A.K.SINGHANIA Vs GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO.LTD.
Bench: CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001692-001718 / 2013
Diary number: 10327 / 2012
Advocates: KAVEETA WADIA Vs
KHAITAN & CO.
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1692-1718 OF 2013 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 2970-2996 OF 2012)
A.K. SINGHANIA … APPELLANT
VERSUS
GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO. LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1719-1725 OF 2013 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 3100-3106 OF 2012)
A.K. SINGHANIA … APPELLANT
VERSUS
GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO. LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1726-1732 OF 2013 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS.984-990 OF 2013)
GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO. LTD. … APPELLANT
VERSUS
VIKRAM PRAKASH & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1733-1759 OF 2013 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 1068-1094 OF 2013)
GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER
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CO. LTD. … APPELLANT
VERSUS
VIKRAM PRAKASH & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
In all these special leave petitions common
question of law and facts arise and, therefore, they
have been heard together and are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
Leave granted.
In all these cases we are concerned with
accused A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash. Several
complaints were filed by Gujarat State Fertilizer
Company against Esslon Synthetics Ltd., its Chairman,
Managing Director and other Directors including
aforesaid A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash alleging
commission of an offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Act’.
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In Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996 the allegations
which are relevant for the decision of these appeals
read as follows:
“3. The accused No. 14 is a Limited Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and are doing business of chemicals, synthetics etc. The accused No. 1 is Managing Director of accused company No. 14 and accused No. 2 is Deputy Managing Director, accused No. 3 is Chairman, accused No. 4 is Whole Time Director, accused No. 5 is Finance Director, accused No. 6 to 12 are the Directors and the accused No. 13 was Senior Manager (Finance) of the accused company No. 14 Esslon Synthetics Ltd.
4. All the business and financial affairs of the accused company No. 14 are decided, organized, administered by accused No. 1 being Managing Director and accused No. 2 being Deputy Managing Director, accused No. 3 Chairman, accused No. 4 Whole Time Director, accused No. 5 Finance Director with consultation of other Directors from accused Nos. 6 to 12 and accused No. 13 was Sr. Manager (Finance) of accused company No. 14. So accused Nos. 1 to 12 and accused No. 13 are also responsible for all the transactions and business affairs done on behalf of accused Company No. 14 and are responsible for all the financial affairs and administration of accused Company No. 14.”
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A.K. Singhania is the accused No. 7 and Vikram
Prakash is accused No. 9 in this complaint.
In Complaint Case No. 1293 of 1996, the
allegations with which we are concerned in these
appeals read as follows:
“4. All the business and financial affairs of the accused company No. 1 are decided, organized, administered by the accused No. 2 being Managing Director and accused No. 3 being Managing Director, accused No. 4 Chairman, accused No. 5 Whole Time Director, accused No. 6 Finance Director with consultation of other Directors from accused Nos. 7 to 13 and accused No. 14 was Sr. Manager (Finance) of accused No. 1. At the time the offence was committed, they were incharge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the accused company. Therefore, they are responsible for day to day affairs and all the transactions and business done on behalf of the accused Company No. 1 and they are also responsible for all the financial affairs and administration of accused company No. 1.”
A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash have been
arrayed as accused Nos. 8 and 10 in this complaint
and in all other complaints, the allegations against
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A.K. Singhania are identical to what have been
alleged in the Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996.
Taking into account the allegations made in the
respective complaints, the learned Magistrate took
cognizance of the offence, issued process to the
accused aforesaid besides other accused to face trial
for commission of the offence under Section 138 of
the Act.
Vikram Prakash, aggrieved by the order issuing
summons to face trial under Section 138 of the Act in
different complaints, filed applications under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for
quashing the order taking cognizance and issuing
process. The applications filed by said Vikram
Prakash were registered as Criminal Miscellaneous
Application Nos. 13393-13399 of 2007. The High Court
by its common order dated January 20, 2012 allowed
all the applications and quashed his prosecution.
While doing so, the High Court held as follows:
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“7.…………It is to be noted that as such there are general allegations and averments against the applicant in the complaints, however there are no specific allegations and averments in the complaint against the applicant with respect to transaction for which the cheques were issued by the accused no. 14 company. Under the circumstance, on the ground that applicant was non Executive Director of the Company on the board of the company, which is not disputed by the complainant, the applicant cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Sections 138 r/w 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and cannot be held vicariously liable for the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused no. 14 company. Under the circumstance, this Court is of opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to quash and set aside the impugned complaint/criminal case qua applicant- original accused no. 9……”
It is this common order which has been assailed
by the Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Ltd. in the
special leave petitions filed by it.
A.K. Singhania also, aggrieved by the order
issuing process under Section 138 of the Act, filed
separate applications for quashing the entire
prosecution including the aforesaid order under
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Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All
the applications filed by A.K. Singhania were taken
together by the High Court for consideration and by
the impugned order the applications filed by him have
been dismissed. While doing so, the High Court
observed as follows:
“9. As the paragraphs of the complaint reproduced in earlier part of decision specifically para 4 and subsequent paragraphs would reveal that the applicant in the capacity of Director was responsible for business affairs and he was in-charge of the Company. Not only that but nowhere it can be said that the applicant was non-Executive Director and even if it is so the said argument is in realm of defence to be decided by Court trying the case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Since sufficient averments attracting of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act are the foundation of the complaint and it is further averred that cheques were issued with mischievous, dishonest intention, knowingly and willingly to cheat the complainant company. Arguments canvassed by learned advocate for the applicant do not require any further deliberation in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code since quashing the complaint would not secure end of justice but would result into miscarriage of justice………..”
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A.K. Singhania, aggrieved by the aforesaid common
order, has preferred these special leave petitions.
Leave granted.
We have heard Mr.Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior
Counsel on behalf of the accused A.K. Singhania and
Mr.Ashok Kr. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of Vikram Prakash whereas the complainant,
Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Ltd. is represented
by Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel. Mr.
Ranjit Kumar appearing on behalf of the accused
submits that necessary averments that at the time the
offence was committed, the accused were in-charge of
and responsible for the conduct of the business of
the company have not been averred, which is sine qua
non for proceeding against the Directors of the
company. He has drawn our attention to the averments
made in the complaints, which we have reproduced in
the preceding paragraphs of this judgment and submits
that mere assertion that these accused persons were
the Directors of the company is not sufficient to
make them liable under Section 141 of the Act. Mr.
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Jayant Bhushan however, submits that there is clear
averment in the complaint that these accused persons
were the Directors of the company and, in fact, in-
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company and, hence, they were rightly
summoned to face the trial. He points out that the
judgment and order of the High Court quashing the
prosecution of accused Vikram Prakash is under
challenge in this batch of appeals and accused A.K.
Singhania cannot take benefit of the said order and
the fate of both the accused shall depend upon the
decision in all these appeals. Mr. Ranjit Kumar
submits that on same set of facts when the
prosecution of the accused Vikram Prakash has been
quashed, there does not seem any justification to
decline the prayer of the accused A.K. Singhania.
In view of rival submissions, we proceed to
consider the exact allegations made against the
accused A.K. Singhania and accused Vikram Prakash.
It is not in dispute that allegations against both
the accused in different complaints are one and the
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same. In Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996, the
allegation is that “all business and financial
affairs of the accused company are decided,
organized, administered by Accused Nos. 1 to 5”. It
has further been alleged that Accused Nos. 1 to 5 do
so with consultation of other Directors namely,
Accused Nos. 6 to 12. In view of aforesaid,
according to the complainant, accused Nos. 1 to 13
are also responsible for all the transactions and
business affairs, financial affairs and
administration done on behalf of the accused company.
It is relevant here to state that A.K. Singhania and
Vikram Prakash are accused Nos. 7 and 9 in this
complaint. The averments made in the complaint
nowhere suggest that these two accused, at the time
the offence was committed, were in-charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company. According to the complainant itself, it was
accused Nos. 1 to 5 who were taking decisions and the
allegation that in taking the decisions they used to
consult these accused also will not mean that these
two accused were at the time the offence was
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committed, were in-charge of and responsible for the
conduct of business of the company. In complaint
Case No. 1293 of 1996 and all other complaints with
which we are concerned in the present appeals the
allegation is that “all business and financial
affairs of the accused company No.1, are decided,
organized, administered by accused Nos. 2 to 6 and in
consultation of other directors i.e. from accused
Nos. 7 to 13”. It has further been averred that at
the time the offence was committed “they were in-
charge and responsible to the company for the conduct
of the business” and, therefore, “they are
responsible for day to day affairs and transaction,
business and all financial affairs of the accused
company.” Mr. Ranjit Kumar submits that the
aforesaid averments are not sufficient and from that
it cannot be inferred that accused A.K. Singhania and
accused Vikram Prakash have been alleged to be
in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company at the time the offence was
committed. He points out that A.K. Singhania is
accused No. 8 whereas accused Vikram Prakash is
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accused No. 10 in these complaints. Mr. Jayant
Bhushan, however, joins issue and submits that the
substance of the accusation clearly indicates that
the two accused were in-charge and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the
time of the offence.
We have perused the complaints and, in fact, the
relevant portions of the allegations have been
reproduced in the foregoing paragraphs of the
judgment. From that it is difficult to infer that
there is any averment that these two accused were
in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company at the time the offence was
committed. The allegations in the complaints in sum
and substance mean that business and financial
affairs of the company used to be decided, organized
and administered by accused Nos. 2 to 6 and while
doing so, other Directors including the two accused
herein were consulted. The inference drawn by the
complainant on that basis that these two accused,
therefore, are in-charge and responsible to the
company for the conduct of its business, is
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absolutely misconceived. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that essential averment in the complaints is
lacking.
In case of offence by company for dishonour of
cheque, the culpability of the Directors has to be
decided with reference to Section 141 of the Act,
same reads as follows:
“141. Offences by companies.-(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case
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may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision
it is evident that every person who at the time the
offence was committed is in charge of and responsible
to the Company shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence under Section 138 of the Act. In the face of
it, will it be necessary to specifically state in the
complaint that the person accused was in charge of
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and responsible for the conduct of the business of
the Company? In our opinion, in the case of offence
by Company, to bring its Directors within the
mischief of Section 138 of the Act, it shall be
necessary to allege that they were in charge of and
responsible to the conduct of the business of the
Company. It is necessary ingredient which would be
sufficient to proceed against such Directors.
However, we may add that as no particular form is
prescribed, it may not be necessary to reproduce the
words of the section. If reading of the complaint
shows and substance of accusation discloses necessary
averments, that would be sufficient to proceed
against such of the Directors and no particular form
is necessary. However, it may not be necessary to
allege and prove that, in fact, such of the Directors
have any specific role in respect of the transaction
leading to issuance of cheque. Section 141 of the
Act makes the Directors in charge and responsible to
Company “for the conduct of the business of the
Company” within the mischief of Section 138 of the
Act and not particular business for which the cheque
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was issued. We cannot read more than what has been
mandated in Section 141 of the Act.
A large number of authorities of this Court have
been cited by the counsel representing the party to
bring home their point. We deem it inexpedient to
refer to all of them. Suffice it to say that this
question has been answered eloquently by a three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, in the following words:
“19. In view of the above discussion, our answers to the questions posed in the reference are as under:
(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in- charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.”
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This Court in the case of National Small
Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal,
(2010) 3 SCC 330, after reviewing all its earlier
judgments summarized the legal position as follows:
“39. From the above discussion, the following principles emerge:
(i) The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction.
(ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened only on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
(iii) Vicarious liability can be inferred against a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made so as to make the accused therein vicariously liable for offence committed by the company along with averments in the petition containing that the accused were in charge of and responsible for the business of the company and by virtue of their
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position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(iv) Vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved and not inferred.
(v) If the accused is a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director then it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(vi) If the accused is a Director or an officer of a company who signed the cheques on behalf of the company then also it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint.
(vii) The person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.”
In Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley,
(2011) 3 SCC 351, after referring to its earlier
decisions in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.(supra), National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd.(supra), N.
Rangachari v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC
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108 and K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48,
this Court reiterated the same view.
We have found on fact that there is no averment
that the two accused herein were in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company at the time the offence was committed.
Hence, there is no essential averment in the
complaints. In view of what we have observed above,
the prosecution of accused A.K. Singhania and accused
Vikram Prakash cannot be allowed to continue.
Accordingly, the order of the High Court quashing the
prosecution of the accused Vikram Prakash is not fit
to be interfered with. For the same reason the order
passed by the High Court declining the prayer of A.K.
Singhania for quashing of the prosecution cannot be
sustained and the appeals preferred by him deserve to
be allowed.
In the result, we dismiss the appeals preferred
by the complainant Gujarat State Fertilizers Company
Ltd. and allow the appeals preferred by A.K.
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Singhania and quash his prosecution in all these
cases.
……………………..………………………………..J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
…….….……….………………………………..J. (KURIAN JOSEPH)
NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 17, 2013
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