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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     Nos.     7601-7602      OF     2012   (Arising out of SLP © No. 26640-26641 of 2011)

Young Men Christian Association … Appellant

Versus

Holy Mother of Aurobindo Ashram  & Ors.     … Respondents

O     R     D     E     R   

RANJAN     GOGOI,     J   

Leave granted.  

2. The order dated 23.9.2009 passed by the High Court of  

Guwahati in a Letters Patent Appeal No. (Writ Appeal No. 18/

(SH)/2005) as well as the order dated 16.6.2011 declining  

the review application filed by the appellant is the subject  

matter of challenge in the present appeal.

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3. In view of the limited notice issued by this Court on  

16.9.2011, at the very outset, we had heard learned counsel  

for the parties as to whether the matter should be remanded  

to the High Court for reconsideration of the LPA, making it  

clear that in the event such a course of action is considered  

to be not feasible or appropriate, the contentions of the  

parties on the merits of the dispute would be considered by  

us. To resolve the aforesaid question a brief recital of the  

core facts will be required.  

4. The respondent No.1 in the present appeal i.e. the Holy  

Mother of Aurobindo Ashram had filed a writ petition before  

the High Court challenging an order dated 8.11.1976  

allotting two plots of lands measuring 0.69 acres i.e. 30,290  

sq. yards and 0.67 acres, i.e. 29,290 sq.yards in favour of  

the Young Women Christian Association and Young Men  

Christian Association impleaded as respondent Nos. 5 and 6  

in the writ petition. The case of the respondent –  writ  

petitioner before the High Court was to the effect that two  

plots of land numbered as plot 5 and 5A included within an  

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estate known as ‘Morven Estate’  was gifted to the  

respondent No. 1 way back in the year 1955. The land in  

question was covered by a lease agreement made in favour  

of the original owner - Shri HL Hadow for a period of 99  

years, w.e.f. 1.9.1865. On expiry of the period of lease, i.e.  

99 years, the Government of Meghlaya, though by order  

dated 2.1.1976, had conveyed its decision to renew the lease  

for another period of 75 years in favour of the respondent  

No.1 –  writ petitioner formal orders in this regard were not  

forthcoming. At the same time by order dated 8.11.1976  

part of the property was allotted to the respondents in  

question. Accordingly, the writ petition was filed challenging  

the aforesaid order dated 8.11.1976 and also seeking  

directions for execution/renewal of the lease deed in favour  

of the respondent – writ petitioner for a further period.

5. By order dated 3.10.2000 a learned Single Judge of the  

High Court allowed the writ petition; the orders impugned  

were set aside and the State of Meghalaya was directed to  

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issue formal orders for execution/renewal of the lease deed  

in favour of the respondent No. 1 – writ petitioner.

In paragraph 23 of the order of learned Single Judge it  

was however observed as:

“23. Before parting with the record, it is made  clear that the possession of the private  respondents over a portion of the land shall not be  disturbed in view of the specific averment made in  the writ petition.”

6. In view of the use of the expression “private  

respondents”  in para 23 of the order of the learned Single  

Judge dated 3.10.2000, the appellant –  YMCA, it is  

contended, had no cause to be aggrieved by the said order.  

However, notwithstanding the directions contained in para 23  

noted above, as interference with the possession of the land  

by the appellant was made Review Petition No. 4 (SH) of  

2002 was filed before the High Court seeking suitable  

clarification of the observations contained in para 23 of the  

order dated 3.10.2000. By order dated 6.1.2004 the learned  

Single Judge clarified that the word “private respondents”  

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mentioned in para 23 meant the respondent – YWCA and no  

other party.

7. The position having been so clarified by the order dated  

6.1.2004 in Review Petition No. 4 (SH) of 2002, Writ Appeal  

No.18/2005 was filed by the appellant challenging both the  

orders passed by the learned Single Judge i.e. order dated  

3.10.2000 in the main writ petition and the order dated  

6.1.2004 passed in Review Petition No. 4 (SH) of 2002.  

Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay  

of three years and 135 days that had occurred in respect of  

the main order dated 3.10.2000 as well as the delay of 61  

days that had occurred with regard to the order dated  

6.1.2004 passed in the review petition was prayed for. In the  

application for condonation of delay it was stated by the  

appellant that it was not aggrieved by the order dated  

3.10.2000 as it stood and it is only after the said order was  

clarified by the subsequent order dated 6.1.2004 that the  

cause of action to file the appeal had arisen.  

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8. Shri Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

appellant, has submitted that a reading of the order dated  

23.9.2009 passed in Writ Appeal No. 18/2005 would go to  

show that the Division Bench of the High Court had no  

occasion to consider the claim of the appellant to the land in  

question on merits. In fact a reading of the said order shows  

that the appeal i.e. Writ Appeal No.18/2005 was construed to  

be against the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the Review  

Petition and the same was disposed of in the above terms.  

Learned counsel has submitted that Writ Appeal No. 18/2005  

being against the main order dated 3.10.2000 as well as the  

order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the Review Petition, in the  

fitness of things, the entire matter ought to be remanded to  

the High Court for due consideration on merits.

9. On the other hand, Shri Sorabjee, learned senior  

counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 has drawn our  

attention to the application for condonation of the delay that  

has occurred in instituting the LPA as well as the order dated  

3.8.2004 condoning the delay. Shri Sorabjee has submitted  

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that the aforesaid application and order clearly demonstrate  

that the appellant had given up its challenge to the main  

order dated 3.10.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge in  

the Writ Petition and had confined its challenge to the order  

dated 6.1.2004 by clearly admitting before the Division  

Bench that it is aggrieved only by the order dated 6.1.2004  

passed in the Review Petition. It is submitted that in view of  

the aforesaid clear and categorical stand taken by the  

appellant there will be no occasion for this Court to remand  

the matter to the High Court for a fresh consideration.

10. We have considered the submissions of the parties and  

have looked into the relevant record referred to in the course  

of the arguments advanced.

11. A reading of the memo of appeal filed by the appellant  

before the High Court clearly shows that what was  

challenged in the appeal is the main order dated 3.10.2000  

passed in the Writ Petition as well as the order dated  

6.1.2004 passed in the Review Petition. What was stated  

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before the Division Bench of the High Court is that the  

appellant had no grievance against the main order dated  

3.10.2000 as it originally stood and the grievance arose only  

after para 23 of the order dated 3.10.2000 was explained in  

the subsequent order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the Review  

Petition. If the above was the stand taken by the appellant, it  

was naturally incumbent on the part of the appellate bench  

to consider the appeal against the main order dated  

3.10.2000 passed in the writ petition as well as the order  

dated 6.1.2004 passed in the Review Petition. A scrutiny of  

the order dated 23.9.2009 passed by the High Court in the  

writ appeal clearly indicates that apart from incidental  

references to the claim of the appellant to the land in  

question, the High Court has proceeded as if the writ appeal  

was directed against the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the  

Review Petition. The said fact being ex facie apparent and  

the same not having been corrected despite the application  

for review filed by the appellant (Review Petition  

No.11/2009), we are of the view that these appeals have to  

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be allowed; the order dated 23.9.2009 should be set aside  

and the matter remanded to the High Court for a fresh  

consideration.

12. We order accordingly and request the High Court to  

restore the writ appeal to its original number and dispose of  

the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a  

period of two months from the date of receipt of this order.  

Naturally, all such questions that may open in law to the  

parties may be urged before the High Court.

...…………………………J. [P. SATHASIVAM]

.........……………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

New Delhi, October 19, 2012.      

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