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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1431 OF 2007

VIPIN JAISWAL(A-I)                      Appellant (s)

                VERSUS

STATE OF A.P. REP.BY PUB.PROSECUTOR     Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

A.K. PATNAIK, J.

This is an appeal against the judgment dated 11th  

December,  2006  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  in  

Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2003.

2. The facts briefly are that an FIR was lodged  

by  Gynaneshwar  Jaiswal  on  4.4.1999  at  2.15  p.m.  in  

Mangalhat Police Station, Hyderabad. In the FIR it was  

stated by the informant that his daughter Meenakshi  

Jaiswal was married to the appellant on 22.2.1996 and  

at  the  time  of  marriage  he  gave  sufficient  gold

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jewellery,  silver  items,  furniture,  electrophinic  

gadgets etc., worth above Rs.2,50,000/- but ever since  

her marriage, she was subjected to physical and mental  

torture by her husband Vipin Jaiswal, her husband's  

parents  Prem  Kumar  Jaiswal  and  Yashoda  Bai  and  her  

husband's sister Supriya and her husband  and they all  

brutally assaulted her on innumerable occasions for not  

getting sufficient dowry. It was further stated in the  

FIR that on 2.4.1999 the informant received a call from  

the appellant and he went to the house of the appellant  

along with his relatives to find out what had happened  

as well as to give invitation for a function at his  

place  but  they  all  abused  him  and  the  appellant  

physically assaulted and pushed him out from the house  

but fearing the safety of his daughter and her welfare,  

he  did  not  report  the  matter  to  the  police.  It  is  

further stated in the FIR that on 4.4.1999 at about  

1.00 p.m. when he came back home, he was informed on  

telephone by his son that Meenakshi had received severe  

burn injuries and as a result died in the house of the  

appellant. The police registered a Criminal Case under  

Section  304B,  IPC  and  took  up  investigation  and  

submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant and his  

other relatives under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC.

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3. At the trial, besides other witnesses, the  

prosecution  examined  the  father  of  the  deceased  

(informant) as PW 1, the cousin of PW 1 as PW 2 and the  

mother  of  the  deceased  as  PW  4.  The  appellant  

volunteered to be a witness and got examined himself as  

DW 1 and took the defence that the deceased had left  

behind a suicide note written by her one day before her  

death in which she has stated that she had committed  

suicide  not  on  account  of  any  harassment  by  the  

appellant  and  her  family  members  but  due  to  the  

harassment  by  her  own  parents.  The  Trial  Court,  

however,  disbelieved  the  defence  and  convicted  the  

appellant and his other relatives under Sections 304B  

and 498A, IPC. The Trial Court in particular held that  

there was material that two days prior to the death of  

the deceased, her father (PW1) and his relative (PW2)  

were called by her and told that she has been harassed  

by the appellant and her in laws for not being paid the  

amount demanded by the appellant and when PWs 1 and 2  

went to the house of the appellant, they were abused by  

the appellant and on 4.4.1999, PW 1 and others were  

informed  by  one  Suresh  Kumar,  a  neighbour  of  the  

appellant, about the incident. From the aforesaid and  

other evidence, the Trial Court came to the conclusion  

that  the  deceased  was  subjected  to  torture  and

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harassment by the accused, mainly for the reason that  

an amount of Rs.50,000/- was not given to the appellant  

by  PW  1.  The  appellant  and  other  relatives  of  the  

appellant  carried  Criminal  Appeal  No.  544  of  2003  

before the High Court and by the impugned judgment, the  

High Court acquitted the two other relatives of the  

appellant (A2 and A3) but maintained the conviction of  

the appellant under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC.

4. At  the  hearing  before  us,  learned  senior  

counsel for the appellant submitted that the findings  

of the Trial Court and of the High Court with regard to  

the demand of dowry are in relation to the demand of  

Rs.50,000/-.  He  submitted  that  this  demand  of  

Rs.50,000/- is not mentioned in the FIR (Ext. P1). He  

further submitted that in any case, the evidence of PW1  

and PW4 is clear that this demand of Rs.50,000/- by the  

appellant was not a dowry demand but an amount which  

the appellant wanted from the family of the deceased to  

purchase a computer and set up his own business. He  

further submitted that the Trial Court and the High  

Court ought not to have disbelieved the suicide note  

(Ext. D19) which was in the handwriting of the deceased  

as proved by DW1. In this context, he explained that  

the signature on the suicide note (Ext. D19) purporting

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to be that of the deceased, tallied with the signature  

of the deceased in Ext. D1 which was a hall ticket  

issued  by  Dr.  B.R.  Ambedkar  Open  University  for  an  

examination which the deceased took  in March, 1998.

5. Learned counsel for the State, on the other  

hand, submitted that both the Trial Court and the High  

Court have discussed the evidence of the prosecution  

witnesses, and in particular, the evidence of PWs 1, 2  

and 4 to establish that there was demand of dowry of  

not  only  Rs.50,000/-  but  other  items  as  well.  He  

further  submitted  that  Section  2  of  the  Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961 defines 'dowry' as any property  

or valuable security given or agreed to be given either  

directly or indirectly at or before or any time after  

the marriage in connection with the marriage of the  

parties  to  the  marriage.  He  submitted  that  the  

expression  “in  connection  with  the  marriage  of  the  

parties to the marriage” is wide enough to cover the  

demand  of  Rs.50,000/-  made  by  the  appellant  for  

purchase of a computer. He further submitted that so  

far as the suicide note (Ext. D19) is concerned, the  

same cannot be believed to have been written by the  

deceased who was only a matriculate and the High Court  

has given good reasons in the impugned judgment why the

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suicide note cannot be believed to have been written  

by the deceased. He argued that in any case only on the  

basis of the evidence given by DW1, the Court cannot  

hold  that  the  suicide  note  had  been  written  by  

the deceased and not by someone else. He submitted that  

since the prosecution has been able to prove that the  

deceased  had  been  subjected  to  not  only  a  demand  

of  dowry  but  also  cruelty  soon  before  her  death,  

the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court  have  rightly  

held the appellant guilty both under Sections 304B and  

498A, IPC.

6. We  have  perused  the  evidence  of  PW  1  and  

PW  4,  the  father  and  mother  of  the  deceased  

respectively.  We find that PW 1 has stated that at the  

time  of  marriage,  gold,  silver  articles,  ornaments,  

T.V., fridge and several other household articles worth  

more than Rs.2,50,000/- were given to the appellant and  

after the marriage, the deceased joined the appellant  

in his house at Kagaziguda. He has, thereafter, stated  

that the appellant used to work in a xerox cum type  

institute  in  Nampally  and  in  the  sixth  month  after  

marriage, the deceased came to their house and told  

them that the appellant asked her to bring Rs.50,000/-  

from them as he was intending to purchase a computer

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and set up his own business. Similarly, PW4 has stated  

in her evidence that five months after the marriage,  

the appellant sent her away to their house and when she  

questioned  her,  she  told  that  the  appellant  was  

demanding Rs.50,000/- and that the demand for money is  

to purchase a computer to start his own business. Thus,  

the  evidence  of  PW1  and  PW4  is  that  the  demand  of  

Rs.50,000/- by the appellant was made six months after  

the marriage and that too for purchasing a computer to  

start his own business. It is only with regard to this  

demand of Rs.50,000/- that the Trial Court has recorded  

a  finding  of  guilt  against  the  appellant  for  the  

offence  under  Section  304B,  IPC  and  it  is  only  in  

relation to this demand of Rs.50,000/- for purchase of  

a computer to start a business made by the appellant  

six months after the marriage that the High Court has  

also confirmed the findings of the Trial Court with  

regard to guilt of the appellant under Section 304B,  

IPC. In our view, both the Trial Court and the High  

Court failed to appreciate that the demand, if at all  

made by the appellant on the deceased for purchasing a  

computer  to  start  a  business  six  months  after  the  

marriage, was not in connection with the marriage and  

was not really a 'dowry demand' within the meaning of  

Section  2  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961.  This

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Court  has  held  in  Appasaheb  &  Anr. Vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721:

“In view of the aforesaid definition of  the  word  "dowry"  any  property  or  valuable  security  should  be  given  or  agreed  to  be  given  either  directly  or  indirectly  at  or  before or any time after the marriage and in  connection  with  the  marriage  of  the  said  parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of  property or valuable security must have some  connection with the marriage of the parties  and  a  correlation  between  the  giving  or  taking of property or valuable security with  the  marriage  of  the  parties  is  essential.  Being a penal provision it has to be strictly  construed.  Dowry  is  a  fairly  well  known  social  custom  or  practice  in  India.  It  is  well settled principle of interpretation of  Statute  that  if  the  Act  is  passed  with  reference to a particular trade, business or  transaction  and  words  are  used  which  everybody  conversant  with  that  trade,  business or transaction knows or understands  to have a particular meaning in it, then the  words  are  to  be  construed  as  having  that  particular meaning. (See  Union of India v.  Garware Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and  Chemicals and Fibres of India v.  Union of  India, AIR (1997) SC 558).”  

7. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of  

both the offences under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC,  

the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable  

doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or  

harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the  

prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW1 and PW4,  

we  find  that  they  have  made  general  allegations  of  

harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and  

have  not  brought  in  evidence  any  specific  acts  of

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cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased.  

On the other hand, DW1 in his evidence has stated that  

on 4.4.1999, the day when the incident occurred, he  

went to the nearby temple along with his mother (A2)  

and his father (A3) went to the bazar to bring ration  

and his wife (deceased) alone was present at the house  

and at about 1.00 p.m., they were informed by somebody  

that some smoke was coming out from their house and  

their house was burning. Immediately he and his mother  

rushed to their house and by that time there was a huge  

gathering at the house and the police was also present.  

He and his family members were arrested by the police  

and after one month they were released on bail. What  

DW1 has further stated is relevant for the purpose of  

his defence and is quoted hereinbelow:

“While  cleaning  our  house  we  found  a  chit on our dressing table. The said chit was  written  by  my  wife  and  it  is  in  her  handwriting  and  it  also  contains  her  signature.  Ex.  D  19  is  the  said  chit.  I  identified the handwriting of my wife in Ex.  D19 because my wife used to write chits for  purchasing of monthly provisions as such on  tallying the said chit and Ex. D19 I came to  know that it was written by my wife only.  Immediately I took the Ex. D19 to the P.S.  Mangalhat and asked them to receive but they  refused to take the same.”

From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that while  

cleaning the house the appellant came across a chit  

written in the handwriting of his wife and containing

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her signature. This chit has been marked as Ext. D19  

and the appellant has identified the handwriting and  

signature of the deceased in Ext. D19 which is written  

in  Hindi.  The  English  translation  of  Ext.D19  

reproduced in the impugned judgment of the High Court  

is extracted hereinbelow:

“I, Meenakshi W/o Vipin Kumar, do hereby  execute  and  commit  to  writing  this  in  my  sound mind, consciousness and senses and with  my free will and violation to the effect that  nobody  is  responsible  for  my  death.  My  parents family members have harassed much to  my husband. I am taking this step as I have  fed up with his life. Due to me the quarrels  are taking place here, as such I want to end  my life and I beg to pardon by all.”

It appears from Ext. D19 that the deceased has written  

the chit according to her free will saying that nobody  

was responsible for her death and that her parents and  

family members have harassed her husband and she was  

taking the step as she was fed up with her life and  

because of her quarrels were taking place.

8. When the appellant, who is the husband of the  

deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the  

aforesaid  chit  (Ext.  D19)  has  been  written  by  the  

deceased herself and has been signed by her and it  

also appears from his evidence quoted above that he  

was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, the  

Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a

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finding  one  way  or  the  other  by  comparing  her  

handwriting  and  signature  with  some  of  her  other  

handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the  

Evidence Act. In the alternative, the Trial Court and  

the  High  Court  could  have  sought  for  an  expert's  

opinion  under  Section  45  of  the  Evidence  Act  on  

whether the handwriting and signature were that of the  

deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court  

nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions  

of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary  

reasoning  disbelieved  the  defence  of  the  appellant  

that  Ext.D19  could  not  have  been  written  by  the  

deceased.

9. In our considered opinion, the evidence of  

DW1  (the  appellant)  and  Ext.D19  cast  a  reasonable  

doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was  

subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with  

demand  of  dowry.  In  our  view,  onus  was  on  the  

prosecution  to  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  the  

ingredient  of  Section  498A,  IPC  and  the  essential  

ingredient of offence under Section 498A is that the  

accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected  

her  to  cruelty  as  defined  in  the  Explanation  to  

Section 498A, IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw

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the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act  

that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined  

in  Section 304B,  IPC, the  prosecution has  to prove  

besides  the  demand  of  dowry,  harassment  or  cruelty  

caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her  

death.  Since  the  prosecution  has  not  been  able  to  

prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  this  ingredient  of  

harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under  

Sections 498A and 304B, IPC has been made out by the  

prosecution.

10. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside  

the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of  

the  Trial  Court  and  direct  that  the  bail  bond  

furnished by the appellant shall stand discharged.

............................J. (A.K. PATNAIK)                 

............................J. (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)  

NEW DELHI, MARCH 13, 2013