-B]      2. It  may be  that certain minor abuses of the process of the  court may  be suitably  dealt with  as  between  the parties by striking out pleadings under the 1173 provisions of  order 6,  Rule 16  C.P.C. or  in  some  other manner. But  on the   other  hand, it  may be  necessary  to punish as  a contempt,  a course of conduct which abuses and makes a  mockery of  the judicial  process  and  which  thus extends its  pernicious influence  beyond the parties to the action and  affects  the  interest  of  the  public  in  the administration of Justice. [1178B-C]      3. The  public have  an interest, an abiding and a real interest and  a vital  stake, in  the effective  and orderly administration of  justice, because,  unless justice  is  so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the  public in  the administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in  order to  protect the  dignity of  the Court against insult or  injury as  the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to  suggest, but  to protect and to vindicate the right of the  public that  administration of  justice shall not be prevented,  prejudiced,   obstructed  or   interfered  with. [1178C-E]      Offutt v. U.S.p.11, quoted with approval.      4. It  is not  necessary  that  every  allegation  made should be  followed then and there by the statement that the allegation established  a contempt  of Court Paragraph 29 of the application  to  commit  the  respondents  for  Contempt expressly referred  to the  application dated  December  14, 1972  and   paragraph  31  state  that  all  the  facts  and circumstances enumerated  in the  petition established  that the respondents  were obstructing  and interfering  with the due course of administration of justice. [1180F-H]      In the instant case:      (a) the  respondents began  the  "game"  by  filing  an application under  Art. 226  of the Constitution of India in the Calcutta  High Court,  whereas in  the normal course one would expect  such an  application to  be filed in the Patna High Court  within whose  jurisdiction the subject matter of dispute was  situate. A  justifiable prima  facie  inference from this  circumstance may  be that the application was not bonafide but  intended to  harass and  oppress the  opposite party. [1179C-E]      (b) Thereafter  application after application was filed before the  learned single  Judge, everyone of them designed to circumvent, defect or nullify the effect of the orders of the Division  Benches of  the Calcutta  High Court and Patna High Court.  The order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta

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High Court  directing the respondents to furnish security in a sum  of Rs.  1,55,000/- was never complied with. The order of the  Division Bench of the Patna High Court directing the respondents to  furnish security  of immovable property in a sum of  Rs. 75,000/-  and to deposit in cash or furnish bank guarantee in  a sum  of Rs. 50,000/- was also never complied with. Instead,  an order  was obtained from the single Judge of the  Calcutta High  Court restraining  the State of Bihar from  continuing   the  money  suit  in  the  Court  of  the Subordinate Judge, Palamau. When this order was set aside by the Division  Bench, an  attempt was  made to circumvent all earlier orders  by obtaining  an order  of the  single Judge that they may be allowed to deposit a sum of Rs. 60,000/- in cash and  permitted to  remove the  stock  from  the  forest Coupes.  When   the  State   of  Bihar   moved  the  learned Subordinate Judge,  Palamau for  a direction  to auction the attached stock,  the respondents  moved  an  application  on December 14,  1972, and  obtained an  order from  the Single Judge of  the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the 1174 money suit  in the  Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau. In considering  the  question  whether  the  filing  of  the application dated  December 14,  1972, amounts to a Contempt of Court,  the Court must take into account the whole course of the  continuing contumacious  conduct of  the respondents from the  beginning of  the ’game’.  Clearly, not  a  single application made  to the  Single Judge  was bonafide.  Every application was a daring ’raid’ on the Court and each was an abuse of  the process  of the  Court. The  application dated December 14,  1972 praying that the proceedings in the money suit in  the Court of the Subordinate Judge should be stayed was made  despite the fact that earlier, on January 10, 1972 the Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the  proceedings in  the money  suit to go on. The application of the respondents clearly showed that they were intent upon obstructing the due course of the proceedings in the money  suit in  the  Court  of  the  Subordinate  Judge, Palamau and  to obstruct  the administration  of justice  by abusing the process of the Court. [1179GH, 1180A-E]      (c) The  application dated  December 14,  1972  was  an abuse of  process of  the Court,  calculated to obstruct the due course  of a  judicial proceeding and the administration of justice  and was therefore, a criminal contempt of Court; [1180H, 1181A]      (d)   though   the   respondents   had   expressed   an unconditional apology  to the  Patna High Court, the conduct of  the  respondents  is  so  reprehensible  as  to  warrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence. [1181A]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 349 of 1974.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  24-4-1974  of  the Patna High Court in original Crl. Misc. No. 7/73.      Lal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh and S. N. Jha for the Appellant.      Sukumar Ghosh for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. The  Advocate-General of  Bihar is the appellant  in  this  appeal  under  Section  19  of  the Contempts of Courts Act, 1971. Respondent No. 1, M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair  Industries, represented  by respondent No. 2,

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Om Prakash  Agrawal, were  the highest  bides at  an auction held by the Divisional Forest officer, Garhwa South, of four forest coupes  in the State of Bihar. Under the terms of the agreements the  respondents were  required to deposit 25% of each of  the four  bids as  security. The  respondents were, however, able  to make  the deposit  in respect of one coupe only and  not in  respect of  the other  three  coupes.  The respondents requested for time. Thereafter, there was a long course  of   correspondence  with   which  we  are  not  now concerned. Finally,  on January 28, 1970, the Conservator of Forests determined  the agreements.  On February  28,  1970, respondent No.  1 served  a notice  on the Divisional Forest officer 1175 Garhwa  South,   intimating  him  that  they  had  filed  an application under  Article 226  of the  Constitution in  the Calcutta High Court and that S. C. Deb, J., had been pleased to issue  a rule nisi and also an injunction restraining the Govt. of Bihar and the officials of the Forest Department of the Govt.  of Bihar from giving effect to the proceedings by which the  leases were determined and further directing them to allow  M/s. Madhya  Pradesh Khair  Industries to carry on the work  of cutting  and felling  of trees and removing the material in  the  said  forest  coupes.  Alleging  that  the officers of  the Forest Department of the Govt. of Bihar had violated the  order of  injunction granted against them, the respondents filed  an application to commit the Officers for Contempt of  Court and  in that  application they prayed for and obtained  an interim order directing the Officers not to interfere in  any way with the activities of the respondents in removing  the produce  of the  Khair trees.  The State of Bihar preferred  an  appeal  to  a  Division  Bench  of  the Calcutta High  Court and  on September 29,1970, the Division Bench passed  an order allowing the appeal and directing the respondents to  furnish security in a sum of Rs. 1,55,000 if they desired  to remove  the forest produce. Otherwise, they were restrained  from selling  the trees  and extracting the produce.  The   respondents  offered   certain  property  as security but  that was  rejected by  the  Registrar  of  the Calcutta High Court as the title was found to be defective.      At this  stage on  January 8,  1971, the State of Bihar filed money  suit  No.  3  of  1971  in  the  Court  of  the Subordinate Judge  of  Palamau  to  recover  a  sum  of  Rs. 1,93,225 as  damages. The  State  of  Bihar  also  filed  an application under  order 38, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure and  obtained   an  order   of  attachment   of  the  ’Kath’ manufactured  by   the   respondents   alongwith   utensils, equipment, etc.  The respondents  were directed  to  furnish security in a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs and asked to show cause why the interim  attachment should  not be  made  absolute.  The attachment was effected on January 10, 1971. The respondents appeared before  the learned Subordinate Judge and requested that the  reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75,000. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the prayer of the  respondents and  reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2  lakhs to  Rs. 75,000. The State of Bihar preferred an appeal to the Patna High Court and an interim order was made by the High Court, staying the operation of the order of the learned Subordinate  Judge but continuing the attachment. On March 29,  1971, after  hearing both  the parties, the Patna High Court  made  an  order  directing  the  respondents  to furnish security  of immovable  property in  a  sum  of  Rs. 75,000 and  to deposit  cash or  furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000. It was directed that 1176

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on such  security being  furnished  the  interim  attachment would cease  and the  respondents would be allowed to remove the stock, utensils and equipment.      Without complying  with the  order of  the  Patna  High Court, Respondent  No.1 then  moved the learned Single Judge of the  Calcutta High  Court on April 21, 1971, and obtained an order  restraining the State of Bihar from continuing the money suit  in the  Court of  the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and further  directing the  State to  take steps  to get the attachment  vacated   if  security   was  furnished  by  the respondents  as  directed  by  the  Division  Bench  of  the Calcutta High  Court. The  State of  Bihar filed  an  appeal against the  order of  the  learned  Single  Judge  and  the operation of the order was stayed by an order of January 10, 1972 of  the  Division  Bench.  It  was  directed  that  the proceedings in  the money  suit in  the Court of the learned Subordinate  Judge   of  Palamau   should  proceed.  In  the meanwhile on  July 30,  1971, Respondent No. 1 moved another application before  the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court  offering to  deposit  Rs.  60,000  in  cash  and requesting that  on such  deposit being  made, they might be allowed to remove the stock. This application was allowed on July 30,  1971, by  the learned  Single Judge and the amount was directed  to be deposited with the counsel for the State of Bihar.  The order  was later  on modified on December 16, 1972, and  the amount  was directed to be deposited with the Registrar of the High Court.      On November  20, 1972,  the State  of  Bihar  filed  an application in  the Court  of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau complaining that  the respondents had not furnished security as directed  by the  Patna High  Court and  as the  attached stock was  deteriorating it might be sold by auction. Before anything further  could be  done Respondent  No. 1  filed  a petition on  14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from the learned  Single Judge  of the  Calcutta  High  Court  on December 18, 1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the  Court of  the Subordinate  Judge, Palamau  until the attached goods  were released  in compliance with the orders dated July  30, 1971  and February  16, 1972.  The State  of Bihar preferred  an appeal  against the order of the learned Single Judge  and on  January 22,  1973, a Division Bench of the Calcutta  High Court  set aside the order of the learned Single Judge  and directed  the proceedings  in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau, to go on.      Vexed by  the manner  in which  the 1st  Respondent was filing repeated  applications and  procuring orders  from  a learned Single Judge 1177 of the  High Court,  necessitating the  filing  of  as  many appeals to  the  Division Bench, the State of Bihar filed an application for  committing the  Respondents for Contempt of Court alleging  that, by  their conduct the respondents were obstructing the  administration of  justice and  interfering with the  due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna High Court  held   that  the   respondents’  conduct   was   most unscrupulous one  that there  was gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could in certain circumstances amount to contempt of  Court. The  High Court,  however, dismissed the application on  the ground  that it was barred by limitation as it  was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by section 20  of the  Contempt of  Courts Act.  The High Court held, on  a reading  of the  Contempt application,  that the material allegation  in regard  to the contempt committed by the respondents  was that  relating to  the  filing  of  the application dated  April 7, 1971, before the Single Judge of

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the Calcutta  High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29, 1971 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. As  the contempt  application was  filed more  than a year later  it was  time-barred. In regard to the allegation relating to  the filing  of the  petition dated December 14, 1972, the  High Court  observed that  there was  no specific allegation that  any Contempt  of Court was committed by the filing of  this application.  We may  also mention  that the respondents tendered  an unconditional  apology to  the High Court of  Bihar. The  question of  accepting the apology was not considered  as the  application was  found to  be beyond time. The  Advocate General  of Bihar  has filed this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court.      Before we  consider the  merits of  the appeal  we  may mention here  that the  learned Single  Judge who  made  the several orders  in favour  of the  respondents  was  himself compelled in  a later  order dated  August 13, 1973 to state that the  respondents  had  suppressed  material  facts  and misled him  on various  occasions and  obtained orders  from him.      Section 2(c)  of the  Contempt of  Courts  Act  defines Criminal contempt as follows:           "(c) ’Criminal  Contempt’  means  the  publication      (whether by  words, spoken or written, or any signs, or      by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter      or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-           (i) scandalises  or tends to scandalise, or lowers      or tends to lower the authority of any court; or           (ii)  prejudices,   or  interferes   or  tends  to      interfere  with,   the  due   course  of  any  judicial      proceeding; or 1178           (iii) Interferes  or tends  to interfere  with, or      obstructs or  tends to  obstruct, the administration of      justice in any other manner". While we  are conscious  that every  abuse of the process of the Court  may not  necessarily amount to Contempt of Court, abuse of  the process  of the Court calculated to hamper the due  course   of  a   judicial  proceeding  or  the  orderly administration of  justice, we  must say,  is a  contempt of Court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the Court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking  out pleadings  under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16  or in some other manner. But, on the other hand, it may be  necessary to  punish as  a  contempt,  a  course  of conduct which  abuses and  makes a  mockery of  the judicial process and  which thus  extends  its  pernicious  influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public  in the  administration of  justice. The  publice have an  interest, an  abiding and  a real  interest, and  a vital stake  in the  effective and orderly administration of justice, because,  unless justice  is so administered, there is the  peril of  all rights  and liberties  perishing.  The Court has  the duty of protecting the interest of the public in  the  due  administration  of  justice  and,  so,  it  is entrusted with  the power  to commit  for Contempt of Court, not in  order to  protect the  dignity of  the Court against insult or  injury as  the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to  suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the  public that  the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "It is a  mode of  vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against  obstruction and outrage".(1) "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope".(2)

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    In  Halsbury’s   Laws  of   England  (4th  Edn-Vol.  9, paragraph 38),  there is a brief discussion of when abuse of the process of the Court may be a punishable contempt. It is said:           "38. Abuse  of process  in general.  The Court has      power to  punish as  contempt any misuse of the court’s      process.  Thus   the  forging  or  altering  off  court      documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable      as serious contempts. Similarly, deceiving the court or      the court’s  officers  by  deliberately  suppressing  a      fact, or  giving  false  facts,  may  be  a  punishable      contempt. 1179           Certain  acts   of  a   lesser  nature   may  also      constitute  an  abuse  of  process  as,  for  instance,      initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting      in bona  fides or  which are  frivolous, vexatious,  or      oppressive. In  such  cases  the  court  has  extensive      alternative powers  to prevent  an abuse of its process      by  striking   out  or   staying  proceedings   or   by      prohibiting the  taking of  further proceedings without      leave. Where  the court,  by exercising  its  statutory      powers,  its  powers  under  rules  of  court,  or  its      inherent jurisdiction,  can give an adequate remedy, it      will not  in general  punish the abuse as a contempt of      court. On  the other  hand, where  an  irregularity  or      misuse  of   process  amounts  to  an  offence  against      justice, extending  its influence beyond the parties to      the action, it may be punished as a contempt".           In the  present case,  the respondents  began ’the      game’ by  filing an  application under  Art. 226 of the      Constitution in the Calcutta High Court, whereas in the      normal course  one would  expect such as application to      be  filed   in  the   Patna  High  Court  within  whose      jurisdiction the  subject matter  of  the  dispute  was      situate. For  some mysterious  reasons which nobody has      been able  to explain  to us,  the writ application was      filed in  the Calcutta  High Court. A justifiable prima      facie inference  from this circumstance may be that the      application was  not bona  fide but  intended to harass      and oppress the opposite parties. We do not want to say      anything more  about this  aspect of the case as we are      told that  this is  a failing  of the respondents which      they shared  with several  others. Perhaps,  as we  had      occasion to  remark during  the course  of the hearing,      some parties  are unable to reconcile themselves to the      fact that the Calcutta High Court has long since ceased      to have jurisdiction over the area comprising the State      of Bihar which it had several decades ago.           The ’game’  proceeded further.  Application  after      application was  filed before the learned Single Judge,      everyone of  them designed  to  circumvent,  defeat  or      nullify the  effect  of  the  orders  of  the  Division      Benches of  the Calcutta  High Court and the Patna High      Court. The  order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta      High  Court   directing  the   respondents  to  furnish      security in  a sum  of Rs.  1,55,000 was never complied      with. The order of the Division Bench of the Patna High      Court directing  the respondents to furnish security of      immovable property  in a  sum  of  Rs.  75,000  and  to      deposit cash  or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs.      50,000 was also never complied with. 1180 Instead, an  order was obtained from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High  Court restraining  the State  of  Bihar  from

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continuing the  money-suit in  the Court  of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau.  When  this  order  was  set  aside  by  the Division Bench,  an  attempt  was  made  to  circumvent  all earlier orders  by obtaining  an order from the Single Judge that they  may be  allowed to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and permitted to  remove the  stock from the forest coupes. When the State  of Bihar  moved the  learned  Subordinate  Judge, Palamau for  a direction  to auction the attached stock, the respondents moved  an application  on December 14, 1972, and obtained an order from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of  the  Subordinate  Judge,  Palamau.  In  considering  the question  whether   the  filing  of  the  application  dated December 14,  1972, amount to a Contempt of Court, the Court must take  into account  the whole  course of the continuing contumacious conduct  of the  respondents from the beginning of the "game". Clearly, not a single application made to the Single Judge  was bona  fide. Every application was a daring ’raid’ on  the Court and each was an abuse of the process of the Court.  The application  dated December 14, 1972 praying that the  proceedings in  the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge should be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, on January 10, 1972, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High  Court had expressly permitted the proceedings in  the  money  suit  to  go  on.  The  application  of  the respondents  clearly  showed  that  they  were  intent  upon obstructing the  due course  of the proceedings in the money suit in  the Court  of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and to obstruct  the  administration  of  justice  by  abusing  the process of the Court.           The High  Court expressed  the view that there was      no specific  allegation that  any contempt of Court had      been committed  by the  filing of the application dated      December 14, 1972. We are unable to agree with the view      of the  High Court.  Paragraph 29 of the application to      commit the respondents for Contempt expressly refers to      the application  dated December  14, 1972 and paragraph      31  states   that  all   the  facts  and  circumstances      enumerated  in   the  petition   established  that  the      respondents were  obstructing and  interfering with the      due course  and administration  of justice.  It was not      necessary that every allegation made should be followed      then and  there by  the statement  that the  allegation      established a Contempt of Court.           We  are   satisfied  that   the  filing   of   the      application dated  December 14,  1972, was  an abuse of      the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct 1181      the  due  course  of  a  judicial  proceeding  and  the administration of  justice and  was, therefore,  a  Criminal Contempt  of   Court.  The   respondents  had  expressed  an unconditional apology  to the  Patna High  Court, but we are convinced  that   the  conduct  of  the  respondents  is  so reprehensible as  to warrant  condemnation by the imposition of a  sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal and sentence each of  the respondents  to pay  a fine  of Rs.  500/-,  in default to  undergo simple  imprisonment for a period of two weeks. V.D.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 1182