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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.462 OF 2008

Venkatesan ... Appellant(s) Versus

Rani & Anr. ... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. What are the true contours of the jurisdiction vested in  

the High Courts under Section 397 read with Section 401 of  

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter for short  

‘the Code’)  while examining an order of acquittal passed by  

the  Trial  Court?   Whether  the  principles  governing  the  

exercise  of  the  aforesaid  jurisdiction  have  been  rightly  

determined  by  the  High  Court  in  the  present  case  and,  

therefore, had been correctly applied to reverse the order of  

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acquittal  of  the  accused-appellant  passed  by  the  learned  

Trial Court and to remit the matter to the said Court for a de  

novo disposal,  is  the  further  question  that  arises  in  the  

present  appeal  filed  against  an  order  dated  27.04.2006  

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras.

2. The  appellant  is  the  husband  of  one  Anusuya  who,  

according  to  the  prosecution,  was  put  to  death  by  the  

appellant  on  19.4.2000  by  pouring  kerosene  on  her  and  

thereafter  setting her  on fire.   The marriage between the  

appellant and the deceased took place sometime in the year  

1998 on the own accord of the parties.   According to the  

prosecution,  after  the  marriage,  the  appellant  raised  

demands for various dowry items including cash.  As such  

demands  were  only  partially  met  by  the  parents  of  the  

deceased  the  appellant,  according  to  the  prosecution,  

harassed and ill treated the deceased and eventually caused  

her death on 19.4.2000.  On the basis of the aforesaid facts  

alleged by the prosecution, the accused-appellant was put to  

trial for commission of offences under Sections 498A, 304-B  

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and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.  The Trial Court, on the  

grounds and reasons assigned, which will  be duly noticed,  

acquitted the accused-appellant.  Aggrieved, the mother of  

the deceased invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High  

Court to challenge the acquittal.  By the impugned judgment  

and order  dated 27.04.2006 the  High  Court  held  that  the  

order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court suffered  

from certain inherent flaws which justified a reversal of the  

same and for remission of the matter for a fresh decision in  

accordance with law and the directions set out in the said  

order of the High Court.   

3. We have heard Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the  

appellant  and  Mr.  M.  Yogesh  Kanna,  learned  counsel  

appearing for the State.

4. Learned counsel  for the appellant  has submitted that  

the acquittal of the accused-appellant made by the learned  

Trial Court is based on a full and complete consideration of  

the evidence and materials on record.  It is submitted that  

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cogent  reasons  have  been  assigned  by  the  learned  Trial  

Court  in  support  of the  acquittal  ordered by it.   It  is  also  

contended that  the  High  Court  has  erroneously taken  the  

view that the order of the learned Trial Court lacks clarity on  

the vital aspects of the case as outlined in the order of the  

High Court dated 27.04.2006.  All the issues highlighted by  

the High Court in its order dated 27.04.2006 have, in fact,  

been dealt with by the learned Trial Court.  The reversal of  

the acquittal by the High Court is, therefore, contended to be  

wholly unjustified.

5. Opposing  the  contentions  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  

accused-appellant, learned counsel for the State has urged  

that  no  acceptable  basis  for  the  impugned  acquittal  is  

evident  in  the  order  of  the  learned  Trial  Court.   Learned  

counsel  has  supported  the  findings  recorded  by  the  High  

Court by contending that there is lack of clarity and absence  

of  categorical  findings  on  vital  issues  of  the  case  which  

makes  it  imperative  that  the  impugned  order  of  remand  

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made by the High Court by its order dated 27.04.2006 be  

maintained. No interference with the same would be justified.

6. To answer the questions that have arisen in the present  

case, as noticed  at the very outset, the extent and ambit of  

the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly in the  

context  of  exercise  thereof  in  respect  of  a  judgment  of  

acquittal, may be briefly noticed.  The law in this regard is  

well  settled  by  a  catena  of  decisions  of  this  Court.  

Illustratively, as also chronologically, the decisions rendered  

in  Pakalapati  Narayana Gajapathi  Raju vs.  Bonapalli   

Peda Appadu1, Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram2, Mahendra  

Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh3,  K. Chinnaswamy Reddy  

v.  State of A.P.4  and  Logendranath Jha v.  Polai  Lal   

Biswas5 may be referred to.  Specifically and for the purpose  

of a detailed illumination on the subject the contents of paras  

8  and  10  of  the  judgment  in  the  case  of  Akalu Ahir  v.  

Ramdeo Ram (supra) may be usefully extracted below.   1(1975) 4 SCC 477 2 (1973) 2 SCC 583 3 AIR 1968 SC 707 4 AIR1962 SC 1788 5 AIR 1951 SC 316

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“8. This Court,  however,  by way of illustration,  indicated the following categories of cases which  would justify the High Court in interfering with a  finding of acquittal in revision:

(i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction  to  try  the  case,  but  has  still  acquitted  the  accused;

(ii) Where the trial court has wrongly shut  out evidence which the prosecution wished to  produce;

(iii) Where the appellate court has wrongly  held the evidence which was admitted by the  trial court to be inadmissible;

(iv) Where the material evidence has been  overlooked only (either) by the trial court or  by the appellate court; and

(v)  Where  the  acquittal  is  based  on  the  compounding of the offence which is  invalid  under the law.

These  categories  were,  however,  merely  illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of  similar nature can also be properly held to be of  exceptional  nature  where  the  High  Court  can  justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.”

“10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the  trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or  free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well  have  felt  justified  in  disagreeing  with  its  conclusion, but from this it does not follow that  on revision by a private complainant,  the High  Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for  itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and  then  order  a  re-trial.  It  is  unfortunate  that  a  serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy  in the matter of election to the office of village  Mukhia,  should  go  unpunished.  But  that  can  scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not   

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strictly following the law as enunciated by this   Court.”

The observations in para 9 in the case of Vimal Singh  

v. Khuman Singh6 would also be apt for recapitulation and,  

therefore, are being extracted below.

“9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High  Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High  Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily  interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by  the trial  court unless there has been manifest  error of law or procedure. The interference with  the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is  limited only to exceptional cases when it is found  that the order under revision suffers from glaring  illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or  when  it  is  found  that  the  trial  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  try  the  case  or  where  the  trial  court has illegally shut out the evidence which  otherwise  ought  to  have  been  considered  or  where the material evidence which clinches the  issue  has  been  overlooked.  These  are  the  instances  where  the  High  Court  would  be  justified in interfering with the order of acquittal.  Sub-section  (3)  of  Section  401  mandates  that  the  High  Court  shall  not  convert  a  finding  of  acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High  Court  would not  be justified in  substituting an  order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it  is  convinced  that  the  accused  deserves  conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise  of its revisional power can set aside an order of  acquittal  if  it  comes  within  the  ambit  of  exceptional  cases  enumerated  above,  but  it  

6  (1998) 7 SCC 223

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cannot  convert  an  order  of  acquittal  into  an  order of conviction. The only course left to the  High Court in such exceptional cases is to order  retrial.”

7. The  above  consideration  would  go  to  show  that  the  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an  

order  of  acquittal  is  extremely  narrow  and  ought  to  be  

exercised only in cases where the Trial Court had committed  

a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and  

ignored  relevant  and  material  evidence  thereby  causing  

miscarriage  of  justice.   Re-appreciation  of  evidence  is  an  

exercise  that  the  High  Court  must  refrain  from  while  

examining  an  order  of  acquittal  in  the  exercise  of  its  

revisional  jurisdiction under the Code.  Needless to say, if  

within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court  

is justified the only course of action that can be  adopted is  

to order a re-trial after setting aside the acquittal.  As the  

language of Section 401 of the Code makes it amply clear  

there  is  no  power  vested  in  the  High  Court  to  convert  a  

finding of acquittal into one of conviction.   

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8. In the present case, the prosecution had examined as  

many as 12 witnesses.  PW-1 Thiru Srinivasan is the father of  

the  deceased  whereas  PW-2  Thirumathi  Rani  (petitioner  

before the High Court)  is  the mother.   Both the aforesaid  

witnesses had stated in their depositions that there was no  

demand for dowry by the accused and that the accused and  

deceased  had  married  on  their  own  volition.   The  two  

witnesses  had  further  stated  that  whatever  was  given  by  

them as dowry items was voluntary.  Insofar as demand for  

cash  (allegedly  made  on  three  different  occasions)  is  

concerned, PW-1 and PW-2 could not account for the source  

from which  the  aforesaid  payments  were  allegedly  made.  

PW-1  Thiru  Srinivasan  and  PW-2  Thirumathi  Rani  are  

admittedly not eye witnesses to the occurrence because they  

had come to the house where the accused and the deceased  

had lived only after noticing smoke from the said house.  PW-

3 Thiru Vincent (brother-in-law of the deceased) and PW-4  

Thirumathi  Mary (sister  of the deceased) are also not eye  

witnesses to the occurrence.  It must also be taken note of  

that  all  the  aforesaid  witnesses,  i.e.,  PW-1  to  PW-4  had  

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deposed  that  when  they  had  reached  the  house  of  the  

deceased  they  saw  her  in  flames  and  the  deceased  was  

unable to speak as there was a piece of cloth in her mouth.  

The aforesaid part of the prosecution story, however, does  

not  find  support  from  the  testimony  of  PW-11  Dr.  

Santhakumar  who  had  conducted  the  postmortem  of  the  

deceased  inasmuch  as  in  cross-examination  PW-11  had  

clearly stated that he did not find any blisters in the mouth of  

the  deceased.   PW-5  Thiru  Balaraman  did  not  sign  the  

mahazar (Exh. P-10) showing the seizure of a burnt kerosene  

can,  a  partially  burnt  saree  and  a  matchbox  allegedly  

recovered from the place of occurrence.  PW-6 Dr. Prakash  

had deposed that the deceased was brought to his clinic at  

about  7.30  a.m.  on  19.4.2000  but  considering  the  burn  

injuries suffered he had referred the case to the government  

hospital.  PW-7 Dr. Vijayalakshmi had deposed that though a  

magistrate  had  come to  the  hospital  to  record  the  dying  

declaration,  the  deceased  was  unconscious  and  not  in  a  

position to make any statement.  PW-10 Dr. N. Usha who was  

working  in  the  casualty  section  of  the  Chennai  Kilpauk  

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Government Hospital   had deposed that  when questioned,  

the  deceased  Anusuya  had  reported  to  her  that  she  got  

injured due to bursting of the stove while she was cooking.  

PW-11   Dr.  Santhakumar  had conducted the postmortem  

and the  most  significant  part  of  his  evidence  has already  

been noticed hereinabove, namely, that he did not find any  

blisters  in  the  mouth  of  the  deceased.   PW-12  Thiru  

Subramaniyam is the Investigating Officer of the case who  

had,  inter  alia,  deposed  that  the  investigation  did  not  

disclose  that  the  accused  had  harassed  or  ill-treated  the  

deceased Anusuya prior to her death.   

9. In view of the specific case of the prosecution that the  

accused  had  poured  kerosene  on  the  deceased  and  

thereafter set her on fire and had gagged her mouth with a  

piece of cloth to prevent her from screaming, which version  

has been unfolded by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is difficult to see  

as to how the charge against the accused-appellant under  

Section 304-B of the IPC could be sustained.  The evidence of  

PW-12 Thiru Subramaniyam, Investigating Officer of the case,  

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that the investigation did not reveal any harassment and ill-

treatment of the deceased by the accused prior to her death  

makes the prosecution case against the accused under the  

aforesaid Section as well as under Section 498A of the IPC  

wholly unsustainable.  Insofar as the offence under Section  

302 of the IPC is concerned, there is no eye witness to the  

occurrence.   PWs-1  to  PW-4  though  examined  as  eye  

witnesses cannot be understood to have actually witnessed  

any of the events that would be crucial for the determination  

of the liability of the accused-appellant.  By the time they  

had  reached  the  place  of  occurrence  the  deceased  was  

already engulfed in flames.  The fact that PW-6 had stated  

that the deceased had come to his clinic unaccompanied by  

PWs 1,  2,  3  and 4  who in  their  depositions have claimed  

otherwise  is  too  significant  a  contradiction  to  be  ignored.  

There is a further contradiction in the evidence of PWs 1 and  

2 on the one hand and PW-12 on the other.  According to PW-

1 and PW-2 they had made a complaint to the police station  

immediately after the occurrence and thereafter went to the  

hospital whereas PW-12 had deposed that the complaint was  

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lodged after PW-1 and PW-2 had returned from the hospital.  

The evidence of PW-10  Dr. N. Usha that the deceased herself  

had stated that she was injured due to bursting of the stove  

while  she  was  cooking  casts  a  further  doubt  on  the  

prosecution story.  The absence of the proof of seizure of the  

material objects, made by the Mahazar (Exh. P-10) and the  

contradiction between the oral testimony and the contents of  

Exh. P-9 with regard to the actual place of occurrence, in our  

considered  view,  further  demolishes  the  credibility  of  the  

prosecution version.  In the above facts the view taken by  

the Trial Court in acquitting the accused cannot be held to be  

a view impossible of being reached.   Keeping in mind the  

extremely  limited  keyhole  available  for  a  scrutiny  of  the  

foundation of the order of acquittal  passed by the learned  

Trial Court the reversal ordered by the High Court does not  

commend to us.  We have also noticed that the High Court  

had found the order of the learned Trial Court to be vitiated  

by lack of clarity on several counts as specified in its order  

dated 27.04.2006.  The said deficiencies, when juxtaposed  

against the reasoning of the learned Trial Court, appear to  

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have been adequately answered by the learned Trial Court in  

the light of the evidence and the material brought before it.   

10. For the aforesaid reasons we find it difficult to accept  

the  conclusion  reached  by  the  High  Court  in  the  present  

matter.  We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order  

of the High Court dated 27.04.2006 and restore the order of  

acquittal  dated  16.07.2003  passed  by  the  learned  Trial  

Court.   

...………………………CJI.

.........……………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

New Delhi, August 19, 2013.  

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