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            NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.181 OF 1998

VILAS V. SANGHAI  … APPELLANT

VERSUS

SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA  & ANR.                                                 …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.210 OF 1998

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA     … APPELLANT

VERSUS

SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA  & ANR.                                                 …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T ANIL R. DAVE, J.

1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 22nd December,

1997 delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay

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in Criminal  Writ  Petition No.22 of  1994, Criminal  Appeal

No.181 of 1998 has been filed by Vilas V. Sanghai against

the  order  of  punishment  imposed  upon  him  under  the

provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter

referred  to  as  “the  Act”)  and  Criminal  Appeal  No.210  of

1998 has been filed by the State of Maharashtra for setting

aside the said judgment.

2. The  facts  giving  rise  to  the  present  litigation  in  a

nutshell are as under :-

As  two  appeals  have  been  filed  against  the  same

judgment, for narration of the facts, we have referred to the

facts from Criminal Appeal No.181 of 1998, which has been

filed  by  Vilas  V.  Sanghai,  a  Police  Inspector,  who  was

entrusted  with  investigation  of  a  case  filed  against

Respondent No.1, Sumermal Mishrimal Bafna, a Trustee of

Bafna  Charitable  Trust.   Respondent  no.1,  who  is  aged

about 64 years and is having some heart ailment, claims to

be a man with good reputation.  A private complaint was

filed against Respondent No.1 by Shri Umesh Karia to the

effect  that  Respondent  No.1  had  committed  an  offence

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punishable under the provisions of Section 420 read with

Sections  120-B  and  109  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code.

Investigation  in  relation  to  the  said  complaint  had  been

entrusted to the Appellant, who was attached to the Crime

Branch at the relevant time.

3. Respondent No.1 had an apprehension that he might

be arrested in the course of investigation and therefore, he

had filed an application for anticipatory bail.   During the

pendency  of  the  said  anticipatory  bail  application,  the

Appellant used to remain present to brief the learned Public

Prosecutor,  who  was  opposing  the  said  application.   No

interim order was passed in the said application when the

application  was  being  heard  but  in  the  presence  of  the

Appellant and in pursuance of the instructions given by the

Appellant,  the  learned  Public  Prosecutor  had  made  a

statement that during the pendency of the said application,

Respondent  No.1  would  not  be  arrested,  provided

Respondent  No.1  would  cooperate  with  the  Police  in  the

investigation.

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4. In spite of the aforestated assurance given to the Court

by  the  learned  Public  Prosecutor  in  pursuance  of  the

instructions given by the Appellant, Respondent No.1 was

arrested on 21st September,  1993,  though hearing of  the

anticipatory bail application was fixed on 22nd September,

1993.  The case made out against the Appellant was that

after the arrest, Respondent No.1 was handcuffed and was

photographed  in  handcuffed  condition  and  the  said

photograph  had  been  published  in  local  newspapers.

Publication  of  such  a  photograph  adversely  affected

reputation of Respondent No.1.

5. In  the  aforestated  circumstances,  Respondent  No.1

had initiated contempt proceedings against the Appellant as

the Appellant had committed breach of an assurance given

to  the  Court  through  the  learned  Public  Prosecutor  that

Respondent  No.1  would  not  be  arrested  during  the

pendency of the anticipatory bail application.

6. In  the  aforestated  contempt  proceedings,  defence  of

the Appellant was that the assurance or undertaking which

had been given to the Court was conditional.  The condition

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was that Respondent No.1 would extend his cooperation in

the  investigation,  but  as  Respondent  No.1  was  not

cooperative and was deliberately trying to create hurdles in

the investigation,  the Appellant was constrained to arrest

Respondent No.1 on 21st September, 1993.

7. After hearing the concerned parties and looking at the

record,  the  High  Court  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the

Appellant was guilty of committing contempt of Court and

was, therefore, sentenced to simple imprisonment for 7 days

with a fine of Rs.2,000/-.  

8. The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  Appellant

submitted that the Appellant had not committed criminal

contempt, as alleged or otherwise.  The main thrust of the

argument of the learned counsel was that the provisions of

Section 15 of the Act had not been complied with before

passing  the  impugned  order  punishing  the  Appellant  for

committing criminal contempt of Court.  He also submitted

that there was no breach of any undertaking or assurance

given to the Court as the assurance given on behalf of the

Appellant was conditional.  By not extending cooperation to

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the investigating agency, Respondent No.1 had committed

breach of his assurance and therefore, undertaking given by

the Appellant had also come to an end.  

9. So  far  as  the  legal  provisions  are  concerned,  he

submitted that the provisions of Section 15 of the Act ought

to  have  been complied  with  for  initiating  proceedings  for

punishing  the  Appellant  for  criminal  contempt.   In  the

instant case, the action was not initiated on a Motion made

by  the  Advocate  General  or  on  a  reference  made  by  the

subordinate  Court  concerned  as  per  the  provisions  of

Section 15 of the Act.  For the aforestated reason, the entire

proceedings were vitiated.

10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for

Respondent No.1 supported the order passed by the High

Court and submitted that there was clear violation of the

undertaking  given  by  the  Appellant  to  the  Court.   He

stressed on the fact that the application for anticipatory bail

was to be heard on 22nd September, 1993 and Respondent

No.1 was arrested on 21st September, 1993.  There was no

justifiable  reason  for  arresting  Respondent  No.1  a  day

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before the date of hearing.  The Appellant could have very

well waited for a day and could have made the grievance

before the Court that Respondent No.1 was not cooperative

and therefore,  the  investigation was  adversely  affected,  if

the  averment  with  regard  to  non-cooperation  of  the

Appellant was correct.  Instead of waiting for a day, in a hot

haste,  the  Appellant  arrested  Respondent  No.1  on  21st

September, 1993 and the said fact clearly denotes that the

Appellant had very scant respect for the assurance given by

him  to  the  Court.   He,  therefore,  submitted  that  the

impugned order is just and proper and therefore, the Appeal

deserved dismissal.  

11. We have heard the learned counsel and have recorded

the facts of the case.   

12. We find substance in what has been submitted by the

learned counsel appearing for the Appellant.

13. The impugned order is in violation of the provisions of

Section 15 of the Act.  Relevant portion of Section 15 reads

as under :

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“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases. -  (1) In the case of  a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by —

(a) the Advocate-General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing to the Advocate-General, or  

(c) in  relation  to  the  High  Court  for  the  Union territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Central Government may,  by notification in the Official Gazette,  specify  in  this  behalf,  or  any  other person, with the consent in writing of such Law Officer.

(2) In  the  case  of  any  criminal  contempt  of  a subordinate  court,  the  High  Court  may  take action  on  a  reference  made  to  it  by  the subordinate court  or  on a motion made by the Advocate-General  or,  in  relation  to  a  Union territory,  by  such  Law  Officer  as  the  Central Government may,  by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.

(3) xxx xxx xxx.”

14. In the instant case, the alleged criminal contempt was

of a subordinate Court and therefore, the action could have

been taken on a reference made to the High Court by the

subordinate Court or  on a Motion made by the Advocate

General,  but  the  proceedings  had  been  initiated  in

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pursuance of an application submitted by Respondent No.1.

From the record, we do not find that the learned Advocate

General had ever given his consent for initiation of the said

proceedings.

15. Without going into the facts of the case, only on this

limited ground that the criminal contempt proceedings had

not been initiated as per the provisions of Section 15 of the

Act,  in  our  opinion,  the  proceedings  are  vitiated  and

therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court is

neither  just  nor  legal  and  therefore,  we  set  aside  the

impugned order.

16. The appeals are accordingly disposed of as allowed.

.…………………………….J.                  (ANIL R. DAVE)

……………………………..J.                                (L. NAGESWARA RAO)

NEW DELHI SEPTEMBER 30, 2016.