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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 792 OF 2014

Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ … Petitioner

versus

Registrar General,  High Court of Madhya Pradesh and others … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. The  present  writ  petition  has  been  filed  by  a  former  

Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  

Higher Judicial Service.  The factual narration in the writ petition  

incorporates  allegations  of  sexual  harassment  aimed  at  the  

petitioner, at the behest of a sitting Judge of the High Court of  

Madhya Pradesh (herein after  referred to as,  ‘the High Court’),  

who  has  been  impleaded  by  name  as  respondent  no.3.   The  

authenticity of the allegations levelled by the petitioner,  which  

have been expressly disputed by respondent no.3, would stand

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affirmed  or  repudiated  only  after  culmination  of  due  process.  

Such being the sensitivity of the matter, it would be inappropriate  

to disclose the identity either of the petitioner or of respondent  

no.3.   In  the  title  of  the  present  writ  petition,  as  also  in  its  

contents, the petitioner has been described as Additional District  

and Sessions Judge ‘X’.  We shall  refer to her as Addl.D&SJ ‘X’.  

This would help to preserve the dignity of the petitioner.  Insofar  

as respondent no.3 is concerned, since he is a sitting Judge of the  

High Court, his reputation deserves a similar protection, we shall  

refer to him as Justice ‘A’.   

2. The averments made in the writ petition reveal that the  

petitioner  having practiced as  an advocate for  fifteen years at  

Delhi, applied for appointment by way of direct recruitment to the  

Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service.  On the culmination of  

the process of selection, the merit list of the selected candidates  

was released on 22.3.2011.  The petitioner was placed at serial  

no.2 in the merit list.  She was accordingly appointed as District  

Judge  (entry  level)  by  the  Madhya  Pradesh  State  Legal  and  

Legislative Works Department,  vide order dated 8.7.2011.  She  

was  deputed  for  training  on  30.7.2011  and  was  posted  as  

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gwalior.

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3. The  contents  of  the  writ  petition  are  systematically  

divided into  various  components.   In  the  first  part  of  the  writ  

petition, the petitioner endeavours to demonstrate her efficient  

discharge of  duties.   For  this,  reliance has been placed on an  

order  passed  by  the  Sessions  Judge,  Gwalior  dated  9.10.2012  

(while  exercising  powers  under  Sections  408  and  409  of  the  

Criminal  Procedure Code),  whereby all  sessions cases,  criminal  

appeals, criminal revisions and miscellaneous criminal cases etc.  

pending in the Court of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, were  

transferred to the Court of the petitioner.  Relying on the above  

order,  it  is  the  petitioner’s  contention,  that  her  superiors  

immediately recognized her professional caliber, and afforded her  

an opportunity to deal with the important and sensitive cases.  On  

23.1.2013, the Sessions Judge, Gwalior, nominated the petitioner  

for  regular  hearing  and  expeditious  disposal  of  heinous  and  

sensational cases involving offences of rape, gang-rape, rape with  

murder etc. under the Indian Penal Code.  It  is further brought  

out,  that  on  9.4.2013,  the  petitioner  was  appointed  as  the  

President  of  the  Vishaka  Committee  (in  compliance  with  the  

directions issued by this Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,  

(1997) 6 SCC 241), by the District and Sessions Judge, Gwalior.  It  

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is also pointed out, that the High Court (in exercise of the power  

vested in it under Section 6(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Dekaiti Aur  

Vyapaharan Prabhavit  Kshotra  Adhiniyam,  1981)  appointed the  

petitioner as “Special Judge” for dealing with matters falling in a  

defined area within the territorial jurisdiction of Gwalior Sessions  

Division.  It is pointed out that again, through a notification dated  

10.5.2013 (in  exercise of  the  power  under  Section  9(3)  of  the  

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure),  the  High  Court  designated  the  

petitioner  as  “Presiding  Officer”  for  speedy trial  of  offences  of  

rape, gang-rape, murder with rape and other related offences.  It  

is  also  the  case  of  the  petitioner,  that  the  petitioner’s  

performance came to be evaluated by the District and Sessions  

Judge in a report dated 5.1.2013.  It is submitted, that thereafter  

in  April  2013,  the  District  Judge  (Inspection  and  Vigilance)  

inspected  the  civil  and  criminal  records  and  assessed  the  

petitioner’s performance.

4. The  factual  position  with  respect  to  the  selection  and  

appointment of the petitioner has not been disputed.  The fact  

that  the  petitioner  was  assigned  different  responsibilities  from  

time to time is also acknowledged.  It is not necessary for us to  

record the personal assessment made by the petitioner on the  

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basis of  the afore-stated reports,  suffice it  to  state that in the  

reply filed before this Court on behalf of the Registrar General of  

the High Court (respondent no.1), it is acknowledged that even  

though  her  disposal  was  assessed  as  –  average,  her  overall  

performance  was  graded  as  –  very  good  ‘B’.   It  was  further  

pointed  out,  that  even  though  the  petitioner  was  advised  to  

improve  inter-personal  relationship  and  team  work  skills,  her  

overall assessment was evaluated as – ‘very good’.

5(i). The next component of the writ petition is devoted to the  

allegations levelled against respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’.   It  is  

asserted,  that  on  8/9-12-2013,  the  wife  of  the  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate, Gwalior called, the petitioner on her land line.  During  

her  conversation,  she informed the  petitioner,  that  respondent  

no.3 – Justice ‘A’, was eager that the petitioner should perform a  

dance on an “item-song”, on the occasion of ladies sangeet (on  

10.12.2013) during the festivities of the 25th marriage anniversary  

of respondent no.3.  It is also the assertion of the petitioner, that  

she politely refused the invitation for 10.12.2013 by giving out  

that she had prior commitments, for that date.   It is sought to be  

asserted by the petitioner, that for reasons of official protocol, she  

felt  compelled  to  attend  the  main  marriage  anniversary  

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celebrations scheduled for 11.12.2013.  It is pointed out, that she  

ventured to do so in the company of her two daughters.   It  is  

alleged by the petitioner that on 11.12.2013, respondent no.3 –  

Justice ‘A’ came close to her and whispered in her ear, that he  

missed the opportunity of viewing her sexy and beautiful figure  

dancing  on  the  floor.   It  is  the  petitioner’s  assertion,  that  

respondent No.3 also told the petitioner, that he wished he could  

see her dancing.  The petitioner claims that she was appalled by  

the above behaviour of respondent no.3, and therefore, she left  

the party along with her two daughters, with tears in her eyes.

(ii). The  factual  position  narrated  above,  pertaining  to  the  

telephonic  conversation  with  the  wife  of  the  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate,  Gwalior  has  been denied by respondent  no.3.   For  

this, respondent no.3 has appended the affidavit of the wife of the  

Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Gwalior  as  Annexure  R-16  with  his  

counter-affidavit.  In her affidavit, it is inter alia asserted, that she  

had neither called the petitioner on 8/9-12-2013, nor had she told  

the  petitioner  that  respondent  no.3  –  Justice  ‘A’  was  eager  to  

watch  her  perform  a  dance  on  an  “item-song”.   The  other  

assertions  at  the  behest  of  the  petitioner,  narrated  in  the  

foregoing paragraph have also been denied by respondent no.3.  

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It is the pointed contention of respondent no.3, that there was no  

occasion  for  him  to  personally  interact  with  the  petitioner  on  

11.12.2013.  It is also the assertion of respondent no.3, that the  

function of 11.12.2013 was video-graphed, which shows that the  

petitioner  enjoyed  her  dinner  and  was  seen  talking  to  other  

invitees.

(iii). Addl.D&SJ  ‘X’  has  also  asserted,  that  in  January  2014,  

respondent no.3 had sent messages to her through the District  

Registrar, asking the petitioner to meet him, at his residence.  It is  

the  contention of  the  petitioner,  that  knowing that  respondent  

no.3 –  Justice ‘A’  usually lived alone,  she avoided going to his  

residence.  As per the understanding of the petitioner, thereafter  

respondent no.3 started showing abnormally high interest in her  

work, and also started making sexually coloured remarks, at her.  

Illustratively, referring to the occasion of a marriage party of a  

judicial officer on 22.2.2014, it is asserted, that respondent no.3  

in the presence of the petitioner’s 16 years old daughter, told her  

that  “although  your  work  is  very  good,  but  you  are  far  more  

beautiful than your work”.  It is contended, that he further went  

on to say, that looking at the petitioner, one does not desire, even  

to blink ones eyes.  It is averred, that the above remarks were  

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made, while respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’ sized up the petitioner  

from  head  to  toe.    It  is  also  the  pointed  assertion  of  the  

petitioner, that while making the above remarks, respondent no.3  

– Justice ‘A’, put his hand on her back.  It is sought to be asserted,  

that the above behaviour of respondent no.3, discomforted the  

petitioner as well as her daughter.  It is also pointed out, that the  

petitioner indicated to respondent no.3, that his advances were  

not welcome.  Thereafter, the petitioner along with her daughter,  

left the marriage party.   

(iv). The  factual  position  as  recorded  in  the  foregoing  

paragraph has been denied by respondent no.3 in the counter-

affidavit filed by him.  It is also asserted, that respondent no.3 did  

not even meet the petitioner, at the aforesaid marriage party.  It  

is sought to be asserted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of  

respondent no.3, that he is in possession of the videography of  

the marriage function in question, which can be produced by him.

(v). Another instance referred to by the petitioner in the writ  

petition,  relates  to  a  farewell  party  organized  by  the  District  

Judiciary, on the occasion of the retirement of a Judge from the  

Gwalior Sessions Division.  It is asserted, that all sitting Judges of  

the Gwalior Bench of the High Court, had been invited.  On the  

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said occasion, it is asserted, that respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’,  

continuously stared at the petitioner.  The petitioner claims, that  

sensing  the  attitude  of  respondent  no.3  and  given  his  past  

conduct, the petitioner left the farewell party before respondent  

no.3 could make any advances at her.

6. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.3,  

the  facts  narrated  in  the  foregoing  paragraph  have  been  

expressly denied.  It has been asserted, that respondent no.3 had  

never inter-acted with the petitioner personally, except when the  

petitioner  had  herself  made  three  calls  to  him  for  her  own  

problems.

7(i). The next component of the narration in the writ petition  

deals with the consequences which the petitioner had to suffer for  

not responding to respondent no.3 – Justice A’s advances.  First  

and  foremost,  it  is  asserted,  that  respondent  no.3  started  

subjecting the petitioner to intense surveillance and harassment,  

in  his  capacity  as  Administrative  Judge  of  Sessions  Division,  

Gwalior  from  April  2014  onwards.  It  is  submitted,  that  the  

aforesaid  surveillance/harassment  was  effectuated  through  the  

District  Judge,  the  District  Judge  (Inspection),  and  the  District  

Registrar.  It is pointed out, that the District Judge and the District  

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Judge (Inspection) visited the petitioner’s court room with unusual  

frequency.  Sometimes, on an hourly basis.  At times, within a few  

minutes  of  her  commencing  court  work.   Sometimes,  minutes  

after  her  rising  for  lunch.   At  other  times,  minutes  after  her  

resuming court work after lunch.  And also after the petitioner had  

risen at the end of the day’s work.  It is also asserted, that the  

District  Judge,  Gwalior  would  depute  his  staff  to  check  the  

petitioner during court working hours.  On certain occasions, this  

happened even during in-camera trials.   When deputed by the  

District Judge, his staff, at times, would even snatch board-diaries  

of cases pending in her court. It is the petitioner’s contention, that  

no fault could ever be found insofar as the discharge of duties and  

the responsibilities  of  the petitioner  were concerned.   It  is  the  

contention of the petitioner, that all these inspections were not  

carried, for the purpose contemplated under the Madhya Pradesh  

Rules  (Criminal)  Inspection  of  Criminal  Courts  (for  short,  ‘the  

Rules’).   Relying on Rule 703 of  the Rules,  it  is  asserted,  that  

these actions were only for harassing the petitioner.  

(ii). In the context of harassment, it is also averred in the writ  

petition, that the petitioner availed casual leave in May 2014, to  

attend  a  family  event  in  New Delhi.   During  the  above  leave  

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period,  a  stenographer  attached  to  the  petitioner’s  court,  was  

posted elsewhere for a full day, on the instructions of the District  

Judge.  It is pointed out, that this was done despite the express  

request made by the petitioner to the Court Manager, that the  

concerned stenographer  had to  type several  judgments,  which  

the petitioner  had dictated,  before proceeding on leave.   Even  

otherwise, it is pointed out, that according to the orders of the  

District Judge (dated 25.4.2014), such posting is permissible only  

for  half  a  day.   On  account  of  the  above  interference  in  the  

discharge of her official  functioning,  the petitioner addressed a  

complaint dated 12.5.2014 to the District Judge against the Court  

Manager.   In her  complaint,  the petitioner also highlighted the  

fact that the Court Manager usually refused to provide alternative  

staff to the petitioner, when staff attached to the petitioner was  

on leave.  According to the petitioner, rather than taking action  

against the Court Manager, the District Registrar issued a notice  

to the concerned stenographer, asking him to show cause why he  

had  not  disclosed  the  extent  of  pending  dictation  work,  with  

reference to the petitioner’s court.  The concerned stenographer  

was asked to file his reply, within three days.  It is averred, that  

the petitioner again approached the District Judge on the above  

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issue. Rather than appreciating the predicament of the petitioner,  

the  District  Judge  informed  the  petitioner,  that  if  she  said  

anything, he would spoil her confidential report.  It is also averred,  

that the District Judge advised her to make a complaint to the  

Administrative Judge (respondent no.3) if  she had any problem  

with  the  system.   According  to  the  petitioner,  given  aforesaid  

circumstances, she contacted respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’ on his  

mobile  phone  on  30.5.2014.   Respondent  no.3,  it  is  averred,  

informed her, that he could not speak to her as he was not in  

station.

(iii). Another instance of harassment and victimization pointed  

out  by  the  petitioner  emerges  from  the  fact,  that  the  peon  

provided to the petitioner at her residence was diagnosed with a  

likelihood of cancer on 12.5.2014.  The concerned peon sought  

leave for treatment, at Mumbai.  Despite several oral requests, no  

substitute  was  provided  to  the  petitioner.  Therefore,  on  

20.5.2014,  the  petitioner  sent  a  letter  to  the  District  Judge,  

Gwalior, requesting him to provide a peon at her residence, out of  

the surplus staff.  Even though the petitioner was entitled to a full  

time peon at her residence, on 22.5.2014, the District Judge made  

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provision for a temporary peon for two hours (from 9 a.m. to 11  

a.m.).

(iv). In order to further demonstrate victimization, it is pointed  

out,  that  the  petitioner  was  suddenly  and  unceremoniously  

transferred mid-session on 8.7.2014.   It  is  further  pointed out,  

that general transfers are made every year, in March/April.  It is  

the  case  of  the petitioner,  that  when annual  general  transfers  

were  made  in  2014,  the  petitioner  had  not  completed  the  

stipulated tenure of service, and accordingly, was not subjected  

to transfer.  Mid-session transfer, according to the petitioner, is  

almost  impermissible,  and  as  such  is  extremely  rare,  and  is  

effected only for compelling reasons.  In order to demonstrate the  

assertion of victimization, it is pointed out, that the petitioner was  

transferred  to  Sidhi,  a  remote  place  in  Madhya  Pradesh.  

According to the petitioner for her posting, Sidhi was deliberately  

chosen, to prevent her husband from visiting her on week ends,  

because of its non-connectivity.  It is also pointed out, that Sidhi  

was chosen because the area is well known to be naxal affected  

and it would be difficult for the petitioner to work, at that station.  

It was also pointed out, that the said transfer was in violation of  

the transfer guidelines/policy of the High Court. (guidelines/policy  

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appended to the petition, as Annexure P-27).  On the very next  

day, after the receipt of the transfer order dated 8.7.2014, i.e.,  

9.7.2014, the petitioner-Addl.D&SJ ‘X’, addressed a representation  

to the Registrar General of the High Court, seeking eight months  

extension.   The  aforesaid  extension  was  sought  because  the  

petitioner’s daughter was to take Board examinations of Class XII.  

It was also pointed out, that under the transfer policy/guidelines,  

in case daughter of a judicial officer is to take Board/University  

examinations, the officer is not to be transferred till the end of the  

academic  session.   Having  submitted  the  aforesaid  

representation, it is the case of the petitioner, that she contacted  

respondent no.3 –  Justice ‘A’,  in  his  capacity as Administrative  

Judge of  her  Sessions Division,  and pleaded with  him that  her  

transfer be deferred for the sake of her daughter, who was to take  

the Class XII Board examination.  In the pleadings the petitioner  

asserted,  that  respondent  no.3  mockingly  reacted  to  the  

petitioner’s request by telling her that she had not fulfilled his  

desires, she had not visited his residence alone to meet him even  

once, and therefore, this order of transfer was before her.   He  

further  told  the  petitioner,  that  he  would  finish  her  career  

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completely.   It  is submitted that the petitioner’s representation  

dated 9.7.2014, was declined on 11.7.2014.  

8. All  the  facts  narrated  in  the  foregoing  paragraph  have  

been  denied  by  respondent  no.3  in  his  counter-affidavit.   In  

response to the above averments,  it  is denied that respondent  

no.3 ever  issued any instructions to  the District  Judge,  District  

Judge (Vigilance) or the District Registrar in regard to surveillance  

of the professional work of the petitioner.  It is denied, that the  

actions of respondent no.3, were responsible for the petitioner’s  

harassment.   Justice ‘A’  has denied having ever spoken to the  

officers  referred  to  by  the  petitioner,  with  reference  to  the  

petitioner, on any of the issues raised by her.  On the allegation of  

the  petitioner’s  intentional  transfer  to  Sidhi  in  July,  2014,  the  

Registrar General of the High Court has filed an affidavit dated  

17.11.2014 acknowledging, that the exercise of annual transfers  

was carried out in March, 2014, but the petitioner was transferred  

in July, 2014.  It is sought to be explained, that at the relevant  

time, the Transfer Committee of the High Court comprised of two  

senior Judges, which recommended the transfer of two Additional  

District & Sessions Judges, namely, Shri Manoj Kumar Tiwari and  

Shri  Rajeev  Kumar  Singh,  to  Sidhi  in  March  2014.   The  

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recommendation  of  the  Committee  was  accepted by  the  Chief  

Justice  of  the  High  Court,  whereupon  the  said  officers  were  

transferred  to  Sidhi.   Reciprocally,  no  Additional  District  and  

Sessions Judge was transferred out of Sidhi, at that juncture.  The  

above transfers had been made on the basis of a request made  

by  the  District  and  Sessions  Judge,  Sidhi  to  handle  the  huge  

pendency of cases at Sidhi.  Despite the transfer of two Additional  

District and Sessions Judges referred to above, the District and  

Sessions  Judge,  Sidhi  made  another  request  through  his  

communication  dated  9.6.2014  to  post  another  two  Additional  

District  and  Sessions  Judges,  at  Sidhi.   This  requirement  

expressed  by  the  District  and  Sessions  Judge,  Sidhi  was  

considered by the Transfer Committee, along with similar other  

requests from other Sessions Divisions.  On a fresh consideration,  

the Transfer Committee recommended the transfer of 28 judicial  

officers  including 6 Additional  District  &  Sessions  Judges.   The  

Chief  Justice of the High Court  approved the recommendations  

made by the Transfer Committee.  The transfer of the petitioner-

Addl.D&SJ ‘X’ to Sidhi accordingly materialized.  It  is submitted  

that all the transfers, including that of the petitioner, were made  

in  administrative  exigencies,  and  not  on  extraneous  

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consideration.   Insofar  as  the  representation  made  by  the  

petitioner,  dated  9.7.2014  seeking  cancellation/deferment  of  

order of her transfer is concerned, it is pointed out, that the same  

was  placed  before  the  Transfer  Committee.   The  Transfer  

Committee,  vide  its  resolution  dated  11.7.2014,  recommended  

the rejection of  the representation.   The said  recommendation  

was approved by the Chief Justice of the High Court on 11.7.2014  

itself.   With  reference  to  the  petitioner’s  representation  dated  

11.7.2014, it is pointed out, that the same was also placed before  

the  Transfer  Committee.   The  Transfer  Committee  vide  its  

resolution  dated  14.7.2014,  recommended  the  rejection  of  the  

second  representation.   The  recommendation  made  by  the  

Transfer Committee, was again approved by the Chief Justice of  

the High Court on 14.7.2014.  It is pointed out, that on the very  

next day, i.e., 15.7.2014, the petitioner tendered her resignation.

9(i). The next component of the narration in the writ petition,  

relates to the measures adopted by the petitioner.  In this behalf,  

it is asserted, that the petitioner along with her husband traveled  

to Jabalpur  on 1.6.2014.  The sole purpose was to discuss the  

afore-stated issues with a senior Judge of the High Court.  After  

the petitioner narrated her version to the senior Judge, she was  

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informed by the senior Judge,  that he knew respondent no.3 –  

Justice ‘A’, and promised to intervene in the matter.  He assured  

the  petitioner,  that  he  would  arrange  a  meeting  between  the  

petitioner and respondent no.3 at Gwalior (during a forthcoming  

marriage in the 2nd week of June, 2014).

(ii). From 11.4.2014 to 14.7.2014, the petitioner claims that  

she spoke to the Private Secretary to the Chief Justice of the High  

Court, for seeking an audience with the Chief Justice of the High  

Court.   According  to  the  pleadings  in  the  writ  petition,  on  

13.7.2014, the Private Secretary informed the petitioner that the  

Chief Justice had refused to give her an appointment.  The Private  

Secretary  however  reassured  her,  that  he  would  make  yet  

another  effort  to  procure her  an appointment for  the following  

day, and was hopeful to manage the same.  He had also informed  

the  petitioner  that  he  would  convey  the  outcome  “early  next  

morning”.  On 14.7.2014, since the petitioner did not receive any  

message from the Private Secretary, she sent a message to him  

inquiring  about  the  outcome  of  his  efforts.   Learned  counsel,  

during the course of hearing, submitted that the Private Secretary  

did  not  contact  the  petitioner  thereafter.   In  support  of  the  

assertion,  that the petitioner was seeking an appointment with  

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the  Chief  Justice of  the  High  Court,  it  is  asserted,  that  as  the  

Private Secretary was hopeful of getting her an audience with the  

Chief Justice, she purchased two railway tickets for 14.7.2014 to  

travel from Gwalior to Jabalpur, in the company of her husband.  

These tickets were in addition to the tickets purchased by her to  

make a similar journey on 11.7.2014 to meet senior Judges of the  

High Court.  Copies of both sets of tickets have been appended to  

the writ petition.

(iii). It  is  the  pleaded  case  of  the  petitioner,  that  on  the  

following day, after the petitioner met respondent no.3 – Justice  

‘A” i.e., on 11.7.2014, the petitioner visited a number of senior  

Judges  of  the  High  Court.   She  was  advised  to  make  another  

representation seeking deferment of her transfer, which she did  

on 11.7.2014 itself.  Some of them urged the petitioner to have  

faith  in  the  system,  and  to  await  the  outcome  of  her  second  

representation.   The  petitioner’s  second  representation,  was  

declined through a communication dated 11.7.2014.

10. According  to  the  petitioner,  having  been  subjected  to  

victimization  and  harassment,  the  petitioner  submitted  her  

resignation  from  the  post  of  Additional  District  and  Sessions  

Judge, on 15.7.2014.  The aforesaid resignation was addressed to  

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the Registrar General of the High Court.  In her resignation, the  

petitioner expressly mentioned about her elder daughter studying  

in Class XII.   It was submitted, that no reference to the sexual  

harassment suffered by her was made in the resignation letter, as  

the same would have been embarrassing for the petitioner.   It  

was pointed out that the resignation submitted by the petitioner,  

was accepted on 17.7.2014 by the Legal  and Legislative Work  

Department  of  the  State  Government.   On  the  issue  of  the  

petitioner’s resignation, the position explained in the reply filed  

on behalf of respondent no.1 is, that the petitioner’s resignation  

was received in the office of the Registrar General of the High  

Court on 15.7.2014.  The same was placed for consideration of  

the Chief Justice of the High Court on 16.7.2014.  The Chief Justice  

recommended  the  acceptance  of  the  resignation  to  the  State  

Government.   The State  Government  accepted the  petitioner’s  

resignation on 17.7.2014.

11. Having suffered extreme vilification at the hands of her  

superiors,  for  having not been afforded even an opportunity of  

being  able  to  express  her  difficulties,  the  petitioner  sent  a  

representation to the President of India, the Chief Justice of India  

and  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  on  1.8.2014.   In  her  

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representation,  the  petitioner  inter  alia sought  the  following  

reliefs:

“1. Appropriate action be taken, after a fact-finding. 2.   Re-consider  the  circumstances  under  which  the  Petitioner was coerced and exerted a great duress upon,  until the only option she had was to resign. 3.  Institute  an  appropriate  mechanism  for  redressal  of  grievances like the above, of sub-ordinate services judicial  officers.”

12. Another relevant fact, which has not been disclosed in the  

writ  petition,  and  which  has  emerged  from  the  reply  filed  on  

behalf of respondent no.1-the Registrar General of the High Court,  

needs to be recorded here to complete the sequence of events.  It  

is pointed out on behalf of respondent no.1, that the petitioner  

had never disclosed the factum of sexual harassment in any of  

the  numerous  communications  addressed  by  her  to  the  High  

Court.  It is pointed out, that the factum of sexual harassment had  

not even been incorporated in the petitioner’s resignation letter.  

In the reply filed by respondent no.1, it is sought to be asserted,  

that the allegations of sexual harassment were recorded by the  

petitioner, for the first time, in her representation dated 1.8.2014,  

which was addressed to the Chief Justice of India.  It is also sought  

to be asserted, in the reply filed on behalf of respondent no.1,  

that the nature of allegations of sexual harassment levelled by  

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the petitioner came to the knowledge of the Chief Justice of the  

High Court through a newspaper item published on 4.8.2014 in  

the Times of India.  It is averred in the reply filed on behalf of  

respondent no.1, that respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, addressed a  

letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court with reference to the  

news item dated 4.8.2014.  The news item as well as the letter  

received from respondent no.3 were sent by the Chief Justice of  

the High Court, by a special messenger, to the Chief Justice of  

India.   Respondent no.1, i.e.,  the Registrar General of the High  

Court, on being directed by the Chief Justice of the High Court,  

issued the following press release on 4.8.2014:

“PRESS RELEASE

This is with regard to news item published in daily  newspaper  ‘Times  of  India’ dated  04.08.2014  reporting  that  a  lady  Judicial  Officer  posted  as  Additional  District  Judge, Gwalior had to resign from judicial service due to  alleged harassment by a High Court Judge.  It has been  reported  that  when  the  lady  Judicial  Officer  sought  appointment with Hon’ble the Chief Justice to apprise him  of the factual position, the same was declined.  This is a  distorted version.

As  a  matter  of  fact,  she  sought  appointment  telephonically through Principal Private Secretary (PPS) to  Hon’ble the Chief Justice, after she had already tendered  her  resignation  which  was  forwarded  to  the  State  Government for necessary action.  In the given situation,  she  was  informed  by  the  PPS  to  submit  a  formal  

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representation,  if  advised,  in  the  matter.   However,  no  representation has so far been made by her.

In the context of the news item, the concerned High  Court Judge faxed a confidential letter to Hon’ble the Chief  Justice  which  was  received  on  4th August,  2014  in  the  morning.  Hon’ble the Chief Justice has forwarded a copy  of the said letter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India with  comments.

The  lady  Ex-Judicial  Officer,  who  was  posted  at  Gwalior since August, 2011 was transferred in July, 2014  to  Sidhi  on  administrative  grounds.   Her  two  representations seeking cancellation of the transfer on the  ground  of  education  of  her  daughters  were  duly  considered and rejected by the concerned Administrative  Committee of the High Court.  She has not represented  about the alleged misbehavior or harassment caused to  her by anyone.    

Sd/- (VED PRAKASH)

REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

JABALPUR        04.08.2014”

(emphasis is ours)

The aforesaid press release has been extracted hereinabove so as  

to avoid any further narration on the aforesaid subject.

13. According to  the  averments  made in  the  reply  filed on  

behalf  of  the  Registrar  General  of  the  High  Court,  a  sealed  

envelope was received from the office of the Chief Justice of India  

in the High Court on 7.8.2014. From the record made available, it  

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is apparent that the Chief Justice of the High Court, keeping in  

view the sensitivity and seriousness of the matter, invited the two  

senior most judges of the High Court and the Registrar General of  

the  High  Court.   All  decisions  in  the  matter  were  made  

collectively, in the best interest of all concerned.  In furtherance  

of the communication received from the Chief Justice of India, the  

Chief Justice of the High Court constituted a two-member senior  

judges Enquiry Committee (one of whom was a lady judge), to  

make a confidential and discreet inquiry, and to submit a report.  

A  senior  lady  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge,  was  

nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court, for secretarial  

assistance of the “two-Judge Committee”.    

14. Consequent  upon  the  nomination  of  the  “two-Judge  

Committee”, the petitioner received (via e-mail) a notice from the  

Secretary of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice of the  

High Court on 12.8.2014, requiring her to appear for a preliminary  

inquiry before the “two-Judge Committee” on 19.8.2014 at 10.30  

a.m.  The petitioner responded to the aforesaid notice vide her  

reply dated 14.8.2014 (via e-mail and speed post) requesting for  

information,  as  to  under  what  authority  of  law  the  “two-Judge  

Committee” had been constituted.  In order to ensure, that the  

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deliberations assigned to the Committee constituted by the Chief  

Justice of  the High Court  were fair,  the petitioner,  through her  

above  reply  dated  14.8.2014,  requested  that  administrative  

functions be withdrawn from respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’.  She  

also sought the transfer of the District Judge, the District Judge  

(Inspection) and the District Registrar posted at Gwalior, so that  

her  witnesses  could  depose  freely  and  fairly  before  the  “two-

Judge Committee”.  In a response dated 14.8.2014 (sent via e-

mail),  the petitioner was informed, that the Chief Justice of the  

High Court had set up the “two-member Committee” to conduct a  

preliminary  inquiry  into  the  allegations  levelled  against  

respondent  no.3.   On  19.8.2014,  the  petitioner  submitted  her  

second reply (via e-mail as also via speed post) stating that her  

request  for  withdrawal  of  administrative  work from respondent  

no.3 – Justice ‘A’ and her request for transfer of judicial officers  

from Sessions Division, Gwalior had remained unaddressed.  She  

also pointed out, that the procedure envisaged by the Supreme  

Court in the decision rendered in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice  

A.M.  Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457,  was not  being followed,  

inasmuch as the Chief Justice of the High Court was to conduct a  

discreet inquiry at his own and that she could not be required to  

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appear  before  the  “two-Judge  Committee”  for  a  preliminary  

inquiry.   In  support  of  the original  complaint  submitted by the  

petitioner, on this occasion she also enclosed a sworn affidavit,  

affirming the factual position expressed in her complaint.

15. The determination of the present controversy, will emerge  

from the factual position projected by the rival parties which has  

been summarized above.

16. It  would  be  pertinent  to  mention,  that  the  main  

submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the  

petitioner  was,  that  the  proceedings  being  conducted  in  the  

matter,  are  not  in  consonance  with  the  “in-house  procedure”  

adopted by this Court for taking suitable remedial action against  

judges, who by their acts of omission or commission, do not follow  

the accepted values of judicial life, including the ideals expressed  

by the Supreme Court in the “Restatement of Values of Judicial  

Life”.  The projection of the aforesaid contention, we felt, would  

not require an insight into the allegations made by Addl.D&SJ ‘X’,  

or  even  the  response  of  Mr.  Justice  ‘A’.   However,  the  

submissions, as they have emerged during the course of hearing,  

reveal that the same also require to be considered.  We also felt,  

after hearing submissions advanced on behalf of the rival parties,  

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that the steps taken by the Chief Justice of the High Court, also  

needed  a  closer  examination,  for  an  effective  and  fruitful  

consideration  of  the  controversy  in  view of  the  sensitivity  and  

seriousness of the matter.  We have, accordingly, briefly traced  

the allegations made by the petitioner,  as also, the defence of  

respondent no.3.   We have also ventured to narrate the steps  

taken by the Chief Justice of the High Court, consequent upon the  

petitioner’s complaint being forwarded to him by the Chief Justice  

of India.  As a note of caution, we would like to record, that our  

recording of the events, may not be taken as the last word on the  

matter, we may have noticed certain facts in a manner which may  

have overlooked the sensitivity with which the party concerned  

had viewed or projected them.  We may have also missed certain  

finer points, which could, on an analysis of facts, result in quite a  

different conclusion on their holistic examination.  The issue of  

sexual  harassment  has  a  variety  of  fine  connotations.   Its  

evaluation  may  sometimes  depend  upon  the  sensitivity  of  the  

person  concerned.   And  also  whether,  the  perception  of  the  

harassed  individual  was  known  to  the  one  against  whom  the  

accusing finger is pointed.

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17. Every day is a matter of learning.  Hearing of submissions  

in this case, we may say, was a matter of further understanding  

the sensitivities involved in a controversy of the present nature.  

We  may  venture  to  demonstrate  this,  by  noticing  a  verbal  

exchange, during the course of hearing, between the counsel for  

the petitioner  and that  for  the High Court.   While  the learned  

counsel representing the High Court was on “his” legs, learned  

counsel for  the petitioner  interjected to  express “her”  point  of  

view.   All  through,  during  the  process  of  hearing,  submissions  

were advanced in a lively and respectful manner, and pointedly  

on  the  subject  under  consideration.   Feeling  that  the  thought  

being projected by the learned  counsel was being disturbed by  

the intervention, the Bench accordingly exhorted learned counsel,  

to go on unmindful of the interruption.  Learned counsel for the  

High  Court,  well-meaning  and  deferential  as  he  always  is,  

responded by observing, “The interjections by the learned senior  

counsel for the petitioner, are always delightful”.  Learned senior  

counsel  for  the  petitioner,  had  serious  objection  to  the  term,  

‘‘delightful’’ used, with reference to “her”.  She questioned, the  

use  of  the  term,  ‘‘delightful”  by  posing  to  the  learned  senior  

counsel,  whether  similar  interjections  by  men,  were  also  

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considered  by  him  as  delightful.   Why  then,  she  questioned,  

should “her” interjection be found ‘‘delightful’’.  In expressing her  

view, she went on to describe the response of the learned senior  

counsel  as  “sexually  coloured”.   Having  given  our  thoughtful  

consideration  to  the  response,  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner, we may only say, that she may well be right.  There is  

a  lot  to  be  learnt,  from what  she  innocuously  conveyed.   Her  

sensitivity to the issue,  one may confess,  brought out to us,  a  

wholly  different  understanding on the subject.   It  is,  therefore,  

that we have remarked above, that the evaluation of a charge of  

sexual harassment, would depend on the manner in which it is  

perceived.    Each case will have to be decided on its own merits.  

Whether the perception of the harassed individual, was conveyed  

to the person accused, would be very material, in a case falling in  

the realm of over-sensitivity.  In that, it would not be open to him  

thereafter,  to  defend  himself  by  projecting  that  he  had  not  

sexually  harassed  the  person  concerned,  because  in  his  

understanding the alleged action was unoffending.   

18. Therefore, as a matter of caution, we desire to expressly  

record, that the facts taken into consideration by us, are for the  

limited purpose of the submissions advanced at the hands of the  

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learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner,  to  consider  whether  the  

procedure  being  followed  in  the  present  controversy,  is  in  

consonance with the “in-house procedure” adopted by this Court,  

as also, whether the procedure adopted by the Chief Justice of the  

High Court, would meet the ends of justice.

19. Before dwelling upon the pointed issues canvassed before  

us,  we would venture to briefly record the sequence of events  

which  led  to  the  adoption  by  this  Court,  of  the  “in-house  

procedure”.   It  is  necessary  for  us  to  do  so,  because  the  

contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner  

were founded on the “in-house procedure”, whereas, it was the  

contention in response, that the same was not justiciable, and as  

such, the present writ petition is not maintainable in law.

20. Amongst the first encounters, to an investigation into the  

conduct of a judge, can be traced from a statement made to the  

Bar  by  the  then  Chief  Justice  of  India,  Mr.  Justice  Sabyasachi  

Mukherjee on 20.7.1990, with reference to the allegations levelled  

against Mr.  Justice V. Ramaswami, who at that juncture, was a  

sitting Judge of the Supreme Court of India.   An extract of the  

statement made to the Bar is being reproduced hereunder:

“Re: Ramaswami, J. CJI’s Statement to the Bar

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In the beginning of May, 1990, some learned advocates of  this Court drew my attention to certain newspapers about  the  audit  report  investigating  the  expenses  incurred  in  furnishing the residence of a former Chief Justice of the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court,  namely,  Shri  V.  Ramaswami, who is now a sitting Judge of this court. I was  requested by the learned lawyers to take action suo-motu.  The matter  was mentioned more than one.  On 1st May,  1990. I had received a communication from the editor of a  magazine enclosing therewith a copy of April 90 issue of  the magazine The Lawyers, stating that it contained the  full  text  of  the  audit  report  of  the  Chandigarh  Administration.  Thereafter  after,  the  learned  Attorney  General, Sir. Soli Sorabjee, the former Attorney General,  Sri  Parasaran,  Mr.  Venugopal,  the  president  of  the  Supreme  Court  Bar  Association,  and  Dr.  Y.S.  Chitale,  former President of  the Supreme Court  Bar  association,  also met me and drew my attention to these reports and  expressed concern  on  the  contents  of  the  publications.  The Union Minister of Law and Justice called on me and  expressed  the  concern  of  the  members  of  parliament  about  the  alleged  extravagance  by  Justice  Ramaswami  and the contents of the report, while working as the Chief  Justice  of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court.  Sharing  their concern, I had told the Law Minister and have since  assured the learned Attorney General and other members  of the Bar that I would look into the matter. Legally and constitutionally the Chief Justice of India, as  such, has no right or authority to inquire into the conduct  of  a  sitting  Judge  of  the  Supreme Court.  However,  the  Chief justice of India, as the head of the Judicial Family  has, I believe, the duty and the responsibility to maintain  the  judicial  propriety  and  attempts  to  secure  the  confidence  of  the  public  in  the  working  of  the  judicial  process. This  was  an  unprecedented  and  an  embarrassing  situation.  It  called  for  caution  and  establishment  of  a  salutary  convention.  If  have  obtained  from  the  Chief  Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court the necessary  papers.

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There are three kinds of reports (i) Reports submitted by  the Internal Audit Cell  of the High Court (ii)  Fact-finding  Reports  submitted  by  District  and  Sessions  Judges  (Vigilance) both of Punjab and Haryana; and(iii)  Reports  and  audit-paras  submitted  by  the  official  of  the  Accountant Generals office to the High Court for reply. The  reports and audit paras last mentioned seek clarifications  and  justifications  in  respect  of  the  transactions  which  prime facie appeared to be irregular. I have looked into it and then arrived at a certain tentative  impression it is not necessary to recapitulate in detail, the  alleged irregularities I understand from the authorities of  the High Court that the officials involved in the alleged  irregularities  have  been  suspended  and  departmental  inquiries  have  been  instituted  against  them.  The  final  result of these departmental inquiries is awaited. In the  meantime, I took Brother Ramaswami into confidence and  made known to him the contents of the audit reports with  a  view  to  ascertaining  his  position  in  relation  to  the  disclosures made in the reports. He has given his version.  I  have  also  requested  Brother  Ramaswami  to  communicate  his  views  to  the  Registrar,  High  Court  of  Punjab and Haryana so that the High Court may reply to  the audit objections raised by the Government. I  understand  that  the  High  Court  had  directly  sought  Brother Ramaswamis clarifications with regard to certain  audit objection and he has written to the officers of the  High Court in this behalf. The proceedings, as mentioned  before,  against  some  of  the  officers  of  High  Court  on  alleged irregularities are still pending. In respect of some  of  the  irregularities  which  I  have  considered  and  the  tendency  of  the  departmental  inquiries  against  the  suspended officers, I am of the opinion that it would be  appropriate to wait for a closer examination of the replies  to the audit objections and the various queries submitted  by the High Court to Brother Ramaswami before one can  come to a final conclusion.

xxx xxx xxx The  Supreme Court  must  uphold  the  rule  of  law.  It  is,  therefore, necessary that those who uphold the rule of law  

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must live by law and judges must, therefore, be obliged to  live according to law. The law, procedure and the norms  applicable in this case, enjoin that the expenses incurred  by  the  Court  for  the  Judges  must  be  according  to  the  rules, norms and the practice. No man is above law or the  rules. The Judges either of the Supreme Court or of the  High Courts and the Chief Justices are all subject to the  rule of  law and procedure like any other  citizen of  this  country  and  must  abide  by  the  norms  and  regulation  prescribed  inasmuch  as  these  and  to  the  extent  are  applicable to them I  always thought this  was clear  and  needed no  reiteration.  We must,  therefore,  ensure  that  there is no conduct of the Judges, which affects the faith  of  the people that  Judges do not  live according to law.  Judges  cannot  afford  to  be  involved  in  disputes,  which  have to determine the question whether the Judges while  functioning as Judges of Chief Justices have attempted to  subvert the law either designedly or in utter negligence or  recklessness. In  this  matter,  the  questions  involved  are,  namely,  (i)  whether the Chief Justice was entitled to the expenses of  his  telephone  at  Madras  because  Chandigarh  was  declared a disturbed area; (ii) Whether the Chief Justice was obliged to obtain leave  to avail the facility of LTC; (iii)  Whether the Chief Justice was entitled to direct the  cars to be taken to madras when he was on vacation from  Chandigarh for the reasons mentioned by him; (iv) Whether the silver maces ordered by the High Court  have been done at the rate similar to the rate applied in  respect of those supplied tot he Madras high Court, and (v)  Whether  even though the Judges of  the Punjab and  Haryana High Court did not approve the idea of having  maces  for  each  individual  Judge,  the  Chief  Justice  was  entitled to direct the purchase of these maces. Theses are  the matters on which interpretation of the rules or on the  permission  or  relaxation  of  rules,  certain  consequences  will follow, and if the Chief justice was not so entitled or  these could not be sanctioned as has been done under the  

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circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid objections and  communications,  reimbursement  or  recovery  would  be  directed.  These  matters,  therefore,  will  have  to  await  adjudication by the appropriate authorities,  namely,  the  Government and the sanctioning authorities dealing with  audit  objections,  in  respect  of  the  permissions  sought.  Though  one  would  like  to  think  that  there  has  been  extravagance and ostentiousness but these by the selves  do  not  involve  determining  questions  of  moral  or  legal  impropriety of a judge functioning as a Judge in the Court. But there are some other aspects involved in this matter,  namely,  the  questions  of  not  accounting  for  all  the  furnitures or items that were in the residence and office of  the  Chief  Justice,  the  alleged  replacement  of  superior  quality items by inferior quality items, the missing items  and  the  splitting  up  of  the  bills  in  order  to  have  the  sanction of the authorities or to conform to the rules, are  the  matters  which  are  also  pending  determination  and  adjudication. Involvement  in  any  investigation  on  the  conduct  of  a  sitting Supreme Court Judge on such matters as aforesaid  is embarrassing in the circumstances and the background  in which these questions have arisen in the instant case.  For one who should attempt to uphold the rule of law, it is  embarrassing to be involved in such a dispute. But no final  decision  on  this  aspect  can  be  arrived  at  until  the  investigations  and  inquiries  are  completed.  I  have,  on  these aspects after looking into the matter and the points  involved, no doubt that those who aspire to uphold the  rule of law must strive to live according to law and they  necessarily expose the selves to the danger of perishing  by law. I am aware and deeply conscious that in certain  circumstances  somebody  may  be  a  victim  of  certain  situation.  I  was  constrained,  in  those  circumstances,  to  advise  Brother  Ramaswami  to  desist  from  discharging  judicial functions so long as the investigations continued  and his name was cleared on this aspect. I wrote to Brother Ramaswami on 18th July 1990 rendering  my  aforesaid  advice.  I  have  also  conveyed  to  him  my  anguish in tendering this advice and I have requested him  

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to  please  be  on  leave  until  the  investigations  on  the  aforesaid conduct are completed. On  18th July,  1990  after  receipt  of  my  letter,  Brother  Ramaswami has applied for leave for six weeks in the first  instance with effect from 23rd July, 1990. I have directed  the office to process his application for leave. Since I had assured the learned Attorney General, the Law  Minister,  the president of the Bar Association and other  that I will look into it, I thought I must covey to you result  of my looking into it.”  

It would be relevant to mention, that no further action was taken  

by the Chief Justice of India, in furtherance of the administrative  

authority vested in him, in the matter relating to the allegations  

levelled  against  Justice  V.  Ramaswami.   Impeachment  

proceedings were initiated against Justice V. Ramaswami under  

Article 124 of the Constitution of India.  The outcome of the same,  

is inconsequential to the present controversy.

21. Contextually,  reference  needs  to  be  made,  to  the  

resolution passed by the Bombay Bar Association on 1.3.1995 by  

a majority of 185 out of 207 permanent members, demanding the  

resignation of Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, the then Chief Justice of  

Bombay High Court.  A writ petition came to be filed in this Court,  

seeking an appropriate writ, order or direction to restrain the Bar  

Council of Maharashtra and Goa, the Bombay Bar Association, and  

the Advocates’ Association of Western India, from coercing Justice  

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A.M. Bhattacharjee from resigning the office held by him.  The  

petitioner in the above case, had also made a prayer, that the  

allegations levelled against Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee be required  

to be investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and if  

the  same were found to  be  true,  a  direction  be issued to  the  

Speaker of the Lok Sabha, to initiate action for the removal of  

Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, under Article 124 read with Article 218  

of the Constitution of India, and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.  

While deliberating upon the aforesaid issue, this Court  inter alia  

held as under:

“40. Bearing  all  the  above  in  mind,  we  are  of  the  considered view that where the complaint relates to the  Judge  of  the  High  Court,  the  Chief  Justice  of  that  High  Court,  after  verification,  and  if  necessary,  after  confidential enquiry from his independent source, should  satisfy himself about the truth of the imputation made by  the Bar Association through its office bearers against the  Judge  and  consult  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  where  deemed  necessary,  by  placing  all  the  information  with  him.  When  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  is  seized  of  the  matter,  to  avoid  embarrassment  to  him  and  to  allow  fairness  in  the  procedure  to  be  adopted  in  furtherance  thereof,  the  Bar  should  suspend  all  further  actions  to  enable the Chief Justice of India to appropriately deal with  the matter. This is necessary because any action he may  take must not only be just but must also appear to be just  to  all  concerned,  i.e.,  it  must  not  even appear to  have  been taken under pressure from any quarter.  The Chief  Justice  of  India,  on  receipt  of  the  information  from the  Chief Justice of the High Court, after being satisfied about  the  correctness  and  truth  touching  the  conduct  of  the  Judge,  may  tender  such  advice  either  directly  or  may  

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initiate such action, as is deemed necessary or warranted  under  given  facts  and  circumstances.  If  circumstances  permit,  it  may  be  salutary  to  take  the  Judge  into  confidence before initiating action. On the decision being  taken by the Chief Justice of India, the matter should rest  at that. This procedure would not only facilitate nipping in  the bud the conduct of a Judge leading to loss of public  confidence in  the courts  and sustain  public  faith in  the  efficacy of the rule of law and respect for the judiciary, but  would  also  avoid  needless  embarrassment  of  contempt  proceedings  against  the  office  bearers  of  the  Bar  Association  and  group  libel  against  all  concerned.  The  independence of judiciary and the stream of public justice  would  remain  pure  and  unsullied.  The  Bar  Association  could remain a useful arm of the judiciary and in the case  of  sagging  reputation  of  the  particular  Judge,  the  Bar  Association could take up the matter with the Chief Justice  of the High Court and await his response for the action  taken thereunder for a reasonable period.

41. In case the allegations are against Chief Justice of a  High  Court,  the  Bar  should  bring  them  directly  to  the  notice  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  India.  On  receipt  of  such  complaint,  the Chief  Justice of  India would in  the same  way act as stated above qua complaint against a Judge of  the High Court, and the Bar would await for a reasonable  period the response of the Chief Justice of India. 42. It  would  thus  be  seen  that  yawning  gap  between  proved misbehaviour and bad conduct in consistent with  the  high  office  on  the  part  of  a  non  cooperating  Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court could be disciplined by  self-regulation through in-house procedure. This in-house  procedure would fill  in the constitutional gap and would  yield  salutary  effect.  Unfortunately,  recourse  to  this  procedure was not  taken in the case at  hand,  may be,  because  of  absence  of  legal  sanction  to  such  a  procedure.”

22. In furtherance of the directions issued in C.Ravichandran  

Iyer’s case (supra), this Court constituted a committee comprising  

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of three Judges of this Court, namely, Justices S.C. Agrawal, A.S.  

Anand (as he then was), S.P. Bharucha (as he then was), and the  

then two senior-most Chief Justices of High Courts, i.e., Justices  

P.S. Misra and D.P. Mohapatra (of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  

and the Allahabad High Court, respectively), to lay down the “in-

house  procedure”,  for  taking  suitable  remedial  action  against  

judges, who by their acts of omission or commission, do not follow  

the accepted values of judicial life, including the ideals expressed  

by the Supreme Court in the  “Restatement of  Values of Judicial  

Life”.  The committee submitted its  report on 31.10.1997.   The  

same was adopted with amendments, in a Full Court Meeting of  

the Supreme Court of India,  on 15.12.1999. In the afore-stated  

report, three sets of procedure for taking such suitable remedial  

action against judges were laid down.  The first, related to Judges  

of  the  High  Courts,  the  second,  to  Chief  Justices  of  the  High  

Courts, and the third, to Judges of the Supreme Court.  Insofar as  

the present controversy is concerned, since the same relates to  

the  allegations  made  against  a  sitting  Judge  of  the  Madhya  

Pradesh High Court, only the “in-house procedure” pertaining to  

Judges  of  the  High  Courts  is  relevant.   The  main  submission  

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner is  

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also  based  on  the  same.   The  “in-house  procedure”,  as  

determined  with  reference  to  Judges  of  the  High  Court,  is  

accordingly being extracted hereunder:

“  HIGH COURT JUDGE:   A complaint against a Judge of a High court is received  either by the Chief justice of that High Court or by the  Chief Justice of India (CJI). Some times such a complaint is  made to the President of India. The complaints that are  received by the President of India are generally forwarded  to  the  CJI.  The  Committee  suggests  the  following  procedure for dealing with such complaints:-

(1) Where the complaint is received against a Judge of a  High Court by the Chief Justice of that High Court, he shall  examine  it.  If  it  is  found  by  him that  it  is  frivolous  or  directly related to the merits of a substantive decision in a  judicial matter or does not involve any serious complaint  of misconduct or impropriety, he shall file the complaint  and inform the CJI accordingly. If it is found by him that  the complaint is of a serious nature involving misconduct  or impropriety, he shall ask for the response thereto of the  Judge concerned. If on a consideration of the allegations in  the complaint  in  the light  of  the response of  the Judge  concerned, the Chief Justice of the High Court is satisfied  that no further action is necessary he shall file complaint  and inform the CJI accordingly. If the Chief Justice of the  High Court is of the opinion that the allegations contained  in the complaint need a deeper probe, he shall forward to  the  CJI  the  complaint  and  the  response  of  the  Judge  concerned along with his comments.

(2) When the complaint is received by the CJI directly or it  is forwarded to him by the President of India the CJI will  examine it. If it is found by him that it is either frivolous or  directly related to the merits of a substantive decision in a  judicial matter or does not involve any serious complaint  of  misconduct  or  impropriety,  he  shall  file  it.  In  other  cases the complaint shall be sent by the CJI to the Chief  Justice of the concerned High court for his comments. On  

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the receipt of the complaint from CJI the Chief Justice f the  concerned High court  shall  ask for  the response of  the  judge concerned. If on a consideration of the allegations in  the complaint  in  the light  of  the response of  the Judge  concerned the Chief justice of the High Court is satisfied  that no further action is necessary or if he is of the opinion  that  the  allegations  contained  in  the  complaint  need  a  deeper  probe,  he  shall  return  the  complaint  to  the  CJI  along  with  a  statement  of  the  response  of  the  Judge  concerned and his comments.

(3)  After  considering  the  complaint  in  the  light  of  the  response of the judge concerned and the comments of the  Chief  justice  of  the  high  court,  the  CJI,  if  he  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  deeper  probe  is  required  into  the  allegations contained in the complaint, shall constitute a  three member Committee consisting of two Chief justices  of  High Courts  other  than the High  Court  to  which the  Judge  belongs  and  one  High  Court  Judge.  The  said  Committee  shall  hold  an  inquiry  into  the  allegations  contained in  the  complaint.  The inquiry  shall  be  in  the  nature  of  a  fact  finding  inquiry  wherein  the  Judge  concerned would be entitled to appear and have his say.  But it would not be a formal judicial inquiry involving the  examination  and  cross-examination  of  witnesses  and  representation by lawyers.

(4) For conducting the inquiry the Committee shall devise  its own procedure consistent with the principles of natural  justice.

(5)(i) After such inquiry the Committee may conclude and  report  to  the  CJI  that  (a)  there  is  no  substance  in  the  allegations  contained  in  the  complaint,  or  (b)  there  is  sufficient  substance  in  the  allegations  contained  in  the  complaint and the misconduct disclosed is so serious that  it  calls  for  initiation  of  proceedings  for  removal  of  the  Judge,  or  (c)  there  is  substance  in  the  allegations  contained in the complaint but the misconduct disclosed is  not  of  such  a  serious  nature  as  to  call  for  initiation  of  proceedings for removal of the Judge.

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(ii) A copy of the Report shall be furnished to the judge  concerned by the Committee.

(6) In a case where the Committee finds that there is no  substance in the allegations contained in the complaint,  the complaint shall be filed by the CJI.

(7) If the Committee finds that there is substance in the  allegations  contained  in  the  complaint  and  misconduct  disclosed  in  the  allegations  is  such  that  it  calls  for  initiation of proceedings for removal of the Judge, the CJI  shall adopt the following course:- (i)  the Judge concerned should be advised to resign his  office or seek voluntary retirement; (ii)  In  a  case  the  judge  expresses  his  unwillingness  to  resign or seek voluntary retirement,  the chief justice of  the concerned High Court should be advised by the CJI not  to allocate any judicial work to the judge concerned and  the  President  of  India  and  the  Prime  Minister  shall  be  intimated  that  this  has  been  done  because  allegations  against the Judge had been found by the Committee to be  so serious as to warrant the initiation of proceedings for  removal and the copy of the report of the Committee may  be enclosed.

(8) If the Committee finds that there is substance in the  allegations but the misconduct disclosed is not so serious  as to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the  judge, the CJI shall call  the Judge concerned and advise  him accordingly and may also direct that the report of the  Committee be placed on record.”

23. Next  in  sequence,  we  may  advert  to  the  letter  dated  

4.8.2008 written by the then Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice K.G.  

Balakrishnan,  to  the then Prime Minister  Mr.  Manmohan Singh,  

recommending the removal of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, then  a  

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sitting Judge of the Calcutta High Court.  A relevant extract of the  

above letter is placed below:

“The text of the letter written by Chief  Justice of India,  K.G.  Balakrishnan  to  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh  recommending removal of Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, Judge  of the Calcutta High Court.

Dated: 4 August, 2008 Dear Prime Minister, I  write  this  to  recommend  that  the  proceedings  contemplated by Article 217(1) read with Article 124(4) of  the  Constitution  be  initiated  for  removal  of  Mr.  Justice  Soumitra Sen, Judge, Calcutta High Court. 2-8. xxx xxx xxx 9.  Reports  appeared  in  newspapers  concerning  the  conduct  of  Justice  Soumitra  Sen  in  the  above-noted  matter.  The  then  Chief  Justice  of  Calcutta  High  Court  withdrew judicial work from him and wrote a letter dated  25th November, 2006 to my learned predecessor bringing  the matter to his notice for appropriate action. 10. On 1st July, 2007 I sought a comprehensive report from  the  Chief  Justice  of  Calcutta  High  Court  along  with  his  views  about  Justice  Soumitra  Sen.  On  12th July,  2007  Justice Soumitra Sen called on me, on advice of his Chief  Justice  and  verbally  explained  his  conduct.  He  sent  his  report to me on 20th August, 2007. 11. xxx xxx xxx

12. On 10th September, 2007 I had asked Justice Soumitra  Sen to furnish his fresh and final response to the judicial  observations made against him. After seeking more time  for  this  purpose  he  furnished  his  response  on  28th  September, 2007 requesting that he may be allowed to  resume duties in view of the order of the Division Bench of  Calcutta High Court.

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13. Since I felt  that a deeper probe was required to be  made into the allegations made against Justice Soumitra  Sen,  to  bring  the  matter  to  a  logical  conclusion,  I  constituted  a  three  Member  Committee  consisting  of  Justice A.P. Shah (Chief Justice, Madras High Court), Justice  A.K. Patnaik (Chief Justice, High Court of Madhya Pradesh)  and Justice R.M. Lodha (Judge, Rajasthan High Court), as  envisaged  in  the  ‘In-House  Procedure’  adopted  by  Supreme Court and various High Courts, to conduct a fact  finding enquiry,  wherein  the  Judge concerned would be  entitled to appear and have his say in the proceedings. 14.  The  Committee  submitted  its  report  dated  1st  February,  2008,  after  calling  for  relevant  records  and  considering the submission made by Justice Soumitra Sen,  who  appeared  in-person  before  the  Committee.  The  Committee inter alia concluded that: (a) Shri Soumitra Sen did not have honest intention right  from the year 1993 since he mixed the money received as  a  Receiver  and  his  personal  money  and  converted  Receiver’s money to his own use: (b) There has been misappropriation (at least temporary)  of the sale proceeds since:

(i) he received Rs. 24,57,000/- between 25th February  1993 to 10th January,  1995 but  the balance in  the  Account No. 01SLPO632800 on 28th February, 1995  was only Rs. 8,83,963.05. (i) a sum of Rs. 22,83,000/- was transferred by him  from  that  account  to  Account  No.  01SLPO813400  and, thereafter, almost entire amount was withdrawn  in a couple of months reducing the balance to the  bare  minimum  of  Rs.  811.56,  thus,  diverting  the  entire  sale  proceeds  for  his  own  use  and  with  dishonest intention.

© he gave false explanation to the court that an amount  of Rs. 25,00,000/- was invested from the account where  the sale proceeds were kept, whereas, in fact, the amount  of  Rs.  25,00,000/-  was withdrawn from Special  Officer’s  

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Account No. 01SLPO813400 and not from 01SLPO632800,  in which the sale proceeds were deposited; (d) mere monetary recompense under the compulsion of  judicial  order  does  not  obliterate  breach  of  trust  and  misappropriation of Receiver’s funds for his personal gain; (e)  the  conduct  of  Shri  Soumitra  Sen  had  brought  disrepute to the high judicial office and dishonour to the  institution  of  judiciary,  undermining  the  faith  and  confidence reposed by the public in the administration of  justice. In the opinion of the Committee misconduct disclosed is  so serious that it calls for initiation of proceedings for his  removal. 15. A copy of the Report dated 6th February, 2008 of the  Committee was forwarded by me to Justice Soumitra Sen  and in terms of the In-House procedure, he was advised to  resign  or  seek  voluntary  retirement.  Thereupon,  Justice  Soumitra Sen made a detailed representation dated 25th  February, 2008 seeking reconsideration of the decision of  his removal and sought a personal hearing. On 16th March,  2008  a  Collegium  consisting  of  myself,  Justice  B.N.  Agrawal  and  Justice  Ashok  Bhan  (Seniormost  Judges  of  Supreme Court) gave a hearing to Justice Soumitra Sen  and  reiterated  the  advice  given  to  him  to  submit  his  resignation or seek voluntary retirement on or before 2nd  April,  2008.  However,  vide  his  letter  dated  26th March,  2008  Justice  Soumitra  Sen  expressed  his  inability  to  tender resignation or seek voluntary retirement. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that proceedings  for  removal  of  Justice  Soumitra  Sen  be  initiated  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  prescribed  in  the  Constitution. With warm regards,

Yours sincerely Sd/-

(K.G. Balakrishnan)

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Hon'ble Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, 7, Race Course Road, New Delhi-110011.”

Based on the communication addressed by the Chief Justice of  

India,  impeachment  proceedings were actually  initiated against  

Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen, under Article 124 of the Constitution of  

India.   Consequent  upon  his  resignation,  during  the  course  of  

deliberation on the impeachment proceedings in Parliament, the  

impeachment proceedings were dropped as having been abated.   

24. It is, therefore, apparent that the seeds of the “in-house  

procedure” came to be sown in the judgment rendered by this  

Court in C. Ravinchandran Iyer’s case (supra).  It is also apparent,  

that actions have been initiated under the “in-house procedure”,  

which has the approval of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of  

India.   And,  based  on  the  afore-stated  “in-house  procedure”,  

impeachment  proceedings  were  actually  initiated  by  the  

Parliament under Article 124 of the Constitution of India.  There  

can  therefore  be  no  doubt  whatsoever,  that  in  the  above  

situation,  the  “in-house  procedure”  is  firmly  in  place,  and  its  

adoption for dealing with matters expressed by this Court in C.  

Ravichandran Iyer’s case (supra) is now a reality.   

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25. Despite the above conclusion, it is imperative to take into  

consideration the observations recorded by this  Court  in  Indira  

Jaising v. Registrar General, Supreme Court (2003) 5 SCC 494, as  

under:

“In our constitutional scheme it is not possible to vest the  Chief  Justice  of  India  with  any  control  over  the  puisne  Judges with regard to conduct either personal or judicial.  In case of breach of any rule of the Code of Conduct, the  Chief  Justice  can  choose  not  to  post  cases  before  a  particular  Judge  against  whom  there  are  acceptable  allegations. It is possible to criticise that decision on the  ground that no enquiry was held and the Judge concerned  had  no  opportunity  to  offer  his  explanation  particularly  when the Chief Justice is  not vested with any power to  decide about the conduct of a Judge. There is no adequate  method  or  machinery  to  enforce  the  Code  of  Conduct.  Article 124 provides  for  appointment  of  Judges  of  this  Court and also their removal. Similarly, Article 217 deals  with the appointment and removal of the Judges of the  High Court. In the Judges' Enquiry Act of 1968 provisions  are made for investigation into misbehavior or incapacity  of  a  Judge.  It  may  be  noted  that  since  Judges  of  the  superior  Courts  occupy  very  high  positions,  disciplinary  proceedings which exist in the case of all other employees  cannot be though of.

The Committee referred to by the petitioner is stated to  have been constituted as a part of In-House procedure. A  Judge  cannot  be  removed  from  his  Office  except  by  impeachment by a majority of the House and a majority of  not  less  than  2/3rd  present  and  voting  as  provided  by  Articles 124 and217 of  the  Constitution  of  India.  The  Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has been enacted providing for  the manner  of  conducting inquiry  into  the  allegation of  judicial conduct upon a Motion of Impeachment sponsored  by at least 100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha  members. The Presiding Officer of the concerned House  has  the  power  to  constitute  a  Committee  consisting  of  

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A perusal of the observations made by this Court in the extract  

reproduced above,  reveals  that  the  existence of  the  “in-house  

procedure”  is  now  an  established  means  for  inquiring  into  

allegations levelled against a judge of a superior court, through  

his peers.  It is a confidential inquiry for institutional credibility  

under the charge of the Chief Justice of India. And therefore, its  

affairs are to be kept out of public domain. The proceedings under  

the  above  procedure  being  sensitive,  are  required  to  be  

inaccessible to third parties.  And therefore, the prayer seeking  

the disclosure of the report submitted on the culmination of the  

“in-house  procedure”  was  declined.   The  object  sought  to  be  

addressed  through  the  “in-house  procedure”,  is  to  address  

concerns of institutional integrity.  That would, in turn, sustain the  

confidence of the litigating public, in the efficacy of the judicial  

process.

26. It  is  impermissible  to  publicly  discuss  the  conduct  of  a  

sitting judge, or to deliberate upon the performance of his duties,  

and even on/of court behaviour, in public domain.  Whilst the “in-

house procedure” lays down means to determine the efficacy of  

the allegations levelled, it is now apparent, that the procedure is  

not toothless, in the sense, that it can lead to impeachment of the  

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concerned judge under Article 124 of the Constitution of India.  

Such being the cause,  effect  and repercussions of the findings  

recorded  during  the  course  of  the   “in-house  procedure”,  this  

Court in Indira Jaising’s case (supra) declined to entertain the writ  

petition filed at the behest of a third party, seeking details of the  

proceedings,  and  the  consequential  report  prepared  by  the  

committee  of  judges.   But,  that  should  not  be  understood  to  

mean, that an individual concerned, who is called upon to subject  

himself/herself  to  the  contemplated  procedure,  should  be  

precluded or prevented from seeking judicial redress.  It is now  

well understood, that an individual who subjects himself/herself to  

the jurisdiction of an authority, cannot turn around to find fault  

with it at a later juncture.  If there is a fault, the same should be  

corrected, before one accepts to submit to the jurisdiction of the  

concerned  authority.   The  submission  of  the  petitioner  in  the  

present case, to the “two-Judge Committee”, would certainly have  

had the above effect.   We are therefore satisfied to hold,  that  

those who are liable to be affected by the outcome of the “in-

house procedure”,  have the right to seek judicial  redressal,  on  

account of a perceived irregularity.  The irregularity may be on  

account of the violation of the contemplated procedure, or even  

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because of contemplated bias or prejudice.  It may be on account  

of impropriety.  The challenge can extend to all subjects on which  

judicial review can be sought.  The objections raised on behalf of  

respondent  no.3,  in  respect  of  the sustainability  of  the instant  

petition  at  the  hands  of  Addl.D&SJ  ‘X’,  are  therefore  wholly  

untenable. The challenge to the maintainability of the instant writ  

petition, is accordingly declined.

27. The petitioner’s pointed contention with reference to the  

procedure  adopted,  while  giving  effect  to  the  “in-house  

procedure” approved by the Full Court of the Supreme Court, is  

with reference to the clear and categoric jurisdictional authority,  

exclusively vested with the Chief Justice of the concerned High  

Court.  According to learned counsel, the Chief Justice of the High  

Court is, to examine the veracity of the allegations, at his own.  It  

was  accordingly  submitted,  that  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  

Court, had neither the jurisdiction nor authority, to constitute a  

committee of judges to hold a fact finding inquiry, by recording  

statements  of  witnesses.   Pointing  out  to  the  procedure  

contemplated  in  paragraph  (1)  of  the  “in-house  procedure”  

(extracted in paragraph 22 herein above), it was submitted, that  

where the complaint  made against  a  sitting judge of  the  High  

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Court is received by the Chief Justice of the High Court, “he” is  

required  to  examine  the  same.   On  “his”  examination,  if  the  

complaint is found to be frivolous or directly related to the merits  

of  a  substantive decision in  a judicial  matter,  or  if  it  does not  

involve  serious  allegations  of  misconduct  or  impropriety,  “he”  

shall  file  the  complaint  and  inform  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  

accordingly.   Alternatively,  if  it  is  found  by  “him”,  that  the  

complaint  is  of  a  serious  nature  involving  misconduct  or  

impropriety,  “he”  would  seek  the  response  of  the  concerned  

judge.   Based  on  the  complaint  and  the  response,  “the  Chief  

Justice of the High Court” would take appropriate action, namely,  

“he” would file the complaint if “he” is satisfied that no further  

action  is  necessary.   However,  if  “he”  considers  that  the  

allegations need to  be further  probed,  “he” would  forward the  

complaint, and the response of the concerned judge, along with  

“his” comments to the Chief Justice of India.  It was pointed out  

that the terms “he”, “his” or “him”, have a reference, exclusively  

to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court.

28. Referring  to  paragraph  (2)  of  the  “in-house  procedure”  

pertaining to a complaint against a sitting High Court Judge, i.e.,  

in situations where the complaint is received by the Chief Justice  

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of  India  directly  (or  it  is  forwarded to him by the President  of  

India), the Chief Justice of India may file the complaint at his own,  

if  it  is found by “him”, i.e.,  the Chief Justice of India, that it  is  

either frivolous or directly related to the merits of a substantive  

decision  in  a  judicial  matter  or  does  not  involve  any  serious  

misconduct or impropriety.  In other cases, the complaint shall be  

forwarded by the Chief Justice of India to the Chief Justice of the  

concerned  High  Court.   On  the  receipt  of  such  complaint,  the  

Chief Justice of the High Court would seek the response of the  

concerned judge.   The consideration at the hands of  the Chief  

Justice  of  the  High  Court,  is  limited  to  an  examination  of  the  

complaint  in  conjunction  with  the  response  of  the  concerned  

judge.  Thereupon, the Chief Justice of the High Court could either  

be  satisfied  that  no  further  action  is  called  for,  or  “he”  may  

entertain  the  opinion  that  the  allegations  contained  in  the  

complaint need a deeper probe.   “he” shall return the complaint  

to  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  along  with  the  response  of  the  

concerned judge and “his” comments.  It was pointed out, that  

even in paragraph (2) of the “in-house procedure” the terms “he”  

and “his”, have a reference exclusively to the Chief Justice of the  

High Court.

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29. Based  on  paragraphs  (1)  and  (2)  of  the  “in-house  

procedure” pertaining to complaint against a sitting High Court  

Judge,  it  is  the  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner,  that  the  procedure  does  not  envisage/contemplate,  

holding of a full  fledged inquiry.   The jurisdiction vested in the  

Chief Justice of the High Court, under the “in-house procedure”,  

according to learned counsel, is limited to seeking the response of  

the  concerned  judge,  and  thereupon,  in  case  the  allegations  

contained  in  the  complaint  require  a  deeper  probe,  the  Chief  

Justice of the High Court, is to forward the complaint along with  

the response of the concerned High Court Judge, as well as his  

own comments, to the Chief Justice of India.  It is therefore, the  

contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner,  that  

constitution  of  the  “two-Judge  Committee”,  to  be  assisted  for  

secretarial  purposes,  by a senior lady Additional  District  Judge,  

was  clearly  beyond  the  authority  and  jurisdiction  of  the  Chief  

Justice of  the High Court,  and that  the  same was in  complete  

violation and derogation of the “in-house procedure” approved by  

the Full Court of the Supreme Court.

30. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the  

petitioner,  that  the  action  of  the  “two-Judge  Committee”  

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constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court, requiring the  

petitioner to appear before the Committee, along with relevant  

documents in relation to the imputations levelled by her, was also  

impermissible.  It  was  pointed  out,  that  the  “two-Judge  

Committee” had not only required the petitioner’s presence, but  

also  that  of  her  daughter.  It  is  further  submitted,  that  a  

communication was addressed by the “two-Judge Committee” to  

the  petitioner’s  husband,  also  requiring  him to  remain  present  

before the Committee.  All the afore-stated actions, according to  

the learned counsel for the petitioner, were in clear violation of  

the  “in-house  procedure”,  approved  by  the  Full  Court  of  the  

Supreme Court.

31. During  the  course  of  hearing,  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner invited our attention, to the assertions made on behalf  

of respondent no.3, namely, that it was imperative for the “two-

Judge Committee”  constituted by the  Chief  Justice of  the High  

Court,  to verify the factual position, from the wife of the Chief  

Judicial  Magistrate,  Gwalior,  the  District  Registrar,  Gwalior,  the  

District  Judge  (Inspection),  Gwalior,  as  also,  the  District  and  

Sessions Judge,  Gwalior,  since averments  had been made with  

reference to all of them, in the complaint filed by the petitioner.  

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Responding to the aforesaid,  it  was submitted,  that  an inquiry  

extending  to  the  persons  referred  to  hereinabove,  as  also  the  

staff attached to the petitioner, who could be witnesses, to the  

acts of omission and commission alleged against respondent no.3,  

were also clearly beyond the scope of “in-house procedure”.

32. It is also necessary for us to record, that the submissions  

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner,  

to demonstrate the responsibility of the Chief Justice of the High  

Court,  with  reference  to  the  “in-house  procedure”,  was  not  

contested by the learned counsel for the respondents.  Whilst the  

stance adopted by the Registrar General of the High Court was,  

that the procedure adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court,  

was  based  on  the  sensitivity  involved  in  the  matter.  In  the  

counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Registrar General of the  

High Court, it is sought to be averred, that even though the “two-

Judge Committee”  constituted by the  Chief  Justice of  the High  

Court had commenced to inquire into the matter, but the report  

thereof was not submitted to the Chief Justice of the High Court,  

because of the news flashed in the media on 29.08.2014, about  

this Court having stayed further proceedings in the matter.  The  

issue under consideration is not whether the Chief Justice of the  

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High  Court  was  well  meaning,  in  constituting  the  “two-Judge  

Committee” for inquiring into the matter.  The issue is, whether it  

was open to the Chief Justice of the High Court, to constitute such  

a committee, within the framework of the “in-house procedure”.  

We are satisfied, that the Chief Justice of the High Court, had no  

jurisdiction to do so, in terms of the “in-house procedure”.  It is  

therefore, that the learned counsel representing the High Court  

repeatedly  adopted  the  stance,  that  in  the  given  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, the High Court would not be averse to  

following  any  procedure,  which  this  Court  would  consider  

reasonable and proper. Learned Solicitor General representing the  

Secretary General of the Supreme Court, fully endorsed the above  

view.   

33. No  pointed  submission  was  advanced  by  the  counsel  

representing  respondent  no.3  –  Justice  ‘A’,  on  the  main  

submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the  

petitioner.   Learned  counsel  for  respondent  no.3,  in  order  to  

repudiate the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned  

counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Chief Justice of a  

High Court, does not function under the administrative control of  

the Chief Justice of India.  It was, therefore pointed out, that while  

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adjudicating on the issue being canvassed, it needed to be kept in  

mind, that the Chief Justice of a High Court, is not subservient to  

the Chief  Justice of  India.   It  was accordingly asserted,  that  in  

discharging his onerous responsibility, the Chief Justice of a High  

Court, would (and should) be at liberty, to evolve a procedure, in  

the best  interest  of  all  concerned.   It  was submitted,  that  the  

Chief Justice of a High Court, should not be deprived of the said  

liberty, for the simple reason, that he has to ensure fairness to  

the rival parties, and at the same time, to safeguard the dignity of  

the institution.  It was therefore, that learned counsel advised us,  

not to limit or place fetters on the discretion of the Chief Justice of  

the  High  Court,  insofar  as  the  investigative  procedure  is  

concerned.   Learned  counsel  submitted,  that  the  procedure  

adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court, represented the  

ethical  and moral  authority  of  the  High  Court,  and as  such,  it  

would not be proper to interfere with the same.  It was submitted,  

that the petitioner had not alleged, that the procedure adopted by  

the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court,  was  unethical  or  morally  

improper.   It  was repeatedly pointed out,  that the proceedings  

assailed by the petitioner, had neither any statutory status, nor  

the force of law.  It was submitted that the Chief Justice of the  

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High  Court  had  followed  the  procedure,  he  felt  best  for  the  

purpose.   The submissions of the learned counsel  representing  

respondent no.3, we are sure, was well intentioned.  The response  

of the learned counsel  avoids the issue being canvassed.   The  

response would be understandable if the Chief Justice of the High  

Court had adopted the procedure in question, because the “in-

house  procedure”,  would  not  have  been  the  proper  course  to  

follow, or would have resulted in injustice to one or the either  

party.  But that is not the case here.

34. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the main  

contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the  

petitioner.  In the process of examining the “in-house procedure”,  

we  have  had  the  occasion  to  appreciate  the  invaluable  

contribution made by three Judges of  this  Court,  two of  whom  

adorned this Court as Chief Justices, and two Chief Justices of High  

Courts, one of whom was later elevated as a Judge of this Court.  

The “in-house procedure”, did not overlook any relevant aspect.  

The sensitivity of the matter was kept in mind.  The individual  

integrity of the parties was taken care of.  The parties concerned  

were assured, that all efforts would be made to unravel the truth.  

The procedure devised ensured the preservation of institutional  

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reputation,  as  well.   In  dealing  with  complaints  made  against  

sitting judges of High Courts, the onus of recording a prima facie  

view,  was vested with the Chief  Justice of  the concerned High  

Court.  Participation in the investigative process, at the hands of  

any  other  judge  of  the  same  High  Court,  was  sought  to  be  

excluded.  The exclusion of judges of the same Court from the  

investigative  process,  was  also  well  thought  out.   In  certain  

situations it may be true, as pointed out by the learned counsel  

for the petitioner, that judges of the same Court being colleagues  

of the concerned judge, would endeavour to exculpate him from  

his  predicament.   It  is  not  as  if,  the  position  could  not  be  

otherwise.   Animosity  amongst  colleagues  is  not  unknown.  

Reasons  of  competitiveness,  jealousy  and  the  like  are  known  

amongst colleague judges, specially from the same High Court.  

By excluding judges of the concerned High Court (as the judge  

complained  against),  is  bound  to  be  beneficial,  in  both  the  

situations, referred to above.  The Chief Justice of the High Court,  

being a Judge from another State, would be shorn of any such  

prejudices.  Moreover, being a man on the spot, he would be most  

suited for the purpose.

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35. A perusal of the “in-house procedure” applicable to sitting  

judges  of  High  Courts  reveals,  that  the  same  is  

compartmentalized into two stages.  Through the first stage, the  

prima facie veracity of the allegations, contained in the complaint  

is ascertained.  If so, whether a deeper probe is called for. The  

first stage does not contemplate an in-depth examination of the  

allegations.   It  requires  merely  an  assessment  based  on  the  

contents  of  the  complaint,  and the  response of  the concerned  

judge.  All that the Chief Justice of the High Court is required to  

do, is to determine whether a deeper probe is required.  This is to  

be  done,  on  the  basis  of  a  logical  assessment  made  on  a  

consideration  of  the  response  of  the  concerned  Judge  (with  

reference to the allegations levelled in the complaint).  

36. It is the second stage of the “in-house procedure”, relating  

to  sitting  judges  of  High  Courts,  which  could  lead  to  serious  

consequences.   The second stage is  monitored by none other,  

than the Chief Justice of India.  Only if the Chief Justice of India  

endorses  the  view expressed  by  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  

Court,  that a deeper probe is called for,  he would constitute a  

“three-member Committee”, and thereby take the investigative  

process, to the second stage.  This Committee is to comprise of  

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two Chief Justices of High Courts (other than the concerned High  

Court),  besides  a  Judge  of  a  High  Court.   The  second  stage,  

postulates  a  deeper  probe.   Even  though  the  “three-member  

Committee” is at liberty to devise its own procedure, the inherent  

requirement provided for is, that the procedure evolved should be  

in consonance with the rules of natural justice.  Herein, for the  

first time, the authenticity of the allegations, are to be probed, on  

the basis of an inquiry.  The incumbents of the “three-member  

Committee”,  would  have  no  nexus,  with  the  concerned  judge.  

Not only would the concerned judge have a fair  opportunity to  

repudiate  the  allegations  levelled  against  him,  even  the  

complainant would have the satisfaction,  that  the investigation  

would not be unfair.   The “in-house procedure” was devised to  

ensure exclusion of favouritism, prejudice or bias.

37. By forwarding the complaint received by the Chief Justice  

of India against respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, to the Chief Justice  

of the High Court, the “in-house procedure” was sought to be put  

in motion.  The extract of the “in-house procedure” (applicable to  

sitting Judges of High Court), reproduced in paragraph 22 above  

reveals,  that  the  same  is  expressed  in  the  simplest  possible  

words.  For recording our conclusions, we have endeavoured to  

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explain the same through “seven steps” contemplated therein.  

The description of  the “in-house procedure”,  relating to  sitting  

High Court Judges, is being narrated hereunder, stepwise:   

Step one: (i)  A  complaint  may  be  received,  against  a  sitting  

Judge of a High Court, by the Chief Justice of that High Court;   

(ii)  A complaint may also be received, against a sitting  

Judge of a High Court, by the Chief Justice of India;

(iii) A complaint may even be received against a sitting Judge  

of a High Court, by the President of India.  Such a complaint is  

then forwarded to the Chief Justice of India;

In  case  of  (i)  above,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  shall  

examine the contents  of  the complaint,  at  his  own,  and if  the  

same are found to be frivolous, he shall file the same.   

In  case  of  (ii)  and  (iii)  above,  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  shall  

similarly examine the contents of the complaint, by himself, and if  

the same are found to be frivolous, he shall file the same.

Step two: (i) The Chief Justice of the High Court, after having  

examined  a  complaint,  may  entertain  a  feeling,  that  the  

complaint  contains  serious  allegations,  involving misconduct  or  

impropriety, which require a further probe;

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(ii) The Chief Justice of India, on examining the contents  

of  a  complaint,  may  likewise  entertain  a  feeling,  that  the  

complaint  contains  serious  allegations,  involving misconduct  or  

impropriety, which require a further probe;

In case of (i) above, the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall seek  

a response from the concerned Judge, and nothing more.

In case of (ii) above, the Chief Justice of India, shall forward the  

complaint to the Chief Justice of the High Court.  The Chief Justice  

of the High Court, shall then seek a response from the concerned  

Judge, and nothing more.

Step three: The Chief Justice of the High Court, shall consider the  

veracity of the allegations contained in the complaint, by taking  

into  consideration  the  response  of  the  concerned  Judge.   The  

above consideration will lead the Chief Justice of the High Court,  

to either of the below mentioned inferences:

(i) The  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court,  may  arrive  at  the  

inference, that the allegations are frivolous.  In the instant  

eventuality,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  shall  

forward his opinion to the Chief Justice of India.

(ii) Or alternatively, the Chief Justice of the High Court, may  

arrive at the opinion, that the complaint requires a deeper  

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probe. In the instant eventuality, the Chief Justice of the  

High Court,  shall  forward the complaint,  along with  the  

response  of  the  Judge  concerned,  as  also  his  own  

consideration, to the Chief Justice of India.

Step four: The  Chief  Justice  of  India  shall  then  examine,  the  

allegations  contained  in  the  complaint,  the  response  of  the  

concerned Judge, along with the consideration of the Chief Justice  

of the High Court.  If on such examination, the Chief Justice of  

India,  concurs with the opinion of the Chief Justice of the High  

Court  (that  a  deeper  probe  is  required,  into  the  allegations  

contained  in  the  complaint),  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  shall  

constitute a “three-member Committee”, comprising of two Chief  

Justices of High Courts (other than the High Court, to which the  

Judge belongs), and one High Court Judge, to hold an inquiry, into  

the allegations contained in the complaint.

Step five: The “three-member Committee” constituted by the  

Chief Justice of India, shall conduct an inquiry, by devising its own  

procedure,  consistent with the rules of natural  justice.   On the  

culmination  of  the  inquiry,  conducted  by  the  “three-member  

Committee”,  it  shall  record  its  conclusions.   The report  of  the  

“three-member Committee”, will be furnished, to the Chief Justice  

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of  India.   The  report  could  lead  to  one  of  the  following  

conclusions:

That, there is no substance in the allegations levelled against the  

concerned  Judge;  or  that  there  is  sufficient  substance  in  the  

allegations  levelled  against  the  concerned  Judge.  In  such  

eventuality, the “three-member Committee”, must further opine,  

whether the misconduct levelled against the concerned Judge is  

so serious, that it requires initiation of proceedings for removal of  

the  concerned Judge;  or  that,  the  allegations  contained  in  the  

complaint  are  not  serious  enough  to  require  initiation  of  

proceedings for the removal of the concerned Judge.

In  case  of  (i)  above,  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  shall  file  the  

complaint.   

In  case  of  (ii)  above,  the  report  of  the  “three-member  

Committee”, shall  also be furnished (by the Committee) to the  

concerned Judge.

Step six: If the “three-member Committee” constituted by the  

Chief  Justice  of  India,  arrives  at  the  conclusion,  that  the  

misconduct is not serious enough, for initiation of proceedings for  

the removal  of  the concerned Judge,  the Chief  Justice of  India  

shall advise the concerned Judge, and may also direct, that the  

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report of the “three-member Committee” be placed on record.  If  

the  “three-member  Committee”  has  concluded,  that  there  is  

substance in the allegations, for initiation of proceedings, for the  

removal of the concerned Judge, the Chief Justice of India shall  

proceed as under:-

(i) The concerned judge will be advised, by the Chief Justice  

of India, to resign or to seek voluntary retirement.

(ii) In case the concerned Judge does not accept the advice of  

the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of India, would  

require the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, not  

to allocate any judicial work, to the concerned Judge.

Step seven: In  the  eventuality  of  the  concerned  Judge,  not  

abiding by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice  

of India, as indicated in step six above, the Chief Justice of India,  

shall  intimate the President of India,  and the Prime Minister of  

India,  of  the  findings  of  the  “three-member  Committee”,  

warranting initiation of proceedings, for removal of the concerned  

judge.

38. It  is  apparent  from the “seven steps”,  of  the “in-house  

procedure”, for sitting High Court Judges, that the role of the Chief  

Justice of the High Court, is limited to the first three steps.  We  

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are satisfied, that the main contention advanced by the learned  

counsel for the petitioner, relying on the “in-house procedure” is  

fully justified.  There can be no doubt, that it was not open to the  

Chief Justice of the High Court, either to constitute the “two-Judge  

Committee”, or to require the “two-Judge Committee”, to hold an  

inquiry  into  the  matter,  by  recording  statements  of  witnesses.  

The role of the Chief Justice of the High Court, being limited to the  

first  stage  of  the  investigative  process,  during  which  the  only  

determination  is,  whether  a  prima  facie case  is  made  out  

requiring a deeper probe; the Chief Justice of the High Court had  

exceeded  the  authority  vested  in  him  under  the  “in-house  

procedure”.  It  is  only in the second stage of the investigative  

process, that the Chief Justice of India, is to constitute a “three-

member  Committee”  for  holding  a  deeper  probe,  into  the  

allegations  levelled in  the  complaint.   Learned counsel  for  the  

petitioner, was fully justified, in submitting, that the “two-Judge  

Committee” constituted by the Chief  Justice of  the High Court,  

was beyond the purview of the “in-house procedure”.

39. Having examined the facts and circumstances of the case,  

we are of the view, that by not strictly abiding by the procedure  

contemplated  under  the  “in-house  procedure”  evolved  by  this  

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Court,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court,  introduced  serious  

infirmities in the investigative process.  These infirmities were of  

the nature which were sought to be consciously avoided under  

the “in-house procedure”.  We may mention a few.  It is apparent,  

that  the  “in-house  procedure”  contemplated  an  independent  

holistic two-stage process.  We have described hereinabove, that  

the first stage comprises of steps ‘one’ to ‘three’.  The first stage  

is limited to a prima facie consideration, at the hands of the Chief  

Justice of the High Court, for determining whether a deeper probe  

into the matter was required.  The first  stage of the “in-house  

procedure”  contemplates  the  implied  exclusion  of  colleague  

Judges, from the same High Court.  In the process adopted by the  

Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court,  he  has  consciously  involved  

colleague Judges, of the same High Court.  This was sought to be  

avoided  under  the  “in-house  procedure”.   Unfortunately,  what  

Chief Justice of the High Court has embarked upon, is not a prima  

facie determination, but a holistic consideration of the allegations.  

This  is  also  wholly  contrary  to  the “in-house procedure”.   The  

Chief Justice of the High Court, has actually embarked upon steps  

‘four’ to ‘seven’, which are a part of the second stage of the “in-

house procedure”.  The second stage of the “in-house procedure”  

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envisages a deeper probe, which is to be monitored by the Chief  

Justice of India himself.  If  the proceedings move to the second  

stage, the Chief Justice of India, would nominate a “three-member  

Committee”.  In the process adopted by the Chief Justice of the  

High Court, he has usurped the investigative process, assigned to  

the “three-member Committee”.   The Chief  Justice of  the High  

Court,  has himself,  commenced the deeper probe,  through the  

“two-Judge Committee”.  Furthermore, under the second stage,  

the inquiry is to be conducted by two sitting Chief Justices of High  

Courts, and one Judge of a High Court.  An inquiry conducted by  

the  “three-member  Committee”,  in  terms  of  the  “in-house  

procedure”, would have a wholly different impact.  Not only would  

the concerned parties feel reassured, that justice would be done,  

even the public at large would be confident,  that the outcome  

would be fair and without any prejudices.  By doing so, the Chief  

Justice of the High Court, ignored the wisdom of the Committee of  

Judges,  who  devised  the  “in-house  procedure”,  as  also,  the  

determination of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of India.  In  

the procedure adopted, by the Chief Justice of the High Court in  

the instant case, it is possible for one or the other party to feel,  

that he/she may not get justice at the hands of the “two-Judge  

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Committee”.  In fact, that is exactly the position, in the present  

case.  For  the  reasons  recorded  hereinabove,  the  proceedings  

adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court are liable to be set  

aside.  The same are accordingly hereby set aside.

40. The  next  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner  was,  that  the  inquiry  conducted  by  the  “two-Judge  

Committee”, constituted by the Chief Justice of the High Court,  

cannot be expected to arrive at a fair conclusion.  That by itself,  

according to learned counsel, vitiates the entire proceedings.  The  

instant submission was sought to be supported on two counts.  

Firstly,  it  was  the  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner,  that  all  the  persons  and officers  through whom the  

petitioner  is  to substantiate her allegations,  are subordinate to  

respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’.  It was pointed out, that Justice ‘A’  

exercises administrative superintendence and control over them.  

It  was  also  the  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner, that even persons who would vouchsafe the veracity of  

the assertions made by respondent no. 3 - Justice ‘A’, are under  

the administrative supervision and control of respondent no. 3,  

and as such, they too cannot be expected to make statements,  

freely and without fear.  Secondly, it was the contention of the  

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learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner,  that  the  “two-Judge  

Committee” constituted by the Chief  Justice of  the High Court,  

comprised of colleagues of respondent no.3 – Justice ‘A’, and as  

such,  the said committee may not be open-minded enough, to  

affirm  the  claim  of  the  petitioner.   In  this  behalf,  it  was  the  

submission  of  the  learned  counsel,  that  the  endeavour  of  the  

“two-Judge Committee”,  would be to exculpate their  colleague,  

from the allegations levelled against him.  Accordingly, it was the  

assertion of the learned counsel, that the “two-Judge Committee”  

required to inquire into the matter,  by the Chief  Justice of  the  

High Court, was wholly unsuited for inquiring into the allegations  

levelled by the petitioner.

41. It  is  not  necessary  for  us,  to  delve into  the  contention  

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner,  

as has been noticed in the foregoing paragraph, for the simple  

reason, that while accepting the main contention advanced at the  

hands of the learned counsel, we have already concluded, that  

the procedure adopted by the Chief Justice of the High Court, is  

liable to be set aside.  Be that as it may, we consider it just and  

appropriate to deal with the above contention, so that the issue  

canvassed is crystallized, by an effective determination for future  

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reference.  There can be no doubt, that an investigation, would  

lead to consequences. The concerned judge may be found remiss,  

or alternatively, he may be exculpated of the charges. Whilst in  

the former eventuality,  the concerned judge against whom the  

findings are recorded, would be the obvious sufferer.  In the latter  

eventuality,  the  adverse  consequences  would  be  against  the  

complainant,  for  it  would  be  assumed  that  she  had  levelled  

unfounded  allegations.   It  is  therefore  imperative,  that  the  

procedure adopted for the investigative process, is absolutely fair  

for all concerned.  The procedure should be such as would ensure,  

that it would be shorn of favouritism, prejudice or bias.  Presence  

of  any one of  the above,  would vitiate the entire investigative  

process.   Recording  of  statements  of  individuals,  who  are  

subservient  to  respondent  no.3  –  Justice  ‘A’,  irrespective  of  

whether  the  statements  are  recorded  on  behalf  of  the  

complainant or the concerned judge, would most definitely render  

the investigative process unsustainable in law.  The influence of  

the concerned judge, over the witnesses to be produced, either  

by the complainant or by the concerned judge himself, will have  

to be removed.  It will be for the complainant, to raise a grievance  

of  the  nature  referred  to  above.   In  such  an  eventuality,  the  

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grievance will be considered by the Chief Justice of India.  And  

whenever necessary, remedial steps will be taken.

42. The  last  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner was, that the Chief Justice of the High Court himself, is  

clearly incapacitated, to be a party to any determinative process,  

insofar as the allegations levelled by the petitioner are concerned.  

It was the contention of the learned counsel, that for the present  

case,  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court,  should  not  even  be  

required to determine, whether or not a deeper probe into the  

matter was required.  Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter  

is  concerned,  learned counsel  vehemently  contended,  that  the  

petitioner had made numerous efforts to meet the Chief Justice of  

the High Court,  to  apprise him of  the factual  position.   It  was  

pointed  out,  that  in  the  petitioner’s  efforts  to  meet  the  Chief  

Justice of the High Court, she had also made repeated attempts to  

do so,  through the Private Secretary of  the Chief  Justice.   The  

Private Secretary has now assumed the stance, that the petitioner  

had never  contacted him,  for  the said purpose.   This  position,  

according to the petitioner, is false not only to the knowledge of  

the Private Secretary, but also, to the knowledge of all concerned.  

It  is  sought  to  be  emphasized,  that  a  press  note  was  also  

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released, to the aforesaid effect, at the behest of the Chief Justice  

of the High Court.  The position adopted by the Chief Justice of the  

High Court,  according to the learned counsel,  clearly reveals a  

position of denial of the factual assertions made by the petitioner.  

In  the above view of  the  matter,  it  was the contention of  the  

learned counsel for the petitioner, that even the Chief Justice of  

the  High  Court,  was  in  denial  of  the  facts  asserted  by  the  

petitioner.  And by doing so, the Chief Justice of the High Court  

had rendered himself  ineligible,  for  any role  arising out  of  the  

complaint made by the petitioner.

43. It is essential for us to record a finding even on the last  

contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel.  We say  

so, because according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it  

would not be proper, in the facts and circumstances of this case,  

to reinitiate the process expressed in the “in-house procedure”,  

through the Chief Justice of the High Court.  It seems to us, that  

there is merit in the instant contention.  Undoubtedly, the Chief  

Justice of the High Court has adopted a position,  in respect of  

some aspects of the matter, contrary to the position asserted by  

the petitioner.  Truthfully, even though these facts do not have  

any direct bearing on the allegations levelled against respondent  

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no. 3, yet when examined dispassionately, the fact of the matter  

is that the Chief Justice of the High Court, personally perceived  

certain facts differently.   These facts are personal  to the Chief  

Justice of the High Court, namely, whether attempts were made  

by the petitioner to meet the Chief Justice of the High Court, and  

whether he declined such attempts.   In the above view of the  

matter,  we  are  of  the  considered  view,  that  it  may  not  be  

appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,  

to  associate  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  with  the  

investigative process.  It is not as if, there is any lack of faith, in  

the Chief Justice of the High Court.  It is also not as if, there is any  

doubt in our mind, about the righteousness of the Chief Justice of  

the High Court.  The issue is that of propriety.  To the credit of the  

Chief Justice of the High Court, we may also observe, that he may  

have  adopted  the  present  procedure,  just  for  the  reasons  

indicated above, namely, to keep himself out of the fact finding  

process, so as to arrive at a fair and just decision.  But that is  

inconsequential.   We  are  accordingly  further  satisfied  in  

concluding,  that  following  the  “in-house  procedure”  strictly  by  

associating the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, would  

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not  serve  the  contemplated  purpose,  insofar  as  the  present  

controversy is concerned.

44. We  have  concluded  hereinabove,  that  it  is  no  longer  

viable,  to strictly follow the “in-house procedure” contemplated  

for sitting judges of the High Court de novo.  That however, does  

not mean, that it is no longer possible to determine the veracity  

of  the  allegations  levelled  by  the  petitioner.   What  procedure  

must be followed in the facts and circumstances of the present  

case, will have to be determined by the Chief Justice of India.  We  

therefore, leave it to the Chief Justice of India, to take a fresh call  

on the matter.  All that needs to be done is, that the role assigned  

to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, in the first stage  

of  the  “in-house  procedure”,  will  now  have  to  be  assigned  to  

some one  other  than  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  concerned  High  

Court.   In taking a decision on the matter,  the Chief Justice of  

India may assign the above role to a Chief Justice, of some other  

High Court.   Or alternatively,  he may himself  assume the said  

role.   The assumption of  the role  by the Chief  Justice of  India  

himself, would not be unrealistic, as the said role is vested with  

the Chief Justice of India, under the “in-house procedure”, with  

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reference to complaints received against Chief  Justices of  High  

Courts.   

45. In  view  of  the  consideration  and  the  findings  recorded  

hereinabove, we may record our general conclusions as under:

(i) The  “in-house  procedure”  framed  by  this  Court,  

consequent upon the decision rendered in C. Ravichandran Iyer’s  

case  (supra)  can  be  adopted,  to  examine  allegations  levelled  

against Judges of High Courts, Chief Justices of High Courts and  

Judges of the Supreme Court of India.

(ii) The  investigative  process  under  the  “in-house  

procedure” takes into consideration the rights of the complainant,  

and that of the concerned judge, by adopting a fair procedure, to  

determine  the  veracity  of  allegations  levelled  against  a  sitting  

Judge.  At the same time, it safeguards the integrity of the judicial  

institution.

(iii) Even  though  the  said  procedure,  should  ordinarily  be  

followed in letter and spirit, the Chief Justice of India, would have  

the authority to mould the same, in the facts and circumstances  

of a given case, to ensure that the investigative process affords  

safeguards, against favouritism, prejudice or bias.   

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(iv) In view of the importance of the “in-house procedure”, it is  

essential  to  bring  it  into  public  domain.   The  Registry  of  the  

Supreme Court of India, is accordingly directed, to place the same  

on the official website of the Supreme Court of India.

46. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, our  

conclusions are as under:

(i) With reference to the “in-house procedure” pertaining to a  

judge of a High Court, the limited authority of the Chief Justice of  

the  concerned  High  Court,  is  to  determine  whether  or  not  a  

deeper probe is  required.   The said determination is  a  part  of  

stage-one (comprising of the first three steps) of the “in-house  

procedure” (elucidated in paragraph 37, hereinabove).  The Chief  

Justice of the High Court, in the present case, traveled beyond the  

determinative authority vested in him, under stage-one of the “in-

house procedure”.

(ii) The Chief Justice of the High Court, by constituting a “two-

Judge  Committee”,  commenced  an  in-depth  probe,  into  the  

allegations levelled by the petitioner.  The procedure adopted by  

the Chief Justice of the High Court, forms a part of the second  

stage  (contemplated  under  steps  four  to  seven  –elucidated  in  

paragraph 37, hereinabove).  The second stage of the “in-house  

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procedure” is to be carried out, under the authority of the Chief  

Justice of India.  The Chief Justice of the High Court by constituting  

a  “two-Judge  Committee”  clearly  traversed  beyond  his  

jurisdictional authority, under the “in-house procedure”.

(iii) In order to ensure, that the investigative process is fair and  

just, it is imperative to divest the concerned judge (against whom  

allegations  have  been  levelled),  of  his  administrative  and  

supervisory authority and control over witnesses, to be produced  

either on behalf of the complainant, or on behalf of the concerned  

judge himself.  The Chief Justice of the High Court is accordingly  

directed  to  divest  respondent  no.3  –  Justice  ‘A’,  of  the  

administrative  and  supervisory  control  vested  in  him,  to  the  

extent expressed above.

(iv) The Chief Justice of the High Court, having assumed a firm  

position,  in  respect  of  certain facts  contained in  the complaint  

filed by the petitioner, ought not to be associated with the “in-

house procedure” in the present case.  In the above view of the  

matter, the Chief Justice of India may reinitiate the investigative  

process, under the “in-house procedure”, by vesting the authority  

required to be discharged by the Chief Justice of the concerned  

High  Court,  to  a  Chief  Justice  of  some  other  High  Court,  or  

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alternatively, the Chief Justice of India may himself assume the  

said role.

47. Liberty  was  sought  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner, to raise all remaining issues raised in the writ petition,  

through a separate petition.  Leave and liberty sought, is granted.  

The instant petition is disposed of, in the above terms.  

……………………………J. (Jagdish  Singh  

Khehar)

……………………………J. (Arun Mishra)

New Delhi; December 18, 2014.

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