YOGENDRA YADAV Vs STATE OF JHARKHAND
Bench: RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI,N.V. RAMANA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001205-001205 / 2014
Diary number: 31804 / 2012
Advocates: BANKEY BIHARI SHARMA Vs
ANIL K. JHA
Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1205 OF 2014
Yogendra Yadav & Ors. … Appellants
Vs.
The State of Jharkhand & Anr. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. The appellants are original Accused Nos.1 to 3
respectively in P.S. Meharma Case No.155 of 2004 registered
under Sections 341, 323, 324, 504 and 307 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the IPC’). The FIR
was lodged on 23/09/1994 by complainant Anil Mandal
alleging that the appellants assaulted him and his men on
22/09/2004. On the same day the appellants also filed FIR in
respect of the same incident dated 22/09/2004 alleging that
Page 2
complainant Anil Mandal, Baldev Mandal and others
assaulted them. This FIR was registered at P.S. Meharma
being Case No.156 of 2004 under Sections 147, 148, 149,
448, 341, 323 and 380 of the IPC.
2. In both the cases, after investigation, charge-sheet was
submitted. While the cases were going on before the 2nd
Additional Sessions Judge, Godda, both the parties agreed to
compromise the cases. A Panchayat was held where with
the intervention of the well-wishers a compromise was
arrived at. A compromise petition dated 16/11/2011 was
signed by both the parties and it was filed in the Court of 2nd
Additional Sessions Judge, Godda. An application was filed
under Section 231(2) read with Section 311 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’) being S.C.
No. 9/05 for recalling PWs 1 to 6 for further cross-
examination on the point of compromise.
3. Learned Additional Sessions Judge by his order dated
16/11/2011 disposed of the said application. Learned
2
Page 3
Additional Sessions Judge observed that compromise petition
was signed by the informant and the injured, their signatures
were identified by the lawyers and, therefore, the
compromise was genuine. He, however, observed that
offences under Sections 324, 341, 323 of the IPC are
compoundable with the permission of the court and offences
under Sections 326, 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC are
non-compoundable. He, therefore, accepted the application
in respect of offences under Sections 323, 324 and 341 of
the IPC. The said offences were compounded and the
accused were acquitted of the same. Prayer for
compounding of offences under Sections 326, 307 read with
Section 34 of the IPC was rejected. Learned Additional
Sessions Judge rejected the application for recalling of
witnesses. He directed that the case should proceed against
the accused for offences under Sections 326, 307 read with
Section 34 of the IPC. This order was challenged by the
appellants in the High Court of Jharkhand. By the impugned
order the High Court dismissed the challenge, hence, this
appeal.
3
Page 4
4. Now, the question before this Court is whether this
Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and
307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to
say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be
compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of
compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The
said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab 1 ). However, in a given case, the High
Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its
power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the
fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and
the victim has no objection, even though the offences are
non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can
exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend
on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which
involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder
etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because
that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences
cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two 1 (2012) 10 SCC 303
4
Page 5
groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong
signal to the society. However, when the High Court is
convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature
and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and
where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account
of compromise would bring about peace and would secure
ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such
cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution.
Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time
and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and
obstruct restoration of peace.
5. In Gian Singh this Court has observed that where the
High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to
the fact that the dispute between the offender and the
victim has been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of
criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice
in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is
put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of
5
Page 6
justice being the ultimate guiding factor. Needless to say
that the above observations are applicable to this Court also.
6. Learned counsel for the parties have requested this
Court that the impugned order be set aside as the High
Court has not noticed the correct position in law in regard to
quashing of criminal proceedings when there is a
compromise. Affidavit has been filed in this Court by
complainant-Anil Mandal, who is respondent No. 2 herein. In
the affidavit he has stated that a compromise petition has
been filed in the lower court. It is further stated that he and
the appellants are neighbours, that there is harmonious
relationship between the two sides and that they are living
peacefully. He has further stated that he does not want to
contest the present appeal and he has no grievance against
the appellants. Learned counsel for the parties have
confirmed that the disputes between the parties are settled;
that parties are abiding by the compromise deed and living
peacefully. They have urged that in the circumstances
pending proceedings be quashed. State of Jharkhand has
6
Page 7
further filed an affidavit opposing the compromise. The
affidavit does not persuade us to reject the prayer made by
the appellant and the second respondent for quashing of the
proceedings.
7. In view of the compromise and in view of the legal
position which we have discussed hereinabove, we set aside
the impugned order dated 4/7/2012 and quash the
proceedings in S.C.No.9/05 pending on the file of 2nd
Additional Sessions Judge, Godda. The appeal is disposed of.
…………………………………..J (Ranjana Prakash Desai)
…………………………………..J (N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi; July 21, 2014.
7
Page 8
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1498 OF 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8795 of 2012]
Manohar Singh … Appellant
Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is original Accused No. 3. He was tried
along with his father Hukum Singh – original Accused No. 1
and his mother Prem Bai – original Accused No. 2 by the
Judicial Magistrate, Dewas (Madhya Pradesh) in Crime Case
No. 1680/2009 for offences punishable under Section 498A
Page 9
of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the IPC’) and Section 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Dowry
Act’). By judgment and order dated 29/9/2010 learned
Magistrate acquitted the appellant and the other two
accused. Being aggrieved by this order the State of Madhya
Pradesh preferred appeal in the Sessions Court, Dewas being
Criminal Appeal No.12/2011. The Sessions Court set aside
the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant and two
others under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced them
to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment each and to pay
a fine of Rs.500/- each. For offence under Section 4 of the
Dowry Act each of them was sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-
each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for two
months each.
3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the
accused carried criminal revision to the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh. The High Court by the impugned order set
aside the conviction and sentence of original Accused Nos. 1
9
Page 10
and 2 i.e. the father and mother of the appellant. The
conviction of the appellant was, however, confirmed. His
sentence was reduced to six months and fine of Rs.500/- on
each count. Both the substantive sentences were to run
concurrently. Being aggrieved by this judgment the
appellant filed the present appeal.
4. On 21/1/2013 the appellant sought permission to
implead the complainant i.e. his wife Reena as respondent
No. 2. A statement was made that the appellant was willing
to pay monetary compensation to his wife in lieu of
substantive sentence of imprisonment. Permission to
implead the complainant-wife Reena was granted. The
appellant was directed to deposit Rs.25,000/- as litigation
expenses. Respondent No. 2 was permitted to withdraw the
said amount unconditionally. Subject to deposit, notice was
issued to respondent No. 2 to consider whether the appellant
can be asked to pay some suitable monetary compensation
to respondent No. 2 in lieu of substantive sentence of
imprisonment. On 24/3/2014 counsel for the appellant made
10
Page 11
a statement that the matter is likely to be settled. We
directed respondent No. 2 – wife to remain present in the
Court on 28/3/2014. Accordingly on 28/03/2014 she
remained present in the Court. She stated that if the
appellant pays her Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty
thousand only) as compensation, she is ready to settle the
matter. This Court, therefore, directed the appellant to bring
a demand draft of Rs.2,50,000/- in the name of Reena
(respondent No. 2). This Court noted that the said demand
draft can be given to her in case after hearing the parties
and considering the legal position, this Court permits
settlement at this stage.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant,
learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh and learned
counsel for respondent No. 2. Learned counsel for the
appellant and learned counsel for respondent No. 2 have
requested the Court to show leniency in view of the
settlement. Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh has
opposed this prayer.
11
Page 12
6. Section 498-A of the IPC is non-compoundable. Section
4 of the Dowry Act is also non-compoundable. It is not
necessary to state that non-compoundable offences cannot
be compounded by a Court. While considering the request
for compounding of offences the Court has to strictly follow
the mandate of Section 320 of the Code. It is, therefore, not
possible to permit compounding of offences under Section
498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Act. However, if
there is a genuine compromise between husband and wife,
criminal complaints arising out of matrimonial discord can be
quashed, even if the offences alleged therein are non-
compoundable, because such offences are personal in
nature and do not have repercussions on the society unlike
heinous offences like murder, rape etc. (See Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab 2 ). If the High Court forms an opinion that
it is necessary to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or to secure ends of justice, the
High Court can do so. The inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code is not inhibited by Section 2 (2012) 10 SCC 303
12
Page 13
320 of the Code. Needless to say that this Court can also
follow such a course.
7. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab3, this Court
was dealing with a situation where the accused was charged
for offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, which is
a non-compoundable offence. The parties arrived at a
compromise at the stage of recording of evidence. A
petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing
of the proceedings in view of the compromise. The High
Court refused to quash the proceedings. This Court set aside
the High Court’s order and quashed the proceedings in view
of the compromise. While doing so, this Court laid down
certain guidelines. In Guideline No.(VII), this Court
considered a situation where a conviction is recorded by the
trial court for offence punishable under Section 307 of the
IPC and the matter is at appellate stage. This Court
observed that in such cases, a mere compromise between
the parties would not be a ground to accept the same
3 JT 2014 (4) SC 573
13
Page 14
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been
convicted by the trial court. This Court observed that in such
cases where charge is proved under Section 307 of the IPC
and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime, there
was no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a
crime. The observation of this Court must be read obviously
in the context of a non-compoundable offence under Section
307 of the IPC. It is trite that a non-compoundable offence
cannot be compounded at any stage (See Gyan Singh v.
State of Punjab4). However, a compoundable offence can
be compounded in view of a compromise, if the Court finds it
proper to do so even after conviction if the appeal is
pending.
8. In this case, the appellant is convicted under Section
498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo six months
imprisonment. He is convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry
Act and sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment.
Substantive sentences are to run concurrently. Even though
4 (2012) 10 SCC 303
14
Page 15
the appellant and respondent No. 2-wife have arrived at a
compromise, the order of conviction cannot be quashed on
that ground because the offences involved are non-
compoundable. However, in such a situation if the court
feels that the parties have a real desire to bury the hatchet
in the interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the
accused to the sentence already undergone. Section 498-A
of the IPC does not prescribe any minimum punishment.
Section 4 of the Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment
of six months but proviso thereto states that the Court may,
for adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term
which may be less than six months. Therefore, sentence of
the appellant can be reduced to sentence already undergone
by him.
9. Now the question is whether a case for reduction of
sentence is made out particularly when the appellant has
undergone only seven days sentence out of six months
sentence imposed on him. We see no reason why in this
15
Page 16
case we should not reduce the appellant’s sentence to
sentence already undergone by him. There can be no doubt
about the genuine nature of compromise between the
appellant and respondent No.2-wife. The appellant has
offered to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent No.2-
wife as compensation. A demand draft drawn in the name of
respondent No.2 is brought to the Court. As directed by us
even litigation costs of Rs.25,000/- has been deposited by
the appellant in the Court. Respondent No.2-wife has
appeared in this Court on more than one occasion and
requested this Court to take compromise into consideration
and pass appropriate orders. Learned counsel for the parties
have requested us to take a kindly view of the matter. The
affidavit filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh opposing the
prayer of the parties does not impress us.
10. We must also note that the trial court had acquitted the
appellant. Though the Sessions Court reversed the order
and convicted the appellant for two years, the High Court
reduced the sentence to six months. The appellant and
16
Page 17
respondent No.2 were married in 2007. About seven years
have gone by. Considering all these circumstances, in the
interest of peace and amity, we are of the opinion that the
appellant’s sentence must be reduced to sentence already
undergone by him.
11. In the circumstances, the appeal is partly allowed. The
conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A of the IPC
and under Section 4 of the Dowry Act is maintained but the
sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to sentence
already undergone by him, subject to the condition that the
appellant pays a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty
thousand only) to respondent No.2-wife as compensation.
Impugned order stands modified to the above extent.
12. We must note that a Demand Draft in the sum of
Rs.2,50,000/- drawn in the name of respondent No.2 Reena
has been handed over to her counsel by learned counsel for
the appellant on 18/7/2014.
17
Page 18
13. In view of this, bail bond of the appellant, if any, stands
discharged.
……………………………..J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)
………………………………J. (N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi; July 21, 2014.
18
Page 19
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1169 OF 2014
SATHIYAMOORTHY AND ORS. …Appellants
Versus
STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, MADURAI …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. The appellants who are original Accused Nos. 1 to 6
respectively were tried in the court of Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Madurai in Sessions Case No.444 of 2005 for
various offences under the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the
IPC’) on the allegation that on 11/11/2004 at about 8.00
p.m. when complainant Ayyanar and his son Murugesan
were standing at a common place all the accused came
Page 20
there and formed an unlawful assembly with deadly
weapons. Accused No. 2 unlawfully restrained Murugesan.
Accused No. 1 attacked complainant-Ayyanar with an iron
rod. He also attacked Murugesan with an aruval.
Complainant Ayyanar lodged the FIR.
2. After completion of investigation, the accused were
sent up for trial. At the trial the prosecution examined 16
witnesses. The accused denied the prosecution case.
Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge found
Accused Nos. 1 to 6 guilty under Section 148 of the IPC. He
sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each, in default, to
undergo two months rigorous imprisonment. Accused No. 1
was found guilty under Section 325 of the IPC and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years
and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three months. Accused No. 2 was
found guilty under Section 341 of the IPC and was sentenced
to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment and to pay
20
Page 21
a fine of Rs.200/-, in default, to undergo four weeks rigorous
imprisonment. Accused No. 2 was also found guilty under
Section 325 read with Section 149 of the IPC and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years
and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months. Accused Nos. 3 to 6
were found guilty under Section 325 read with Section 149 of
the IPC. Each of them was sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-
each, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six
months. Substantive sentences were to run concurrently.
3. Being aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence
the appellants-accused preferred an appeal to the High
Court. By the impugned order the High Court partly allowed
the appeal. The order of conviction passed by the trial court
was confirmed. However, the sentence imposed under
Section 325 of the IPC on Accused No. 1, sentence imposed
under Section 325 read with Section 149 of the IPC on
Accused No. 2 and sentence imposed under Section 325
21
Page 22
read with Section 149 of the IPC on Accused Nos. 3 to 6 was
reduced to two years rigorous imprisonment instead of three
years rigorous imprisonment. Rest of the order of the trial
court was confirmed. Being aggrieved by the judgment and
order, the appellants-accused have filed the present appeal.
4. During the pendency of the appeal on 25/04/2014
victim-Murugesan remained present in this Court. He had
filed an application for impleadment which was granted. He
stated that he would like to compound the offences. That
statement was recorded and the matter was adjourned to
consider the prayer. An application has been filed by the
appellants praying that offences may be permitted to be
compounded. It is stated in the application that victim
Murugesan and the accused are cousins and they have
decided to settle the disputes amicably. It is further stated
that pursuant to this decision the accused have paid a
reasonable amount to victim Murugesan as per the decision
of family elders and they have entered into an amicable
settlement in their village much before the accused
22
Page 23
surrendered as per the orders of this Court. A copy of the
statement of victim Murugesan dated 30/9/2012 stating that
he has entered into a compromise with the accused is
annexed to the application.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants-
accused, Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General (AC)
and learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu. They
confirmed that parties have entered into a compromise.
They submitted that in view of the settlement, this Court
may compound the offences as that will accord a quietus to
all disputes between the parties. Counsel submitted that the
accused and the complainant are cousins. After the
compromise they have been staying peacefully in the
village. It is in the interest of both sides to bury the hatchet
and lead a peaceful life.
6. Offences under Sections 341 and 325 are
compoundable. In view of the settlement they can be
permitted to be compounded. However, offences under
23
Page 24
Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC are not compoundable.
Hence, permission to compound them cannot be granted.
However, since the accused and the victim have entered into
a compromise, we feel that it would be in the interest of both
sides to reduce the sentence awarded to the accused under
Sections 325 and 341 of the IPC to the sentence already
undergone.
7. In Ram Lal and anr. v. State of J & K 5 the
accused were convicted for offence under Section 326 of the
IPC, which is non-compoundable. Looking to the fact that
the parties had arrived at a settlement and victim had no
grievance, this Court reduced the sentence for the offence
under Section 326 to sentence already undergone by the
appellants-accused. We are inclined to follow similar course.
8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The offences
under Sections 341 and 325 of the IPC, for which the
appellants are convicted, are permitted to be compounded
5 (1999) 2 SCC 213
24
Page 25
because they are compoundable. The appellants are
acquitted of the said offences. The appellants are stated to
have undergone more than six months imprisonment. So far
as offences under Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC are
concerned, the conviction of the appellants for the said
offences is reduced to the sentence already undergone by
them subject to the appellants paying Rs.30,000/- as
compensation to victim-Murugesan. Compensation be paid
within three months from the date of this judgment.
9. This Court has already released the appellants on bail.
In view of this order the bail bonds of the appellants are
discharged subject to payment of compensation of
Rs.30,000/- as directed by us. If compensation is not paid
consequences will follow.
………………………………J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)
………………………………J. (N.V. Ramana)
New Delhi;
25
Page 26
July 21, 2014.
26