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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3793 OF 2016

VINOD KUMAR    … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI    … RESPONDENT(S)

With

C.A. No. 8972-8973/2017, C.A.No. 6063 of 2019(arising out of SLP(C) No. 19965/2017), C.A.No. 6064 of 2019 (arising  out  of  SLP(C)  No.  20414/2017),  C.A.Nos. 6066-6072 of 2019 (arising out of SLP(C) No. 20735- 20741/2017),  C.A.No.  6073  of  2019  (arising  out  of SLP(C)  No.  22383/2017),  C.A.  No.  16916/2017   and C.A.No.  6075  of  2019  (arising  out  of  SLP(C)  No. 28455/2017)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals, except one where leave to defend

was granted, have been filed against the judgment of

Delhi  High  Court  dismissing  the  Rent  Control

Revisions filed by the appellants in which the order

passed  by  the  Rent  Controller  rejecting  the

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application filed by the appellants-tenants seeking

leave to defend in a  petition under Section 14(1)(e)

of  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  have  been

challenged.

3. The  appellants  are  tenants  occupying  non-

residential  buildings  for  whose  eviction  petitions

have  been  filed  by  the  landlord  on  the  ground  of

bonafide need of landlord. The appellants at the very

outset  challenge  the  maintainability  of  eviction

petitions filed by the landlord under 14(1)(e) on the

ground of bonafide need. The facts are being taken

from C.A.No.3793 of 2016 (Vinod Kumar vs. Ashok Kumar

Gandhi) for considering the issues which have been

raised by the learned counsel for the appellant at

the very beginning of the submission.  

C.A.No.3793  of  2016(Vinod  Kumar  vs.  Ashok  Kumar

Gandhi)

4. The appellant is a tenant of a shop bearing No.J-

3/188-B,  Nehru  Market,  Rajouri  Garden,  New  Delhi-

110027. The respondent-landlord of the premises filed

an  Eviction  Petition  on  03.01.2011  to  obtain

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possession of the shop on the ground that son of the

landlord  was  without  any  job  and  the  premises  in

question are bonafide required by his son to start

business  of  sale  of  readymade  garments  and

accessories.  It  was  further  pleaded  in  the

application that the landlord has planned to make a

passage of around six feet wide throughout the length

of the property, from the front side, to have access

to the stairs case in the rear side of the property.

The  Rent  Controller  after  receipt  of  the  said

application issued notice to the appellant-tenant. On

25.01.2011,  the  appellant  filed  an  application

seeking  leave  to  defend  along  with  a  detailed

affidavit in support thereof. The landlord filed a

reply to the application alongwith counter-affidavit.

The  Additional  Rent  Controller  vide  order  dated

05.05.2015 rejected the application seeking leave to

defend filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the order

of  the  Additional  Rent  Controller  dated  05.05.2015

revision petition was filed by the appellant under

Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

challenging the order or Additional Rent Controller.

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The  High  Court  vide  its  judgment  dated  14.03.2016

dismissed  the  revision  petition  filed  by  the

appellant.  Aggrieved  by  the  judgment  of  the  High

Court, this appeal has been filed by the appellant.

5. In C.A.No.3793 of 2016 various grounds have been

raised  in  support  of  the  appeal.  Other  appeals

included in this group also raise several grounds on

the merits questioning the refusal to grant leave to

defend  by  the  Rent  Controller.  However,  on  the

opening of the submissions, learned counsel for the

appellants  have  confined  their  submissions  on  the

judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by

LRs. Vs. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC

287.   Questioning  the  correctness  of  judgment  of

Satyawati Sharma various grounds have been canvassed

before us. Learned counsel for the appellant submits

that  the  said  judgment  needs  to  be  referred  to  a

larger Bench to examine its correctness. It is the

submission  of  the  appellant  that  the  Eviction

Petitions have been filed under 14(1)(e) for eviction

from  non-residential  premises  on  the  projected

bonafide  need  of  landlord  only  on  the  basis  of

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judgment of Satyawati Sharma, which had, in fact, re-

written the provision of 14(1)(e). It is submitted

that as per provision of 14(1)(e) as contained in

Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958,  the  landlord  was

precluded from filing application for eviction on the

ground  of  bonafide  need  regarding  non-residential

premises.  It  is  submitted  that  application  under

14(1)(e) was contemplated by the Act only with regard

to premises let for residential purposes.  

6. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord has

countered the submission of the appellant and submits

that the judgment of this Court in  Satyawati Sharma

lays down the correct law and needs no reference to a

larger Bench.  

7. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have  confined

their submissions only on the question as to whether

judgment  of  this  Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma needs

reference  to  larger  Bench  or  not.  We,  in  these

appeals, thus, proceed to consider limited submission

as to whether judgment of this Court in  Satyawati

Sharma  needs reference to larger bench or not. The

issues  on  merits  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Rent

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Controller rejecting leave to defend application are

not being examined as of now.  

8. Before we notice the respective submissions of

the learned counsel for the parties in detail, we may

first notice the provisions of Section 14 of Delhi

Rent Control Act, 1958 as enacted. The Delhi Rent

Control Act, 1958 had been enacted to provide for the

regulation  of  rents,  repairs  and  maintenance  and

evictions relating to premises and of rates of hotels

and lodging houses in the National Capital Territory

of Delhi. The premises have been defined in Section

2(i) which is to the following effect:

“2(i) "premises" means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to  be,  let  separately  for  use  as  a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes—  

(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if  any,  appertaining  to  such  building  or part of the building;  

(ii)  any  furniture  supplied  by  the landlord for use in such building or part of  the  building;  but  does  not  include  a room in a hotel or lodging house;”

9. Chapter III of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 deals

with control of eviction of tenants. Section 14(1)

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which has arisen for consideration in these cases is

as follows:

“Section  14.  Protection  of  tenant against  eviction.-  (1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for  the  recovery  of  possession  of  any premises  shall  be  made  by  any  court  or Controller  in  favour  of  the  landlord against a tenant:  

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-  

(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent  legally  recoverable  from  him  within two months of the date on which a notice of demand  for  the  arrears  of  rent  has  been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882).

(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining  the  consent  in  writing  of  the landlord;  

(c)  that  the  tenant  has  used  the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let-  

(i) if the premises have been let on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, without obtaining  the  consent  in  writing  of  the landlord; or

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(ii)  if  the  premises  have  been  let before the said date without obtaining his consent;  

(d) that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein  for  a  period  of  six  months immediately before the date of the filing of  the  application  for  the  recovery  of possession thereof;  

(e)  that  the  premises  let  for residential purposes are required bona fide by  the  landlord  for  occupation  as  a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord  or  such  person  has  no  other reasonably  suitable  residential accommodation;  

Explanation.-For  the  purposes  of  this clause,  "premises  let  for  residential purposes" include any premises which having been  let  for  use  as  a  residence  are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally  for  commercial  or  other purposes;  

(f) that the premises have become unsafe or  unfit  for  human  habitation  and  are required  bona  fide  by  the  landlord  for carrying  out  repairs  which  cannot  be carried  out  without  the  premises  being vacated;  

(g) that the premises are required bona fide  by  the  landlord  for  the  purpose  of building or re-building or making thereto any  substantial  additions  or  alterations and  that  such  building  or  re-building  or addition  or  alteration  cannot  be  carried

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out without the premises being vacated;  

(h) that the tenant has, whether before or  after  the  commencement  of  this  Act, built,  acquired  vacant  possession  of,  or been allotted, a residence:  

(i) that the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the  landlord,  and  that  the  tenant  has ceased,  whether  before  or  after  the commencement  of  this  Act,  to  be  in  such service or employment;  

(j) that the tenant has, whether before or  after  the  commencement  of  this  Act, caused  or  permitted  to  be  caused substantial damage to the premises;  

(k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous  notice,  used  or  dealt  with  the premises  in  a  manner  contrary  to  any condition  imposed  on  the  landlord  by  the Government  or  the  Delhi  Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate;  

(l)  that  the  landlord  requires  the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the  Delhi  Development  Authority  or  the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in pursuance of  any  improvement  scheme  or  development scheme and that such building work cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated.”

10. A perusal of the various grounds available to a

landlord  to  recover  possession  of  any  premises

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indicates that although several grounds are available

both for residential and non-residential premises but

few grounds are available only for premises let for

residential purposes. The provision of Section 14(1)

(e) which needs consideration confine to the premises

let for residential purposes which may be required

bonafide  by  the  landlord  for  occupation  as  a

residence for himself or for any member of his family

dependent  on  him.  The  explanation  explains  that

premises  let  for  residential  purposes  which  having

been  let  for  use  as  a  residence  are,  without  the

consent  of  the  landlord,  used  incidentally  for

commercial  or  other  purposes  are  also  included  in

residential premises.

11. The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) were resorted

by the landlord for seeking recovery of possession

only with regard to residential premises till part of

Section 14(1)(e) has been struck down in  Satyawati

Sharma case. This Court held that Section 14(1)(e) of

Act, 1958 is violative of the doctrine  of equality

embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution in so far

as  it  discriminates  between  the  premises  let  for

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residential  and  non-residential  purposes  when  the

same  are  required  bonafide  by  the  landlord  for

occupation  for  himself  or  for  any  member  of  his

family dependent on him and restricts the landlord’s

right  to  seek  eviction  of  the  tenant  from  the

premises  let  for  residential  purposes  only.  This

Court clarified that it is not totally striking down

of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act in its entirety but it

has struck down only the discriminatory portion of

Section  14(1)(e).  In  Satyawati  Sharma(AIR  2008  SC

3148) this  Court  held  that  striking  down  the

discriminatory  portion  of  Section  14(1)(e)  the

remaining part of the Section 14(1)(e) shall be read

in the manner as extracted in paragraph 39 of the

judgment which is as follows:

“39.  However,  the  aforesaid  declaration should  not  be  misunderstood  as  total striking  down  of  Section  14(1)(e)  of  the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned Counsel argued  that  Section  14(1)(e)  is unconstitutional  in  its  entirety  and  we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under:

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“that  the  premises  are  required  bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has  no  other  reasonably  suitable accommodation.”

……………”

12. It is on the strength of the judgment of this

Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma that  after  the  said

judgment landlords of non-residential premises have

also  filed  application  for  eviction  under  Section

14(1)(e) which are dealt with by the Rent Controller

as per procedure contained in Chapter III-A of the

Act, 1958. Chapter III-A contains ‘Summary Trial of

Certain Applications’. The Rent Controller treating

the said procedure applicable on applications filed

by the landlords under Section 14(1)(e) has issued

summons to the tenants in the form prescribed in the

Third Schedule and have passed order either rejecting

the  leave  to  defend  or  granting  leave  to  defend

which  orders,  were  challenged  in  the  High  Court

giving rise to these appeals.  

13. After noticing the brief background of one of the

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issues which has been pressed at the very outset, we

now  proceed  to  notice  the  submissions  of  learned

counsel for the parties in detail as canvassed before

us.

14. Shri  Uday  Gupta,  learned  counsel  who  led  the

submission on behalf of the appellant has very ably

and  persuasively  put  forward  his  submissions.  Shri

Gupta  submits  that  validity  of  the  provision  of

Section 14(1)(e) was challenged in Delhi High Court

more than once which challenge was repelled by the

High Court. Shri Gupta submits that Delhi High court

in  H.C.Sharma vs. LIC of India,(1973) ILR 1 Del 90,

in  which

restriction placed on the rights of landlord to evict

the  tenant  from  non-residential  premises  as

discriminatory and violative of Section 19 and  14(1)

(f) was considered and rejected. In Satyawati Sharma

appellant had filed an application for eviction of

the tenant which application was rejected by the Rent

Controller  on  the  ground  that  application  is  not

maintainable  under  Section  14(1)(e)  for  non-

residential  purposes.  Apart  from  a  revision

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challenging the said order in the High court a writ

petition  was  also  filed  by  Satyawati  Sharma

challenging  the  constitutional  validity  of  Section

14(1)(e) which challenge was repelled by Delhi High

Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma  vs.  Union  of  India  and

others,  2002  (65)  SRJ  615 (  Full  Bench),  which

judgment  was  subject  matter  of  the  Civil  Appeals

before this Court giving rise to the judgment of this

Court in Satyawati Sharma (supra). Shri Gupta relying

on  the  judgment  of  Constitution  Bench  judgment  in

Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar and others, (1985) 2

SCC  683,  submits  that  Gian  Devi  Anand itself  has

noticed the distinction in provision of Section 14(1)

(e) which was confined to residential premises and

not available in case of commercial premises. It is

submitted  that  Gian  Devi Anand suggested  that

Legislature may consider the advisability of making

the bona fide requirement of the landlord a ground of

eviction in respect of commercial premises as well.

The  legislature  having  not  yet  enforced  the  Delhi

Rent Act, 1995 it was not open for this Court in

Satyawati Sharma (supra) to read down the provision

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of  Section  14(1)(e).  Shri  Gupta  submits  that  the

judgment  of  Satyawati  Sharma  is  contrary  to  the

Constitution  Bench  judgment  in  Gian  Devi  Anand.  A

Bench of two Hon’ble Judges could not have adopted

the course which was not adopted by the Constitution

Bench itself in  Gian Devi Anand. Shri Gupta further

submits that  Satyawati Sharma  failed to take notice

of three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Gauri

Shanker and others vs. Union of India and others,

(1994) 6 SCC 349. It is submitted that view taken in

paragraph 41 of  Satyawati Sharma is per incuriam  in

view  of  the  judgment  already  rendered  in  Gauri

Shanker case. Alternatively, Shri Gupta submits that

even judgment of  Satyawati Sharma is not held to be

per incuriam, the said judgment necessarily needs to

be revisited, in view of the fact that the Satyawati

Sharma  did not consider several relevant provisions

of Act, 1958 including Section 25B and Section 19. It

is submitted that summary procedure which was brought

in the statute by inserting Chapter III-A by Act 18

of 1976 with effect from 01.12.1975 specially Section

25B which was special procedure for the disposal of

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applications for eviction on the ground of bonafide

requirement under Section 14(1)(e) was meant only for

residential  premises.  Without  adverting  to  Section

25B, this Court in  Satyawati Sharma could not have

held that Section 14(1)(e) should also be available

for  non-residential  premises.  The  very  premise  in

Satyawati  Sharma  that  Rent  Control  legislation  did

not  make  any  distinction  in  residential  and  non-

residential  purposes  was  erroneous,  which  led

Satyawati  Sharma  to  fall  in  error.  The  two-Judge

Bench  of  this  Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma  has  re-

written Section 14(1)(e) which could not have been

done by the Court and matter ought  to have been left

for legislature as was said by the Constitution Bench

in  Gian Devi Anand case.   The Constitution Bench in

Gian Devi Anand  itself has observed that there has

been distinction between residential and commercial

premises  in  Delhi.  Satyawati  Sharma  has  relied  on

judgment of this Court in  Harbilas Rai Bansal vs.

State  of  Punjab  and  another,  (1996)  1  SCC  1,  and

Rakesh Vij vs. Raminder Pal Singh Seth and others,

(2005) 8 SCC 504,  which were the judgments on  East

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Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and could

not have been applied with regard to interpretation

of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In East Punjab Urban

Rent  Restriction  Act  the  remedy  for  landlord  for

seeking eviction on the bonafide requirement both for

residential  and  non-residential  premises  was  very

much available from the very beginning and it was,

for the first time, sought to be taken away by 1956

Amendment  which  amendment  was  struck  down  by  this

Court. Those cases were not relevant for Delhi Rent

Control  Act.  The  tenants  occupying  non-residential

premises are dependent on their livelihood. Applying

summary  procedure  as  prescribed  under  Section  25B

brings  hardship  in  denying  them  protection  of  law

since  they  are  not  able  to  defend  their  cases  on

merits.  Referring  to  statement  of  Minister,  Shri

H.K.L.  Bhagat  on  debate  in  the  House  on  1976

Amendment, it is submitted that statement was made

that Section 25B was not to apply to non-residential

premises since under Section 14(1)(e) eviction can be

sought only with regard to residential premises. It

is submitted that due to Explanation to Section 14(1)

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(e) having held to be redundant the benefit given

under  Section  19  is  also  denied  to  the  tenant.

Section 19(2) has been rendered otiose. The principle

of  reading  down  was  not  attracted  in  the  present

case. It is submitted that reading down cannot be

used when the legislative intent is clear.

15. Satyawati Sharma even does not refer to Sections

14A to 14D which were also inserted by Act 18 of

1976.  There  is  reasonable  doubt  of  correctness  of

Satyawati Sharma, hence, it needs to be referred to a

larger  Bench  for  final  opinion.  Legislature  never

intended to apply Section 25B to commercial tenancy.

Since, the procedure of Section 25B was harsh which

was  made  looking  to  bonafide  need  for  residential

premises,  Section  25B  should  not  be  ipso  facto

applied  to  commercial  tenancy.  In  other  case,  the

tenant has right to file written statement which is

now denied by applying procedure under Section 25B.

Section 25B having not referred to it is to be seen

as to whether Section 25B shall apply. In any view of

the  matter  judgment  of  Satyawati  Sharma should  be

applied  to  the  tenancy  coming  into  the  existence

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after the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma

case.  

16. Shri  Neeraj  Krishan  Kaul,  senior  counsel,  led

arguments  on  behalf  of  the  landlord.  Shri  Kaul

submits  that  this  Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma found

Section 14(1)(e) to be ultra vires to Article 14 of

the Constitution. However, instead of striking down

the  provisions  altogether,  this  Court  removed  the

offending part of the legislation by obliterating the

classification  between  residential  and  non-

residential premises and holding that Section 14(1)

(e)  would  apply  equally  to  residential  and  non-

residential premises. Satyawati Sharma took notice of

Constitutional  Bench  judgment  in  Gian  Devi  Anand

(supra)which had suggested the Legislature to remove

the  discrimination  between  residential  and  non-

residential premises in the Delhi Rent Control Act,

1958 with regard to seeking eviction by landlord on

the ground of bona fide need. When the Legislation

had not acted in removing aforesaid classification,

this  Court  applying  the  doctrine  of  temporal

reasonableness held that a Legislation which may have

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been reasonable and rational at the time of enactment

may  over  passage  of  time  become  arbitrary,

unreasonable and violative of Article 14. This Court

in Satyawati Sharma took judicial notice of the fact

that the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 which was a subsequent

Legislation, but yet to be notified by the Central

Government,  did  not  distinguish  between  the

residential and non-residential premises in sofaras

landlord’s right to seek eviction on bona fide need

is  concerned.  The  observations  made  in  Gian  Devi

Anand  were  in  the  background  of  a  discussion  in

relation  to  heritability  of  tenancies  vis-à-vis

Section  2(l)of  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958.  The

judgment of this Court in  Satyawati Sharma  has also

been  affirmed  by  a  three-Judge  Bench  in  State  of

Maharasthra and Anr. Vs. Super Max International (P)

Ltd. and Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 772.

17. This  Court  in  Harbilas  Rai  Bansal (supra)  and

Rakesh Vij (supra)had held no distinction can be made

with  regard  to  residential  tenancy  and  non-

residential tenancy in sofaras eviction is concerned

at the instance of the landlord on the ground of bona

21

fide need. The judgment of Satyawati Sharma cannot be

held to be any kind of judicial Legislation. What has

been done in Satyawati Sharma is to only strike down

the unconstitutional portion of Section 14(1)(e). The

part of Section 14(1)(e) which is severable has been

retained. The judgment of Satyawati Sharma cannot be

held to be  per incuriam either Gian Devi Anand case

or  Gauri  Shanker  case.  The  observations  in  Gauri

Shanker  were in the background of Section 2(l)(iii)

of  Act,  1958  wherein  heritability  of  tenancy  is

provided.  

18. There can be no distinction in sofaras bona fide

need  of  the  landlord  is  concerned  regarding

residential and commercial premises. The observations

of three-Judge Bench in  Super Max International are

not obiter but are the judicial dicta which has re-

confirmed  the  principles  in  Satyawati  Sharma  case.

Replying the submission of the appellant in sofaras

Section  25B  of  the  Act  is  concerned,  Shri  Kaul

submits  that  procedure  for  eviction  cannot  be

different  in  sofaras  residential  and  commercial

tenancies  are  concerned.  Adopting  different

22

procedures for eviction in the above two cases itself

be  treated  as  discriminatory.  There  are  various

safeguards under Act, 1958 which amply protect the

tenant.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Satyawati  Sharma

judgment which can be said to be  per incuriam. The

appellant is asking this Court to violate certainty

of law and comity of the Courts.  There is no ground

today to refer the judgment of Satyawati Sharma case

for consideration of a larger Bench. The judgment of

this  Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma  case  is  just,

reasonable and protects both landlord and tenant. The

provision of Section 14(1)(e) which was enacted at

the  time  when  circumstances  were  different  can  no

longer be said to be reasonable and valid and has

rightly  done  away  with  the  unjust  classification

between  residential  and  commercial  in  sofaras

eviction  on  the  ground  of  bona  fide  need  of  the

landlord was concerned.  

19. The Judgement of this Court in  Satyawati Sharma

has stood test of time and at this distance of time

this  Court  cannot  revive  the  unjust  classification

between residential and non-residential premises in

23

sofaras landlord’s right of eviction is concerned on

the ground of bona fide need. Shri Kaul submits that

there  is  absolutely  no  reason  for  referring  the

Satyawati Sharma case  for consideration of a larger

Bench. Shri Kaul further has referred to the order

dated  20.07.2015  passed  in  Special  Leave  Petition

(C)No.31687 of 2014,  Jag Mohini Kaur vs. Tilak Raj

and  ors.,  where  this  Court  after  noticing  the

judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma dismissed

the petition of tenant wherein submission was sought

to be raised that landlord cannot file an application

under Section 14(1)(e) with regard to non-residential

premises. Satyawati Sharma has time and again relied

by this Court and the High Courts and there is no

occasion to have any re-look in these appeals. The

mere fact that the procedure under Section 25B is

applicable  with  regard  to  non-residential  premises

also  has  no  bearing  on  the  unconstitutionality  of

part  of  the  provision  of  Section  14(1)(e).  No

distinction  can  be  made  with  regard  to  procedure

applicable regarding residential and non-residential

premises. Shri Kaul submits that the prayer of the

24

appellant to refer the judgment of  Satyawati Sharma

to  a  larger  Bench  be  rejected  and  the  appeals  be

heard and dismissed.  

20. From the submissions of learned counsel for the

parties as noted above following two questions arise

for consideration by us:

(1) Whether  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in

Satyawati Sharma (supra) is per incuriam.  

(2) Whether there are any other grounds to refer

the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Satyawati

Sharma for reconsideration by a larger Bench.

Question No.1

21. The  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant  is  that  Satyawati  Sharma  having  not

followed the binding Constitution Bench judgment in

Gian  Devi  Anand  and  three-Judge  Bench  judgment  in

Gauri Shanker is a judgment rendered  per incuriam.

Further, submission is that Satyawati Sharma ignores

provisions of Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control

Act. Hence, the judgment in  Satyawati Sharma is  per

25

incuriam.  

22. The principle of per incuriam has been developed

by the English Courts in relaxation of the rule of

stare  decisis.  In  practice  per  incuriam  is  per

ignoratium. The above principle has been developed,

accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while

interpreting  Article  141  of  the  Constitution  which

embodies the doctrine of precedent as a matter of

law.  A Constitution Bench in Punjab Land Development

and  Reclamation  Corporation  Ltd.,  Chandigarh  vs.

Presiding  Officer,  Labour  Court,  Chandigarh  and

another, (1990) 3 SCC 682 dealing with question of

per incuriam laid down following in paragraph 40:

“40. We now deal with the question of per incuriam by  reason  of  allegedly  not following  the  Constitution  Bench decisions.  The  Latin  expression  per incuriam means  through  inadvertence.  A decision  can  be  said  generally  to  be given  per  incuriam when  this  Court  has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when a High Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of this Court. It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Article  141 embodies, as a rule of law, the doctrine of  precedents  on  which  our  judicial system  is  based.  In  Bengal  Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC  66,  it  was  held  that  the  words  of Article  141,  “binding  on  all  courts

26

within  the  territory  of  India”,  though wide enough to include the Supreme Court, do not include the Supreme Court itself, and it is not bound by its own judgments but  is  free  to  reconsider  them  in appropriate cases. This is necessary for proper  development  of  law  and  justice. May  be  for  the  same  reasons  before judgments  were  given  in  the  House  of Lords and  Re Dawson’s Settlement Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Dawson, (1966) 3 All ER 68, on July 26, 1966 Lord Gardiner, L.C. made the  following  statement  on  behalf  of himself  and  the  Lords  of  Appeal  in Ordinary:

“Their Lordships regard the use of  precedent  as  an  indispensable foundation  upon  which  to  decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of  legal  rules.  Their  Lordships nevertheless  recognise  that  too rigid  adherence  to  precedent  may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present  practice  and,  while treating former decisions of this House  as  normally  binding,  to depart  from  a  previous  decision when it appears right to do so.

In  this  connection  they  will bear  in  mind  the  danger  of disturbing  retrospectively  the basis  on  which  contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into

27

and  also  the  especial  need  for certainty as to the criminal law.”

23. In  V.Kishan  Rao  vs.  Nikhil  Super  Specially

Hospital  and  another,  2010(5)  SCC  513,  this  Court

again  explaining  the  concept  of  per  incuriam  laid

down following in paragraph 54:

“54. When a judgment is rendered by ignoring the provisions of the governing statute and earlier larger Bench decision on the point such decisions are rendered per  incuriam.  This  concept  of  per incuriam  has  been  explained  in  many decisions  of  this  Court.  Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority in A.R. Antulay v.  R.S.  Nayak,  (1988)  2  SCC  602, explained  the  concept  in  the  following words: (SCC p. 652, para 42)

“42.  …  ‘Per  incuriam’  are  those decisions  given  in  ignorance  or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory  provision  or  of  some authority  binding  on  the  court concerned,  so  that  in  such  cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.”

Subsequently also in the Constitution Bench  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Punjab Land  Development  and  Reclamation  Corpn. Ltd. v.  Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682, similar views were expressed in para 40 at p. 705 of the report.”

28

24. When  a  Court  delivers  judgment  ignoring  the

binding precedent of a larger Bench, the judgment so

delivered  is  held  to  be  per  incuriam and  has  no

precedential value. Whether the judgment of Satyawati

Sharma  can  be  said  to  be  per  incuriam.  The

Constitution  Bench  judgment  of  Gian  Devi  Anand  is

first to be examined. The Constitution Bench judgment

in Gian Devi Anand(supra) was delivered by Amarendra

Nath  Sen,  J.  with  which  opinion  Bhagwati,  J.

concurred. The question which arose for consideration

was noticed in paragraph 5 of the judgment.

“Amarendra  Nath  Sen,  J.-  The  question for consideration in this appeal by special leave  is  whether  under  the  Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the statutory  tenancy,  to  use  the  popular phraseology,  in  respect  of  commercial premises is heritable or not. To state it more precisely, the question is whether the heirs  of  a  deceased  tenant  whose contractual  tenancy  in  respect  of commercial  premises  has  been  determined, are entitled to the same protection against eviction  afforded  by  the  Act  to  the tenant.”

25. In the above case landlord has determined tenancy

of the tenant and thereafter filed a petition under

29

Section  14  for  eviction  of  the  tenant  on  various

grounds. Tenancy was of a shop situate in New Market,

West  Patel  Nagar,  New  Delhi.  Rent  Controller  had

allowed the petition of the landlord on the ground of

default in payment of rent rejecting other grounds.

Landlord preferred an appeal to which tenant had also

filed cross-objection. During pendency of the appeal

tenant  died  on  05.09.1977  in  whose  place  the

appellant,  the  widow  of  deceased  tenant  was

impleaded.  Cross-objection  of  tenant  was  allowed.

Appellate  Court  remanded  the  matter  to  decide  the

question of sub-letting. The widow of deceased tenant

filed  an  appeal  before  the  High  Court  to  which

landlord filed a cross-objection. The High Court held

that on the death of the statutory tenant, the heirs

of the statutory tenant had no right to remain in

possession of the premises, as statutory tenancy was

not  heritable  and  the  protection  afforded  to  a

statutory tenant by the Act is not available to the

heirs  and  legal  representatives  of  the  statutory

tenant. A decree for eviction was passed by the High

Court which judgment was challenged by the widow of

30

the  deceased  tenant  before  this  Court.  This  Court

held that Act does not make any distinction between

‘so-called statutory tenant’ and ‘contractual tenant’

but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such

tenant in respect of residential premises. One more

submission was raised before this Court that in view

of  the  amendment  of  definition  of  ‘tenant’  under

Section 2(l)(iii)  right of continuing in possession

in respect of residential premises only and not with

regard to so-called statutory tenant in respect of

commercial  premises,  rejecting  the  said  submission

the Court laid down following in paragraph 31:

“31……..Section 2(1)(iii) of the Act does not create any additional or special right in favour of the heirs of the `so called statutory tenant' on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises. As the status and rights of a contractual tenant  even  after  determination  of  his tenancy  when  the  tenant  is  at  times described  as  the  statutory  tenant,  are fully protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenants become entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and position of the statutory tenant on  his  death,  the  Legislature  which  has created this right has thought it fit in the case of residential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the manner and to  the  extent  provided  in  Section  2(1) (iii). It appears that the Legislature has

34

ground without going into the merits of the appeal filed by the appellant in the High Court against the order of remand and also without  considering  the  cross-objections filed in the High Court by the landlord. We accordingly,  set  aside  the  judgment  and order of the High Court and we remand the case to the High Court for decision of the appeal and the cross objection on merits. The  appeal  is  accordingly  allowed  to  the extent indicated above with no order as to costs.”

28. The  most  important  observations  which  are

relevant  in  present  case  were  made  by  the

Constitution Bench in paragraph 39 of the judgment.

The Constitution Bench observed the landlord who let

out commercial premises under circumstances may need

bona  fide  premises  for  his  own  use  under  changed

conditions.  The  Constitution  Bench  suggested  that

Legislature may consider the advisability of making

the bona fide requirement of the landlord a ground of

eviction in respect of commercial premises as well.

Following was observed in paragraph 39:

“39.Before  concluding,  there  is  one aspect  which  we  consider  it  desirable  to make certain observations. The owner of any premises,  whether  residential  or commercial,  let  out  to  any  tenant,  is permitted by the Rent Control Acts to seek eviction of the tenant only on the ground specified  in  the  Act,  entitling  the

35

landlord  to  evict  the  tenant from  the premises. The restrictions on the power of the landlords in the matter of recovery of possession of the premises let out by him to  a  tenant  have  been  imposed  for  the benefit of the tenants. Inspite of various restrictions put on the landlords right to recover possession of the premises from a tenant,  the  right  of  the  landlord  to recover possession of the premises from the tenant  for  the  bona  fide  need  of  the premises by the landlord is recognised by the Act, in case of residential premises. A landlord  may  let  out  the  premises  under various  circumstances.  Usually  a  landlord lets out the premises when he does not need it  for  own  use.  Circumstances  may  change and a situation may arise when the landlord may require the premises let out by him for his own use. It is just and proper that when  the  landlord  requires  the  premises bona fide for his own use and occupation, the landlord should be entitled to recover the  possession  of  the  premises  which continues to be his property inspite of his letting  out  the  same  to  a  tenant.  The legislature  in  its  wisdom  did  recognise this fact and the Legislature has provided that bona fide requirement of the landlord for his own use will be a legitimate ground under  the  Act  for  the  eviction  of  his tenant from any residential premises. This ground is, however, confined to residential premises and is not made available in case of commercial premises. A landlord who lets out commercial premises to a tenant under certain  circumstances  may  need  bona  fide the premises for his own use under changed conditions in some future date should not in  fairness  be  deprived  of  his  right  to recover the commercial premises. Bona fide need of the landlord will stand very much on  the  same  footing  in  regard  to  either class  of  premises,  residential  or

36

commercial.  We  therefore,  suggest  that Legislature  may  consider  the  advisability of making the bona fide requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial premises as well.”  

29. Now, we revert back to  Satyawati Sharma’s case.

Satyawati  Sharma  case  has  noticed  Gian  Devi  Anand

case in  paragraphs  20  and  21.  Satyawati  Sharma

extracted  the  entire  paragraph  39  of  Constitution

Bench judgment in paragraph 20.  Satyawati Sharma  in

paragraph 21 states following:

“21. What is significant to be noted is that  in  para  34  of  the  aforementioned judgment,  the  distinction  between residential and non-residential tenancies was made in the context of the rights of the heirs of the tenant to continue to enjoy  the  protection  envisaged  under Section 14(1). The Court was of the view that  the  heirs  of  the  tenants  of  the commercial premises cannot be deprived of the  protection  else  the  family  of  the tenant may be brought on road or deprived of  the  only  source  of  livelihood.  The Court also opined that if the heirs of the  individual  tenants  of  commercial tenancies are deprived of the protection, extremely  anomalous  consequences  will ensue because the companies, corporations and  juridical  entities  carrying  on business  or  commercial  activities  in rented  premises  will  continue  to  enjoy the protection even after the change of management, but the heirs of individual tenants  will  be  denuded  of  similar

37

protection. At the same time, the Court noted that the landlord of a premises let for  residential  purpose  may  bona  fide require the same for his own use or the use of his dependent family members and observed  that  the  legislature  should remove  apparent  discrimination  between residential and non-residential tenancies when the landlord bona fide requires the same.  If  the  observations  contained  in para 34 are read in any other manner, the same  would  become  totally  incompatible with  the  observation  contained  in  the penultimate paragraph of the judgment and we  do  not  see  any  reason  for  adopting such course, more so, because the later part of the judgment has been relied in Harbilas Rai Bansal v.  State of Punjab, (1996)  1  SCC  1 and  Rakesh  Vij v.  Dr. Raminder  Pal  Singh  Sethi,  (2005)  8  SCC 504.”

30. The  submission  which  has  been  pressed  by  Shri

Uday Gupta is that the Constitution Bench in  Gian

Devi  Anand  did  not  declare  provisions  of  Section

14(1)(e)  unconstitutional  rather  left  it  to  the

Legislature to amend the law. When  Gian Devi Anand

has itself not struck down Section 14(1)(e) Satyawati

Sharma doing the same is contrary to the judgment of

Gian Devi Anand. The observation in paragraph 39 of

Gian  Devi  Anand’s  case  itself  suggest  that  the

Constitution Bench was satisfied that a ground for

eviction  of  tenant  of  commercial  premises  on  bona

38

fide requirement of landlord should also be provided

for. The basis for what has been done in  Satyawati

Sharma  was clearly laid down in Gian Devi Anand  for

striking  down  the  unconstitutional  part  in  Section

14(1)(e).  We  fail  to  see  that  how  can  Satyawati

Sharma judgment be said as per incuriam. The ratio of

Gian  Devi  Anand  has  neither  been  ignored  nor  any

contrary view has been taken by Satyawati Sharma. We

may observe that Gian Devi Anand in paragraphs 32 and

34  has  noticed  the  provisions  of  Section  14(1)

specifically Section 14(1)(e) as existed in the Act,

1958. There was no challenge for the classification

in Section 14(1)(e) in the above case, hence neither

Gian  Devi  Anand  was  required  to  pronounce  on  the

classification in Section 14(1)(e) nor was required

to consider striking down of the provisions. In any

view of the matter, the observation in paragraph 39,

Gian Devi Ananad  justified that there is ground to

seek  eviction  on  bona  fide  need.  Thus,  Satyadevi

Sharma  seeks support of what has been done in  Gian

Devi Anand’s case.  

31. Now,  we  come  to  three-Judge  Bench  judgment  of

39

Gauri Shanker which according to appellant is binding

precedent and Satyawati Sharma having not noticed the

said,  the  judgment  of  Satyawati  Sharma  is  per

incuriam. Gauri Shanker was a case where restriction

on rights of heir of statutory tenant of residential

premises placed by explanation to Section 2(l)(iii)

of Delhi Rent Control Act as introduced Act 18 of

1976 while no restrictions were placed on tenants of

commercial premises where challenge on the ground of

violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of

India. Gauri Shanker has noticed the Gian Devi Anand,

especially  paragraphs  32  and  34.  The  ground  of

distinction was repelled and following was laid down

in paragraph 12:

“12. It  is  evident  from  the  above decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  of this Court that a commercial tenancy is invaluable and has got distinct features and characteristics of its own different from that of a residential tenancy. None of  the  peculiar  or  unique  features present  in  the  case  of  commercial tenancies  exist  in  the  case  of residential  tenancies.  In  the  above background, if the legislature thought it fit  to  afford  a  greater  and  extended right  or  benefit  to  the  heirs  of  the statutory tenants of commercial premises and  not  to  extend  such  rights  to  the

40

heirs  of  the  statutory  tenants  of residential premises, we should say that it only stands to reason and reckons the stark  realities  of  the  prevailing situation. The protection afforded by the Rent  Act  to  a  tenant  after  the termination  of  the  tenancy  and  to  the heirs of the tenant is only a creation of the Act and it is open to the Legislature to  make  appropriate  provisions  in  that behalf.  It  can  make  suitable  and appropriate  provisions  in  the  Act  with regard to the nature and extent of the benefit and protection to be so enjoyed and the manner in which the same is to be enjoyed. In the above perspective, we are of  the  view  that  the  provisions  in Section 2(l)(iii) of the Act, which seeks to  restrict  or  limit  the  right  of  the heirs, insofar as the statutory tenants of residential premises are concerned and to the extent provided therein, are not in  any  way  discriminatory  and  do  not offend the guarantee under Article 14 of the  Constitution.  This  is  not  a  case where  the  residential  tenancy  and  the commercial tenancy are similarly placed. They belong to two different categories with  distinct  features  and characteristics of their own. No question of  discrimination  arises.  In  this context, it is only proper to quote the following observations in Sakhawat Ali v. State of Orissa, AIR 1955 SC 166, which is apposite:

“…  legislation  enacted  for  the achievement of a particular object or  purpose  need  not  be  all embracing.  It  is  for  the Legislature  to  determine  what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely

41

because  certain  categories  which would stand on the same footing as those  which  are  covered  by  the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted  in  any  manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental  right  guaranteed  by Article 14 of the Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

Nor are we impressed by the plea that the right to shelter is a guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and  so  the  abridgement  or  limitation placed on the rights of the legal heirs in  the  case  of  a  statutory  tenancy  of residential premises makes an inroad into the rights of the tenant under Article 21 of  the  Constitution  of  India.  We  hold that  the  statutory  tenancies  regarding residential  premises  are  distinct  and different  from  statutory  tenancies regarding  commercial  premises  and  the limitations or the restrictions placed by Section  2(l)(iii)  of  the  Act  on  the rights  of  the  heirs  of  the  statutory tenants  of  residential  premises  are reasonable,  fair  and  just  in  all  the circumstances  of  the  case.  There  is  no violation of the guarantee enshrined in Article  14  or  Article  21  of  the Constitution of India.”

32. Gauri Shanker upheld Section 2(l)(iii) of the Act

holding it not violating Article 14 and 21 of the

Constitution. The observations in the judgment with

respect to residential tenancy and commercial tenancy

42

were made in reference to heritability. In the above

context,  this  Court  held  that  they  belong  to  two

different  categories  with  distinct  features  and

characteristics of their own. Gauri Shanker was not a

case in which provision of Section 14(1)(e) came for

consideration nor any observation has been made with

regard to ground of eviction available to landlord

with regard to commercial premises. Gauri Shanker had

dealt  with  entirely  different  provision,  certain

limitation which was attached to residential premises

itself  to  heritability.  The  case  of  Gauri  Shanker

being on different provision and premise, it cannot

be said that Gauri Shanker was a binding precedent to

be  followed  by  Satyawati  Sharma.  The  judgment  of

Gauri Shanker being on different provision cannot be

said to be binding precedent in reference to what has

been dealt in  Satyawati Sharma.  We, thus, conclude

that the judgment of Satyawati Sharma cannot be held

to be per incuriam.

33. The  next  limb  of  attack  of  the  appellant  on

Satyawati Sharma is on the basis of non-consideration

of  Section  25B  of  the  Act,  1958.  Section  25A  to

43

Section 25C were inserted by Act 18 of 1976 w.e.f.

01.12.1975.  Section  25  B  provided  for  special

procedure  for  the  disposal  of  applications  for

eviction  on  the  ground  of  bona  fide  requirement.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on

Parliamentary debate on Delhi Rent Control Amendment

Bill,  1976.  Learned  counsel  submits  that  Hon’ble

Minister  of  State  in  the  Ministry  of  Works  and

Housing  on  the  Floor  of  the  House  stated  the

following:

“An apprehension was also expressed that commercial tenants would be evicted through summary  procedure.  First  of  all,  this procedure  is  confined  to  residential premises  and  secondly,  it  is  applicable only to Government servants and  bona fide necessities.  Nothing  else.  It  does  not apply  to  commercial  premises  and, therefore, there is no question of tenants being evicted from commercial premises.”

34. There cannot be any dispute to the submission of

the appellant that provision of Section 25B when it

was  inserted,  the  procedure  was  confined  to

residential  premises  as  has  been  stated  by  the

Hon’ble Minister on the Floor of the House. There

being no ground available to landlord for eviction of

44

a tenant of commercial premises on bona fide need,

there was no contemplation for applying the procedure

under Section 25B.

35. The question is as to whether non-consideration

of Section 25B by  Satyawati Sharma  renders judgment

of  Satyawati  Sharma  per  incuriam.  Satyawati  Sharma

was  considering  the  challenge  to  provisions  of

Section 14(1)(e) in sofaras the ground of bona fide

need  of  landlord  is  also  available  for  commercial

premises. Section 25B being related to only procedure

for considering the application under Section 14(1)

(e)has no bearing on the issue which had propped up

before  this  Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma.  Nothing  in

Section 25B can be read which runs counter to what

has been laid down by  Satyawati Sharma.  Whether a

procedure  giving  more  flexibility  to  tenants  of

commercial premises should be provided for is another

subject but non-reference of Section 25B by Satyawati

Sharma does not render the judgment per incuriam.  

36. We may also at this stage notice one submission

raised  by  the  counsel  for  the  respondent  that

judgment  of  Satyawati  Sharma has  been  affirmed  by

45

three-Judge Bench judgment in Super Max International

Pvt. Ltd. (supra).   The submission is countered by

the counsel for the appellant who contends that Super

Max  was a case which was dealing entirely different

subject and it cannot be said that ratio of Satyawati

Sharma has been affirmed in Super Max.  

37. We may now notice judgment of Super Max in some

detail.  Super Max was a case where this Court had

occasion to consider Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging

House Rates Control Act, 1947. In the above case, the

Government of Maharashtra was in occupation of sixth

floor of a building which used for housing the Office

of  the  Registrar,  Cooperative  Societies.  The

appellant suffered a decree of ejectment passed by

the  Court  of  Small  Causes.  The  decree  came  to  be

challenged  by  civil  revision  application  where  the

High Court stayed the execution of the decree subject

to  the  condition  that  the  shall  deposit  Rs.

5,40,000/- every month which amount was, however, not

allowed  to  be  withdrawn  by  the  appellant.  In

paragraph 8 this Court noticed:

“8. Of late, orders are coming to this

46

Court  where,  in  cases  arising  from ejectment  proceedings,  the  High  Courts, with a view to strike a balance between the competing interests of the landlord and  the  tenant,  pass  interim  orders asking the tenant to pay to the landlord or  deposit  in  Court,  as  monthly  rent, certain sum fixed by it (that, according to  the  High  Court,  should  be  the reasonable market rent for the tenanted premises), far in excess of the existing monthly rent.”

38. Three-Judge Bench in the above case noticed both

the  judgments  in  Gian  Devi  Anand  and  Satyawati

Sharma. The judgment of Satyawati Sharma specifically

paragraphs  12,  29  and  32  have  been  considered  in

paragraphs  67  to  70  of  the  judgment  which  are  as

follows:

“67. The  way  this  Court  has  been looking at the relationship between the landlord and the tenant in the past and the  shift  in  the  Court’s  approach  in recent times have been examined in some detail  in  the  decision  in  Satyawati Sharma v.  Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287. In that decision one of us (Singhvi, J.) speaking for the Court referred to a number of earlier decisions of the Court and (in para 12 of the judgment) observed as follows: (SCC pp. 304-05)

“12. Before proceeding further we consider  it  necessary  to  observe that  there  has  been  a  definite shift in the Court’s approach while

47

interpreting  the  rent  control legislations.  An  analysis  of  the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would  benefit  the  tenant—Mohinder Kumar v.  State of Haryana, (1985) 4  SCC  221,  Prabhakaran  Nair v. State  of  T.N.  (1987)  4  SCC  238, D.C.  Bhatia v.  Union  of  India, (1995)  1  SCC  104 and  C.N. Rudramurthy v.  K.  Barkathulla Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 275. In these and  other  cases,  the  Court consistently  held  that  the paramount  object  of  every  rent control legislation is to provide safeguards  for  tenants  against exploitation by landlords who seek to  take  undue  advantage  of  the pressing need for accommodation of a  large  number  of  people  looking for a house on rent for residence or  business  in  the  background  of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different  trend  is  clearly discernible  in  the  later judgments.”

68. The  learned  Judge  then  referred  to some later decisions and (in para 14 at SCC  p.  306  of  the  judgment)  quoted  a passage from the decision in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 to  the  following  effect:  (Joginder  Pal case, SCC p. 404, para 9)

“14. … ‘9. … The courts have to adopt  a  reasonable  and  balanced approach  while  interpreting  rent control legislations starting with an  assumption  that  an  equal treatment  has  been  meted  out  to

48

both the sections of the society. In  spite  of  the  overall  balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while  interpreting  such  of  the provisions as to take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour  of  the  landlords.  Such provisions  are  engrafted  in  rent control legislations to take care of  those  situations  where  the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble.’ ”

(emphasis in original)

69. Commenting  upon  the  Full  Bench decision of the Delhi High Court that had upheld  the  constitutional  validity  of Section  14(1)(e)  of  the  Delhi  Rent Control Act and that came under challenge in Satyawati Sharma, Singhvi, J. (in para 29 of the judgment) observed as follows: (SCC p. 318)

“29. … It is significant to note that  the  Full  Bench  did  not,  at all, advert to the question whether the  reason/cause  which  supplied rationale  to  the  classification continued  to  subsist  even  after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants  of  premises  let  for  non- residential  purposes  should continue  to  avail  the  benefit  of implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of  the  landlord  despite  see-saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in the availability of buildings and premises  which  could  be  let  for non-residential  or  commercial purposes.”

49

70. The decision in Satyawati Sharma then referred  to  the  doctrine  of  temporal reasonableness and in para 32 observed as follows: (SCC p. 320)

“32.  It  is  trite  to  say  that legislation  which  may  be  quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of  time  and/or  due  to  change  of circumstances  become  arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine  of  equality  and  even  if the  validity  of  such  legislation may  have  been  upheld  at  a  given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale  of  classification  has become non-existent.”

39. The ratio which was quoted by three-Judge Bench

from Satyawati Sharma was that which was laid down in

paragraph 32 of the Satyawati Sharma case. The ratio

in  Satyawati Sharma  that a Legislation which may be

quite  reasonable  and  rational  at  the  time  of  its

enactment  may  with  the  lapse  of  time  and  due  to

change  of  circumstances  become  arbitrary,

unreasonable  and  violative  of  the  doctrine  of

equality  has  been  affirmed  which  is  clear  from

paragraph 71 of the judgment. Paragraph 71 of three-

50

Judge Bench judgment is as follows:

“71. We reaffirm the views expressed in  Satyawati  Sharma and  emphasise  the need  for  a  more  balanced  and  objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant. This is not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all  tenants,  as  a  class,  are  in  dire circumstances  and  in  desperate  need  of the  Court’s  protection  under  all circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq ft in a building situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs 5236.58, plus  water  charges  at  the  rate  of  Rs 515.35  per  month  more  than  amply highlights the point.)”

40. It is true that in the above three-Judge Bench

judgment, the Court was not directly concerned with

Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Thus,

three-Judge Bench had the basis of  Satyawati Sharma

and on which basis Section 14(1)(e) was struck down

after working of the Act after more than 50 years.

We, thus, are of the view that three-Judge Bench in

Super Max approved limited ratio of Satyawati Sharma

as  extracted  by  three-Judge  Bench  which  fully

supports the submission that basis and reasoning on

which  Satyawati Sharma  struck down Section 14(1)(e)

51

partly stood on firm footing.  

Question No.2

41. We  having  rejected  the  submission  of  learned

counsel  for  the  appellant  that  the  judgment  of

Satyawati Sharma  is  per incuriam. Whether there is

any  ground  or  basis  on  which  the  judgment  of

Satyawati Sharma can be referred for re-consideration

is the next question to be answered.

42. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  not

referred  to  any  judgment  of  this  Court  which  has

sounded different note or which has taken a contrary

view to what has held in Satyawati Sharma case. What

is  emphasised  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant  is,  that  as  the  Legislature  has  never

intended  to  apply  Section  14(1)(e)for  commercial

premises which was clear from legislative intendment,

Satyawati Sharma could not have taken a view which is

contrary to the legislative intendment. By noticing

the three-Judge Bench judgment in Super Max, we have

already noticed that three-Bench has reaffirmed ratio

of  Satyawati Sharma  that the Legislation which was

quite  reasonable  and  rational  at  the  time  of  its

54

“8. There  is  considerable  judicial authority in support of the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that with  the  passage  of  time  a  legislation which  was  justified  when  enacted  may become  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  with the change in circumstances. In the State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1179, dealing with a question whether  geographical  classification  due to historical reasons would be valid this Court at SCR p. 853 observed as follows:

“Differential treatment arising out of the application of the laws so continued in different regions of the same reorganised State, did not therefore  immediately  attract  the clause  of  the  Constitution prohibiting discrimination. But by the passage of time, considerations of necessity and expediency would be  obliterated,  and  the  grounds which  justified  classification  of geographical regions for historical reasons may cease to be valid. A purely  temporary  provision  which because  of  compelling  forces justified  differential  treatment when  the  Reorganisation  Act  was enacted  cannot  obviously  be permitted to assume permanency, so as  to  perpetuate  that  treatment without a rational basis to support it after the initial expediency and necessity have disappeared.”

31. Taking  all  the  facts  and circumstances into consideration we have no doubt that the existing provisions of the  Bombay  Rent  Act  relating  to  the determination  and  fixation  of  the standard rent can no longer be considered

55

to  be  reasonable.  The  said  provisions would have been struck down as having now become unreasonable and arbitrary but we think it is not necessary to strike down the same in view of the fact that the present  extended  period  of  the  Bombay Rent Act comes to an end on 31-3-1998. The  Government’s  thinking  reflected  in various documents itself shows that the existing  provisions  have  now  become unreasonable  and,  therefore,  require reconsideration.  The  new  bill  is  under consideration  and  we  leave  it  to  the legislature to frame a just and fair law keeping  in  view  the  interests  of  all concerned  and  in  particular  the resolution  of  the  State  Ministers  for Housing  of  1992  and  the  National  Model Law  which  has  been  circulated  by  the Central  Government  in  1992.  We  are  not expressing any opinion on the provisions of the said Model Law but as the same has been drafted and circulated amongst all the  States  after  due  deliberation  and thought, there will, perhaps, have to be very  good  and  compelling  reasons  in departing  from  the  said  Model  Law.  Mr Nargolkar assured us that this Model Law will be taken into consideration in the framing of the proposed new Rent Control Act.”

44. The  above  principles  have  been  reiterated  in

following judgments:

(i) Anuj Garg and Others Vs. Hotel Association of

India  and  Others,  (2008)  3  SCC  1 reiterated  the

principle  that  a  statute  although  could  have  been

56

held to be a valid piece of legislation keeping in

view the societal condition of those times, but with

the changes occurring therein, such a law can also be

declared  invalid.   In  Paragraph  Nos.  7,  8  and  9,

following has been laid down:-

“7. The  Act  is  a  pre-constitutional legislation. Although it is saved in terms of  Article  372  of  the  Constitution, challenge to its validity on the touchstone of  Articles  14,  15  and  19  of  the Constitution  of  India,  is  permissible  in law.  While  embarking  on  the  questions raised, it may be pertinent to know that a statute although could have been held to be a  valid  piece  of  legislation  keeping  in view the societal condition of those times, but with the changes occurring therein both in  the  domestic  as  also  in  international arena,  such  a  law  can  also  be  declared invalid.

8. In  John Vallamattom v.  Union of India, (2003)  6  SCC  611, this  Court,  while referring  to  an  amendment  made  in  UK  in relation to a provision which was in pari materia  with  Section  118  of  the  Indian Succession Act, observed: (SCC p. 624, para 28)

“28.  …  The  constitutionality  of  a provision, it is trite, will have to be  judged  keeping  in  view  the interpretative changes of the statute affected by passage of time.”

Referring to the changing legal scenario and having regard to the Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the World

57

Conference on Human Rights as also Article 18 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and  Political  Rights,  1966,  it  was  held: (John  Vallamattom  case,  SCC  p.  625,  para 33)

“33. It is trite that having regard to Article 13(1) of the Constitution, the constitutionality of the impugned legislation  is  required  to  be considered  on  the  basis  of  laws existing  on  26-1-1950,  but  while doing so the court is not precluded from  taking  into  consideration  the subsequent  events  which  have  taken place thereafter. It is further trite that  the  law  although  may  be constitutional when enacted but with passage of time the same may be held to be unconstitutional in view of the changed situation.”

9. Changed social psyche and expectations are important factors to be considered in the  upkeep  of  law.  Decision  on  relevance will be more often a function of time we are  operating  in.  Primacy  to  such transformation  in  constitutional  rights analysis  would  not  be  out  of place……………………………….  

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”

(ii)In Saradamani Kandappan Vs. S. Rajalakshmi &

Ors.,  (2011)  12  SCC  18,  Justice  R.V.  Raveendran

speaking for the Court reiterated the same principles

in paragraph Nos. 38 and 39 in the following words:-

“38. It  is  now  well  settled  that  laws,

58

which  may  be  reasonable  and  valid  when made,  can,  with  passage  of  time  and consequential  change  in  circumstances, become  arbitrary  and  unreasonable.  In Rattan Arya v.  State of T.N.7 this Court held: (SCC pp. 389-90, para 4)

“4. … We must also observe here that whatever justification there may have been in 1973 when Section 30(ii) was amended by imposing a ceiling of Rs 400  on  rent  payable  by  tenants  of residential buildings to entitle them to seek the protection of the Act, the  passage  of  time  has  made  the ceiling  utterly  unreal.  We  are entitled to take judicial notice of the  enormous  multifold  increase  of rents  throughout  the  country, particularly  in  urban  areas.  It  is common  knowledge  today  that  the accommodation  which  one  could  have possibly got for Rs 400 per month in 1973 will today cost at least five times  more.  In  these  days  of universal,  day-to-day  escalation  of rentals  any  ceiling  such  as  that imposed by Section 30(ii) in 1973 can only  be  considered  to  be  totally artificial and irrelevant today. As held by this Court in  Motor General Traders v.  State  of  A.P.8 a provision which was perfectly valid at the commencement of the Act could be challenged later on the ground of unconstitutionality  and  struck  down on  that  basis.  What  was  once  a perfectly valid legislation, may in course  of  time,  become discriminatory  and  liable  to challenge on the ground of its being violative of Article 14.”

(emphasis supplied)

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39. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 2 SCC 1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the validity of  determination  of  standard  rent  by freezing or pegging down the rent as on 1- 9-1940 or as on the date of first letting, under  Sections  5(10)(b),  7,  9(2)(b)  and 12(3)  of  the  Bombay  Rents,  Hotel  and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. This Court  held  that  the  said  process  of determination  under  the  Act,  which  was reasonable  when  the  law  was  made,  became arbitrary  and  unreasonable  in  view  of constant  escalation  of  prices  due  to inflation and corresponding rise (sic fall) in money value with the passage of time. This Court held: (SCC pp. 22-23, paras 29 & 31)

“29. Insofar as social legislation, like  the  Rent  Control  Act  is concerned,  the  law  must  strike  a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society. When there is shortage of  accommodation  it  is  desirable, nay, necessary that some protection should be given to the tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited. At the same time such a law has to be revised periodically so  as  to  ensure  that  a disproportionately  larger  benefit than the one which was intended is not given to the tenants…….

* * * 31.  Taking  all  the  facts  and circumstances  into  consideration  we have  no  doubt  that  the  existing provisions  of  the  Bombay  Rent  Act

60

relating  to  the  determination  and fixation of the standard rent can no longer  be  considered  to  be reasonable.”

It is relevant to note that Justice Raveendran

has  placed  reliance  on  earlier  judgments  of  this

Court in Rattan Arya Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra)

and Malpe Vishwanath Acharya (supra), which judgments

have  already  been  referred  to  and  relied  by  this

Court  in  Satyawati  Sharma’s  case.   Thus,  the

proposition,  which  was  laid  down  in  Satyawati

Sharma’s  case  relying  on  above  two  judgments  have

again  been  reiterated  by  this  Court  in  Sardarmani

Kandappan (supra)  in Paragraph Nos. 38 and 39, as

noted above.

(iii)  The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in

Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Others

Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2016) 7 SCC

353,  speaking  through  Dr.  Justice  A.K.  Sikri  in

paragraph  Nos.  69  and  92,  following  has  been

observed:-

“69. ………………………………………It is rightly said that the  law  is  not  an  Eden  of  concepts  but rather an everyday life of needs, interests

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and the values that a given society seeks to realise in a given time. The law is a tool which is intended to provide solutions for  the  problems  of  human  being  in  a society.   92. ………………………………Law is not static, it has to change with changing times and changing social/societal conditions.”

45. Much  emphasis  has  been  given  by  the  learned

counsel for the appellant on the fact that various

tenants are tenants of small shops which are their

source of livelihood when application under 14(1)(e)

filed by the landlord on bona fide need, they are not

even entitled to contest the application by filing

written statement. They are obliged to obtain leave

to defend as per Section 25B which leave to defend is

rejected  in  most  of  the  cases  which  causes  great

hardship on the tenants. It is submitted that in so

far as applicability of the procedure under Section

25B is concerned, the issue needs to be revisited to

save  the  tenants  from  hardship.  In  our  view  this

cannot  be  a  ground  for  referring  the  judgment  of

Satyawati Sharma  to larger Bench for reconsideration

of  judgment  of  Satyawati  Sharma.  Satyawati  Sharma

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having not said about the procedure, there is nothing

in the judgment which needs to be revisited on the

above aspect. It is for the Legislature to take stock

of  situation  and  if  it  so  decides  it  can  make

necessary  changes  in  the  procedure  for  considering

the application under Section 14(1)(e) with regard to

eviction of commercial tenants on the ground of bona

fide need of the land lord. We need to add nothing

more on the subject. In sofaras submission of the

learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  is  that  under

Section  14(1)(e)  in  respect  of  commercial  tenancy

leave to defend is generally rejected, it is suffice

to say that rejection of leave for a particular case

is matter to be examined in each case and no general

observation can be made in this regard.  

46. There  is  one  more  aspect  of  the  matter  which

needs  to  be  noted.  We  have  already  extracted

observation  of  Constitution  Bench  judgment  in  Gian

Devi  Anand  in  paragraph  39  where  the  Constitution

Bench observed that bona fide need of the landlord

stands very much on the same footing in regard to

either class of premises, residential or commercial.

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We, therefore, suggest that Legislature may consider

the advisability of making the bona fide requirement

of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of

commercial premises as well. After more that a decade

of  the  above  observation,  a  comprehensive

Legislation, namely, Delhi Rent Act, 1995 has been

enacted  to  provide  for  the  regulation  of  rents,

repairs  and  maintenance  and  evictions  relating  to

premises and of rates of hotels and lodging houses in

the National Capital Territory of Delhi. In Act, 1995

the definition of premises as was contained in Act,

1958  remained  same.  With  regard  to  protection  of

tenant  against  eviction  a  new  Section  22(r)  which

provides as follows:

“Section  22(r)  that  the  premises  let for residential or non-residential purposes are required, whether in the same form or after  re-construction  or  re-building,  by the landlord for occupation for residential or non-residential purpose for himself or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord  or  such  person  has  no  other reasonably suitable accommodation:

Provided that where the landlord has acquired  the  premises  by  transfer,  no application for the recovery of possession of  such  premises  shall  lie  under  this

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clause unless a period of three years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition:  

Provided  further  that  where  an  order for  the  recovery  of  possession  of  any premises is made on the ground specified in this clause, the landlord shall be entitled to  obtain  possession  thereof  on  the expiration of a period of six months in the case of residential premises and one year in  the  case  of  non-residential  premises from  the  date  of  passing  of  eviction order.”

47. We may notice another three-Judge Bench judgment

of this Court, i.e., Subramanian Swamy and others vs.

Raju  through  Member,  Juvenile  Justice  Board  and

another, (2014) 8 SCC 390.  This Court in the above

judgment laid down that reading down the provisions

of a statute cannot be resorted to when the meaning

thereof is plain and unambiguous and the legislative

intent is clear. We need to notice the issues raised

in  the  above  case  and  the  ratio  of  the  judgment.

Above was a case where a lady of 23 years in age in

moving  bus  was  brutally  assaulted  sexually  and

physically. The lady succumbed to her injuries. Five

persons  were  apprehended  in  connection  with  the

crime. The respondent, Raju was below 18 years of age

on the date of commission of the crime. His case was

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referred for inquiry to the Juvenile Justice Board.

The other accused were tried in a regular Sessions

Court  and  have  been  found  guilty  of  the  offences

under Section 376(2)(g) and Section 302 of the Penal

Code. Other accused were sentenced to death, appeal

against which was dismissed by the High court. The

petitioners  had  filed  applications  for  impleadment

before the Juvenile Justice Board. The case of the

petitioners was that on a proper interpretation of

the  Act  (Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of

Children)  Act,  2000),  the  Juvenile(respondent)  was

not entitled to the benefits under the Act but was

liable to be tried under the penal law of the land in

a  regular  criminal  court  along  with  the  other

accused.  

48. A writ petition was also filed in the High Court

praying  for  an  authoritative  interpretation  of

Sections 2(l) and 2(k) of the Act that the criterion

of 18 years set out therein does not comprehend cases

of grave offences in general and of heinous crimes

against women in particular that shakes the root of

humanity in general. The writ petition was dismissed

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by the High Court holding that against the order of

the Juvenile Justice Board the alternative remedies

were available under the Act which should be first

exhausted.  The  prayer  for  impleadment  of  the

petitioners was also rejected.  

49. A  Special  Leave  Petition  against  the  above

judgment of the High Court as well as writ petition

was  filed  in  this  Court.  The  submissions  of

petitioners were noted by this Court. In paragraphs

59 and 60 this Court noticed the submissions made on

behalf of the petitioner as below:

“59. Dr. Swamy at the outset has urged that there is no attempt on his part to challenge  the  constitutional  validity  of the  Act,  particularly,  the  provisions contained in Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of the Act and what he seeks is a mere reading down of the Act……  

60. Dr. Swamy would urge that the relevant provisions of the Act i.e. Sections 1(4), 2(k), 2(l) and 7 must be read to mean that juveniles  (children  below  the  age  of  18) who  are  intellectually,  emotionally  and mentally  mature  enough  to  understand  the implications  of  their  acts  and  who  have committed serious crimes do not come under the purview of the Act. Such juveniles are liable to be dealt with under the penal law of the country and by the regular hierarchy of courts under the criminal justice system administered in India……”

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50. This  Court  in  the  background  of  the  above

submissions laid down following in paragraph 61:

“61. Reading down the provisions of a statute  cannot  be  resorted  to  when  the meaning  thereof  is  plain  and  unambiguous and  the  legislative  intent  is  clear.  The fundamental principle of the "reading down" doctrine  can  be  summarized  as  follows. Courts must read the legislation literally in the first instance. If on such reading and  understanding  the  vice  of unconstitutionality  is  attracted,  the courts must explore whether there has been an unintended legislative omission. If such an  intendment  can  be  reasonably  implied without  undertaking  what,  unmistakably, would  be  a  legislative  exercise,  the  Act may  be  read  down  to  save  it  from unconstitutionality. The above is a fairly well  established  and  well  accepted principle  of  interpretation  which  having been  reiterated  by  this  Court  time  and again  would  obviate  the  necessity  of  any recall  of  the  huge  number  of  precedents available  except,  perhaps,  the  view  of Sawant,  J.  (majority  view)  in  Delhi Transport  Corporation  v.  D.T.C.  Mazdoor Congress and Ors. 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600 which succinctly sums up the position is, therefore, extracted below: (SCC pp.728-29, para 255)

“255.  It  is  thus  clear  that  the doctrine  of  reading  down  or  of recasting the statute can be applied in  limited  situations.  It  is essentially used, firstly, for saving a  statute  from  being  struck  down  on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when  two  interpretations  are

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possible--one  rendering  it constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions  of  the  Constitution.  The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are  vague  and  ambiguous  and  it  is possible to gather the intentions of the legislature from the object of the statute,  the  context  in  which  the provision occurs and the purpose for which  it  is  made.  However,  when  the provision  is  cast  in  a  definite  and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to  mend  or  bend  it  even  if  such recasting  is  in  accord  with  good reason  and  conscience.  In  such circumstances, it is not possible for the court to remake the statute. Its only  duty  is  to  strike  it  down  and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the remaking of the statute by the courts  is  to  lead  to  its  distortion that  course  is  to  be  scrupulously avoided. One of the situations further where the doctrine can never be called into  play  is  where  the  statute requires  extensive  additions  and deletions. Not only it is no part of the  court's  duty  to  undertake  such exercise,  but  it  is  beyond  its jurisdiction to do so.””

51. Rejecting  the  submission  of  the  petitioner  to

read down the statute following was held in paragraph

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64:

“64.If the provisions of the Act clearly indicate  the  legislative  intent  in  the light  of  the  country's  international commitments and the same is in conformity with the constitutional requirements, it is not necessary for the Court to understand the  legislation  in  any  other  manner.  In fact,  if  the  Act  is  plainly  read  and understood, which we must do, the resultant effect  thereof  is  wholly  consistent  with Article 14. The Act, therefore, need not be read down, as suggested, to save it from the  vice  of  unconstitutionality  for  such unconstitutionality does not exist.”

52. Now reverting to the judgment of this Court in

Satyawati Sharma (supra), in the said judgment this

Court  did  not  read  down  the  provision  of  Section

14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. This Court

held that Section 14(1)(e) is not intra vires the

doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the

Constitution.  In  paragraph  31  following  was  laid

down:

“31………In  our  considered  view,  the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of the 1958  Act  has,  with  the  passage  of  time (almost  50  years),  become  so  pronounced that  the  impugned  provision  cannot  be treated  intra  vires  Article  14  of  the Constitution  by  applying  any  rational criteria.”

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53. After considering all aspects of the matter, this

Court in  Satyawati Sharma (AIR 2008 SC 3148) held

that Section 14(1)(e) is violative of the doctrine of

equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution.

This  Court,  thus,  struck  down  the  discriminatory

portion of Section 14(1)(e). In paragraphs 38 and 39

following was laid down:

“38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is  violative  of  the  doctrine  of  equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of  India  insofar  as  it  discriminates between  the  premises  let  for  residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant  from  the  premises  let  for residential purposes only.”

39. However, the aforesaid declaration should  not  be  misunderstood  as  total striking  down  of  Section  14(1)(e)  of  the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned Counsel argued  that  Section  14(1)(e)  is unconstitutional  in  its  entirety  and  we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e)…”  

54. The judgment of Satyawati Sharma was, thus, not a

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case of reading down of Section 14(1)(e) rather it

was  a  case  where  portion  of  Section  14(1)(e)  was

struck  down  as  discriminatory  and  violative  of

Article  14  of  the  Constitution.  Thus,  three-Judge

Bench  judgment  in  Subramanian  Swamy  and  others

(supra)  is  clearly  distinguishable  and  does  not

affect  the  ratio  laid  down  by  two-Judge  Bench

judgment in Satyawati Sharma case.

55. The  Legislature  itself  notices  the  need  for

providing a ground for eviction to landlord on bona

fide need with regard to residential as well as non-

residential  premises.  Thus,  what  was  said  in  Gian

Devi  Anand  in  paragraph  39  was  duly  accepted  by

Legislature.  It  is  another  matter  that  Delhi  Rent

Act,  1995  even  though  it  received  assent  of  the

President  could  not  be  enforced.  Section  1(3)

provided that it shall come into force on such date

as the Central Government may, by notification in the

Official Gazette, appoint. Central Government did not

issue any notification in the Official Gazette for

enforcement of the Act. Writ Petition was filed in

Delhi High Court for issuance of mandamus to Central

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Government to enforce Act, 1995 which was dismissed.

From the above, it is clear that what was observed by

Gian Devi Anand was also accepted by the Legislature

in providing for eviction from both the residential

and non-residential premises on the ground of bona

fide need in Act, 1995. Although, said Act could not

be enforced, the Legislation is complete when the Act

is passed by the Legislature and receives the assent

of the President.  

56. A  Constitution  Bench  in  State  of  Kerala  and

others  vs.  Mar  Appraem  Kuri  Company  Limited  and

another, (2012) 7 SCC 106,  laid down following in

paragraphs 50 and 51:

“50. Broadly speaking, law-making is exclusively  the  function  of  the legislatures (see Articles 79 and 168). The President and the Governor are a part of the Union or the legislatures of the States.  As  far  as  Parliament  is concerned,  the  legislative  process  is complete  as  soon  as  the  procedure prescribed  by  Article  107  of  the Constitution and connected provisions are followed and the Bill passed by both the Houses  of  Parliament  has  received  the assent  of  the  President  under  Article 111.  Similarly,  a  State  legislation becomes an Act as soon as a Bill has been passed  by  the  State  Legislature  and  it has received the assent of the Governor

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in  accordance  with  Article  200.  It  is only  in  the  situation  contemplated  by Article 254(2) that a State legislation is  required  to  be  reserved  for consideration  and  assent  by  the President. Thus, irrespective of the date of  enforcement  of  a  parliamentary  or State  enactment,  a  Bill  becomes  an  Act and comes on the statute book immediately on receiving the assent of the President or  the  Governor,  as  the  case  may  be, which assent has got to be published in the Official Gazette.

51. The legislature, in exercise of its legislative power, may either enforce an Act, which has been passed and which has received the assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, from a specified  date  or  leave  it  to  some designated  authority  to  fix  a  date  for its  enforcement.  Such  legislations  are conditional legislations as in such cases no  part  of  the  legislative  function  is left  unexercised.  In  such  legislations, merely  because  the  legislature  has postponed the enforcement of the Act, it does not mean that the law has not been made.”

57. The above authority duly supports our view that

law has been made by the Parliament in enacting Act,

1995  which  accepts  the  suggestion  of  Constitution

Bench in Gian Devi Anand and hence what has been held

by  Satyawati Sharma  was felt both by this Court and

Legislature. We, thus, do not find any good ground to

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refer the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma

for  reconsideration  by  a  larger  Bench.  We,  thus,

reject the submission of the learned counsel for the

appellant that Satyawati Sharma needs to be referred

to a larger Bench for reconsideration.  

58. We having decided the above issue let the appeals

be now listed for consideration on merits.

    ......................J.                                ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.                                ( K.M. JOSEPH ) New Delhi, August 05, 2019