IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 385­386 OF 2008    

YASHWANT ETC.           …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA        …

RESPONDENT(S)

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 299 OF 2008    

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 387­388 OF 2008    

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 182­187 OF 2009    

J UDGMENT

N. V. RAMANA, J.    

“With great power comes greater responsibility”

1. At the outset it is important to note that our police force need

to develop and recognize the concept of ‘democratic policing’,

wherein crime control is not the only end, but the means to

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REPORTABLE

achieve this order is also equally important. Further the turn

of events in this case obligates us to re­iterate herein that ‘be

you ever so high, the law is always above you!’

2. These criminal appeals are filed against the impugned

common order and judgment, dated 13.12.2007, passed by

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in

Criminal Appeal Nos. 393, 394, 395, 397, 419 and 420 of

1995.  As the incident is same and  contentions canvassed

individually, being similar, we proposed to deal with the

judgment through this common order.

3. The prosecution’s case in brief are that on 23.06.1993, Police

Inspector (P.I) Narule (A­1) was on duty,  when one head

constable Telgudiya (PW­48), working at the concerned Police

Station, Deolapar came to P.I Narule (A­1)  accompanied by

three persons namely Ganeshprasad, Arunkumar and

Kashiram. They informed P.I Narule (A­1) that they  were

staying at India Sun Hotel and were looted eight days before.

It may be relevant that they informed P.I Narule (A­1)  that

they had not lodged any complaint concerning the incident.  

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4. On that night , the accused patrolling party which included

P.I Narule (A­1), Assistant Police Inspector Yashwant Mukaji

Karade (A­2), Sub­Inspector Rambhau Vitthalrao Kadu (A­3),

Police constables Jahiruddin  Bashirmiya  Deshmukh (A­4),

Nilkanth Pandurang Chaurpagar (A­5), Namdeo Nathuji

Ganeshkar (A­6), Ramesh Tukaram Bhoyar (A­7), Ashok

Bhawani Gulam Shukla (A­8), Sudhakar Marotrao Thakre (A­

9) and Raghunath Barkuji Bhakte (A­10), along with

Ganeshprasad, Arunkumar and Kashiram, went to the house

of H.C.P Telgudiya (PW­48) at Police Lines, Ajni. In the

meanwhile, H.C.P Telgudiya (PW­48) is supposed to have

found out that a Christian male by the name of ‘Anthony’ was

responsible for the looting. Although, the  H.C.P Telgudiya

(PW­48) confirmed  that there  was  no ‘Anthony’,  but  he is

supposed to have revealed that one Joinus (deceased)  lives

nearby, who was a known suspect from earlier robbery case.

H.C.P. Telgudiya, took the police party to the residential

quarters  of  Joinus (deceased),  who had already slept  after

having his dinner and consuming some alcohol.  

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5. It was around 1:00 AM in the night, the police party reached

the house of Joinus (deceased). He was taken into custody

and his residential quarters were searched. It is alleged that

during this process, some of the police men are supposed to

have molested Zarina (PW­1), wife of Joinus (deceased).

Thereafter, the police party tied Joinus (deceased) to an

electric pole outside and was beaten by the police personnel

with sticks. Later Joinus (deceased) and  his other family

members were taken to various locations including Rani

Kothi,  Hill Top restaurant  wherein  he  was given  beatings

intermittently. At about 3:55 AM he was brought back to the

police Station, wherein he was locked­up with two other cell

mates.  

6. In the  morning  of  24.06.1993 at  7:30 AM,  on duty  police

constables found Joinus (deceased) to be motionless and on

examination he was found to be not breathing. Meanwhile,

Magistrate was requested to conduct an inquest and

chemical analysis. The case was handed over to the State CID

for investigation into the  matter.  A complaint came to  be

registered against one Anthony, being Crime No. 238/1993

under Section 420 of IPC at 10:20 PM on 24.06.1993 after

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the death of Joinus. Thereafter, post­mortem was conducted,

and investigation was conducted by P.I. Oza. After requisite

sanction was granted by the Government for prosecuting the

accused, the investigating officer laid charges against ten

erring officers in the following manner­ 1.) That you  all the accused on  23.06.1993  at about 23.00 hours made an entry in  the Movement  Register  of Crime Branch at Sr. No. 26 that you left the Crime Branch Office for Night Patrolling and thereafter along with Ganeshprasad Thakur, Arunkumar Gupta, Kashiram Barethia, Head Constable Madhorao Tenguriya drove in the police  van Bearing No.  MH­12/9887 and  forcibly  entered the house of the deceased Joinus Adam Yelamati at about 00.45 hours on 24.06.1993. The deceased was wearing his underwear and banian and was sleeping in his house. You all the accused  in  furtherance of  your common  intention pulled the deceased out of his house and took him on the road and tied him to the electric pole with a rope and he was given merciless beating with the stick.  The deceased was made to sit in the said Crime Branch Vehicle and he was brought to the office of Crime Branch. You made him naked and also gave a heavy beating to the deceased with the stick in the Crime Branch office. At that time you all were aware  that  such merciless beating would cause the death of the deceased. You kept him in the lock up at about 3.55 a.m. without registering any offence in the Crime Branch. In the morning, the deceased found dead. You did commit murder of Joinus Adam Yellamati and thereby you all committed an offence punishable u/s. 302 r/w. Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.  2.) Secondly, that you all the accused in furtherance of your common intention entered the house of deceased Joinus Adam Yellamati at about 00.45 hours on 24.06.1993 and pretended to take the personal search of the wife of the deceased namely  Zarina  and under the  pretext  of taking search, touched the breasts of Zarina. Thereafter, you made her to sit in your police van and also took pinches on her body with an intention to outrage her modesty. Thereafter, she was brought to your Crime branch office and you inserted your hand in the petticoat of Zarina with an intention to outrage her modesty and by such assault you

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all thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 354 r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my Cognizance. 3.) Thirdly, that you all the accused in furtherance of your common intention, wrongfully confined two children of the deceased namely Kumari Stenlos aged 10 years and boy Jorge aged 8 years and the brother of Zarina by  name Richard Abraham, aged 19 years and another cousin brother by name Stenly Patrik, aged 19 years and thereby committed an offence  punishable  u/s.  342 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance. 4.) Fourthly, that you all the accused in furtherance of your common  intention,  on the aforesaid day,  date, time and place, voluntarily caused hurt to Joinus Adam Yellamati, aged 42 years and Zarina w/o Joinus Yellamati for the purpose of extorting from the said Joinus Yellamati and Zarina w/o Joinus Yellamati certain information which might lead to detection of offence of cheating committed at Hotel “India Sun”, Nagpur, in respect of one Ganeshprasad Babulal  Thakur  and one  Arunkumar  Gupta  and  thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 330 r/w Sec 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.  5.) Fifthly, that you  all the  accused in furtherance  of your common intention on the aforesaid day, date, time and place, assaulted  Joinus  Adam Yellamati and  Zarina  w/o Joinus  Yellamati, intending  by such  assault to  dishonor said Joinus Adam Yellamati and Zarina w/o Joinus Yellamati and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 355 r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.

7. All the accused  pleaded  not guilty and claimed trial. The

Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 416 of 1993, by order

dated 22.09.1995, passed following order­

ACCUSED  SECTION PUNISHMENT/ACQUITTAL

Accused No. 1­10

302 of IPC Acquitted

Accused No. 1­10

330 r/w. 34 of IPC

Each of them was convicted to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/­, in default three months further rigorous imprisonment.

Accused 354 r/w. 34 Each of them was convicted to suffer

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No. 1­10 of IPC rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/­, in default three months further rigorous imprisonment.

Accused No. 1­10

355 r/w. 34 of IPC

Each of them was convicted to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/­, in default one month further rigorous imprisonment.

Accused No. 1­10

342 r/w. 34 of IPC

Each of them was convicted to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/­, in default one month further rigorous imprisonment.

The sentence was ordered to run concurrently.

8. The reasons provided by the trial court for the

acquittal/conviction in short, are as follows­ i. That reliance is placed on the evidence of Dr.

Kewalia/PW­49 (Ex. 296), to conclude that there was a possibility of death of the deceased, may have been due to asphyxiation.

ii. That the post mortem report or the medical evidence clearly indicates that the injuries in the Column No. 17 did not correlate with the asphyxial death.

iii. That the injuries sustained simple injuries and were not sufficient to cause death of an individual.

iv. That the presence of the accused­officers are admitted and the same cannot be dislodged as the same is proved by the movement register.

v. From the conspectus of other evidence it  was clear that injuries were caused by the police officer to extract information, which would squarely fall under the four corners of Section 330 of IPC.

9. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, accused­Bhaskar [A­

1], Yashwant [A­2], Raghunath [A­10]) filed Criminal Appeal

No. 393 of 1995, Jahiruddin [A­4], Nilkanth [A­5] and

Namdeo [A­6] filed Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1995, Ramesh

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[A­7],  Ashok Bhavani  Gulam Shukla  [A­8],  Sudhakar [A­9]

filed Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 1995, Rambhau [A­3] filed

Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 1995, before the High Court. On

the other hand, State of  Maharashtra also filed  Criminal

Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 419 of  1995 against the

judgment of acquittal and Criminal Appeal No. 420 of 1995

for enhancement of sentence.

10. By order  dated  13.12.2007, the  High Court  dismissed the

appeal preferred by the State being Criminal Appeal No (s).

419 and 420 of 1995, but partly allowed the appeals

preferred by the accused officer by acquitting accused no. 1

to 9 of the offences punishable under Sections 354, 355, 342

read with 34 of  IPC, however, upheld the conviction under

Section 330 of IPC. Moreover, Raghunath Barkuji Bhakte (A­

10) was acquitted of all the offences. The High Court passed

the aforesaid order on the following grounds­ i. That the injuries to the deceased are established by

the Post­mortem report, corroborated by the photographs taken during the investigation.

ii. That the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death was not result of the injuries sustained by the accused, should enure to the accused appellants herein.

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iii. Even  though  there  are  many discrepancies in the evidence of PW­1 [Zarina], the court separated the falsehood from the truth.

iv. That offence under Section 355 of IPC is not proved beyond reasonable doubt as there are stark discrepancies in this regard.

v. That the accused A­10’s presence is not proved and the benefit of doubt needs to be given to him, thereby mandating his acquittal.

11. Still  aggrieved by  the High Court  order,  accused­Yashwant

[A­2] and  Bhaskar [A­1] filed  Criminal  Appeal  No. 385 of

2008, Rambhau [A­3] filed Criminal Appeal No. 386 of 2008,

Jahiruddin [A­4], Nilkanth [A­5] and Namdeo [A­6] filed

Criminal Appeal No. 387 of 2008, Ramesh [A­7] and Ashok

Bhavani Gulam Shukla [A­8] filed Criminal Appeal No. 388 of

2008, Sudhakar [A­9] filed a  Criminal Appeal  No. 299 of

2008, State of Maharashtra filed Criminal Appeals No. 182­

187 of  2009. This Court  by order dated 22.02.2008, while

issuing notice in these cases, the appellant­accused were also

issued  show cause  notice for enhancement  of sentence. It

may not be out of context to note that accused A­1 is said to

have passed away after filing of these appeals, accordingly,

the name of accused A­1 was struck off and the conviction

against him stands abated.

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12.  When the matter was argued, learned senior counsel, Mr. R.

Basant and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, together contended that­ a. That the  concurrent  opinion of the  court  below,  w.r.t

non applicability of Section  302  of IPC,  need  not be disturbed.

b. The defence of superior orders were applicable  for the other accused subordinate officers.

c. That in any case the charge under Section 330 of IPC could have been attracted in this case.

d. In alternative,  he pleads that only Section 323 of  IPC may be maintainable which would suffice a punishment of the period already undergone.

e. In any case they plead that acquittal of Accused A­10 should not be interfered with.

13. On the other hand, Mr. Nishant Ramakantrao

Katneshwarkar, leaned counsel for the State of Maharashtra

has brought to our notice that the evidence of PW­49, who

has categorically stated that the effect of death was the

cumulative effect of the injuries caused. Further, it is

contended that the number of injuries are sufficient to prove

the causal connection. In the end, the State has argued that

the custodial torture needs to be taken seriously and

punished appropriately. Alternatively, State seeks to press for

charges under Section 304 Part II of IPC, in case Section 302

of IPC is not made out.

14. Having heard learned counsels for both the parties and

perusing the documents on record, we are of the opinion that

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we need to address only four questions herein, as the High

Court has sufficiently considered other questions, which we

need  not interfere  with. The first question is  whether the

incident narrated above amounted to murder so as to attract

Section 302 of IPC?

15. A brief  narration of  background facts may be necessary to

understand the circumstances in which this contention

arose. That it has been established by PW­21 (Kishan

Khadode), that the lock­up in which Joinus (deceased) was

found  was suffocating, dirty and bottle guard seeds  were

found vomited in the place where the body of the deceased

was found. PW­49 (Dr. Kewaliya), the doctor who conducted

post­mortem, opines that the cause of death  was due to

asphyxia,  as there  were indications for the same  such as

defecation,  urethra discharge etc.  Even though PW­49 was

not subjected to detailed cross­examination on the aspect of

choking due to vomiting, However, the doctor does accept the

possibility of asphyxiation due to such choking from the

contents of vomit. The other circumstance was that the

deceased was found to be in an inebriated condition, which

as per the medical evidence decreases the resistance to

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stress. Moreover, it is on record that the deceased was earlier

suffering from Tuberculosis.  

16. It is a matter of record that both the courts below have taken

a concurrent view that the crime  narrated above did not

amount to culpable homicide as the cause of death  was

asphyxiation and there was nothing on record to prove that

the injuries were the cause of the death. It is well settled that

in order to be called a  murder, it needs to be culpable

homicide in the first  place, that is to  say all  murders are

culpable homicides,  but the vice versa may not true in all

cases. Therefore,  we need to ascertain  whether a case of

culpable homicide is made out herein in the first place. In

this context,  we need to observe Section 299 of IPC at the

outset­

299. Culpable homicide.—  Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he  is  likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

(emphasis supplied)

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17. As noted above, causation is an important ingredient to

determine as to whether a person commits culpable homicide

in the first place. Causation simply means “causal

relationship between conduct and result”. In this respect we

need to assess whether the contentions of the parties could

stand the scrutiny of the law of the land. Section 299 of IPC

indicates two types of causations, one the factual causation

and the second the  legal  causation.  Coming to the  factual

causation, it is a matter of fact as to whether the action of the

accused caused death of the person. But the second aspect

concerns itself, whether the death can be sufficiently imputed

to the accused’s action as being responsible legally. In our

considered opinion this case turns on the second leg of

causal relationship wherein, could the injuries caused by the

police officers be sufficiently imputed to be the cause of death

of Joinus herein?

18. It is settled under common law wherein the principle of ‘take

their victim as they find them’ is followed,1 meaning ‘A person

who does any act/omission which hastens the death of

another person who, when the act is done or the omission is

1 R v Blaue, [1975] 3 All ER 446 (CA)

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made,  is labouring under some disorder  or disease arising

from another cause, is deemed to have killed that other

person.’   This principle has been expressly ingrained under

the Explanation 1 to the Section 299 of IPC. Without going

into details on this aspect as this is not a case of multiple

causation requiring us to consider the same, rather it is a

case wherein the deceased died of asphyxiation due to

contents of  his  vomit,  hours  later  from the time when the

injury was inflicted, which is an independent reason for

cause of death herein.   

19. As elucidated above, various other circumstances which dis­

associate the cause of death to the actions of the appellant

officers are available. It is on record that the injuries noted in

the  post­mortem report clearly indicate that the  nature  of

these injuries were not grievous. The head injury noted does

not show any internal fracture to the skull bone. Therefore,

when, on facts, it is concurrently inferred by the courts below

that the cause of death was due to asphyxiation, we do not

see  any reasons for  accepting  a  different factual inference

herein, as the same is not perverse.  

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20. Further, we agree with the reasoning of the High Court on the

aspect that the PW­1 (Zarina) has not been completely honest

in her statements. She has at times deposed over­zealously,

thereby mandating us to be cautious in accepting her

evidence. Further no witness has clearly deposed on the

aspect of injuries and how they happened to be, except for

blank statements that  ‘beatings were given to the deceased

Joinus’. Further we may note that the surrounding

circumstances also strengthen our conclusions such as

firstly, the condition of the deceased was said to be good as

per the statements of PW­21 (cell­inmate) and PW­42 (head

constable) although he was suffering from tuberculosis, when

he was admitted in the lock­up. Secondly, Joinus (deceased)

was heavily inebriated when he was arrested and thirdly, the

aspect of asphyxiation which is a significant cause to break

the chain of causal link between the death of Joinus and the

injuries inflicted by the appellants herein.

21. As discussed above, the causal link between the injuries

caused to the deceased by the erring officers and the death is

not connected, therefore, Section 299 of IPC is not attracted.

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Accordingly, there is no question of attracting Section 302 or

304 of IPC.

22. In any case this Court in catena of cases has taken a view

that, as regards the inference of facts, when two Courts have

acquitted the accused­appellant of charges under Section 302

of IPC, then it would not be appropriate upon this Court to

overturn the factual finding,  unless the  view taken by  the

lower courts is shown to be highly unlikely or unreasonable

or perverse. Although the learned counsel for the State has

tried to argue that the cumulative effect of the injuries was

responsible for the death, but the medical evidence itself, on

the other hand affirms the high possibility of death due to

asphyxiation. Further there is no material brought before us

to portray that the courts below had taken a perverse view. In

this light, when two reasonable views are possible, then

reversal of concurrent acquittal would not be appropriate

herein [refer  Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4

SCC 415;  Mahtab Singh v.  State of  U.P, (2009)  13 SCC

670].

23. It  may  not be out of context to note that it is generally

difficult to prosecute the custodial torture cases as the 16

evidence available on record may not sufficient. It is in this

context that Law Commission in its 113th Report published in

1985 had  recommended  inclusion of  Section 114­B  to the

Evidence  Act,  but the  same was  never  materialized  into  a

statutory law.   Further this Court in  State of M.P. v.

Shyamsunder Trivedi, 1995 (4) SCC 262, appealed to the

Parliament for considering such amendment.  

24. The Second question is with respect to the defence of

superior order or infamously known as ‘Nuremburg defence’

pleaded by the accused­appellants (subordinate officers). The

earliest known example, wherein such defence was pleaded

was before an international ad hoc tribunal, can be traced to

the trial of Peter Von Hagenbach for occupation of Breisach

on the orders of Duke of Burgundy in the year 1474.2 We are

aware of the fact that IPC allows such a defence if conditions

provided under Section 76 of IPC are fulfilled. A three­Judge

Bench of this Court in  State of  West Bengal v. Shew

Mangal Singh and Ors.,  AIR 1981 SC 1917, observed as

under­

2 Y. Dinstein, “The Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders in International Law”, Leyden,  1965.

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Section 76 of the Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who  by reason  of a  mistake of fact and  not  by reason of a mistake of  law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law, to do it. The illustration to that  section  says that if  a  soldier fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the  law,  he commits no offence. The occasion to apply the provisions of the section does not arise in the instant case since the question as to whether the accused believed in good faith on account of a mistake of fact that he was bound by law to do the act which is alleged to constitute an offence, would arise only if, to the extent relevant in this case, the order  or command  of the superior officer is  not justified or is otherwise unlawful.

25. It is a matter of record that accused A­1 has passed away and

the matter  against  him stands abated.  The other accused­

appellants, with a view to take advantage of this situation, as

an after­thought have pleaded herein the defence that they

were  merely executing the orders of accused  A­1. At the

outset we may indicate that it is not merely that the accused­

appellants have to prove that they have followed the order of

the superior officer  (accused A­1), rather they need to also

prove to the Court that the aforesaid appellants  bonafidely

believed that the orders  issued by accused A­1 were  legal.

However, our attention was not drawn to any argument

before the courts or evidence on record to this effect that the

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accused­appellants were merely acting on the orders of their

superiors on a bonafide belief that such orders were legal. It

was not even their case from the beginning that the accused­

appellants were not aware of facts and circumstances, rather

all of them started out as a investigation party  with full

knowledge and participation. On the perusal of the record, we

may note that this argument is only taken before this court,

to seek  a re­trial and  such  attempt cannot  be taken into

consideration herein.

26. The third question concerns about the acquittal of Accused

A­10 (Raghunath Bhakte). It would be necessary to deal with

the individual liability of accused A­10, as he states that he

was not present with the investigation party. Although some

evidence points to his presence with the investigation party,

but the fact remains that all the other accused have

unanimously stated that A­10 did not accompany them as he

fell sick during the investigation and accordingly, went home.

We need to examine the liability of accused A­10, with the

above premise in mind.

27. It  is wrought in our criminal  law tradition that the Courts

have the responsibility to separate chaff from the husk and

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dredge out truth. It may not be out of context to note that the

legal maxim ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’  is not

applicable in India, thereby the courts are mandated to

separate truth from  falsehood. [refer  Kulwinder  Singh  v.

State of Punjab,  (2007) 10 SCC 455; Ganesh v. State of

Karnataka,  (2008)  17  SCC 152;  Jayaseelan v.  State  of

Tamil Nadu, (2009) 12 SCC 275] It is not uncommon that in

some cases witnesses in the jealousness to see all the

accused get conviction, may stretch the facts or twist them.

In those instances, it is necessary for the Courts to be

cautious enough to not ‘rush to convict’ rather uphold

justice. It is clear from the statements of all the accused as

well as the evidence of PW­41 (Driver Vijay Thengde), PW­48

(HC Telgudiya) and PW­66 (I.O Dy. SP. Godbole) that there

exists a reasonable doubt as to the presence of A­10, during

the patrolling party and thereafter. Therefore,  we are not

inclined to  disturb the findings  of the  High Court  on  this

aspect as well.

28. The fourth question, which we need to consider, concerns the

punishment under Section 330 of IPC. At the outset, we need

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to state that we do not find any material on record to interfere

with the conviction of the accused under the aforesaid

Section,  except  for the quantum of  punishment,  which we

need to determine.

29. Recently, this Bench in  State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal

and Anr3, following  Soman v. State of Kerala,  (2013) 11

SCC 382 and  Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of

Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648 observed as under­

From the aforementioned observations,  it  is clear that the principle governing the imposition of punishment will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the sentence should be appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances have to be borne in mind while imposing the sentence. The Court cannot afford to be casual while imposing the sentence, inasmuch as both the crime and the criminal  are  equally important in the  sentencing process. The Courts must see that the public does not lose confidence in the judicial system. Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice system and may lead to a state where the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and resorts to private vengeance.

3 Criminal Appeal No. 959 of 2018

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30. From the facts portrayed it is clear that the police knew the

identity of the deceased was different from the person, they

wanted to investigate initially. The  manner in which the

deceased and his  family members were taken into custody

reflects pure act of lawlessness and does not befit the

conduct of the Police. The High Court of Lahore in  Lal

Mohammad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 Lah 471, had observed

that there was a requirement to treat the crime under Section

330 with stringent punishments in order to have deterrent

effect, in the following manner­

In  my opinion,  however, conduct  of this  sort  by responsible police officers engaged in the investigation of a crime, is one of the most serious offences known to the law. The result of third degree methods or of actual torture or beating such as in this case  must be that innocent persons might  well be convicted, confession  being forced from them which are false. In almost every case in which a confession is recorded, in criminal Courts, it is  alleged  by the  defence that the  police  have resorted to methods such as these.  It is  seldom, however, that an offence of this nature is or can be proved. It clearly is the duty of the Courts when a case of this kind is proved to pass sentences which may have a deterrent effect.

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31. In  Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes  (27th Ed.), the

author while discussing the sentencing under Section 330 of

IPC notes as under­ The causing of hurt by a responsible police officer  engaged  in investigation of  a  crime  is one of the most serious offences known to law and deterrent  punishment  should  be inflicted on the offender.

(emphasis supplied)

32. The factual narration of the events portrayed herein narrate a

spiteful events of police excessiveness. The motive to falsely

implicate Joinus for a crime he was alien to was not befitting

the police officers investigating crimes. The manner in which

Joinus was taken during late night from his house for

investigation ignores the basic rights this country has

guaranteed its citizen. It is on record that injuries caused to

the individual were in furtherance of extracting a confession.

The  mala fide  intention of the officers­accused to undertake

such action are writ large from the above narration, which

does not require further elaboration.  

33. As the police in this case are the violators of law, who had the

primary responsibility to protect and  uphold law, thereby

mandating the punishment for such violation to be

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proportionately stringent so as to have effective deterrent

effect and instill confidence in the society. It may not be out

of  context to remind  that the  motto  of  Maharashtra  State

Police is "Sadrakshnāya Khalanīghrahanāya" (Sanskrit: "To

protect good and to Punish evil"), which needs to be

respected. Those, who are called upon to administer the

criminal law, must bear, in mind, that they have a duty not

merely to the individual accused before them, but also to the

State and to the community at large. Such incidents involving

police usually tend to deplete the confidence in our criminal

justice system  much  more than those incidents involving

private  individuals. We must additionally  factor this aspect

while imposing an appropriate  punishment to the  accused

herein.

34. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the punishment

of three­year imprisonment imposed by the Trial Court under

Section  330 of IPC,  would  be  grossly insufficient  and dis­

proportional. We deem it appropriate to increase the term of

sentence to maximum imposable period under Section 330 of

IPC i.e., seven years of rigorous imprisonment, while

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maintaining the fine imposed by the Trial Court. Accordingly,

we modify the sentence to this limited extent.

35. In light of the afore­said discussion, we partly allow the

Criminal  Appeal  Nos.  182­187 of  2009  in the  afore­stated

terms. Further Criminal Appeal Nos. 385­386 of 2008,

Criminal Appeal Nos. 387­388 of 2008, Criminal Appeal No.

299 of 2008 stand dismissed.

36. The appellants­accused are directed to surrender before the

authorities for serving out the rest of the sentence forthwith.

........................J.                            (N.V. RAMANA)

                      ........................J.         (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)

New Delhi, September 04, 2018   

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