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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.2486-2487 OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 330-331 of 2013]

Vasanta Sampat Dupare ... Appellant

Versus

State of Maharashtra              ...  Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

In these two appeals, we are required to deal with a  

sordid and despicable act of a married man who, at the  

time of incident was in wedlock for more than two scores  

having a criminal background, has yielded not only to the  

inferior endowments of nature but also has exhibited the  

gratification  of  pervert  lust  and  brutish  carnality.   The  

prey of such degradation and depravity was a minor girl

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aged  about  four  years,  daughter  of  Pinki,  PW-1,  and  

Krushna,  PW-4.   The  appellant,  as  per  the  prosecution  

version,  after  satisfying his  uncontrolled,  insatiable and  

rapacious savage desire, battered the girl to death.  This  

led to his  facing trial for the offences punishable under  

Sections 302, 376(2)(f), 363, 367 and 201 of the Indian  

Penal  Code  (for  short,  “IPC”)  in  Sessions  Trial  No.  

252/2008 before the Learned Additional Sessions Judge,  

Nagpur,  who  considering  the  evidence  on  record  and  

keeping in view the nature of the crime vide judgment  

dated  23.02.2012  after  recording  the  conviction  in  

respect  of  aforesaid  offences,  imposed  the  death  

sentence,  apart  from  other  punishment  in  respect  of  

other offences and sent, as required under Section 366(1)  

of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, “CrPC”), for  

confirmation  by  the  High  Court.   The  judgment  of  

conviction and the order of sentence was challenged by  

the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 112/2012 and it was  

heard along with the Criminal Confirmation Case No.1 of  

2012  wherein  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  

confirmed  the  sentence  of  death  awarded  by  the  trial  

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Court  and as  a  logical  corollary  dismissed the criminal  

appeal  preferred  by  him.   The  said  judgment  is  the  

subject of assailment in the present appeal.   

2. According to the prosecution case on 3.4.2008 about  

9-10 p.m., informant, Krushna Dudhraj Sharma, father of  

the deceased, lodged a report at the police station Wadi  

stating that he was staying in a tenanted house with his  

wife and two daughters, the kidnapped girl aged about 4  

years  and  her  sister  aged  about  six  months.   One  

Subhash Sonawane was residing along with his wife and  

son in the neighbourhood of the informant as a tenant of  

the  common  landlord,  Kushal  Bansod.   The  appellant,  

Vasanta Dupare,  a friend of Subhash Sonawane, was a  

frequent visitor to the house of Subhash.  On the fateful  

day  when  the  informant,  carpenter  by  profession,  

returned  home  about  7.00  p.m.,  he  found  his  wife  

weeping and on a query being made, she disclosed that  

Vasanta  Dupare  had  taken  the  elder  daughter  on  his  

bicycle  while  she  was  playing  in  the  courtyard  of  the  

house and she had not yet returned home.   He,  being  

perturbed, searched for his daughter in the vicinity, but it  

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was an exercise in futility.  Thus, the initial allegation was  

that the appellant had kidnapped his minor daughter.  On  

the basis of the aforesaid report, a crime was registered  

against  the  accused  for  an  offence  punishable  under  

Section 363 of the IPC.

3. As the prosecution version further undrapes, on the  

same  day,  Santosh  Ghatekar,  PW-13,  Assistant  Police  

Inspector, while returning to the police station, received  

the  information  that  the  appellant  was  moving  around  

Gati Godown located on Khadgaon Road, and he passed  

on the said information to Police Inspector D.J.  Chauhan,  

PW-16,  and  eventually  the  appellant  was  apprehended  

and  brought  to  the  police  station.   While  in  police  

custody, on 4.4.2008, he took the investigating agency to  

the spot where he had after ravishing the minor girl child  

had  murdered  her.   A  memorandum of  panchnama to  

that effect was prepared in the morning of 4.4.2008 and  

thereafter  he  led  the  police  to  the  place  of  incident  

wherefrom  the  dead  body  of  the  minor  girl  was  

recovered.   At  his  instance,  the  bicycle  used  was  

recovered from the godown located in between Khadgaon  

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to  Kamleshwar  road  belonging  to  one  Ashwin  Prakash  

Agrawal.  Thereafter, the initial offence registered under  

Section 363 IPC was converted to offences under Section  

376(2)(f), 367, 302 and 201 of the IPC.  The Investigating  

Agency examined number of witnesses under Section 161  

CrPC  and  completed  all  the  formalities  and  laid  the  

chargesheet  before  the  competent  court  which  in  turn  

committed the matter to the Court of Session.   

4. The  accused-appellant  pleaded  his  innocence  and  

non-involvement  and  took  the  plea  that  he  had  been  

falsely implicated due to animosity.  

5. The  prosecution,  to  substantiate  the  charges  

levelled  against  the  appellant,  examined  17  witnesses.  

After  closure  of  the  evidence  of  the  prosecution,  the  

accused was  examined under  Section  313 of  the  CrPC  

and  he  pleaded  complete  denial  and  false  implication.  

The defence chose not to adduce any evidence.   

6. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence  

brought on record came to hold that the mother of the  

minor girl, Pinki, PW-1, knew the appellant because of his  

frequent visits  to her neighbour Subhash; that she had  

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seen the accused in the courtyard where the minor girl  

was playing along with other children; that  she had also  

seen  him  going  on  a  bicycle  from  the  behind;  that  

Vandana Ramkar, PW-5, had deposed categorically that  

while  she  was  present  outside  Chandrawanshi  Hospital  

after finishing her work, she saw the appellant going on  

the bicycle with the deceased and she had revealed when  

Pinki had made an enquiry about her daughter; that Baby  

Sharma,  PW-6,  and  Minal  @  Twinkle,  PW-3,  the  child  

witness, have also unequivocally deposed that they had  

seen the accused taking the minor girl  with him at the  

relevant  time  from  the  locality  in  question;  that  Baby  

Sharma had further deposed that the minor girl had fallen  

down from the bicycle near her shop and the cyclist had  

purchased  ‘Minto  Fresh’  for  the  girl  who  was  wearing  

black top and blue skirt; that she had identified the cyclist  

and also the photograph of the girl who had accompanied  

the  appellant  at  the  relevant  time;  that  Subhash  

Sonawane, PW-11, had stated that the accused had been  

to his house for repairing his tape recorder on that day;  

that version of Subhash had received corroboration from  

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his  wife,  Kavita,  who  has  deposed  that  her  daughter  

Akanksha and the victim were playing in the courtyard  

and at that juncture  the appellant was standing in the  

courtyard; that the appellant had told Akanksha and the  

daughter of PW-1 that he would buy chocolates for them  

and, therefore, they should accompany him; that it had  

come in the testimony of Kavita, PW-12, that Akanksha,  

who was not having appropriate clothes on her person  

came  back  home  and  by  that  time  accused  took  the  

victim girl on his bicycle; that Manisha, PW-2, who knew  

the  appellant,  had  deposed  that  he  had  come  to  her  

house on the bicycle  along with  the  girl  and on being  

asked he had told her name and she was wearing black  

top and blue midi and the accused had mentioned to her  

that  she  was  the  daughter  of  his  friend;  that  Baby  

Sharma, PW-6, had identified the clothes of the deceased  

which were on her person on the day of the incident and  

had also identified him that he was the person who had  

taken the girl; that the panch witnesses Ramprasad, PW-7  

and Anand Borkar,  PW-8,  had stood embedded in their  

testimony  about  the  recovery  wherefrom  the  girl  was  

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taken and the place where the dead body was found, and  

they had also remained firm in their testimony proving  

the  panchnama  to  indicate  the  seized  incriminating  

materials, that is, two stones smeared with blood, blood  

mixed  sample  earth,  branches  of  trees  having  blood  

stains,  minto  fresh  and empty chocolate wrappers  and  

nikar and other clothes of the accused from the spot; that  

the  other  two  panch  witnesses,  namely,  Purushottam  

Gore, PW-9,  and Sanotsh Keche, PW-10, had stated about  

the  parcels  containing  clothes  of  the  deceased  and  

various samples taken from the body of  the deceased,  

received from the hospital and the recovery of the bicycle  

from  the  godown;  and  that  nothing  had  been  elicited  

which would create any kind of concavity in the testimony  

of these witnesses; and that the investigating officers had  

not given any room for doubt; that the examining doctor,  

Dr. Prashant Barve, who had conducted autopsy on the  

deceased  had  remained  inflexible  in  the  testimony  as  

regards  the  reports;  and  that  the  ocular  and  the  

documentary  evidence  brought  on  record  established  

beyond reasonable doubt that the accused by alluring a  

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minor  girl  of  four  years  for  giving  chocolates,  had  

kidnapped her, raped her and caused injuries; and also  

had  intentionally  made  disappear  the  evidence  of  the  

crime committed by him.  On the aforesaid reasoning, the  

learned  trial  Judge  found  the  appellant  guilty  of  the  

offences  and  treated  the  same as  a  crime of  extreme  

brutality, for he had committed rape on a minor girl aged  

about four years without thinking about the effect on the  

victim.  It was also opined by the learned trial Judge that  

the accused was in mid 40s and had caused injuries by  

crushing stones weighing 8.5 kg. and 7.5 kg with force  

upon her when she was in unbearable pains because of  

the ferocious act of rape and injuries sustained by her;  

and that the accused was having criminal antecedents as  

he  was  prosecuted  for  various  offences  in  four  cases.  

Taking  into  consideration  the  totality  of  circumstances,  

that is, the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances,  

the learned trial Judge regarded the case as rarest of the  

rare cases and sentenced the appellant to suffer death  

penalty under Section 302 IPC, life imprisonment and fine  

of  Rs.2,000/-  with  the  default  clause  for  the  offence  

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punishable  under  Section  376(2)(f)  of  the  IPC;  rigorous  

imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.1000/- with  

default clause for the offence punishable under Section  

363 of  the  IPC;  rigorous imprisonment  for  seven years  

and fine of Rs.1000/- with default clause for the offence  

punishable  under  Section  367  of  the  IPC;  and rigorous  

imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.1000/- with  

default clause for the offence punishable under Section  

201 of the IPC with the stipulation that all the sentences  

relating  to  imprisonment  shall  be  concurrent  and  

submitted  the  proceedings  to  the  High  Court  under  

Section 366(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  

for confirmation of death sentence by the High Court.

7. As has been stated earlier, the appellant preferred a  

Criminal Appeal assailing the conviction and the sentence  

and the High Court appreciated the evidence afresh and  

found that the evidence of the witnesses was impeccable  

and  totally  beyond  reproach  and  the  prosecution  had  

been able to prove the offences to the hilt.  While dealing  

with  the  confirmation  of  the  sentence,  the  High  Court  

referred to various decisions and opined as follows:

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“The accused raped a four years old girl  and thereafter battered and smashed her  head by two heavy stones and killed her.  The aggravating circumstance as pointed  out  by  us  must  be  such  as  would  have  shocked the conscience of the community  in  general.   The  accused  had  acted  in  diabolical  manner  and  had  designedly  lured  the  unsuspecting  Muskan  to  accompany him on the bicycle.  Battering  of the head of the girl of tender years was  done by the accused with extreme cruelty.  The  crime  has  been  committed  by  the  accused  in  an  extremely  cruel  manner  exhibiting  brutality  and  utter  perversity.  The history sheet of the accused which is  placed  on  record  exhibits  several  prosecutions  against  him.   The  accused  has  not  displayed  any  remorse  or  repentance for the act done by him and  we  do  not  find  any  material  to  indicate  that there is a possibility of the accused  reforming  himself.   The  accused  would  continue to  be  a  menace to  the  society  and,  therefore,  according to us,  this is  a  rarest of rare case calling for the extreme.

The  mitigating  circumstances  which  are  brought on record against the accused are  that the accused is middle aged man of 45  years with no previous conviction so far.  The accused is a married person having a  family.   However,  the  aggravating  circumstances far out way the mitigating  circumstances  and  according  to  us,  the  extreme penalty of death imposed by the  trial court deserves to be confirmed.”

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8. We have heard Mr. Sanjiv Das, learned counsel for  

the appellant and Mr. Shankar Chillarge, learned counsel  

for the respondent-State.

9. It  is  submitted  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant that the learned trial Judge as well as the High  

Court has committed gross illegality in placing reliance on  

the testimony of the parents of the deceased and other  

witnesses  to  establish  the  last  seen theory,  which  has  

really not been established.  It is urged by him that the  

leading to recovery of the dead body of the deceased and  

the clothes are not in consonance with Section 27 of the  

Evidence  Act.   Learned counsel  would  submit  that  the  

panch witnesses who have alleged to have supported the  

prosecution story have really paved the path of deviancy  

which has been lost sight of by the learned trial Judge as  

well as by the High Court.  It is his further submission that  

there  are  material  inconsistencies,  contradictions  and  

omissions, which had seriously affected the prosecution’s  

case and the chain of circumstances for implicating the  

accused in the crime has really not been established.  It is  

propounded by him that  the witnesses who have been  

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cited  by  the  prosecution  to  establish  the  chain  of  

circumstances,  fundamentally  the  last  seen  theory,  

cannot  be  given  credence  to  regard  being  had  to  the  

unacceptable contradictions and infirmities.  Finally, it is  

canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant that  

the  present  case  could  not  fall  under  the  category  of  

rarest  of  the  rare  cases  warranting capital  punishment  

and the  criminal  background that  has  been taken  into  

consideration by the learned trial Judge as well as by the  

High Court is of not such  nature by which the appellant  

can be treated or regarded as a menace to the society  

and,  therefore,  if  this  Court  affirms  the  conviction,  it  

should  substitute  the  punishment  to  that  of  life  

imprisonment.   

10. Mr.  Shankar  Chillarge,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent-State in support of the view expressed by the  

High Court, contends that the prosecution has succeeded  

in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable  

doubt and the scanning of the evidence by the learned  

trial  Judge,  which has been re-appreciated by the High  

Court,  does  not  remotely  indicate  any  contradiction  or  

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discrepancy.  It is proponed by him that all the witnesses  

have remained absolutely unshaken in their version and  

nothing substantial  has been elicited from them during  

the cross-examination which could create a dent in their  

testimony.  Learned counsel would further contend that if  

the ocular and documentary evidence is  appreciated in  

proper  perspective,  there  remains  no  scintilla  of  doubt  

that the appellant had committed the brutal and heinous  

crime and in such a circumstance when the society cries  

for  justice,  the Court should not  show any leniency for  

conversion of the sentence.  

11. To  appreciate  the  rival  submissions  raised  at  the  

Bar, we think it appropriate to refer to the postmortem  

report of the deceased.  The said report by the doctor,  

namely,  Dr.  Prashant  Barve,  PW-15,  which  has  been  

brought  on record as  Exhibit  55,  describes  that  at  the  

time of postmortem, the face was flattened, eyes closed,  

mouth  partially  opened,  tongue  was  clinched  and  

lacerated  between  teeth,  blood  was  oozing  through  

mouth,  nostrils  and ears.   It  was also noticed that  dry  

grass  leaves  adhered  over  body  at  back  side  and  dry  

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blood-stains were present over face, neck, perineum and  

lower limb.  He has found the following injuries on the  

dead body of the deceased:

“1) Multiple  scratch  abrasions  present  over front of chest and front of neck size  varying from 1 cm x   1/4 cm, to 3 cm. x  1/4th cm., reddish brown.

2) Contused  abrasion  involving  fore-head,  eyes, nose, both cheeks and lips red and  dark  red  coloured,  underlying  bone  fractured, underlying, muscle lacerated.

3) Multiple  scratch  abrasion  present  over  left lower leg and left foot size varying from  ½ cm.  x  1/4th cm.,  to  1  cm.  x  1/4th cm.,  reddish brown.

4) Multiple  scratch  abrasion  present  over  back  of  trunk  upper  2/3rd of  size  varying  from 1 cm. x 1/4th cm. to 5 cm. x 1/4th  cm.,  reddish brown.

5) Abrasion of size 1 cm. x ½ cm. present  over left knee, reddish brown.”   

12. According  to  the  doctor,  he  had  found  during  

internal  examination  that  under  scalp  haemotoma was  

present over left frontal and right frontal region of size 4  

cm. x 4 cm, dark red, the frontal bone was fractured and  

depressed,  fracture  line  extended  up  to  occipital  bone  

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through  right  temporal  and  parietal  bone  fracture  on  

interior  and  middle  eranial  side.   The  subarachined  

hemorrhage was present all  over the brain surface and  

meninges was congested.   In  his opinion,  the cause of  

death was head injury, associated with the injury on the  

genital region.  He has testified that the two stones that  

were  sent  to  him  in  sealed  cover  along  with  the  

requisition, Exhibit 62, for opinion, could have been used  

to cause the injuries on the victim.  He has weighed the  

stones which is 8.5 kg and 7.5 kg. and has opined that  

there had been forceful sexual intercourse.

13. From the aforesaid medical evidence, it is clear as  

crystal that there was forcible sexual intercourse with the  

girl and the death was homicidal in nature.   

14. Having analysed the  said  aspect,  it  is  to  be seen  

whether  the  prosecution  has  really  established  the  

complicity of the appellant in the crime in question.  We  

have enumerated  the  reasons  ascribed  by  the  learned  

trial Judge and the concurrence given by the High Court,  

but to satisfy our conscience, we have thought it seemly  

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to peruse the evidence with all  insight and concern by  

ourselves.

15. As is manifest, the father of the victim, Krishna, PW-

4, had lodged the FIR immediately i.e. at 9:10 p.m.  The  

FIR clearly stated that the accused had taken away the  

victim.  The role of the accused and the suspicion was  

thus  immediately  reported.   PW-1,  mother  of  the  

deceased, has deposed that her daughter, the deceased  

girl,  was  playing  in  the  courtyard  along  with  other  

children  while  she  was  doing  the  household  work  and  

when she came back to  courtyard,  she found that  the  

child was missing and she saw the appellant going on the  

bicycle.    Be it  clarified, she had not actually seen the  

accused  taking  away  the  victim  but,  as  the  evidence  

brought on record do reveal, five prosecution witnesses  

are the eye witnesses to the factum of accused taking  

away  the  minor  girl.   On  a  studied  scrutiny  of  the  

evidence  it  becomes  graphically  clear  that  when  the  

mother had gone in search of her, Vandana Ramkar, PW-

5, had told her that the child had gone on bicycle with the  

appellant.   PW-5,  in  her  testimony,  has  unambiguously  

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stated about the said fact.  It has come in the testimony  

of PW-1 that her daughter was wearing a blue midi and  

black top on her person, and she has identified the said  

clothes which have been brought on record as Articles 6,  

9 and 10.  From the cross-examination it is manifest that  

they  knew  the  appellant  earlier,  and  it  is  also  

demonstrable from the evidence of Vandana Ramkar, PW-

5, that the appellant had taken the girl on the bicycle.  It  

has come in the evidence of  Baby Sharma,  PW-6,  that  

about 7.30 pm on 3.4.2008  the appellant while going on  

the bicycle fell down near grocery shop and, thereafter,  

the cyclist and the girl came to purchase “Minto Fresh”.  

As deposed by her the girl was wearing a black top and  

blue skirt on her person.  The said witness has identified  

the appellant and also identified the photograph of the  

girl, Article 12.  She has also identified the clothes of the  

girl.   PW-12,  Kavita,  has  deposed  that  her  husband,  

Subhash,  PW-11 and Krushna,  PW-4,  father  of  the  girl,  

were working at the same place and on the fateful day  

the  appellant  had  come  to  her  house  and  told  her  

husband Subhash,  PW-11,  who was busy in repairing a  

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tape-recorder  that  he  could  repair  the  same and  after  

checking  it,  he  found  some  parts  were  damaged  and  

needed to be replaced and for the said purpose he took  

Rs.20 from PW-11 and after 15 minutes came with the  

part and tried to repair it but could not succeed.   He left  

the house of PW-11 at 4.00 pm.   It is in her testimony  

that  about  6.00  pm  the  appellant  came  to  her  house  

again and as she was feeling giddy and had reclined on  

the  cot,  he  sprinkled  some  water  on  her  face.   It  is  

deposed  by  her  that  her  daughter,  Akansha,  and  the  

deceased were playing in the courtyard and at that time  

the appellant who was standing in the courtyard had told  

Akansha  and  the  minor  girl  that  he  would  buy  them  

chocolates and, therefore, they should accompany him.  

As the daughter of PW-12 was not wearing proper clothes  

she  came  back  to  her  and  the  appellant  took  the  

deceased with him.  According to her testimony the girl  

sat on the rod of the bicycle.  It is testified by her that as  

the appellant did not bring back the child, they went in  

search  of  her.   She  has  clearly  deposed  about  the  

acquaintance of the appellant with her family. It is apt to  

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state here that  nothing has been elicited in  the cross-

examination to raise any doubt about the veracity of her  

version.    

16. Manisha, PW-2, has deposed that her father-in-law  

runs a tea stall  and she had the occasion to know the  

appellant.   She  has  supported  the  version  of  the  

prosecution by stating that the appellant had come to her  

house about 7.30 p.m. and a girl aged about four years  

was with him.  She has stated that the girl was dressed in  

black top and blue apparel and on a query being made,  

the appellant had introduced the child as the daughter of  

his friend and he was going  to ‘Tekdi-Wadi’ along with  

the girl.  In the cross-examination it has only been elicited  

that she was not aware of the character of the appellant.  

In this context, the evidence of Ku. Minal @ Twinkle, PW-

3, aged about 11 years is extremely significant.  She has  

clearly deposed that PW-1 is a resident of the locality and  

she knew the deceased girl as she used to come to their  

house  for  playing  with  her  younger  sister.   She  has  

emphatically  stated that  the deceased was going on a  

bicycle sitting on the front rod with one person and on  

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being asked she said she was going to eat chocolates.  

She  has  identified  the  accused.   From  the  aforesaid  

evidence, it is quite vivid that the appellant was last seen  

with the deceased and there is no justification to discredit  

the  testimony  of  the  witnesses.   Nothing  has  been  

brought on record that they had any axe to grind against  

the appellant.  The fact that the appellant was taking the  

minor child on his bicycle, and stopped at shop of Baby  

Sharma, PW-6, to purchase chocolate and was also seen  

at other places as testified by other witnesses has been  

proven to the hilt.  There are really no contradictions and  

discrepancies that would compel the court to discard their  

evidence.  

17. Be it noted, in appeal the High Court has observed  

that even if the testimony of Minal, PW-3, is left out from  

consideration  there  is  ample  evidence  to  show  that  

accused  had  taken  the  deceased  under  the  guise  of  

offering her chocolates.  In our considered view, there is  

no justification not to rely upon the testimony of the said  

witness.  She has identified the appellant in court and has  

stood  firm  in  her  version.   Her  identification  of  the  

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accused-appellant  in  the  open  court  is  piece  of  

substantive evidence as has been held in  Dana Yadav  

V. State of Bihar1 and such identification by her has not  

been shaken or contradicted.  Be it noted, the High Court  

has not rejected the said evidence, but has only opined  

that even if the testimony is not accepted, then also the  

identification has been proved.  We think the testimony of  

PW-3  further  strengthens  the  case  of  the  prosecution.  

Considering the evidence brought on record in  totality,  

the irresistible conclusion is that the deceased was last  

seen  with  the  appellant.   In  this  context,  a  fruitful  

reference  may  be  made  to  the  observations  made  in  

Dharam  Deo  Yadav  V.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh2,  

wherein it has been held thus:

“... if the prosecution, on the basis of reliable  evidence, establishes that the missing person  was seen in the company of the accused and  was never seen thereafter, it is obligatory on  the  part  of  the  accused  to  explain  he  circumstances  in  which  the  missing  person  and the accused parted company.”

In the instant case, the appellant has not offered any  

explanation.  1  (2002) 7 SCC 295 2  (2014) 5 SCC 509

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18. The next circumstance which has been taken note of  

by the learned trial Judge as well as by the High Court  

pertains to leading to discovery by the appellant.  As is  

evincible,  the  panch  witness,  Anand Borkar,  PW-8,  has  

proved Exhibit 29, the statement of the accused relating  

to discovery of the spot wherefrom the dead body was  

found.   He has also supported the seizure panchnama,  

Exhibit  31,  wherefrom  the  blood  stained  earth,  two  

stones,  nikar,  Minto  Fresh   chocolate  and  one  empty  

rapper were seized.  According to the said witness the  

said articles were seized vide Exhibit 31.  PW-10,  Santosh  

Keche,  has  proved the  seizure  of  the  bicycle  from the  

godown at the instance of the appellant.  The spot which  

was shown by the appellant and the godown from which  

bicycle was seized, as has come in the evidence, is in the  

vicinity where the dead body was found.   Vide Exhibit 34,  

the clothes, handkerchief and foot wear of the accused  

were seized.  The stones smeared with blood had been  

seized at the instance of the accused.   

19. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  submitted  

that  the  seizure  witnesses  cannot  be  believed  as  the  

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proper procedure has not been followed. As we find from  

the evidence on record the appellant was in custody and  

he had led to recovery.   The search and seizure has also  

been  supported  in  minute  detail  by  the  Investigating  

Officer.  It is also evident that the search witnesses are  

independent  witnesses  and  their  evidence  inspire  

confidence.   While accepting or rejecting the factors of  

discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind.  The  

Privy Council  in  Pulukuri Kotayya V. King Emperor3  

has held thus:

“It is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’  within  the  section  as  equivalent  to  the  object  produced;  the  fact  discovered  embraces the place from which the object  is  produced  and  the  knowledge  of  the  accused  as  to  this,  and  the  information  given  must  relate  distinctly  to  this  fact.  Information  as  to  past  user,  or  the  past  history,  of  the  object  produced  is  not  related  to  its  discovery  in  the  setting  in  which it is discovered. Information supplied  by a person in custody that ‘I will produce  a knife concealed in the roof of my house’  does not lead to the discovery of a knife;  knives were discovered many years ago. It  leads to  the  discovery  of  the fact  that  a  knife  is  concealed  in  the  house  of  the  informant to his knowledge, and if the knife  is  proved  to  have  been  used  in  the  

3 AIR 1947 PC 67

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commission  of  the  offence,  the  fact  discovered is  very  relevant.  But  if  to  the  statement the words be added ‘with which  I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible  since they do not relate to the discovery of  the knife in the house of the informant.”

20. In  Mohmed  Inayatullah  V.  The  State  of   

Maharashtra4, while dealing with the ambit and scope of  

Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court held that:-

“Although  the  interpretation  and  scope of  Section 27 has been the subject of several  authoritative  pronouncements,  its  application to concrete cases is not always  free  from  difficulty.  It  will  therefore  be  worthwhile  at  the  outset,  to  have a  short  and  swift  glance  at  the  section  and  be  reminded of  its  requirements.  The section  says:

“Provided that, when any fact is deposed to  as  discovered  in  consequence  of  information received from a person accused  of  any offence,  in  the custody of a police  officer,  so  much  of  such  information,  whether it amounts to a confession or not,  as  relates  distinctly  to  the  fact  thereby  discovered may be proved.”

The  expression  “provided  that”  together  with the phrase “whether it  amounts to a  confession or not” show that the section is  in  the  nature  of  an  exception  to  the  preceding  provisions  particularly  Sections  25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to  consider  if  this  section  qualifies,  to  any  

4  (1976) 1 SCC 828

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extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that  the  first condition  necessary  for  bringing  this section into operation is the  discovery  of  a  fact,  albeit  a  relevant  fact,  in  consequence  of  the  information  received  from a person accused of an offence. The  second is  that  the  discovery  of  such  fact  must be deposed to. The third is that at the  time of  the receipt  of  the information the  accused must be in police custody. The last  but  the  most  important  condition  is  that  only “so much of the information” as relates  distinctly to the fact  thereby discovered is  admissible. The rest of the information has  to be excluded. The word “distinctly” means  “directly”,  “indubitably”,  “strictly”,  “unmistakably”.  The  word  has  been  advisedly used to limit and define the scope  of  the  provable  information.  The  phrase  “distinctly  relates  to  the  fact  thereby  discovered” is the linchpin of the provision.  This  phrase  refers  to  that  part  of  the  information supplied by the accused which  is  the  direct and  immediate cause  of  the  discovery.  The  reason  behind  this  partial  lifting  of  the  ban against  confessions  and  statements made to the police, is that if a  fact is  actually discovered in consequence  of  information  given  by  the  accused,  it  affords  some  guarantee  of  truth  of  that  part, and that part only, of the information  which  was  the  clear,  immediate  and  proximate cause of the discovery. No such  guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest  of the statement which may be indirectly or  remotely related to the fact discovered.

At one time it was held that the expression  “fact discovered” in the section is restricted  to a physical or material fact which can be  

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perceived by the senses,  and that it  does  not  include  a  mental  fact  (see  Sukhan v.  Crown5;  Rex v.  Ganee6).  Now  it  is  fairly  settled  that  the  expression  “fact  discovered” includes not only the physical  object  produced,  but  also  the  place  from  which it is produced and the knowledge of  the accused as to this (see Palukuri Kotayya  v.  Emperor;  Udai  Bhan v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh7).”

21. In  Aftab  Ahmad  Anasari  V.  State  of   

Uttaranchal8 after referring to the decision in  Palukuri  

Kotayya (supra), the Court adverted to seizure of clothes  

of the deceased which were concealed by the accused.  In  

that context, the Court opined that:-  

“The  part  of  the  disclosure  statement,  namely, that the appellant was ready to  show the place where he had concealed  the  clothes  of  the  deceased  is  clearly  admissible  under  Section  27  of  the  Evidence Act because the same relates  distinctly to the discovery of the clothes  of  the  deceased  from  that  very  place.  The contention that even if it is assumed  for the sake of argument that the clothes  of  the  deceased  were  recovered  from  the house of the sister of the appellant  pursuant  to  the  voluntary  disclosure  statement  made  by  the  appellant,  the  prosecution has failed to prove that the  clothes  so  recovered  belonged  to  the  

5  AIR 1929 Lah. 344 6  AIR 1932 Bom 286 7 1962 Supp 2 SCR 830 8 (2010) 2 SCC 583

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deceased and therefore, the recovery of  the clothes should not be treated as an  incriminating circumstance, is devoid of  merits”.

22. In  State  of  Maharashtra v.  Damu9 it  has  

been held as follows:  

“ … It is now well settled that recovery of  an  object  is  not  discovery  of  a  fact  as  envisaged in [Section 27 of the Evidence  Act,  1872].  The  decision  of  the  Privy  Council  in  Pulukuri  Kotayya v.  King  Emperor is the most quoted authority for  supporting the interpretation that the ‘fact  discovered’  envisaged  in  the  section  embraces the place from which the object  was  produced,  the  knowledge  of  the  accused as to it, but the information given  must relate distinctly to that effect.”

23. The  similar  principle  has  been  laid  down  in  

State of Maharashtra v.  Suresh10,  State of Punjab  

v. Gurnam Kaur11, Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of  

Uttaranchal,  Bhagwan  Dass v.  State  (NCT  of  

Delhi)12, Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)13 and  

Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam14.

9   (2000) 6 SCC 269 10   (2000) 1 SCC 471 11   (2009) 11 SCC 225 12  (2011) 6 SCC 396 13  (2010) 6 SCC 1 14  (2013) 7 SCC 417

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24. In  the  case  at  hand,  as  is  perceptible,  the  

recovery  had  taken  place  when  the  appellant  was  

accused  of  an  offence,  he  was  in  custody  of  a  police  

officer, the recovery had taken place in consequence of  

information  furnished  by  him and  the  panch  witnesses  

have supported the seizure and nothing has been brought  

on record to discredit their testimony.  

25. Additionally, another aspect can also be taken  

note of.  The fact that the appellant had led the police  

officer  to  find  out  the  spot  where  the  crime  was  

committed,  and  the  tap  where  he  washed  the  clothes  

eloquently speak of his conduct as the same is admissible  

in evidence to establish his conduct.  In this context we  

may refer with profit to the authority in Prakash Chand  

v  State  (Delhi  Admn.)15 wherein  the  Court  after  

referring  to  the  decision  in  H.P.  Admn.  V.  Om  

Prakash16 held thus:

“… There is a clear distinction between the  conduct  of  a  person  against  whom  an  offence is alleged, which is admissible under  Section  8  of  the  Evidence  Act,  if  such  

15 (1979) 3 SCC 90 16 (1972) 1 SCC 249

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conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or  relevant fact and the statement made to a  Police  Officer  in  the  course  of  an  investigation which is hit by Section 162 of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code.  What  is  excluded by Section 162, Criminal Procedure  Code  is  the  statement  made  to  a  Police  Officer in the course of investigation and not  the evidence relating to the conduct of an  accused  person  (not  amounting  to  a  statement)  when  confronted  or  questioned  by a Police Officer during the course of an  investigation. For example, the evidence of  the  circumstance,  simpliciter,  that  an  accused  person  led  a  Police  Officer  and  pointed out the place where stolen articles  or weapons which might have been used in  the  commission  of  the offence were  found  hidden,  would  be  admissible  as  conduct,  under  Section  8  of  the  Evidence  Act,  irrespective  of  whether  any  statement  by  the  accused  contemporaneously  with  or  antecedent to such conduct falls within the  purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.”

26. In  A.N. Vekatesh and another v. State of   

Karnataka17 it has been ruled that:-  

“By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the  conduct of the accused person is  relevant,  if  such conduct influences or is influenced by any  fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of  the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused  pointed  out  to  the  police  officer,  the  place  where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was  found and on their pointing out the body was  exhumed,  would  be  admissible  as  conduct  

17 (2005)  7 SCC 714

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under  Section  8  irrespective  of  the  fact  whether the statement made by the accused  contemporaneously with or antecedent to such  conduct falls within the purview of Section 27  or not as held by this Court in  Prakash Chand  v. State (Delhi Admn.). Even if we hold that the  disclosure  statement  made  by  the  accused- appellants  (Exts.  P-15  and  P-16)  is  not  admissible  under  Section 27 of  the Evidence  Act,  still  it  is  relevant  under  Section  8.  The  evidence of the investigating officer and PWs  1, 2, 7 and PW 4 the spot mahazar witness that  the accused had taken them to the spot and  pointed  out  the  place  where  the  dead  body  was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence  under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused.  Presence  of  A-1  and  A-2  at  a  place  where  ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their  action of fleeing on spotting the police party is  a  relevant  circumstance  and  are  admissible  under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.”

27. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities  

only to highlight that in the present case the provision  

under Section 27  of Evidence Act is clearly attracted and  

we see no illegality in the seizure and the Panch witness  

have remained embedded in their version.  Nothing has  

been suggested to disregard their evidence.  Therefore,  

we have no hesitation in holding that there is ample proof  

of  seizure  of  the  articles.   That  apart,  we  have  also  

additionally considered the conduct of the appellant that  

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speaks eloquently,  for  it  is  worthy of  being considered  

within the admissible parameters.  

28. The  next  circumstance  which  has  been  

accepted by the learned trail Judge and the High Court is  

the identification of  the clothes and matching of  blood  

stains of the appellant’s clothes.  On the clothes that has  

been seized, the stains of human blood of ‘A’ Group are  

detected.  The chemical analysis report, Exhibit 77, has  

indicated that stains of human blood of ‘A’ group which is  

detected on seized clothes, and the blood group that has  

been found on the clothes of the accused including his  

underwear and handkerchief is the same.  The matching  

of  the  blood  group  gains  signification  in  such  a  

circumstance.  The incriminating articles, namely, stones  

smeared  with  blood,  the  clothes  and  the  blood  group  

matching  is  an  important  circumstance  showing  

complicity of the appellant in the crime in question.

29. Another facet which has immense significance  

is the injury report.  It graphically depicts the injuries on  

the private parts of the minor girl which has been caused  

by sexual intercourse.  Stains of human blood of ‘A’ group  

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have also been noticed on the front portion of the nikar of  

the accused as per Exhibit 77 which matches the blood  

group found on the stones.   

30. The other relevant circumstance that weighs against  

the appellant is that the dead body of the deceased was  

recovered at the instance of the appellant.  It was within  

his special knowledge.  The tap where he had washed his  

clothes was quite nearby.  In this context, it is worthy to  

note that the accused had disclosed the facts and on the  

basis of his disclosure statement he had led to the place  

where  the  dead  body  of  the  victim  was  found.     In  

Deepak  Chandrakant   Patil  V.  State  of  

Maharashtra18, it was observed by this Court:

“... The fact that he knew about the dead  body of the deceased lying in the garden  behind  the  house  of  A-1  is  almost  clinching in nature and leaves nothing to  doubt...”

31. Regard being had to the aforesaid circumstances, it  

is  to  be  seen  whether  on  the  basis  of  the  said  

circumstances,  it  can  be  held  whether  such  

circumstances  lead  towards  the  guilt  of  the  accused  18  (2006) 10 SCC 151  

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regard  being  had  to  the  principle  that  they  lead  to  a  

singular  conclusion  that  the  appellant  is  guilty  of  the  

offence and it does not allow any other probability which  

is  likely  to  allow  the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  

accused.  In this context, we may refer with profit to the  

decision  rendered  more  than  six  decades  back  in  

Hanumant  Govind  Nargundkar  V.  State  of  M.P.19,  

wherein it has been held as follows:

“ … It is well to remember that in cases  where the evidence is of a circumstantial  nature, the circumstances from which the  conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in  the first instance be fully established, and  all  the  facts  so  established  should  be  consistent only with the hypothesis of the  guilt  of  the  accused.  Again,  the  circumstances  should  be  of  a  conclusive  nature and tendency and they should be  such as to exclude every hypothesis but  the one proposed to be proved. In other  words, there must be a chain of evidence  so  far  complete  as  not  to  leave  any  reasonable  ground  for  a  conclusion  consistent  with  the  innocence  of  the  accused and it must be such as to show  that within all  human probability the act  must have been done by the accused.”

19  AIR 1952 SC 343

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32. In  Sharad  Birdhichand  Sarda v.  State  of  

Maharashtra20, the  five  golden  principles  which  have  

been stated to constitute the “panchsheel” of the proof of  

the case based on circumstantial evidence are that the  

circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be  

drawn must or should be and not merely “may be” fully  

established;  that  the  facts  so  established  should  be  

consistent  only  with  the  hypothesis  of  the  guilt  of  the  

accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on  

any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;  

that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature  

and tendency;  that  they should  exclude every possible  

hypothesis except the one to be proved; and that there  

must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave  

any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with  

the innocence of the accused and must show that in all  

human probability the act must have been done by the  

accused.

33. In C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P21 it has been  

held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the  20  (1984) 4 SCC 116 21  (1996) 10 SCC 193

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circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn  

should be fully proved and such circumstances must be  

conclusive  in  nature,  moreover,  all  the  circumstances  

should be complete and there should be no gap left in the  

chain of evidence. That apart, the proved circumstances  

must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of  

the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

34. We may also take note of the fact that the appellant  

in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, except making  

a bald denial, has not stated anything.  In this context, we  

may  refer  with  profit  to  a  decision  in  Suresh (supra)  

wherein  it  has  been  held  that  there  can  be  three  

possibilities when an accused points to the place where  

the  incriminating  material  is  concealed  without  stating  

that it was concealed by himself.  Elucidating on the three  

possibilities, the Court observed thus:

“  …  One is  that  he  himself  would  have  concealed it. Second is that he would have  seen somebody else concealing it. And the  third is  that he would have been told by  another  person  that  it  was  concealed  there.  But if  the accused declines to tell  the  criminal  court  that  his  knowledge  about the concealment was on account of  

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one  of  the  last  two  possibilities  the  criminal  court  can  presume  that  it  was  concealed by the accused himself. This is  because  the  accused  is  the  only  person  who can offer the explanation as to how  else  he  came  to  know  of  such  concealment and if he chooses to refrain  from telling the court as to how else he  came to know of it, the presumption is a  well-justified course to be adopted by the  criminal  court  that  the concealment  was  made by himself.”

35. On a critical analysis of the evidence on record, we  

are  convinced  that  the  circumstances  that  have  been  

clearly established are that the appellant was seen in the  

courtyard where the minor girl  and other children were  

playing; that the appellant was seen taking the deceased  

on  his  bicycle;  that  he  had  gone  to  the  grocery  shop  

owned by PW-6 to buy Mint chocolate along with her; that  

the  accused  had  told  PW-2  that  the  child  was  the  

daughter of his friend and he was going  to ‘Tekdi-Wadi’  

along with the girl; that the appellant had led to discovery  

of the dead body of the deceased, the place where he  

had washed his  clothes and at  his  instance the stones  

smeared  with  blood  were  recovered;  that  the  medical  

report  clearly  indicates  about  the  injuries  sustained by  

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the deceased on her body; that the injuries sustained on  

the private parts have been stated by the doctor to have  

been  caused  by  forcible  sexual  intercourse;  that  the  

stones that were seized were smeared with blood and the  

medical evidence corroborates the fact that injuries could  

have  been  caused  by  battering  with  stones;  that  the  

chemical analysis report shows that the blood group on  

the stones matches with the blood group found on the  

clothes  of  the  appellant;  that  the  appellant  has  not  

offered any explanation with regard to the recovery made  

at his instance; and that nothing has been stated in his  

examination under Section 313 CrPC that there was any  

justifiable  reason  to  implicate  him  in  the  crime  in  

question.   Thus,  we find that  each of  the incriminating  

circumstances has been clearly established and the chain  

of circumstances are conclusive in nature to exclude any  

kind of hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved,  

and  lead  to  a  definite  conclusion  that  the  crime  was  

committed  by  the  accused.   Therefore,  we  have  no  

hesitation  in  affirming  the  judgment  of  conviction  

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rendered by the learned trial Judge and affirmed by the  

High Court.  

36. Now  we  shall  proceed  to  deal  with  the  facet  of  

sentence.  In  Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab22, the  

Court held thus:-

“(a) The normal rule is that the offence of  murder  shall  be  punished  with  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment.  The  court  can depart from that rule and impose the  sentence of death only if there are special  reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be  recorded  in  writing  before  imposing  the  death sentence.

(b)  While  considering  the  question  of  sentence to be imposed for the offence of  murder  under  Section  302  of  the  Penal  Code, the court must have regard to every  relevant circumstance relating to the crime  as well as the criminal. If the court finds,  but not otherwise, that the offence is of an  exceptionally  depraved  and  heinous  character and constitutes, on account of its  design and the manner of its execution, a  source of  grave danger  to  the society  at  large,  the  court  may  impose  the  death  sentence.”

37. In the said case, the Court referred to the decision in  

Furman v. Georgia23 and noted the suggestion given by  

the  learned  counsel  about  the  aggravating  and  the  22 (1980) 2 SCC 684 23 33 L Ed 2d 346 : 408 US 238 (1972)

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mitigating  circumstances.  While  discussing  about  the  

aggravating  circumstances,  the  Court  noted  the  

aggravating  circumstances  suggested  by  the  counsel  

which read as follows:-

“Aggravating circumstances: A court may,  however, in the following cases impose the  penalty of death in its discretion:

(a) if the murder has been committed after  previous  planning  and  involves  extreme  brutality; or

(b)  if  the  murder  involves  exceptional  depravity; or

(c) if the murder is of a member of any of  the  armed  forces  of  the  Union  or  of  a  member of any police force or of any public  servant and was committed—

(i)  while  such  member  or  public  servant  was on duty; or

(ii)  in  consequence  of  anything  done  or  attempted to be done by such member or  public servant in the lawful discharge of his  duty  as  such  member  or  public  servant  whether at the time of murder he was such  member or public servant, as the case may  be, or had ceased to be such member or  public servant; or

(d)  if  the murder is of a person who had  acted  in  the  lawful  discharge of  his  duty  under Section 43 of the Code of Criminal  

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Procedure,  1973,  or  who  had  rendered  assistance  to  a  Magistrate  or  a  police  officer demanding his aid or requiring his  assistance  under  Section  37  and  Section  129 of the said Code.”

After reproducing the same, the Court opined:-

“Stated broadly, there can be no objection to  the acceptance of these indicators but as we  have indicated already, we would prefer not  to fetter judicial discretion by attempting to  make an exhaustive enumeration one way or  the other.”

38. Thereafter,  the  Court  referred  to  the  suggestions  pertaining to mitigating circumstances:-

“Mitigating circumstances.—In the exercise  of its discretion in the above cases, the court  shall  take  into  account  the  following  circumstances:

(1)  That  the  offence  was  committed  under  the influence of extreme mental or emotional  disturbance.

(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is  young or  old,  he shall  not  be sentenced to  death.

(3)  The  probability  that  the  accused  would  not commit criminal acts of violence as would  constitute a continuing threat to society.

(4) The probability that the accused can be  reformed  and  rehabilitated.  The  State  shall  

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by evidence prove that the accused does not  satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above.

(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the  case  the  accused  believed  that  he  was  morally justified in committing the offence.

(6) That the accused acted under the duress  or domination of another person.

(7) That the condition of the accused showed  that he was mentally defective and that the  said  defect  impaired  his  capacity  to  appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”

After reproducing the above, the Court observed:-

“We will do no more than to say that these  are  undoubtedly  relevant  circumstances  and  must  be  given  great  weight  in  the  determination of sentence.”

39. In  the  said  case,  the  Court  has  also  held  thus:-

“It  is,  therefore,  imperative  to  voice  the  concern  that  courts,  aided  by  the  broad  illustrative  guide-lines  indicated  by  us,  will  discharge the onerous function with evermore  scrupulous  care  and  humane  concern,  directed  along  the  highroad  of  legislative  policy outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that for  persons  convicted  of  murder,  life  imprisonment is the rule and death sentence  an exception. A real and abiding concern for  the dignity of human life postulates resistance  to taking a life through law’s instrumentality.  That ought not to be done save in the rarest  

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of rare cases when the alternative option is  unquestionably foreclosed.”

40. In Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab24  

a three-Judge Bench has explained the concept of rarest  

of the rare cases by stating that:-  

 “The  reasons  why  the  community  as  a  whole  does  not  endorse  the  humanistic  approach  reflected  in  ‘death  sentence-in- no-case’ doctrine are not far to seek. In the  first  place,  the  very  humanistic  edifice  is  constructed on the foundation of ‘reverence  for  life’  principle.  When  a  member  of  the  community  violates  this  very  principle  by  killing  another  member,  the  society  may  not feel itself bound by the shackles of this  doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realised that  every member of the community is able to  live with safety without his or her own life  being endangered because of the protective  arm of  the community  and on account  of  the  rule  of  law  enforced  by  it.  The  very  existence of the rule of law and the fear of  being  brought  to  book  operates  as  a  deterrent for those who have no scruples in  killing  others  if  it  suits  their  ends.  Every  member of the community owes a debt to  the community for this protection.”

41. Thereafter,  after  adverting  to  the  aspects  of  the  

feeling  of  the  community  and  its  desire  for  self-

preservation, the Court opined that the community may  

24 (1983) 3 SCC 470  

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well  withdraw  the  protection  by  sanctioning  the  death  

penalty.  The Court in that regard ruled thus:-  

“But  the  community  will  not  do  so  in  every case. It may do so ‘in the rarest of  rare cases’ when its collective conscience  is  so  shocked  that  it  will  expect  the  holders  of  the  judicial  power  centre  to  inflict  death  penalty  irrespective  of  their  personal opinion as regards desirability or  otherwise of retaining death penalty.”

42. It is apt to state here that in the said case, emphasis  

was  laid  on  certain  aspects,  namely,  manner  of  

commission of murder, motive for commission of murder,  

anti-social  or  socially  abhorrent  nature  of  the  crime,  

magnitude  of  crime  and  personality  of  the  victim  of  

murder.  

43. After so enumerating the propositions that emerged  

out from  Bachan Singh  (supra) were culled out which  

are as follows:-

“The following propositions emerge from  Bachan Singh case:

“(i)  The extreme penalty of  death need  not be inflicted except in gravest cases of  extreme culpability.

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(ii)  Before  opting  for  the  death  penalty  the circumstances of  the ‘offender’  also  require  to  be  taken  into  consideration  along  with  the  circumstances  of  the  ‘crime’.

(iii)  Life  imprisonment  is  the  rule  and  death sentence is an exception. In other  words death sentence must be imposed  only  when life  imprisonment  appears  to  be an altogether inadequate punishment  having  regard  to  the  relevant  circumstances of the crime, and provided,  and only provided, the option to impose  sentence of imprisonment for life cannot  be  conscientiously  exercised  having  regard to the nature and circumstances  of  the  crime  and  all  the  relevant  circumstances.

(iv)  A balance sheet of aggravating and  mitigating circumstances has to be drawn  up  and  in  doing  so  the  mitigating  circumstances  have  to  be  accorded  full  weightage and a just balance has to be  struck between the aggravating and the  mitigating  circumstances  before  the  option is exercised.”

44. Thereafter,  the  three-Judge  Bench  opined  that  to  

apply  said  guidelines,  the  following  questions  are  

required to be answered:-

“(a) Is there something uncommon about  the  crime  which  renders  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  inadequate  and  calls for a death sentence?

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(b)  Are  the  circumstances  of  the  crime  such that  there is  no alternative but  to  impose  death  sentence  even  after  according  maximum  weightage  to  the  mitigating circumstances which speak in  favour of the offender?”

In the said case, the Court upheld the extreme  

penalty of death in respect of three accused persons.

45. In  Haresh  Mohandas  Rajput  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra25 while  dealing  with  the  situation  where  

the  death  sentence  is  warranted  the  two-Judge  Bench  

referred to  the guidelines  laid down in  Bachan Singh  

(supra)  and the principles culled out  in  Machhi Singh  

(supra) and opined as follows:-

“In Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab this Court  expanded  the  “rarest  of  rare”  formulation  beyond  the  aggravating  factors  listed  in  Bachan Singh to cases where the “collective  conscience” of the community is so shocked  that it will expect the holders of the judicial  power  centre  to  inflict  the  death  penalty  irrespective  of  their  personal  opinion  as  regards desirability or otherwise of retaining  the  death  penalty,  such  a  penalty  can  be  inflicted.  But  the  Bench  in  this  case  underlined  that  full  weightage  must  be  accorded to the mitigating circumstances in a  case  and  a  just  balance  had  to  be  struck  

25 (2011)  12 SCC 56

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between the aggravating and the mitigating  circumstances.”

After so stating, the Court ruled thus:-

“The rarest of the rare case” comes when a  convict would be a menace and threat to the  harmonious and peaceful coexistence of the  society. The crime may be heinous or brutal  but may not be in the category of “the rarest  of the rare case”. There must be no reason to  believe that the accused cannot be reformed  or  rehabilitated  and  that  he  is  likely  to  continue criminal  acts  of  violence as  would  constitute a continuing threat to the society.  The accused may be a menace to the society  and would continue to be so, threatening its  peaceful  and  harmonious  coexistence.  The  manner  in  which  the  crime  is  committed  must  be  such that  it  may result  in  intense  and  extreme  indignation  of  the  community  and  shock  the  collective  conscience  of  the  society.  Where an accused does not act on  any  spur-of-the-moment  provocation  and  indulges  himself  in  a  deliberately  planned  crime and meticulously executes it, the death  sentence  may  be  the  most  appropriate  punishment  for  such  a  ghastly  crime.  The  death sentence may be warranted where the  victims  are  innocent  children  and  helpless  women. Thus, in case the crime is committed  in a most cruel and inhuman manner which is  an  extremely  brutal,  grotesque,  diabolical,  revolting  and  dastardly  manner,  where  his  act  affects  the  entire  moral  fibre  of  the  society  e.g.  crime  committed  for  power  or  political  ambition  or  indulging  in  organised  criminal activities, death sentence should be  awarded.  (See  C.  Muniappan v.  State  of  

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T.N26.,  Dara  Singh v.  Republic  of  India27,  Surendra  Koli v.  State  of  U.P.28,  Mohd.  Mannan29 and  Sudam v.  State  of  Maharashtra30.)

Thus, it is evident that for awarding the death  sentence,  there  must  be  existence  of  aggravating  circumstances  and  the  consequential  absence  of  mitigating  circumstances.  As  to  whether  the  death  sentence should be awarded, would depend  upon  the  factual  scenario  of  the  case  in  hand.”

46. In  Dhanjoy Chatterjee alias Dhana v. State of   

W.B.31, this Court was dealing with the murder of a young  

girl of about 18 years.  The Court took note of the fact  

that the accused was a married man of 27 years of age,  

the principles stated in Bachan Singh’s case and further  

took note of the fact that rise of violent crimes against  

women in recent years, and thereafter on consideration  

of aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances and  

opined that:-

“In  our  opinion,  the  measure  of  punishment in a given case must depend  upon  the  atrocity  of  the  crime;  the  

26 (2010) 9 SCC 567 27 (2011) 2 SCC 490 28 (2011) 4 SCC 80 29 (2011) 5 SCC 317 30 (2011) 7 SCC 125s  31 (1994) 2 SCC 220

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conduct  of  the  criminal  and  the  defenceless and unprotected state of the  victim.  Imposition  of  appropriate  punishment  is  the manner  in  which the  courts  respond  to  the  society’s  cry  for  justice  against  the  criminals.  Justice  demands  that  courts  should  impose  punishment  befitting  the  crime  so  that  the  courts  reflect  public  abhorrence  of  the crime. The courts must not only keep  in view the rights of the criminal but also  the rights of the victim of crime and the  society  at  large  while  considering  imposition of appropriate punishment.”

47. After so stating, the Court took note of the fact that  

the  deceased  was  a  school  going  girl  and  it  was  the  

sacred duty of the appellant, being a security guard, to  

ensure the safety of  the inhabitants of  the flats  in the  

apartment  but  to  gratify  his  lust  he  had  raped  and  

murdered  the  girl  in  retaliation  which  made the  crime  

more  heinous.   Appreciating  the  manner  in  which  the  

barbaric  crime  was  committed  on  a  helpless  and  

defenceless school-going girl of 18 years the Court came  

to hold that the case fell in the category of rarest of the  

rare  cases  and  accordingly  affirmed  the  capital  

punishment imposed by the High Court.

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48. In Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa32 the Court has  

commenced the judgment with the following passage:-

“The  present  case  before  us  reveals  a  sordid story which took place sometime  in the afternoon of February 17, 1990, in  which the alleged sexual assault followed  by  brutal  and  merciless  murder  by  the  dastardly and monstrous act of abhorrent  nature is said to have been committed by  the appellant herein who is none else but  an  agnate  and  paternal  uncle  of  the  deceased  victim  Nitma,  a  girl  of  the  tender age of 7 years who fell a prey to  his lust which sends shocking waves not  only  to  the  judicial  conscience  but  to  everyone  having  slightest  sense  of  human  values  and  particularly  to  the  blood relations and the society at large”.

49. Be it  stated,  in  the said  case the High Court  had  

dismissed the appellant’s appeal and confirmed the death  

sentence awarded to him.  While discussing as regards  

the  justifiability  of  sentence  the  Court  referred  to  the  

decision in Bachan Singh’s case and opined that there  

were absolutely no mitigating circumstances and, on the  

contrary, the facts of the case disclosed only aggravating  

circumstances against the appellant.  Elaborating further  

the Court held thus:-  

32 (1994) 3 SCC 381

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“The hard facts of the present case are  that the appellant Laxman is the uncle of  the  deceased  and  almost  occupied  the  status  and  position  that  of  a  guardian.  Consequently  the  victim  who  was  aged  about  7  years  must  have  reposed  complete confidence in the appellant and  while reposing such faith and confidence  in the appellant must have believed in his  bona fides and it was on account of such  a faith and belief that she acted upon the  command  of  the  appellant  in  accompanying him under the impression  that she was being taken to her village  unmindful  of  the  preplanned  unholy  designs of the appellant. The victim was a  totally helpless child there being no one  to  protect  her  in  the  desert  where  she  was taken by the appellant misusing her  confidence  to  fulfil  his  lust.  It  appears  that  the  appellant  had  preplanned  to  commit  the  crime  by  resorting  to  diabolical  methods and it  was with that  object  that  he  took  the  girl  to  a  lonely  place to execute his dastardly act.”

After  so stating the Court  while affirming the  

death sentence opined that:-

“ …….The  victim  of  the  age  of  Nitma  could not have even ever resisted the act  with  which  she  was  subjected  to.  The  appellant  seems  to  have  acted  in  a  beastly manner as after satisfying his lust  he thought that the victim might expose  him for the commission of the offence of  forcible  rape  on  her  to  the  family  members and others, the appellant with a  

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view to screen the evidence of his crime  also put an end to the life of innocent girl  who had seen only seven summers. The  evidence  on  record  is  indicative  of  the  fact as to how diabolically the appellant  had  conceived  of  his  plan  and  brutally  executed it and such a calculated, cold- blooded and brutal murder of a girl of a  very tender age after committing rape on  her  would  undoubtedly  fall  in  the  category  of  rarest  of  the  rare  cases  attracting no punishment other than the  capital punishment and consequently we  confirm the  sentence  of  death  imposed  upon the appellant for the offence under  Section 302 of the Penal Code.”

50. In  Kamta  Tiwari  and  State  of   M.P.33 the  

appellant  was  convicted  for  the  offences  punishable  

under  Sections  363,  376,302  and  201  of  IPC  and  

sentenced to death by learned trial Judge and the same  

was affirmed by the High Court.  In appeal the two-Judge  

Bench referred to the propositions culled out in  Machhi  

Singh and expressed thus:-  

“Taking an overall  view of all  the facts and  circumstances of the instant case in the light  of the above propositions we are of the firm  opinion that the sentence of death should be  maintained.  In  vain  we have searched for   mitigating  circumstances  —  but  found  aggravating  circumstances  aplenty.  The  evidence  on  record  clearly  establishes  that  

33 (1996) 6 SCC 250

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the  appellant  was  close  to  the  family  of  Parmeshwar  and  the  deceased  and  her  siblings  used  to  call  him  ‘Tiwari  Uncle’.  Obviously  her  closeness  with  the  appellant  encouraged her to go to his shop, which was  near  the  saloon where  she had gone for  a  haircut with her father and brother, and ask  for  some  biscuits.  The  appellant  readily  responded to the request by taking her to the  nearby grocery shop of Budhsen and handing  over  a  packet  of  biscuits  apparently  as  a  prelude to his sinister design which unfolded  in her kidnapping, brutal rape and gruesome  murder  — as  the numerous  injuries  on her  person  testify;  and  the  finale  was  the  dumping of her dead body in a well. When an  innocent  hapless  girl  of  7  years  was  subjected  to  such  barbaric  treatment  by  a  person who was in a position of her trust his  culpability  assumes  the  proportion  of  extreme  depravity  and  arouses  a  sense  of  revulsion in the mind of the common man. In  fine,  the  motivation  of  the  perpetrator,  the  vulnerability  of  the  victim,  the  enormity  of  the crime, the execution thereof persuade us  to hold that this is a “rarest of rare” cases  where  the  sentence  of  death  is  eminently  desirable  not  only  to  deter  others  from  committing such atrocious crimes but also to  give  emphatic  expression  to  society’s  abhorrence of such crimes.”

51. In  Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh34 a five year  

minor girl was raped and murdered and the appellant was  

awarded  death  sentence  by  the  trial  Court  which  was  

affirmed  by  the  High  Court.   This  Court  found  the  34 (2008) 11 SCC 113

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appellant guilty of the crime and thereafter referred to  

the principles stated in  Bachan Singh, Machhi Singh  

(supra)  and Devender  Pal  Singh v.  State  of  A.P.35  

and eventually came to hold that the said case fell in the  

rarest  of the rare category and the capital  punishment  

was warranted.  Being of this view, the Court declined to  

interfere with the sentence.  

52. In  Rajendra  Pralhadrao  Wasnik  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra36, the appellant was awarded sentence of  

death by the learned trial Judge which was confirmed by  

the High Court, for he was found guilty of the offences  

punishable under Sections 376(2)(f), 377 and 302 IPC.  In  

the  said  case,  the  prosecution  had  proven  that  the  

appellant had lured a three year old minor girl child on  

the pretext of buying her biscuits and then raped her and  

eventually being apprehensive of being identified, killed  

her.   In  that  context,  while  dismissing  the  appeal,  the  

Court ruled thus:

“When the Court draws a balance sheet  of  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances,  for  the  purposes  of  

35 (2002) 5 SCC 234 36 (2012) 4 SCC 37

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determining  whether  the  extreme  sentence  of  death  should  be  imposed  upon  the  accused  or  not,  the  scale  of  justice only tilts  against  the accused as  there  is  nothing  but  aggravating  circumstances evident from the record of  the  Court.  In  fact,  one  has  to  really  struggle  to  find  out  if  there  were  any  mitigating  circumstances  favouring  the  accused.

Another aspect of the matter is that the  minor  child  was  helpless  in  the  cruel  hands of the accused. The accused was  holding  the  child  in  a  relationship  of  “trust-belief” and “confidence”, in which  capacity he took the child from the house  of PW 2. In other words, the accused, by  his  conduct,  has  belied  the  human  relationship of trust and worthiness. The  accused  left  the  deceased  in  a  badly  injured  condition  in  the  open  fields  without  even  clothes.  This  reflects  the  most  unfortunate  and  abusive  facet  of  human  conduct,  for  which  the  accused  has to blame no one else than his own  self.”

53. At this juncture, we may refer to some authorities  

where in cases of rape and murder, the death penalty  

was not awarded.  In  State of T.N. V. Suresh and  

Another37,  the  Court  unsettled  the  judgment  of  

acquittal  recorded by the High Court and found that  

the accused was guilty of rape of a pregnant woman  37 (1998) 2 SCC 372

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and also murder.  While awarding the sentence of life  

imprisonment, the Court expressed the view:-

“The  above  discussion  takes  us  to  the  final conclusion that the High Court has  seriously erred in upsetting the conviction  entered by the Sessions Court as against  A-2 and A-3. The erroneous approach has  resulted  in  miscarriage  of  justice  by  allowing  the  two  perpetrators  of  a  dastardly  crime  committed  against  a  helpless young pregnant  housewife  who  was sleeping in her own apartment with  her little baby sleeping by her side and  during the absence of her husband. We  strongly feel that the error committed by  the  High  Court  must  be  undone  by  restoring the conviction passed against A- 2 and A-3, though we are not inclined, at  this  distance  of  time,  to  restore  the  sentence  of  death  passed  by  the  trial  court on those two accused”.

From the aforesaid authority, it is seen that the  

Court did not think it appropriate to restore the death  

sentence passed by the trial court regard being had to  

the passage of time.  

54. In Akhtar V. State of U.P.38, the appellant was  

found guilty of murder of a young girl after committing  

rape  on  her  and  was  sentenced  to  death  by  the  

learned  Sessions  Judge  and  the  said  sentence  was  

38  (1999) 6 SCC 60

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confirmed by the High Court.   The two-Judge Bench  

referred  to  the  decisions  in  Laxman  Naik (supra),  

Kamta Tiwari (supra)  and addressed itself  whether  

the case in hand was one of the rarest of the rare case  

for which punishment of death could be awarded.  The  

Court distinguished the two decisions which have been  

referred to hereinabove and ruled:-  

“In  the  case  in  hand  on  examining  the  evidence  of  the  three  witnesses  it  appears to us that the accused-appellant  has  committed  the  murder  of  the  deceased girl  not  intentionally  and with  any premeditation. On the other hand the  accused-appellant  found  a  young  girl  alone in a lonely place, picked her up for  committing rape;  while committing rape  and in the process by way of gagging the  girl has died. The medical  evidence also  indicates that the death is on account of  asphyxia. In the circumstances we are of  the  considered opinion  that  the case  in  hand  cannot  be  held  to  be  one  of  the  rarest  of  rare  cases  justifying  the  punishment of death”.

55. In  State  of  Maharashtra  V.  Barat  Fakira  

Dhiwar39,  a  three-year  old  girl  was  raped  and  

murdered  by  the  accused.   The  learned  trial  Judge  

convicted  the  accused  and  awarded  the  death  

39  (2002) 1 SCC 622

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sentence.  The High Court had set aside the order of  

conviction and acquitted him for  the offences.   This  

Court, on scrutiny of the evidence found the accused  

was guilty of rape and murder.  Thereafter, the Court  

proceeded  to  deal  with  the  sentence  and  in  that  

context observed:-

“Regarding  sentence  we  would  have  concurred with the Sessions Court’s view  that the extreme penalty of death can be  chosen for such a crime. However, as the  accused was once acquitted by the High  Court  we  refrain  from  imposing  that  extreme penalty in spite of the fact that  this case is perilously near the region of  “rarest of the rare cases”, as envisaged  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Bachan  Singh v.  State  of  Punjab.  However,  the  lesser  option  is  not  unquestionably  foreclosed and so we alter the sentence,  in  regard  to  the  offence  under  Section  302 IPC, to imprisonment for life”.  

56. Keeping  in  view  the  aforesaid  authorities,  we  

shall  proceed to adumbrate what is  the duty of  the  

Court  when  the  collective  conscience  is  shocked  

because of the crime committed.  When the crime is  

diabolical  in  nature  and  invites  abhorrence  of  the  

collective, it shocks the judicial conscience and impels  

it to react keeping in view the collective conscience,  

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cry  of  the  community  for  justice  and  the  intense  

indignation the manner in  which the brutal  crime is  

committed.  We are absolutely conscious that Judges  

while  imposing  sentence,  should  never  be  swayed  

away  with  any  kind  of  individual  philosophy  and  

predilections.   It  should  never  have  the  flavour  of  

Judge-centric attitude or perception.  It has to satisfy  

the test  laid  down in  various  precedents  relating to  

rarest of the rare case.  We are also required to pose  

two  questions  that  has  been  stated  in  Machhi  

Singh’s case.   

57. Presently,  we  shall  proceed  to  dwell  upon  the  

manner in which the crime was committed.  Materials  

on record clearly  reveal  that  the appellant  was well  

acquainted with the inhabitants of the locality and as  

is  demonstrable  he  had access  to  the house of  the  

father of the deceased and the children used to call  

him “uncle”.  He had lured the deceased to go with  

him  to  have  chocolates.   It  is  an  act  of  taking  

advantage of absolute innocence.  He had taken the  

deceased  from  place  to  place  by  his  bicycle  and  

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eventually raped her in a brutal manner, as if he had  

the  insatiable  and  ravenous  appetite.   The  injuries  

caused on the minor girl are likely to send a chill in the  

spine  of  the  society  and  shiver  in  the  marrows  of  

human conscience.  He had battered her to death by  

assaulting  her  with  two  heavy  stones.   The  injured  

minor  girl  could  not  have  shown  any  kind  of  

resistance.  It is not a case where the accused had a  

momentary  lapse.   It  is  also  not  a  case  where  the  

minor child had died because of profuse bleeding due  

to rape but because of the deliberate cruel assault by  

the  appellant.   After  the  savage  act  was  over,  the  

coolness of the appellant is evident, for he washed the  

clothes on the tap and took proper care to hide things.  

As is manifest, he even did not think for a moment the  

trauma and torture that was caused to the deceased.  

The gullibility  and vulnerability of the four year  girl,  

who  could  not  have  nurtured  any  idea  about  the  

maladroitly designed biological desires of this nature,  

went with the uncle who extinguished her life spark.  

The barbaric act of the appellant does not remotely  

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show  any  concern  for  the  precious  life  of  a  young  

minor  child  who  had  really  not  seen  life.   The  

criminality of the conduct of the appellant is not only  

depraved  and  debased,  but  can  have  a  menacing  

effect on the society.  It is calamitous.  In this context,  

we  may  fruitfully  refer  to  a  passage  from  Shyam  

Narain  V.  State  (NCT  of  Delhi)40,  wherein  it  has  

been observed as follows:

“The  wanton  lust,  vicious  appetite,  depravity of senses, mortgage of mind to  the  inferior  endowments  of  nature,  the  servility  to  the  loathsome  beast  of  passion and absolutely unchained carnal  desire  have  driven  the  appellant  to  commit  a  crime  which  can  bring  in  a  “tsunami”  of  shock  in  the  mind  of  the  collective, send a chill down the spine of  the society, destroy the civilised stems of  the milieu and comatose the marrows of  sensitive polity”.

In the said case, while describing the rape on an  

eight year old girl, the Court observed:

“Almost  for  the  last  three  decades,  this  Court has been expressing its agony and  distress pertaining to the increased rate of  crimes against women. The eight year old  girl,  who was supposed to spend time in  

40  (2013) 7 SCC 77

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cheerfulness,  was  dealt  with  animal  passion  and  her  dignity  and  purity  of  physical  frame was shattered.  The plight  of the child and the shock suffered by her  can be well visualised. The torment on the  child  has  the  potentiality  to  corrode the  poise  and  equanimity  of  any  civilised  society.  The  age-old  wise  saying  that  “child is a gift  of the providence” enters  into the realm of absurdity. The young girl,  with  efflux  of  time,  would  grow  with  a  traumatic  experience,  an  unforgettable  shame.  She  shall  always  be  haunted  by  the memory replete with heavy crush of  disaster constantly echoing the chill air of  the  past  forcing  her  to  a  state  of  nightmarish melancholia. She may not be  able to assert the honour of a woman for  no fault of hers.”

58. In the case at hand, as we find, not only the rape  

was committed in a brutal manner but murder was also  

committed in a barbaric manner.  The rape of a minor girl  

child is nothing but a monstrous burial of her dignity in  

the darkness. It is a crime against the holy body of a girl  

child  and  the  soul  of  the  society  and  such  a  crime  is  

aggravated  by  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been  

committed.  The nature of the crime and the manner in  

which  it  has  been  committed  speaks  about  its  

uncommonness.   The  crime  speaks  of  depravity,  

degradation  and  uncommonality.   It  is  diabolical  and  

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barbaric.   The  crime  was  committed  in  an  inhuman  

manner.  Indubitably, these go a long way to establish the  

aggravating circumstances.  

59. We  are  absolutely  conscious  that  mitigating  

circumstances  are  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  

Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  pointing  out  the  

mitigating circumstances would submit that the appellant  

is  in  his  mid  fifties  and  there  is  possibility  of  his  

reformation.  Be it noted, the appellant was aged about  

forty-seven years at the time of commission of the crime.  

As is noticeable, there has been no remorse on the part of  

the  appellant.   There  are  cases  when  this  Court  has  

commuted  the  death  sentence  to  life  finding  that  the  

accused has expressed remorse or the crime was not pre-

meditated.   But  the  obtaining  factual  matrix  when  

unfolded stage by stage would show the premeditation,  

the proclivity and the rapacious desire.  Learned counsel  

would  submit  that  the  appellant  had  no  criminal  

antecedents  but  we find that  he was a  history-sheeter  

and had number of cases are pending against him.  That  

alone may not be sufficient.  The appalling cruelty shown  

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by him to the minor girl child is extremely shocking and it  

gets  accentuated,  when  his  age  is  taken  into  

consideration.  It was not committed under any mental  

stress  or  emotional  disturbance  and  it  is  difficult  to  

comprehend  that  he  would  not  commit  such  acts  and  

would be reformed or rehabilitated.  As the circumstances  

would graphically depict, he would remain a menace to  

the society, for a defenceless child has become his prey.  

In  our  considered  opinion,  there  are  no  mitigating  

circumstances.  

60. As  we  perceive,  this  case  deserves  to  fall  in  the  

category of rarest of the rare cases.  It is inconceivable  

from the perspective of the society that a married man  

aged about two scores and seven make a four year minor  

innocent girl  child the prey of  his lust  and deliberately  

cause her death.  A helpless and defenceless child gets  

raped and murdered because of the acquaintance of the  

appellant with the people of the society.  This is not only  

betrayal  of  an  individual  trust  but  destruction  and  

devastation of social trust.  It is perversity in its enormity.  

It  irrefragably  invites  the  extreme  abhorrence  and  

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indignation of the collective.   It  is  an anathema to the  

social balance.  In our view, it meets the test of rarest of  

the rare case and we unhesitatingly so hold.  

61. Consequently,  we  dismiss  the  criminal  appeals  

preferred by the appellant and affirm the death sentence.  

........................................J. [DIPAK MISRA]

.........................................J.                    [ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN]

........................................J.                  [UDAY UMESH LALIT]

NEW DELHI NOVEMBER 26, 2014.   

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