REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.2090-2093 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.4161-4164 of 2008

Abdul Rehman & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

K.M. Anees-ul-Haq …Respondent

J U D G E M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  short  question  that  arises  for  determination  in  

these  appeals  is  whether  the  complaint  filed  by  the  

respondent-complainant  against  the  appellants,  alleging  

commission  of  offences  punishable  under  Sections  211,  

500, 109, and 114 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal  

Code, 1860 was barred by the provisions of Section 195 of  1

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The High Court of  

Delhi has, while dismissing the petition under Section 482  

of  the  Cr.P.C.  filed  by  the  appellants  held  that  the  

complaint  in  question  is  not  barred  and  that  the  

Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, committed no error of law  

or  jurisdiction  in  taking  cognizance  of  the  offence  

punishable under Sections 211 and 500 IPC. The appellants  

who happen to be the accused persons in the complaint  

aforementioned  have  assailed  the  said  finding  in  the  

present  appeal  by  special  leave.  The  appellants  contend  

that the bar contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. was attracted  

to the complaint filed by the respondent inasmuch as the  

offence allegedly committed by them was “in relation to the  

proceedings”  in  the  court  which  the  Respondent-

complainant had approached, for the grant of bail and in  

which the court concerned had granted the bail prayed for  

by  him.  What  is  the  true  purport  of  the  expression  “in  

relation  to  any  proceedings  in  any  Court”  appearing  in  

Section  195(1)(b)(i)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  

1973  and  in  particular  whether  the  grant  of  bail  to  the  

respondent in connection with the FIR registered against  

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him would attract the bar contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C is  

all  that falls for  determination.  Before we advert to the  

provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., we may briefly set  

out the facts in the backdrop.   

3. Appellant-Abdul Rehman lodged a complaint with the  

Crime against Women (CAW) Cell, Nanakpura, Moti Bagh,  

New  Delhi,  accusing  the  Respondent-K.M.  Anees-Ul-Haq  

and  four  others  of  commission  of  an  offence  punishable  

under Section 406 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3  

and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  The complainant’s case  

is that the accusations made by the appellant in the report  

lodged  with  the  Women  Cell  were  totally  false  and  

fabricated.  In particular,  allegations regarding demand of  

dowry as a condition precedent for performance of  Nikah  

between the complainant’s nephew and Ms Aliya-appellant  

No.3 in this appeal were also false and unfounded. It was  

on  that  premise  that  the  respondent  filed  a  complaint  

alleging  that  the  appellants  had  instituted  criminal  

proceedings  against  him  without  any  basis  and  falsely  

charged  him  with  commission  of  offences  knowing  that  

there was no just or lawful ground for such proceedings or  3

charge and thereby committed offences punishable under  

Sections 211 and 500 read with Sections 109, 114 and 34  

IPC.  

4. The Metropolitan Magistrate entertained the complaint,  

recorded statements  of  three witnesses  produced by the  

respondent  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  there  was  

sufficient  material  to  show  commission  of  offences  

punishable under Sections 211 and 500 IPC. While doing  

so, the Magistrate placed reliance upon a decision of this  

Court in  M.L. Sethi v.  R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528] to  

hold  that  a  complaint  for  commission  of  an  offence  

punishable under Section 211 IPC is maintainable even at  

the stage of investigation into a First Information Report.

5. Aggrieved  by  the  order  passed  by  the  Metropolitan  

Magistrate,  the  appellant  preferred  a  Criminal  Revision  

before  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  New  Delhi,  who  

dismissed the same as barred by limitation. The appellant  

then preferred a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before  

the High Court of Delhi for quashing complaint No.180/1 of  

2002 pending before  the  Metropolitan  Magistrate  and all  

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proceedings  consequent  thereto.  The High  Court  has,  as  

mentioned above, dismissed the said petition holding that  

since no judicial proceedings were pending in any Court at  

the time when the complaint under Sections 211 and 500  

IPC  was  filed  by  the  respondent-complainant,  the  bar  

contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. was not attracted nor was  

there any illegality in the order passed by the Metropolitan  

Magistrate summoning the appellants to face trial.

6. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  at  

considerable length and perused the order under challenge.  

Section  195  of  the  Cr.P.C.  to  the  extent  the  same  is  

relevant for our purposes may be extracted at this stage:  

“195. Prosecution  for  contempt  of  lawful   authority of public servants, for offences against   public  justice  and  for  offences  relating  to  documents given in evidence.  – (1) No Court shall   take cognizance –

xxx xxx xxx  

xxx xxx xxx  

 (b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following   sections  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of  1860),   namely,  sections 193 to  196 (both inclusive),  199,   200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such   offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in   relation to, any proceeding in any court, or

xxx xxx xxx  

xxx xxx xxx”  5

7. A plain reading of the above would show that there is  

a  legal  bar  to  any  Court  taking  cognizance  of  offences  

punishable under Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199,  

200,  205  to  211  (both  inclusive)  and  228  when  such  

offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation  

to, any proceeding in any Court except on a complaint in  

writing, of that Court or by such officer of the Court as may  

be authorised in  that  behalf,  or  by some other  Court  to  

which that Court is subordinate. That a complaint alleging  

commission  of  an  offence  punishable  under  Section  211  

IPC, “in or in relation to any proceedings in any Court”, is  

maintainable only at the instance of that Court or by an  

officer of that Court authorized in writing for that purpose  

or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate, is  

abundantly  clear  from  the  language  employed  in  the  

provision.  It  is  common  ground  that  the  offence  in  the  

present case is not alleged to have been committed “in any  

proceedings in any Court”. That being so, the question is  

whether the offence alleged against the appellants can be  

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said  to  have  been  committed  “in  relation  to  any  

proceedings in any Court”.   

8. It is not in dispute that upon the filing of the complaint  

by  the  appellants  with  the  CAW  Cell  the  respondent-

complainant had sought an order of anticipatory bail from  

the Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, Delhi, nor is it  

disputed that an order granting bail was indeed passed in  

favour of the respondent.  It is also not in dispute that on  

completion of the investigation into the case lodged by the  

appellants under Section 406 read with Sections 3 and 4 of  

Dowry Prohibition Act, a charge sheet under Section 173  

Cr.P.C. has already been filed before the Court competent  

to try the said offences in which the respondents have been  

released on regular bail on a sum of rupees ten thousand  

with one surety of the like amount. The filing of the charge  

sheet, however, being an event subsequent to the taking of  

cognizance by the Metropolitan Magistrate on the complaint  

filed by the respondent-complainant, the same can have no  

relevance for determining whether cognizance was properly  

taken.  The question all  the same would be whether the  

grant  of  anticipatory  bail  to  the  respondent  by  the  7

Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Karkardooma  Court,  Delhi,  

would  constitute  judicial  proceedings  and,  if  so,  whether  

the offence allegedly committed by the appellants could be  

said  to  have  been  committed  in  relation  to  any  such  

proceedings.  

9. The question whether grant of bail would attract the  

bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. is no longer  

res integra.  In  Badri  v.  State [ILR (1963) 2 All 359] an  

offence punishable under Section 211 IPC was alleged to  

have been committed by the person making a false report  

against the complainant and others to the police.  It  was  

held that the said offence was committed in relation to the  

remand proceedings and the bail proceedings which were  

subsequently  taken  before  the  Magistrate  in  connection  

with that report to the police and, therefore, the case was  

governed by Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and no cognizance  

could be taken except  on a complaint  by the Magistrate  

under Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.  The  

said  decision  came  up  for  consideration  before  a  three-

Judge Bench of this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR  

1967  SC  528],  but  this  Court  left  open  the  question  8

whether remand and bail proceedings before a Magistrate  

would  constitute  proceedings  in  a  Court.   This  Court  

observed:

“We  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  express  any   opinion  whether  the  remand  and  bail  proceedings   before the Magistrate could be held to be proceedings   in a Court, nor need we consider the question whether   the  charge  of  making  of  the  false  report  could  be   rightly held to be in relation to those proceedings.  That   aspect need not detain us, because, in the case before   us, the facts are different.”

10. The  legal  position  regarding  maintainability  of  a  

complaint under Section 211 IPC by reference to a false  

complaint lodged before the police was nevertheless stated  

in the following words:

“Consequently,  until  some  occasion  arises  for  a   Magistrate to make a judicial order in connection with   an investigation of a cognizable offence by the police   no  question  can  arise  of  the  Magistrate  having  the   power  of  filing  a  complaint  under  Section 195(1)(b),   Cr.P.C.   In  such  circumstances,  if  a  private  person,   aggrieved by the information given to the police, files a   complaint for commission of an offence under Section   211, IPC, at any stage before a judicial order has been   made by a Magistrate, there can be no question, on the   date on which cognizance of that complaint is taken by   the Court, of the provisions of Section 195(1)(b) being   attracted,  because,  on that  date,  there  would  be no   proceeding  in  any  Court  in  existence  in  relation  to   which  Section  211,  IPC  can  be  said  to  have  been   committed.  The mere fact that on a report being made   to the police of a cognizable offence, the proceedings   must, at some later stage, and in a judicial order by a   Magistrate,  cannot  therefore,  stand  in  the  way  of  a   

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private complaint being filed and of cognizance being   taken by the Court on its basis.”

11. The  question  regarding  bail  proceedings  before  the  

Court being proceedings in a Court within the meaning of  

Section 195(1)(b)(i) once again fell for consideration before  

this Court in Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal  

[1980 (2) SCC 91].  Kamlapati Trivedi had in that case filed  

a complaint under Sections 147, 448 and 379 IPC against  

six persons including one Satya Narayan Pathak. Warrants  

were  issued  for  the  arrest  of  the  accused,  all  of  whom  

surrendered  before  the  Court  of  Sub-Divisional  Judicial  

Magistrate, Howrah, who passed an order releasing them  

on  bail.  In  due  course  the  police  completed  the  

investigation  and  submitted  a  final  report  under  Section  

173 Cr.P.C. stating that the complaint filed by Shri Trivedi  

was  false.  The  Magistrate  agreed  with  the  report  and  

passed an order discharging the accused.  Sometime after  

the discharge order made by the Magistrate, Mr. Pathak,  

who was  one  of  the  accused persons  of  committing  the  

offence,  filed  a  complaint  before  the  SDJM  accusing  

Kamalapati  Trivedi  of  the  commission  of  offences  

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punishable under Sections 211 and 182 IPC by reasons of  

the latter having lodged with the police a false complaint.  

Trivedi  filed a petition before the High Court  praying for  

quashing of the proceedings before the Magistrate in view  

of the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code.  

That prayer was declined by the High Court who took the  

view that criminal proceedings before the Court became a  

criminal proceeding only when cognizance was taken and  

not before and since no proceeding was pending before the  

Court,  the  provisions  of  Section  195(1)(b)(i)  were  not  

attracted.  In appeal, this Court formulated the following  

two questions:

“33. The points requiring determination therefore are:

“(a) Whether the SDJM acted as a Court when he   passed the orders dated May 6, 1970 and July 31, 1970   or any of them?

(b) If  the  answer  to  question  (a)  is  in  the  affirmative, whether the offence under Section 211 of   the  Indian Penal  Code attributed  to  Trivedi  could  be  regarded as having been committed in relation to the   proceedings culminating in either or both of the said   orders?”

12. Answering the questions in the affirmative this Court  

observed:

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“60. As the order releasing Trivedi on bail and the one   ultimately discharging him of the offence complained of   amount to proceedings before a Court, all that remains   to be seen is whether the offence under Section 211 of   the Indian Penal Code which is the subject-matter of   the complaint against Trivedi can be said to have been   committed “in relation to” those proceedings. Both the   orders resulted directly from the information lodged by   Trivedi  with  the  police  against  Pathak  and  in  this   situation there is no getting out of the conclusion that   the said offence must be regarded as one committed in   relation  to  those  proceedings.  This  requirement  of   clause  (b)  aforementioned  is  also  therefore  fully   satisfied.

61. For the reasons stated, I hold that the complaint   against  Trivedi  is  in  respect of an offence alleged to   have  been  committed  in  relation  to  a  proceeding  in   Court  and  that  in  taking  cognizance  of  it  the  SDJM  acted in contravention of the bar contained in the said   clause (b), as there was no complaint in writing either   of  the  SDJM  or  of  a  superior  Court.  In  the  result,   therefore,  I  accept the appeal  and,  setting aside the   order of the High Court, quash the proceedings taken   by the SDJM against Trivedi.”

13. The above view was reiterated by this Court in State  

of Maharashtra v.  SK. Bannu and Shankar [(1980) 4  

SCC  286].  The  question  in  that  case  was  whether  

prosecution  for  an  offence punishable  under  Section 476  

IPC could be lodged at the instance of a transferee Court in  

a case where the offence was committed in the other Court  

which was earlier dealing with a different stage of the said  

proceedings. Answering the question in the affirmative this  

Court held that the two proceedings namely one in which  

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the offence was committed and the other in which the final  

order  is  made  are,  in  substance,  different  stages  of  the  

same  integrated  judicial  process  and  that  the  offence  

committed in the earlier of the said proceedings can be said  

to be an offence committed in relation to the proceedings  

before  the  Court  to  whom  the  case  was  subsequently  

transferred or the Court which finally tried the case.  It was  

further  held  that  bail  proceedings  before  the  Magistrate  

were  judicial  proceedings  even  though  such  proceedings  

had taken place at a stage when the offence against the  

accused,  who  were  bailed  out,  was  under  police  

investigation.  This Court observed:-

“16…………..This  being  the  real  position,  the  bail   proceedings  before  Shri  Deshpande,  and  the   subsequent  proceedings  before  Shri  Karandikar   commencing with the presentation of the challan by the   police for the prosecution of Deolal Kishan, could not be   viewed  as  distinct  and  different  proceedings  but  as   stages  in  and  parts  of  the  same  judicial  process.   Neither the time-lag between the order of bail and the   challan,  nor  the  fact  that  on  presentation  of  the   challan, the case was not marked to Shri Deshpande   but was transferred under Section 192 of the Code, to   Shri  Karandikar,  would  make  any  difference  to  the   earlier  and  subsequent  proceedings  being  parts  or   stages  of  the  same  integral  whole.  Indeed,  the   commission of the offences under Sections 205, 419,   465, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code, came to light only   when Shri Karandikar, on the basis of the forged surety   bond in question, attempted to procure the attendance   of the accused. If the earlier proceedings before Shri   

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Deshpande and the subsequent proceedings before Shri   Karandikar were stages in or parts of the one and the   same  process  —  as  we  hold  they  were  —  then  it   logically  follows  that  the  aforesaid  offences  could  be   said to have been committed “in or in relation to” the   proceedings in the Court of Shri Karandikar, also, for   the purpose of taking action under Section 476 of the   Code.

21. In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the   bail  proceedings before Shri  Deshpande were  judicial  proceedings before a court, although such proceedings   took  place  at  a  stage  when  the  offence  against  the   accused,  who  was  bailed  out,  was  under  police   investigation.  Thus,  the  facts  in  Nirmaljit  Singh case  (1973) 3 SCC 753 were materially different. The  ratio  of  that  decision,  therefore,  has no application to  the   case before us.

14. Applying  the  above  principles  to  the  case  at  hand,  

there is no gainsaying that the bail proceedings conducted  

by the Court of Additional  Sessions Judge, Karkardooma,  

Delhi, in connection with the case which the appellants had  

lodged  with  CAW Cell  were  judicial  proceedings  and  the  

offence punishable under Section 211 IPC alleged to have  

been  committed  by  the  appellants  related  to  the  said  

proceedings.   Such  being  the  case  the  bar  contained  in  

Section  195  of  the  Cr.P.C.  was  clearly  attracted  to  the  

complaint  filed  by  the  respondent.   The  Metropolitan  

Magistrate and the High Court had both failed to notice the  

decision  of  this  Court  in  Kamlapati  Trivedi’s and  SK.  14

Bannu’s cases  (supra)  and  thereby  fallen  in  error  in  

holding  that  the  complaint  filed  by  the  respondent  was  

maintainable. The High Court appears to have also failed to  

appreciate that the real question that fell for consideration  

before  it  was  whether  the  bail  proceedings  were  

tantamount to judicial proceedings. That question had been  

left open by this Court in M.L Sethi’s case (supra) but was  

squarely answered in  Kamalapati Trivedi’s case (supra).  

Once it is held that bail proceedings amounted to judicial  

proceedings the same being anterior in point of time to the  

taking of cognizance by the Metropolitan Magistrate, there  

is  no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  any  offence  

punishable  under  Section  211  IPC  could  be  taken  

cognizance of only at the instance of the Court in relation to  

whose proceedings the same was committed or who finally  

dealt with that case.  

15. As  noticed  above,  a  charge-sheet  has  already  been  

filed against  the respondent by the CAW Cell  before  the  

Competent Court.  The respondent would, therefore, have a  

right to move the said Court for filing a complaint against  

the appellants for an offence punishable under Section 211  15

IPC or any other offence committed in or in relation to the  

said proceedings at the appropriate stage. It goes without  

saying  that  if  an  application  is  indeed  made  by  the  

respondent to the Court concerned, it is expected to pass  

appropriate  orders  on  the  same  having  regard  to  the  

provisions of Section 340 of the Code. So long as the said  

proceedings  are  pending  before  the  competent  Court  it  

would  neither  be  just  nor  proper  nor  even  legally  

permissible to allow parallel proceedings for prosecution of  

the  appellants  for  the  alleged  commission  of  offence  

punishable under Section 211 IPC.

16. It  was  next  argued  by  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent  that  while  an offence under  Section 211 IPC  

cannot  be  taken  cognizance  of,  there  was  no  room  for  

interfering  with  the  proceedings  in  so  far  as  the  same  

related to the commission of an offence punishable under  

Section 500, since the bar of Section 195 Cr.P.C. was not  

attracted to the proceedings under Section 500 IPC. The  

argument though attractive does not stand closer scrutiny.  

The substance of the case set up by the respondent is that  

the allegations made in the complaint lodged with CAW Cell  16

accusing him of an offence punishable under Section 406  

and Sections 3 and 4 of  the Dowry Prohibition Act were  

false  which  according  to  the  respondent  tantamounts  to  

commission of an offence punishable under Section 211 IPC  

apart from an offence punishable under Section 500 IPC.  

The factual matrix for both the offences is however one and  

the same. Allowing the respondents to continue with the  

prosecution  against  the  appellants  for  the  offence  

punishable under Section 500 IPC would not, in our opinion,  

subserve  the  ends  of  justice  and  may  result  in  the  

appellants getting vexed twice on the same facts. We are  

doubtless conscious of the fact that any complaint under  

Section 500 IPC may become time barred if the complaint  

already lodged is quashed. That is not an insurmountable  

difficult; and can be taken care of by moulding the relief  

suitably.  It  would,  in  our  opinion,  be  appropriate  if  the  

orders  passed  by  the  Metropolitan  Magistrate  and  that  

passed by the High Court are set aside and the complaint  

filed by the respondent directed to be transferred to the  

Court  dealing  with  the  charge  sheet  filed  against  the  

respondent.  The said court shall treat the complaint as an  

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application for filing of a complaint under Section 211 of the  

IPC to be considered and disposed of at the final conclusion  

of the trial; having regard to the provisions of Section 340  

of IPC and the finding regarding guilt or innocence of the  

respondent as the case may be recorded against him. The  

respondent shall also have the liberty to proceed with the  

complaint in so far as the same relates to commission of  

the  offence  punishable  under  Section  500  of  the  IPC  

depending upon whether there is any room for doing so in  

the light of the findings which the court may record at the  

conclusion of the trial against the respondent.   

17. In  the  result  these  appeals  are  allowed,  and  order  

dated  3rd February,  2003  passed  by  the  Metropolitan  

Magistrate and that passed by the High Court dated 26th  

February, 2008 are quashed. Criminal complaint No.180/1  

of 2002 filed by the respondent shall stand transferred to  

the Court of competent jurisdiction seized of the charge-

sheet filed against the respondents, for such orders as the  

Court  may deem fit  at  the conclusion of  the trial  of  the  

respondent having regard to the observations made above.  

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……………………..………J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

……………………..………J. New Delhi (T.S. THAKUR) November 14, 2011

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