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     REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS  .  4412 -4413     OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.28437-28438 of 2015]

Sri Y.P. Sudhanva Reddy & Ors.        .. Appellant(s)

Versus

The Chairman And Managing  Director, Karnataka Milk  Federation Etc.                           .. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) These  appeals  are  filed  against  the  final

judgment and order dated 16.12.2014 passed by the

High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bengaluru  in  Regular

First Appeal No. 2096 of 2012 C/W RFA. CROB. No.

27 of  2013 whereby the  High Court  dismissed the

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Regular  First  Appeal  filed by the  appellants herein

and  allowed  the  CROB.  No.27  of  2013  and  the

application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 read with

Section  151  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Code”)  filed  by  the

Respondent and set aside the findings recorded by

the  Trial  Court  on  Issue  No.1  that  the  appellants

(plaintiffs) are the absolute owners of the Schedule ‘A’

and “B’ property.  

3) In order to appreciate the issue involved in the

appeals,  few  relevant  facts  need  to  be   mentioned

infra.

4) The  appellants  are  the  plaintiffs  whereas  the

respondent  is  the  defendant  in  a  civil  suit  out  of

which these appeals arise.

5) The disputes in the civil suit out of which these

appeals  arise  relate  to  a  land  bearing  Sy.  No.2/1,

Koramangala Village, Begur Hobli,  Bangalore South

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Taluk  measuring  1  acre  27  guntas  (hereinafter

referred  to  as  “suit  land”).  It  is  between  the

appellants (plaintiffs) and the respondent (defendant)

which  is  a  Co-operative  Society  engaged  in  the

business of manufacturing and selling of Milk.  

6) One Mr. K.G. Yellappa Reddy was the original

holder  of  the  suit  land.  In  the  year  1998,  K.G.

Yellappa Reddy filed a civil suit (OS No. 4875/1998)

against the respondent for permanent injunction in

relation to the suit land. He claimed,  inter alia, that

he  is  in  possession  of  the  suit  land  and  the

respondent is trying to interfere in his possession.  

7) The suit was, however, dismissed as being not

maintainable  on 17.02.2001 by  the  Trial  Court  for

want  of  notice.  Mr.  K.G.  Yellappa  Reddy,   in  the

meantime,  died leaving behind the appellants herein

as his legal representatives.

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8) On 14.03.2007, the appellants filed another civil

suit  (No.2143/2007)  against  the  respondent  before

the City Civil Judge, Bangalore for a declaration and

permanent injunction in relation to the suit land.  

9) In the suit, the appellants claimed title through

their ancestor (late K.G. Yellappa Reddy) and alleged

that the appellants are now the owners of  the suit

land after the death of Mr. K.G. Yellappa Reddy by

inheritance  and  the  respondent  has  no  right,  title

and interest in the suit land and nor has any right to

interfere in the possession of the appellants over the

suit land.

10) The  respondent  (defendant)  denied  the

appellants’ claim and, inter alia, alleged in the written

statement that they have been in possession of the

suit land in their own rights. It was alleged that the

State Government acquired the suit land a long back

for public purpose and allotted the suit land to the

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respondent  for  a  valuable  consideration  and  since

then they are in possession of the suit land in their

own right and carrying on their business.

11)  The respondent also  contended that  the  suit

filed by the appellants is barred by the principle of

res judicata because of the dismissal of the previous

suit  filed by their  father (Mr.  K.G. Yellappa Reddy)

against  the respondent in relation to the suit  land

wherein the same relief was claimed but was declined

to  the  appellants’  late  father.  The  respondent  also

raised other  legal  pleas,  such as  suit  is  barred by

limitation,  it  is  neither  properly  valued  and  nor

proper Court Fees has been paid on the relief claimed

etc.  

12) The  Trial  Court,  by  judgment/decree  dated

13.08.2012,  though  dismissed  the  suit  as  being

barred by limitation but held the appellants to be the

owner of the suit land. In other words, the Trial Court

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held  that  the  appellants  were  able  to  prove  their

ownership over the suit land but dismissed the suit

as being barred by limitation. It was also held that

the respondents failed to prove their case inasmuch

as they failed to file any document in support of their

stand that the suit land had been acquired by the

State.  

13) The appellants felt aggrieved by the dismissal of

their case and filed first appeal in the High Court of

Karnataka at Bangalore whereas the respondent felt

aggrieved against the finding of ownership recorded

against them and filed cross objection under Order

41 Rule 22 of  Code.   The respondent also filed an

application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code in

the appeal and filed copy of the notification issued

under  Section  4  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  (for

short, “the Act”) by the State by which the State had

acquired the suit land in support of their case.

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14) By  impugned  judgment,  the  High  Court

dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants, allowed

the application filed by the respondent under Order

41 Rule 27 of the Code and also the cross objection

filed by the respondent and dismissed the appellants’

suit.  

15) Against this judgment, the appellants(plaintiffs)

felt aggrieved and filed the present appeals by way of

special leave in this Court.  

16) Heard  Mr.  Sanjay  R.  Hegde,  learned  senior

counsel  for  the appellants and Mr.  S.S.  Naganand,

learned senior counsel for the respondent.

17) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and  on  perusal  of  the  record  of  the  case,  we  are

constrained to dismiss the appeals finding no merit

therein.

18) In our considered opinion, the filing of the two

suits, namely, first by the appellants’ father, Mr. K.G.

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Yellappa Reddy, (O.S.No.4875/1998) and later by the

appellants  out  of  which  these  appeals  arise  were

wholly  misconceived  in  nature  and  were  not

maintainable  as  would  be  clear  from the  following

reasons.  

19) It  is  not  in  dispute  that  once  the  respondent

filed a copy of the notification in appeal before the

High  Court  bearing  No.L-5468-MI  10-4-15  dated

22.01.1941 issued under Section 4 of the Act by the

State  Government,  which  was  taken  on  record  as

additional evidence by the High Court, showing that

the suit land was acquired by the State in the year

1941, the legal position arising in the case in relation

to the suit land became clear.  

20) Indeed,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  consequent  upon

issuance of  the  notification under  Section 4 of  the

Act, which was followed by declaration under Section

6 and then by an award under Section 11 of the Act

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and lastly, by taking over of the possession of the suit

land  from  the  owner  of  the  suit  land  (appellants’

father)  under  Section  16  of  the  Act,  the  suit  land

stood  vested  in  the  State  absolutely  free  from  all

encumbrances as provided under Section 16 of the

Act.  

21) In  other  words,  on  and  after  issuance  of  the

notifications  under  the  Act  and  initiation  of

acquisition  proceedings  by  the  State  which

culminated in passing of the award as far back as in

the  year  1941,  the  appellants’  predecessor-in-title

ceased to be the owner of the suit land and lost all

his rights to hold the suit land and claim possession

over it.  

22) The  only  legal  remedy  available  to  the

appellants’  predecessor-in-title  (Mr.  K.G.Yellappa

Reddy) in such case was to challenge the legality and

correctness of the notifications issued under Section

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4  or/and  6  of  the  Act  and  that  too  within  a

reasonable time after their issuance in the year 1941.

It is not in dispute that the landowners, admittedly,

did not challenge the validity and correctness of the

notifications and, on the other hand, by suppressing

the  fact  of  acquisition  proceedings  from the  Court

filed two suits one after the other and claimed title

over the suit land.

23) In  our  considered  opinion,  neither  the

predecessor-in-title  of  the  appellants  and  nor  the

appellants had any subsisting right, title and interest

in the suit land on and after 1941 consequent upon

issuance of the notifications by the State under the

Act. The reason was that all the ownership rights of

the  appellants’  predecessor-in-title  in  the  suit  land

stood  vested  in  the  State  once  the  acquisition

proceedings  were  completed  under  the  Act.   As

mentioned above,  the  appellants’  only  right  was to

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either challenge the land acquisition proceedings as

being  against  the  provisions  of  Act  or  to  claim

compensation payable  under  the  Act  in  relation to

the suit land under Section 11 of the Act followed by

reference  proceedings  under  Section  18  of  the  Act

and lastly,  in  appeal  before  the  High Court  for  its

re-dertermination.  

24) We  find  from  the  record  that  the  appellants

failed  to  file  any  document  in  rebuttal  to  the

documents filed by the respondent in appeal by way

of additional evidence with a view to show that the

notifications issued under the Act for acquiring the

suit land, which were relied on by the respondent in

appeal,  were  either  withdrawn  or  set  aside  or  not

given effect to.  Such fact, in our view, alone would

have enabled the appellants to claim and assert their

right  of  ownership  over  the  suit  land.  Such  was,

however, not the case of the appellants.

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25)  In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are

of the considered opinion that the suit filed by the

appellants seeking therein a declaration of their title

over  the  suit  land and further  claiming permanent

injunction was wholly misconceived and was liable to

be dismissed.  

26) Indeed, no declaration of title over the suit land

could be claimed or/and granted by the Civil Court

and nor any suit of such nature could be filed in the

Civil Court in the light of background facts brought

on  record  by  the  respondent  by  way  of  additional

evidence in appeal.  These documents fully establish

that neither the appellants’ predecessor and nor the

appellants  had  any  subsisting  prima  facie  title  in

their favour over the suit land on the date of filing the

two suits.

27) Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  however,

argued  that  there  was  non-compliance  of  the

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provisions of  Order  41 Rule  27-A of  the  Code and

hence the application filed by the respondent ought

not  to  have  been  allowed  by  the  High  Court.  The

submission,  in  our  opinion,  has  no  merit  for  the

following reasons.

28) In the first place, the documents sought to be

filed by the respondent, namely, notifications issued

under the Act were relevant and also necessary for

deciding  the  rights  of  the  parties  involved  in  the

suit/appeal.  Second,  these  documents  did  not

require any proof being public documents in nature.

Third, the respondent had already made reference of

these  documents  and  laid  foundation  in  the

pleadings  and  lastly,  the  first  Appellate  Court  has

jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code to

allow the parties to file additional evidence, if such

documents  are  required  to  decide  the  suit/appeal

provided satisfactory explanation is given as to why

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the documents could not be filed in the suit and why

they are filed in appeal. The respondent, in this case,

did give the explanation, which found acceptance to

the High Court and, in our opinion, rightly.   

29) Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  (plaintiffs)

argued some issues but they did not impress us in

the light of the settled legal position taken note of us

supra.

30) In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  we

concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived

at  by  the  High  Court  and  find  no  merit  in  the

appeals.

31) The  appeals  thus  fail  and  are  accordingly

dismissed.

………………………………..J  (R.K. AGRAWAL)

           …..………………………………J.      (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

New Delhi, April 25, 2018