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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11774 OF 2018  

Vasant Ganpat Padave (D)  

By LRs & Ors.            … Appellants  

 Versus  

Anant Mahadev Sawant (D)  

Through LRs & Ors.              … Respondents  

WITH  

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.11775-11798 OF 2018  

JUDGMENT  

R.F. Nariman, J.  

1. This case has been referred to a Three Judge Bench by a  

detailed judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported as Vasant  

Ganpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (2019) 2 SCC 788. The  

relevant facts that are necessary for determination of the controversy  

before us are set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the referral order as  

follows:  

“3. One Balwant Sawant was landlord of Survey No. 92/2,  corresponding to new Survey No. 31 Hissa No. 2/10,

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admeasuring about 0.01.3 H.R. at Village Padavewadi,  Taluka & District Ratnagiri. Balwant Sawant died on 10-5- 1950 leaving behind Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his  widow as his legal heir and representative. Smt Indirabai  Balwant Sawant, widow became the owner of the said  property. Her name was mutated in the revenue records.  The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was  amended by Act 15 of 1957. Section 32 as amended  provided that on 1-4-1957 (Tillers' Day), every tenant shall  be deemed to have purchased from the landlord free from  all encumbrances the land held by him as a tenant. The  predecessor of the appellants were tenants prior to 1956- 1957 i.e. prior to 1-4-1957. The proceedings for declaring  the appellants as purchaser under Section 32-G were  initiated during the lifetime of the landlady, Smt Indirabai  Balwant Sawant but the mutation Entry No. 1341 recorded  that since landlady Indirabai Balwant Sawant is a widow, the  proceedings as contemplated under Section 32-G are  suspended. On 12-5-1975, Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant  executed last will and testament in favour of Anant Mahadev  Sawant, Respondent 1. Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant died  on 7-5-1999. The name of Respondent 1 was mutated in the  revenue records on 29-2-2000, with regard to which no  notice was issued to the appellants, hence they were not  aware of either the death of Indirabai or mutation in favour  of Respondent 1.  

4. In the year 2008, when the appellants came to know that  the landlady has died and in her place, name of Respondent  1 has been mutated, they filed an application on 5-9-2008  before Respondent 2 — Additional Tahsildar & A.L.T.  Ratnagiri, Maharashtra for fixing the purchase price under  Section 32-G of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1948 Act”).  Respondent 1 filed reply and opposed the said application.  Respondent 2 allowed the application of the appellants by  order dated 9-9-2011. Respondent 2 held that predecessors  of the appellants were tenants prior to 1956-1957.  Proceedings under Section 32-G for declaring the appellants  as purchasers were initiated during the lifetime of the  landlady and the same were suspended on 8-1-1964 during  the lifetime of the landlady being a widow. Respondent 2  fixed the purchase price and directed the appellants to

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deposit the same to enable issue of sale certificate in favour  of the appellants. Aggrieved against the order dated 9-9- 2011, Respondent 1 filed an appeal under Section 74 of the  1948 Act before Respondent 3, Sub-Divisional Officer,  Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. Respondent 3 allowed the appeal  vide its order dated 8-1-2013. Respondent 3 held that the  appellant ought to have issued notice under Section 32-F  within the time as prescribed and no notice having been  issued within the time as prescribed, the appellants have lost  right of purchase.  

5. The appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Sub- Divisional Officer, filed a revision application before the  Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. There were other revisions  filed by several other tenants who were aggrieved by the  order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra  Revenue Tribunal by a common order dated 20-4-2013  dismissed the revisions and confirmed the order of the Sub- Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held  that applicants were under legal obligation to give intimation  expressing their desire to purchase within time stipulated  under Section 32-F, which having not been given, no right of  purchase is available to applicants. Aggrieved against the  judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, writ  petitions were filed by the appellants and several other  similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions were  dismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari  Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom  4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these  appeals have been filed.”  

2. After setting out various provisions of the Maharashtra Tenancy  

and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”),  

as amended, and after referring to various judgments of this Court  

dealing, in particular, with Section 32-F of the Act, the Division Bench  

then stated:

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“30. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments can be restated  in the following words:  

30.1. For a landlord suffering from a disability on the Tillers'  Day i.e. 1-4-1957, the deemed purchase shall be  suspended.    

30.2. Landlord suffering from a disability has a right under  Section 31(3) of the Act to give notice of termination of  tenancy and file an application for possession.  

30.3. Under Section 31(3), a minor, within one year from the  date on which he attains majority; a successor-in-title of a  widow within one year from the date on which her interest in  the land ceases to exist; and landlord within one year from  the date on which his/her mental or physical disability  ceases to exist, can also give an application for termination  of tenancy and possession.  

30.4. Under Section 32-F, tenant has right to purchase  where landlord was minor or a widow or a person subject to  mental or physical disability within one year from the expiry  of the period during which such landlord is entitled to  terminate the tenancy under Section 31.  

30.5. The tenant, in event, does not exercise his right of  purchase within the period as prescribed under Section 32- F(1)(a), his/her right to purchase shall be lost.  

31. In the present case, it is undisputed fact that the landlady  died on 7-5-1999 and within one year thereafter her  successor-in-title did not exercise his right under Section  31(3) and thereafter within one year tenant has not given  any intimation for purchase as contemplated by Section 32- F. The question to be answered is as to whether in the above  facts, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Revenue Tribunal as well  as the High Court were right in their conclusion that right of  the tenant i.e. the appellant has lost, he having not issued  any intimation for purchase of the land within one year from  expiry of the period as contemplated under Section 31(3).  

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32. The ratio of this Court as noticed above, especially in the  judgments of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum [Appa  Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4  SCC 443] , Sudam Ganpat Kutwal [Sudam Ganpat  Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC  200] and Tukaram Maruti Chavan [Tukaram Maruti  Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358] ,  clearly supports the submission of the learned counsel for  the respondents that the appellants having not exercised  their right to purchase under Section 32-F(1) read with  Section 32-F(1-A) within the time prescribed, the right of  purchase of the tenant is lost. But there is one aspect of the  matter which needs to be noted and has not been  considered in the above judgments rendered by two-Judge  Benches of this Court which we shall notice hereinafter.”  

The Division Bench then laid emphasis upon the Statement of Objects  

and Reasons to the 1969 Amendment of the 1948 Act and opined:  

“37. Amendment in Section 32-F(1)(a) added by Act 49 of  1969 expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor  and has attained majority. Intimation by a minor landlord  who has attained majority has been made a statutory  obligation of the landlord so that tenant may exercise his  right of purchase. The other two categories which are a  widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability  have not been expressly included in the amendment  incorporated by Act 49 of 1969. The Statement of Objects  and Reasons of the amendment given in 1969 as well as the  express provisions of such amendment are for the purposes  and object to enable the tenant to exercise right of purchase.  When for one category of landlord i.e. minor it is mandated  that he will intimate the tenant after he attained the majority  so that tenant may be enabled to exercise the right of  purchase, we are of the view that the same object has to be  read in two other categories of landlord that is the successor- in-title of a widow and a landlord whose mental or physical  disability has been ceased. When the legislative object is to  facilitate a tenant of a disabled landlord after cessation of  disability to exercise right of purchase, the same benefit  needs to be extended to other two categories of disabled  landlord. We do not find any distinction in three categories

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of disabled landlords nor tenant of a landlord who was a  minor can be put on any higher footing as compared to other  landlords suffering from the above two disabilities. The  question may be asked that amendment only expressly  included the landlord who has attained majority to send  intimation and the legislature consciously did not include the  other two categories of landlord i.e. successor-in-interest of  a widow and landlord of a mental and physical disability  ceases to exist. The Objects and Reasons and express  amendment made by Act 49 of 1969 were with a view to  enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase. The said  legislative intendment is to be extended to all tenants of  landlords who were suffering from disability on the Tillers'  Day, whether successor-in-title of a widow or a landlord  whose mental or physical disability ceases. All the three  categories of tenants should be extended the same benefit  and provision should be interpreted so that all tenants may  be enabled to exercise their right of purchase effectively and  in real sense.  

38. As in the present case, the tenant's case is that he was  unaware of the death of the landlady since for the last  several years she was living in Bombay, the date of  knowledge of death of the landlady cannot be said to be an  irrelevant factor and unless the tenant is aware of the death  of landlady or in case of landlord suffering from physical or  mental disability, how he will exercise his right of purchase,  is an important question. The 1948 Act and the amendments  made by the 1969 Act were with intent to facilitate tenants to  exercise their right. The amendments by Act 15 of 1957 was  agrarian reform making tillers of the soil the owners of the  land which was done to achieve the object of making all  tillers of the soil as owners of the land. While interpreting the  provisions of Section 32-F(1-A) as well as Section 31(3), the  purpose and object of the 1948 Act, amendments made  therein from time to time cannot be lost sight off.  

39. When Section 32-F of the 1948 Act gives right to  purchase to a tenant whose landlord was suffering from a  disability on Tillers' Day, the exercise of right to purchase by  such tenant has to be interpreted in a manner so as to make  the exercise of right meaningful and effective. The

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abovesaid right cannot be defeated on the ground that it was  not exercised within the period prescribed when the tenant  is unaware as to when the period has begun.  

40. The period prescribed for exercising the right to  purchase is not a period of limitation but a reasonable period  prescribed for the exercise of a right. The knowledge of  cessation of disability of landlord by the tenant can only be  commencement of the period prescribed.  

41. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute needs  to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the right  workable, effective and meaningful. Such right cannot be  defeated unless it is proved that tenant, even after knowing  that disability has ceased, does not exercise his right within  the period prescribed.  

42. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Appa  Narsappa Magdum [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai  Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] has expressly  rejected the submission that tenant had no intimation of the  death of landlady. Further judgments of this Court in Sudam  Ganpat Kutwal [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai  Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] and Tukaram Maruti  Chavan [Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan  Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358] also laid down the same ratio.  The judgments in the above three cases were rendered by  the two-Judge Benches in which cases the amendments  made by Act 49 of 1969 were neither raised nor considered.  We, thus, are of the view that the ratio laid down in the above  cases needs to be reconsidered and explained in view of the  object and purpose for which amendments were made in  Section 32-F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 as noticed above. We,  thus, refer to the following questions for consideration of a  larger Bench:  

42.1. (1) Whether the object and purpose of amendment  made in Section 32-F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 is also relevant  and applicable for exercise of right to purchase by a tenant  of landlord who was widow or suffering from mental and  physical disability on Tillers' Day?  

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42.2. (2) Whether the successor-in-interest of a widow is  also obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation  of interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his  right of purchase.  

42.3. (3) In the event the answer to above Question (1) or  (2) is in the affirmative, whether decision of this Court  in Appa Narsappa Magdum [Appa Narsappa  Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443]  , Sudam Ganpat Kutwal [Sudam Ganpat  Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC  200] and Tukaram Maruti Chavan [Tukaram Maruti  Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358]  needs reconsideration and explanation.  

43. Let the papers be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief  Justice for constituting a larger Bench. In the meantime, we  direct that the parties shall maintain the status quo.”  

3. We have heard Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Advocate for the  

Appellant and Shri Ajit S. Bhasme, learned Senior Advocate for the  

Respondent. Shri Joshi painstakingly took us through various  

provisions of the 1948 Act and was at pains to point out that it was a  

social welfare legislation enacted in furtherance of an Agrarian Reform  

Programme and was, therefore, covered by Article 31A of the  

Constitution of India. He laid great emphasis, in particular, upon the  

Amendment Acts of 1956 and 1969. By the first mentioned Amendment  

Act, the statutory scheme was to divest an absentee landlord of his title  

and vest title directly in the cultivating tenant of agricultural land.  The  

landlord was given only a limited right to ask for resumption of his land

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provided certain very stringent conditions were met,  provided that such  

application was made on or before Tillers’ Day i.e. 1st April, 1957.  He  

argued that in the case of three categories of persons, namely, widows,  

minors and persons suffering from a disability, the right of the  

cultivating tenant to become owner was only postponed, and Section  

32-F must be read narrowly so as not to interfere with the statutory  

right of purchase of the cultivating tenant. The 1969 Amendment made  

this clear, but was limited only to one of the three categories, namely,  

minors. According to him, therefore, to sub-serve the object sought to  

be achieved by the 1956 Amendment, it is clear that whether a  

cultivating tenant is a tenant under a minor on the one hand, or a widow  

or a person with a disability on the other, should make no difference to  

the fact that once the landlord’s disability ceases, the tenant must first  

know that such disability has ceased before he can meaningfully  

exercise the statutory right given to him within the period prescribed.  

According to him, all the Division Bench Judgments of this Court, which  

have held that such knowledge is immaterial, are wrong in law and  

need to be overruled.  He stated that a manifestly absurd result would  

be reached if we were to so construe Section 32-F of the Act.    

According to him, the one year within which the cultivating tenant may  

exercise his statutory right of purchase is only after the period of  

disability has ceased, in that, for example, the widow has died and one

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year has elapsed from the date of her death within which she has not  

exercised any right to resume the land.  If the Division Bench  

Judgments of this Court are correct, then since the period of one year  

from this date has also elapsed for the reason that the tenant had no  

knowledge of the widow’s death and, therefore, was not able to apply  

in time, the result would be that such lands would then have to be  

distributed under Section 32-P, under which the first preference is  

given again to the absentee landlord who may then be given back this  

land to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act. This would  

turn the Object of the 1956 Amendment on its head, as an absentee  

landlord would, after not availing of any right to resumption, get back  

agricultural land from a cultivating tenant only because the cultivating  

tenant had no knowledge of a fact which was exclusively within the  

landlord’s domain. According to him, therefore, applying the golden  

rule of interpretation, if the literal reading of Section 32-F were to lead  

to this absurd result, it is possible for us as interpreters of the law to  

add or subtract words which would remove this absurdity, which can  

only be the counting of the one year period, so far as the cultivating  

tenant is concerned, from the date of knowledge of the death of the  

widow.  He cited a number of judgments in support of this proposition.  

He also argued that in any event, if Section 32-F were to be construed  

literally, it would violate Article 14 as it would discriminate between

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cultivating tenants who are similarly situate, namely, tenants whose  

statutory right to become owners has been postponed on account of  

the landlord’s disability. Whereas in the case of minors, the landlord is  

bound to intimate the tenant of the date on which such minor attains  

majority, so that he may exercise his statutory right in a meaningful  

way, there is no such obligation on a widow’s successors to inform the  

tenant of the death of the widow, resulting in persons who are similarly  

situate being deprived of their statutory right for no fault of theirs, and  

contrary to the Object sought to be achieved by the 1956 Amendment.    

4. On the other hand, Shri Ajit Bhasme, took us through various  

provisions of the Act and argued that the rent by a cultivating tenant  

needs to be paid at least annually by 31st May every year, which would  

enable the cultivating tenant to know that his landlady widow has died,  

as otherwise rent paid to a dead person cannot be credited to such  

person’s account.  He also made an emotional appeal to the Court that  

in all these cases, most landlords and tenants were villagers who would  

definitely come to know of a widow’s death by word of mouth, given  

Indian village society. On law, he argued that the Division Bench  

judgments were correct.  Section 32-F contains a non-obstante clause,  

which must be given full effect. Further, the legislature is free to  

recognise degrees of harm and can, therefore, pick up one class

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among three classes, where the need is felt most, for protection.  He  

referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment  

Act of 1969 and argued that the legislature was cognizant of the fact  

that a large number of cases relating to minors had come to their  

knowledge, which is why the legislature alleviated the rigor of the  

Section in so far as minor landlords were concerned. He also argued  

that times and clime had changed, and the impoverished tenant of  

yesterday is the rich tenant of today, as opposed to the impoverished  

landlord who continues to remain so.   According to him, the literal rule  

of statutory interpretation must apply, and it is not possible for us to  

add or subtract words in Section 32-F when the meaning is plain and  

unambiguous.  He then dealt with some of the judgments that were  

cited by Shri Joshi and attempted to distinguish them.    

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is important  

to first advert to the Scheme of the 1948 Act. Section 2(6) refers to  

persons who cultivate personally. Explanation - I is important and is set  

out hereinbelow:  

“2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless there is anything  repugnant in the subject or context,  

xxx xxx xxx  

(6) “to cultivate personally”…  

Explanation I – A widow or a minor, or a person who is  subject to physical or mental disability, or a serving member

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of the armed forces shall be deemed to cultivate the land  personally if such land is cultivated by servants, or by hired  labour, or through tenants.”   

The deeming provision contained in Explanation I makes it clear that  

the four categories mentioned are deemed to cultivate land personally  

even if such land is cultivated through tenants.   

6. Under Section 2(8), “land” is defined as referring to land which is  

used for agricultural purposes. Under Section 2(18), “tenant” includes  

three categories of persons – deemed tenants under Section 4,  

protected tenants and permanent tenants, as defined.  Under Section  

4 of the Act, a person who cultivates lawfully any land belonging to  

another person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not  

cultivated personally by the owner or a member of his family or by a  

servant on wages payable in cash or kind or by a mortgagee in  

possession. Under Section 4-B tenancies cannot be terminated merely  

on the ground that the period fixed by an agreement has expired.    

Section 31 is important and is set out hereinbelow:-  

“31. Landlord's right to terminate tenancy for personal  cultivation and non-agricultural purpose.—  

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 14 and  30 but subject to Sections 31-A to 31-D (both inclusive), a  landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter  III-AA) may, after giving notice and making an application for  possession as provided in sub-section (2), terminate the  tenancy of any land (except a permanent tenancy), if the

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landlord bona fide requires the land for any of the following  purposes:-  

(a) for cultivating personally, or  

(b) for any non-agricultural purpose.  

(2) The notice required to be given under sub-section (1)  shall be in writing, shall state the purpose for which the  landlord requires the land and shall be served on the tenant  on or before the 31st day of December, 1956. A copy of such  notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the Mamlatdar. An  application for possession under Section 29 shall be made  to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957.  

(3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person  subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may  be given and an application for possession under Section 29  may be made,—  

(i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he  attains majority;  

(ii) by the successor-in-title of a widow within one year from  the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;  

(iii) within one year from the date on which mental or physical  disability ceases to exist; and  

(iv)***  

 Provided that where a person of such category is a member  of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not  apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the  categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the  31st day of March, 1958 the share of such person in the joint  family has been separated by metes and bounds and the  Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such  person in the land is separated, having regard to the area,  assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same  proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint  family property, and not in a large proportion.”  

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7. Under Section 31-A, the right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy  

in order to cultivate the land personally himself is subjected to very  

stringent conditions.  He can take possession of the land leased only  

to the extent of the ceiling area, provided the income that is obtained  

from such land is the principal source of income for his maintenance,  

and not otherwise.  If more tenancies than one are held under the same  

landlord, then the landlord is competent to terminate only such  

tenancies which are shortest in point of duration.  Under Section 31-B,  

a tenancy can only be terminated to the extent of half the area of the  

land leased to the tenant and no more.   Section 32 is the Section by  

which agrarian reform, as mentioned hereinabove, is actually  

achieved. This Section is important and is set out hereinbelow:  

“32. Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers’  day –   

(1) On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as  “the tillers day”) every tenant shall, subject to the other  provisions of this section and the provisions of the next  succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from  his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on  the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if, –  

(a) Such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and  cultivates land personally;  

(b) Such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the  land leased personally; and    (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of  

his tenancy under Section 31; or  (ii) notice has been given under Section 31, but the  

landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or

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before the 31st day of March, 1957 under Section  29 for obtaining possession of the land; or  

(iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on  any of the grounds specified in Section 14, or has  so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to  the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March,  1957 under Section 29 for obtaining possession  of the land:  

Provided that if an application made by the landlord under  Section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been  rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in  revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the  provisions of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to have  purchased the land on the date on which the final order of  rejection is passed.  The date on which the final order of  rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as “the  postponed date”.  

Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled  to the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 31  shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the 1st day  of April 1958, if no separation of his share has been effected  before the date mentioned in that proviso.  

(1A) (a)   Where a tenant, on account of his eviction from the  land by the landlord, before the 1st day of April, 1957, is not  in possession of the land on the said date but has made or  makes an application for possession of the land under sub- section (1) of Section 29 within the period specified in that  sub-section, then if the application is allowed by the  Mamlatdar, or as the case may be, in appeal by the Collector  or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, he shall  be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which  the final order allowing the application is passed.  

(b) Where such tenant has not made an application, for  possession within the period specified in sub-section (1) of  Section 29 or the application made by him is finally rejected  under this Act, and the land is held by  any other person as  tenant on the expiry of the said period or on the date of the  final rejection of the application, such other person shall be  deemed to have purchased the land on the date of the expiry  of the said period or as the case may be, on the date of the  final rejection of the application.

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(1B)   Where a tenant who was in possession on the  appointed day and who on account of his being  dispossessed before the 1st day of April 1957 otherwise than  in the manner and by an order of the Tahsildar as provided  in Section 29, is not in possession of the land on the said  date and the land is in the possession of the landlord or his  successor-in-interest on the 31st day of July 1969 and the  land is not put to a non-agricultural use on or before the last  mentioned date, then, the Tahsildar shall, notwithstanding  anything contained in the said Section 29, either suo motu  or on the application of the tenant, hold an inquiry and direct  that such land shall be taken from the possession of the  landlord or, as the case may be, his successor-in-interest,  and shall be restored to the tenant; and thereafter, the  provisions of this Section and Section 32-A to 32-R(both  inclusive) shall, in so far as they may be applicable, apply  thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be  deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which  the land is restored to him.  

Provided that, the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of  the land under this sub-section only if he undertakes to  cultivate the land personally and of so much thereof as  together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant  shall not exceed the ceiling area.   

Explanation - In this sub-section, “successor-in-interest”  means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary  disposition or devolution on death.”   

Section 32-F is the Section that falls for construction in the present  

case and is set out in toto hereinbelow:  

“32-F. Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is  minor, etc.—  

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding  sections,—    

(a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person  subject to any mental or physical disability, the tenant shall

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have the right to purchase such land under Section 32 within  one year from the expiry of the period during which such  landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section  31 and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of  purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant  of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of  the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate  the tenancy under Section 31:  

Provided that where a person of such category is a member  of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not  apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the  categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the  31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint  family has been separated by metes and bounds and the  Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such  person in the land is separated, having regard to the area,  assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same  proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint  family property and not in a larger proportion.  

(b) where the tenant is a minor, or a widow, or a person  subject to any mental or physical disability or a serving  member of the armed forces, then subject to the provisions  of clause (a), the right to purchase land under Section 32  may be exercised, -    

(i) By the minor within one year, from the date on  which he attains majority;  

(ii) By the successor-in-title of the widow within one  year from the date on which her interest in the land  ceases to exist;  

(iii) Within one year from the date on which the mental  or physical disability of the tenant ceases to exist;  

(iv) Within one year from the date on which the tenant  ceases to be a serving member of the armed  forces:    

Provided that where a person of such category is a member  of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not  apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the  categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the

19    

31st day of March, 1958 the share of such person in the joint  family has been separated by metes and bounds and the  Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such  person in the land is separated, having regard to the area,  assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same  proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint  family property, and not in a larger proportion.   

(1-A) A tenant desirous of exercising the right conferred on  him under sub-section (1) shall give an intimation in that  behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed  manner within the period specified in that sub-section:  

Provided that, if a tenant holding land from a landlord (who  was a minor and has attained majority before the  commencement of the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969) has not given intimation as  required by this sub-section but being in possession of the  land on such commencement is desirous of exercising the  right conferred upon him under sub-section (1), he may give  such intimation within a period of two years from the  commencement of that Act.  

 (2) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32-E (both inclusive)  and Sections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive) shall, so far as  may be applicable, apply to such purchase”   

8. Section 32-G is also important, in that, it is only after notice to the  

tenant that the price of the land to be paid by the tenant to the erstwhile  

landlord is then determined. The relevant sub-sections of this Section  

states as follows:  

“32G. Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of  land to be paid by tenants. –   

(1)  As soon as may be after the tillers’ day the Tribunal shall  publish or cause to be published a public notice in the

20    

prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling  upon, –  

(a) all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have  purchased     the lands,   

(b) all landlords of such lands, and  

(c) all other persons interested therein,  

to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The  Tribunal shall issue a notice individually to each such tenant,  landlord and also, as far as practicable, other person calling  upon each of them to appear before it on the date specified  in the public notice.   

(2) The Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner the  statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to  purchase the land held by him as a tenant.   

(3)  Where any tenant fails to appear or makes a statement  that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall  by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing  to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective:  

Provided that if such order is passed in default of the  appearance of any party, the Tribunal shall communicate  such order to the parties and any party on whose default the  order was passed may within 60 days from the date on which  the order was communicated to him apply for the review of  the same.   

xxx xxx xxx  

(5)  In the case of a tenant who is deemed to have purchased  the land on the postponed date the Tribunal shall, as soon  as may be after such date determine the price of the land.”   

9. Under Section 32-M, a purchase by a tenant is ineffective on his  

failure to pay purchase price, as a result of which land shall then be at  

the disposal of the Tribunal to be disposed in the manner set out in  

Section 32-P.  Under Section 32-O, in respect of any tenancy created

21    

after Tillers’ Day, such tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled,  

within one year from the commencement of such tenancy, to purchase  

from the landlord the land held by him to the extent of the ceiling area  

permissible.   This can only be done if the tenant gives an intimation in  

that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal within the period prescribed.    

Section 32-P is also important and is set out hereinbelow:  

“32P. Power of Tribunal to resume and dispose of land  not purchased by tenant. –   

(1) Where the purchase of any land by tenant under Section  32 becomes ineffective under Sections 32-G or 32-M or  where a tenant fails to exercise the right to purchase the land  held by him within the specified period under Sections 32F,  32O, 33C or 43-1D the Tribunal may suo motu or on an  application made on this behalf land in case other than those  in which the purchase has become ineffective by reason of  Section 32-G or 32-M, after holding a formal inquiry direct  that the land shall be disposed of in the manner provided in  sub-section (2).  

(2)  Such direction shall provide –  

(a) that the former tenant be summarily evicted;    (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of Section  15, be surrendered to the former landlord;    (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be  surrendered in accordance with the provisions of Section  15, the entire land or such portion thereof, as the case may  be, notwithstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed  of by sale to any person in the following order of priority  (hereinafter called “the priority list”):-  

(i) a co-operative farming society the members of  which are agricultural labourers, landless persons  or small holders or a combination of such persons;  

(ii) agricultural labourers;  (iii) landless persons;

22    

(iv) small holders;  (v) a co-operative farming society of agriculturists  

(other than small holders) who hold either as owner  or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant,  landless in area than an economic holding and who  is an artisans;  

(vi) an agriculturist (other than a small holder) who  holds either as owner or tenant as partly as owner  and partly as tenant landless in area than an  economic holding and who are artisan;  

(vii) any other co-operative farming society;  (viii) any agriculturist who holds either as owner or  

tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land  larger in area than an economic holding but less in  area than the ceiling area;  

(ix) any person, not being an agriculturist, who intends  to take to the profession of agriculture:  

Provided that the State Government may, by notification in  the Official Gazette give in relation to such local areas as it  may specify, such priority in the above order as it thinks fit  to any class or person who, by reason of the acquisition of  their land for any development project approved for the  purpose by the State Government have been displaced, and  require to be re-settled.”  

10. In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1959  

SC 459, the 1956 Amendment to the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  

Act came up for consideration.  One of the arguments made was that  

since the landlord’s right was not extinguished statutorily on Tillers’  

Day, the said Act was not protected by Article 31A.  This argument was  

negatived holding:  

“41. These observations were confined to suspension of the  right of management of the estate and not to a suspension  of the title to the estate. Apart from the question whether the

23    

suspension of the title to the estate for a time, definite or  indefinite would amount to a modification of a right in the  estate within the meaning of Article 31-A(1)(a), the position  as it obtains in this case is that there is no suspension of the  title of the landlord at all. The title of the landlord to the land  passes immediately to the tenant on the tiller's day and there  is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the  landlord and the tenant. The tenant is no doubt given a locus  penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not  willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he  fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to  purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing  declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land  and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a  declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes  ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the  purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller's  day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on  the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode  determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in  the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments  as determined by the Tribunal, Section 32-M declares the  purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall  then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by  him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase  continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such  default is committed and there is no question of a conditional  purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and  tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the  landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or the  alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is  defeasable only in the event of the tenant failing to appear  or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the  land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as  determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested  interest in the land defeasable only in either of those cases  and it cannot, therefore, be said that the title of landlord to  the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite. If  that is so, there is an extinguishment or in any event a  modification of the landlord's right in the estate well within  the meaning of those words as used in Article 31-A(1)(a).”

24    

11. Importantly, the judgment also referred to the right of the tenant  

to purchase land where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person  

subject to a mental or physical disability, and the Court stated that such  

right is postponed till one year after the cessation of disability.     

 12. This judgment was followed in Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath  

Janardhan Trade (1983) 3 SCC 437, the Court holding:  

“6. The Tenancy Act was comprehensively amended by  Amending Act 15 of 1957. The amendment brought in a  revolutionary measure of agrarian reforms making tiller of  the soil the owner of the land. This was done to achieve the  object of removing all intermediaries between tillers of the  soil and the State. Section 32 provides that by mere  operation of law, every tenant of agricultural land situated in  the area to which the Act applies shall become by the  operation of law, the owner thereof. He is declared to be a  deemed purchaser without anything more on his part. A  Constitution Bench of this court in Sri Ram Ram Narain  Medhi v. State of Bombay [1959 Supp 1 SCR 489, 518-19 :  AIR 1959 SC 459 : 1959 SCJ 679] held that:  

“The title of the landlord to the land passes  immediately to the tenant on the tillers' day and there  is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between  the landlord and the tenant. The title of the land which  was vested originally in the landlord passes to the  tenant on the tillers' day and this title is defeasible only  in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a  statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or  commit default in payment of the price thereto as  determined by the Tribunal.”  

Therefore, it is unquestionably established that on the tillers'  day, the landlord's interest in the land gets extinguished and  simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by  the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or

25    

created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant  relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of  Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken.  The absent non-cultivating landlord ceases to have that  ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the  tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof. This is  unquestionable. The landlord from the date of statutory sale  is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined  by the Tribunal under Section 32-G. In other words, the  landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the  owner of the land and comes in direct contact with the State.  Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord  is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant  making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted  position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord  and Janardhan was the tenant. Tarachand landlord was  under no disability as envisaged by Section 32-F. Therefore  on April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser and  Mr Lalit could not controvert this position.  

7. If Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on tillers'  day, the relationship of landlord and tenant between  Tarachand and Janardhan came to be extinguished and no  right could be claimed either by Tarachand or anyone  claiming through him such as Ashoklal or the present  purchasers on the footing that they are the owners of the  land on or after April 1, 1957. This basic fact is  incontrovertible.  

8. It may be mentioned that Section 32-F has no application  to the facts of this case. Section 32-F postponed the date of  compulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a  minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical  disability on the tillers' day. Section 32-F has an overriding  effect over Section 32 as it opens with a non-obstante  clause. The combined effect of Sections 32-F and 32 would  show that where the landlord is under no disability as  envisaged by Section 32-F the tenant of such landlord by  operation of law would become the deemed purchaser but  where the landlord is of a class or category as set out in  Section 32-F such as a minor, a widow or a person subject  to any mental or physical disability, the date of compulsory

26    

sale would be postponed as therein provided. Now, if  Tarachand, the landlord was under no disability and he was  alive on April 1, 1957 and he was the owner, his tenant  Janardhan became the deemed purchaser. This conclusion,  in our opinion, is unassailable.”   

13. It can thus be seen that the Scheme of the 1948 Act, and in  

particular, the 1956 Amendment, which introduced Tillers’ Day, is that  

an absentee landlord’s rights in the land must give way to a cultivating  

tenant.  Statutorily, on Tillers’ Day, the landlord is divested of title and  

the tenant is vested with title to agricultural land which he cultivates by  

dint of his own effort. It is only in three cases that such purchase  

becomes ineffective – if the tenant fails to appear within the time  

prescribed after notice is given to him, or appears and declines  

purchase, or if the tenant fails to pay the entire purchase price.  The  

widow, the minor and the person subject to a disability are placed on  

the same pedestal, and throughout their widowhood, minority or period  

of disability are deemed to cultivate the land personally through their  

tenants – the Explanation - I to Section 2(6) makes this clear. As we  

have seen from the case law extracted above, in the vast majority of  

cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April,  

1957.   It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow,  

minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is  

postponed.  What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of

27    

both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily  

on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957.  Even otherwise, on postponed dates  

that are mentioned under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to  

have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first  

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for  

possession made by the landlord under Section 29 is finally rejected –  

a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant.  Also, under  

the circumstances prescribed under Section 32(1A), again the tenant  

shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final  

order is passed by the Tribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the  

said sub-section.   Again, under sub-section (1B), in the circumstances  

mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section, land gets restored to the tenant  

upon which deemed purchase takes place.   Statutorily, therefore, in  

all cases covered by Section 32, the landlord is divested of his title  

either on Tillers’ Day or on a postponed date which is to the knowledge  

of the tenant, as the aforesaid date is on and from a final order of a  

Tribunal or a Tahsildar, as the case may be.   

14. Section 32-G is a very important pointer to the fact that a tenant  

must be put on notice in order that the purchase price of land be  

determined by the Tribunal.  This notice under Section 32-G(1) is in the  

form of a public notice in the prescribed form in each village.  Apart

28    

from this, the Tribunal shall also issue a notice individually to each  

tenant calling upon him to appear before it on the date specified in the  

notice.   The same is the case of a tenant who is deemed to have  

purchased the land on the postponed date under Section 32-G(5).   

Again, when we come to Section 32-O in respect of tenancies created  

after Tillers’ Day, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled, within  

one year from the commencement of such tenancy, to purchase such  

land within the ceiling area.  What is important is that under sub-section  

(1A), this right is to be exercised by giving an intimation in that behalf  

to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the  

period of one year.   This again is a date which is within the knowledge  

of the tenant as the period of one year is calculated from the  

commencement of his tenancy.  It can thus be seen that in the case of  

postponed dates under Section 32 and the right of a tenant in respect  

of tenancies created after Tillers’ Day, the tenant is to exercise his  

statutory right knowing fully well that if he does not do so within the  

prescribed period or does not pay purchase price, the purchase either  

becomes ineffective or the right cannot be exercised.  In all these  

cases, what is important to notice is that the tenant knows of the time  

within which he must exercise his rights.  

29    

15. We now come to the Section which needs to be interpreted.    

Section 32-F was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1956 as part of  

a scheme of agrarian reform. The reason for the non-obstante clause,  

with which the Section begins, is that the cultivating tenant in all cases  

where the landlord is a minor, a widow or a person subjected to a  

disability, does not statutorily become owner of the agricultural land  

cultivated personally by him on Tillers’ Day.  This is for the reason that  

under Section 2(6) Explanation- I, these three categories of landlords  

are deemed to cultivate personally through such tenant.  The  

entitlement of terminating a tenancy under any one of these three  

categories is contained in Section 31(3).  In any of these three cases,  

the moment the disability ceases i.e. that the land in question no longer  

belongs to a minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she  

has died or transferred her share with permission under Section 63, or  

to a person whose mental or physical disability ceases, one year is  

granted for such persons to apply for resumption of the land on the  

ground that such persons wish to personally cultivate the said land,  

pursuant to which an application for possession  of land under Section  

29 may then be made. In case this is done within the time prescribed,  

the tenant’s right to purchase does not fructify.  It is only when this is  

not done within the period of one year, as aforestated, that the  

postponed right of the tenant springs into being.    

30    

16. Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literal reading of  

Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had to exercise this right  

within a period of one year from the expiry of the one year spoken of in  

Section 31(3) of the Act.  Literally speaking, therefore, even if the  

tenant does not know when the minor became major or when the  

widow died or transferred her share, this right would cease on the  

expiry of one year.  

17. Realising that this would cause immense hardship for want of  

knowledge of a special fact which is only within the landlord’s ken, the  

legislature stepped in and amended Section 32-F.   The Statement of  

Objects and Reasons for this Amendment Act is as follows:  

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS  

It has come to the notice of the Government that a number  of tenants in the Bombay area and the Vidarbha region of  the State, failed to acquire ownership right in the lands held  by them on account of their being dispossessed from the  land otherwise than in the manner laid down in the relevant  tenancy law. It is, therefore, expedient to amend the tenancy  laws in force in these regions for safeguarding the interest  of these dispossessed tenants.  

It is also noticed that a large number of tenants in the  Bombay area of the State holding land from landlords who  were minors have lost right to purchase land for their failure  to give intimation within the period laid down in sub-section  (1-A) of Section 32, It is, therefore, necessary to give these  tenants a fresh opportunity to purchase land. Section 32-F  is, therefore, being suitably amended for that purpose.  

31    

As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court of India,  in Mussamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari Gobindbhai  Ratnabhai [Mussamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari  Gobindbhai Ratnabhai, AIR 1969 SC 439] from the  judgment of the High Court of Gujarat regarding jurisdiction  of civil court in certain matters, it has also become necessary  to suitably amend certain sections of the tenancy laws in  force in the three regions of the State.  

 The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”  

 18. Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates  

that an amnesty scheme is necessary, in that a large number of tenants  

in the Bombay area who are minors have lost the right to purchase as  

they have failed to give the necessary intimation within the period laid  

down by statute.  Under this amnesty scheme, if a tenant held land  

from a landlord who was a minor and who had obtained majority before  

the commencement of the 1969 Amendment and no intimation had  

been given, two years extra was given from the date of commencement  

of that Act in which such intimation may be given.  This statutory object,  

reflected in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is  

carried out by the proviso to sub-section (1A) inserted by the 1969  

Amendment Act into Section 32-F.  

19. Simultaneously, the same Amendment Act inserted into sub-

section (1)(a), the following:  

“and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase,  the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact

32    

that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period  during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the  tenancy under Section 31:”  

The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a) would show that  

the legislature, in keeping with the object sought to be achieved  

statutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the land  

to the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved unless a special  

fact within the knowledge of the landlord alone is first intimated to the  

tenant, so that he may then, with  knowledge that the minor landlord  

has now turned major, meaningfully exercise his right of purchase  

under the Act.   

20. It seems to us that the vast majority of cases which came to the  

notice of the legislature were cases of landlords who were minor at the  

time of the 1956 Amendment Act and who turned major only thereafter.    

The amnesty scheme contained in sub-section (1A), was, therefore,  

limited only to such cases.  Unfortunately, the legislature, when it  

inserted words into sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32-F, appears to have  

forgotten that these words will govern the right of tenants which has  

been postponed on account of a landlord’s disability.   What appears  

to have been missed is the fact that, apart from minors, there are two  

other categories mentioned in Section 32-F(1)(a), all of whom would  

stand on the same footing insofar as the tenant is concerned.   It would  

be wholly anomalous for a tenant to be told that if his landlord

33    

happened to be a minor who has attained majority later, he must first  

be intimated of this fact before he can meaningfully exercise his right  

of purchase; whereas to a tenant who is similarly situate when the  

landlord is a widow, in which case no such intimation need be made,   

the tenant would suffer for no fault of his as the tenant would have no  

knowledge of the date of death of the widow (which is a special fact  

known only to her family), such tenant’s right of purchase being  

extinguished by time. It seems that the draftsman of the 1969  

Amendment was overwhelmed with the amnesty scheme laid down in   

Section 32-F (1A), which then spilled over to the amendment made in  

Section 32-F(1)(a), thereby unintentionally leaving out the two other  

categories of landlords, where the same intimation needs to be made  

to the tenant, as the death of the widow and/or the ceasing of disability  

are special facts known only to the landlord and his family, just as in  

the case of a minor turning major.    

21. It has rightly been argued by learned counsel appearing on  

behalf of the Appellant that an absurd situation would be created by a  

literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a). The landlord being a widow is  

protected until her death.   After her death, one year is given to her  

successors in interest to exercise the right of resumption.  When this  

does not take place one year is granted from the expiry of this first one

34    

year to the tenant to exercise his statutory right.   This cannot be done  

because the tenant does not know of the death of the widow.  As a  

result, this very land which was not required by the landlord’s  

successors in interest for personal cultivation, goes back to the  

landlord under Section 32-P in cases in which the landlord either has  

no land within the ceiling limit or some land which does not exhaust the  

ceiling limit.   This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian  

reform on its head.   We have thus to see whether the language of  

Section 32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the  

absurdity aforementioned and the discrimination between persons who  

are similarly situate be obviated.   

The Golden Rule of Interpretation  

22. In Grey v.  Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61, what is referred to  

as the Golden rule of literal interpretation was stated as follows:  

“… I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom  

of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the  

Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills  

and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the  

grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be  

adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or  

some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the  

instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary  

sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that  

absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This is laid down  

by Mr Justice Burton, in a very excellent opinion, which is to  

be found in Warburton v. Loveland [Warburton v. Loveland,

35    

(1831) 2 Dow & Cl 480 : 6 ER 806] (see ante, p. 76. n.)”  

(Emphasis supplied)  

23. In an early Privy Council judgment in Salmon v. Duncombe  

(1886) 11 AC 627, Ordinance No. 1 of 1856 as it applied to Natal was  

up for construction. In order to make sense of the provision, the Privy  

Council found it necessary to cross out certain words of the Ordinance.  

This they did by stating:  

“It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the  main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a  nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of law.   It may be necessary for a Court of Justice to come to such  a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify  it except necessity or the absolute intractability of the  language used.  And they have set themselves to consider,  first, whether any substantial doubt can be suggested as to  the main object of the legislature; and, secondly, whether the  last nine words of        sect. 1 are so cogent and so limit the  rest of the statute as to nullify its effect either entirely or in a  very important particular.   

As to the broad intention of those who framed the Ordinance,  their Lordships cannot find that anybody has ever intimated  a doubt, nor do they find it possible to entertain one, that it  was intended to give to all the Queen’s subjects, resident or  settled in Natal, the option of disposing by will according to  English law, of property both real and personal which  otherwise would devolve according to Natal law.  The title  may be looked at for aid in finding out the object. The  preamble is of great importance in finding out the object.  They have been quoted above, and nobody who reads to  the end of the preamble and there stops, can doubt that the  object is to provide a substantial measure substituting  English law for Natal law in the cases mentioned.   

That object is carried into effect by sect. 1, on which the  subsequent sections turn.  Now suppose that sect. 1 ended

36    

with the words “in this district” or with the words “intents and  purposes.”  Though it would then be very inartificially drawn,  it would not be difficult to construe it so as to give effect to  the before declared object.  The conditional words “could or  might exercise” would require the implication of an  unexpressed condition; otherwise the sentence would result  in a nullity.  But the implication would be by no means a  difficult one.  By implying after the words “customs of  England” the addition “over property subject to those laws  and customs,” the enactment would become sensible and  harmonious.   

The difficulty is, and their Lordships quite agree that it is a  great difficulty, that a condition which is apparently and at  first sight the correlative condition of the conditional words  “could or might exercise” is expressed by the last nine words  of the section.  And the question is whether that expression  excludes all other implications. If such a construction left a  substantial operative effect to the enactment, it might be  necessary to answer that question in the affirmative; but, as  it destroys the expressed objects altogether unless the word  “resident” be construed to mean “domiciled,” and in that  case destroys the expressed objects so far as regards real  property, their Lordships answer it in the negative.  It is true  that they cannot find a sensible meaning for the nine words  in question.  Very likely the draftsman, whose want of skill is  shown by other expressions in the Ordinance, attributed to  residence a legal effect which it does not possess.  But he  does not make the legislature say that the powers conferred  are not to be any greater powers than would be conferred by  a residence in England.  He makes it in the rest of the section  use terms which, with the easy implication that is necessary  to give them meaning and to harmonize with the declared  objects, confer the power of escaping from Natal law and  coming under English law; and he then adds words which  may add nothing to what has gone before, but which ought  not without necessity to be construed so as to destroy all that  has gone before.  A man exercising the powers conferred  does not in any way violate or contravene the nine words in  question.  He does exercise these powers as if he resided in  England, because it is perfectly immaterial for their exercise  whether he is supposed to reside in England or not, and  because wherever he is supposed to reside he exercises

37    

them in the same way.  It is very unsatisfactory to be  compelled to construe a statute in this way, but it is much  more unsatisfactory to deprive it altogether of meaning.   Their Lordships chose the lesser of two difficulties.”       

24. In an early judgment of our Court, Tirath Singh v. Bachittar  

Singh & Ors (1955) 2 SCR 457, this Court had to construe the proviso  

to Section 99(1)(a)(ii) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.  The  

Court held:  

“…But it is a rule of interpretation well-established that,  “Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning  and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest  contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or  to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,  presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it  which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the  structure of the sentence”. (Maxwell's Interpretation of  Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 229). Reading the proviso along with  clause (b) thereto, and construing it in its setting in the  section, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the wideness  of the language used, the proviso contemplates notice only  to persons who are not parties to the petition.”  

The Court, therefore, restricted the word “person” appearing in the said  

proviso to mean only persons who are not parties to the election  

petition.  This was done, given the fact that the object of the proviso  

was to give notice to persons who had hitherto not been given notice  

of the election petition.  Obviously, the parties to the election petition  

were persons who knew of the existence of such petition.  

38    

25. In Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras (1958) SCR 739, this  

Court found it necessary to supply words which were not found in  

Section 423(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. This the Court did  

as follows:  

“…But this argument is wholly ineffective because in either  view of the matter the court has to supply some words in  answer to the question “find him guilty of what?” According  to the appellant, those additional words should be “of such  offence as has been charged and of which he had been  acquitted”, and according to the other view, “of the offence  disclosed”. If, in construing the section, the court has to  supply some words in order to make the meaning of the  statute clear, it will naturally prefer the latter construction  which is more in consonance with reason and justice.”    

26. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. &  

Anr. (1966) Supp. SCR 473, Section 11 of the Opium (Madhya Bharat  

Amendment) Act, 1955 was construed as being permissive and not  

obligatory as follows:  

“...It is well recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity,  hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction  may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words,  and even the structure of the sentence, (vide Tirath  Singh v. Bachittar Singh [(1955) 2 SCR 457 at 464] ).    Secondly, it is a penal statute and it should, if possible, be  construed in such a way that a person who has not committed  or abetted any offence should not be visited with a penalty.    Thirdly, if the meaning suggested by Mr Shroff is given, Section  11(d) of the Madhya Bharat Act may have to be struck down  as imposing unreasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the  Constitution. Bearing all these considerations in mind, we

39    

consider that Section 11 of the Madhya Bharat Act is not  obligatory and it is for the court to consider in each case  whether the vehicle in which the contraband opium is found or  is being transported should be confiscated or not, having  regard to all the circumstances of the case.”    

27. In Budhan Singh v. Nabi Bux (1970) 2 SCR 10, this Court held  

that the expression “held” occurring in Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari  

Abolition and Reforms Act, 1950 must mean “lawfully held” thereby  

adding the word “lawfully”.  The Court held: -  

“…Before considering the meaning of the word "held" in  Section 9, it is necessary to mention that it is proper to  assume that the lawmakers who are the representatives of  the people enact laws which the society considers as  honest, fair and equitable.  

The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare.  In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on  Statutory Constructions the entire legislative process is  influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice  and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in  every piece of legislation. Consequently where the  suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in  any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of  justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the  apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the  one intended by the law-makers. In the absence of some  other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was  actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to  believe that it represents the legislative intent.”    

28. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National  

Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370, this Court construed Section 33-B of

40    

the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in order to avoid a manifestly absurd  

result as follows:  

“…According to the construction contended for by the  assessee and which found favour with the High Court the  answer was in the affirmative because sub-section (2)(b), on  its literal construction, was absolute. In our view such literal  construction would lead to a manifestly absurd result,  because in a given case, like the present one, where the  Appellate Authority (Tribunal) has found (a) the Income Tax  Officer's order to be clearly erroneous as being prejudicial to  the interests of the Revenue, and (b) the Commissioner's  order unsustainable as being in violation of principles of  natural justice, how should the Appellate Authority exercise  its appellate powers? Obviously it could not withhold its  hands and refuse to interfere with Commissioner's order  altogether, for, that would amount to perpetuating the  Commissioner's erroneous order, nor could it merely cancel  or set aside the Commissioner's wrong order without doing  anything about the Income Tax Officer's order, for, that  would result in perpetuating the Income Tax Officer's order  which had been found to be manifestly erroneous as being  prejudicial to the revenue. But such result would flow from  the view taken by the High Court which has held that the  Tribunal acted properly in vacating the Commissioner's  order but did not act properly in directing him to dispose of  the proceedings afresh after giving opportunity to the  assessee. Such manifestly absurd result could never have  been intended by the Legislature.  

xxx xxx xxx  

A literal construction placed on sub-section (2)(b) would lead  

to such manifestly absurd and anomalous results, which, we  

do not think, were intended by the Legislature. These  

considerations compel us to construe the words of sub-

section (2)(b) as being applicable to suo motu orders of the  

Commissioner in revision and not to orders made by him  

pursuant to a direction or order passed by the Appellate  

Tribunal under sub-section (4) or by any other higher  

authority. Such construction will be in consonance with the  

principle that all parts of the section should be construed

41    

together and every clause thereof should be construed with  

reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that  

the construction put on that particular provision makes a  

consistent enactment of the whole statute.”  

29. In K.P. Verghese v. ITO (1981) 4 SCC 173, this Court dealt with  

the correct interpretation of Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.   

Read literally, the moment there is transfer of a capital asset by an  

amount less than the fair market value, the fair market value is to be  

taken instead of the stated consideration.   This Court read into Section  

52 the fact that it would have no application in case of a bona fide  

transaction where the full value of the consideration for the transfer is  

correctly declared by the assessee.  The Court held:  

“5. …The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is  not a mechanical task. It is more than a mere reading of  mathematical formulae because few words possess the  precision of mathematical symbols. It is an attempt to  discover the intent of the legislature from the language used  by it and it must always be remembered that language is at  best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human  thought and as pointed out by Lord Denning, it would be idle  to expect every statutory provision to be “drafted with divine  prescience and perfect clarity”. We can do no better than  repeat the famous words of Judge Learned Hand when he  laid:  

“... it is true that the words used, even in their  literal sense, are the primary and ordinarily the  most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of  any writing: be it a statute, a contract or anything  else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature  and developed jurisprudence not to make a  fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that  statutes always have some purpose or object to

42    

accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative  discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”  

We must not adopt a strictly literal interpretation of Section  52 sub-section (2) but we must construe its language having  regard to the object and purpose which the legislature had  in view in enacting that provision and in the context of the  setting in which it occurs. We cannot ignore the context and  the collocation of the provisions in which Section 52 sub- section (2) appears, because, as pointed out by Judge  Learned Hand in most felicitous language:  

“... the meaning of a sentence may be more  than that of the separate words, as a melody is  more than the notes, and no degree of particularity  can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which  all appear, and which all collectively create.”  

Keeping these observations in mind we may now approach  the construction of Section 52 sub-section (2).  

6. The primary objection against the literal construction of  Section 52 sub-section (2) is that it leads to manifestly  unreasonable and absurd consequences. It is true that the  consequences of a suggested construction cannot alter the  meaning of a statutory provision but they can certainly help  to fix its meaning. It is a well-recognised rule of construction  that a statutory provision must be so construed, if possible,  that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. There are many  situations where the construction suggested on behalf of the  Revenue would lead to a wholly unreasonable result which  could never have been intended by the legislature. Take, for  example, a case where A agrees to sell his property to B for  a certain price and before the sale is completed pursuant to  the agreement — and it is quite well-known that sometimes  the completion of the sale may take place even a couple of  years after the date of the agreement — the market price  shoots up with the result that the market price prevailing on  the date of the sale exceeds the agreed price at which the  property is sold by more than 15 per cent of such agreed  price. This is not at all an uncommon case in an economy of  rising prices and in fact we would find in a large number of  cases where the sale is completed more than a year or two

43    

after the date of the agreement that the market price  prevailing on the date of the sale is very much more than the  price at which the property is sold under the agreement. Can  it be contended with any degree of fairness and justice that  in such cases, where there is clearly no under-statement of  consideration in respect of the transfer and the transaction  is perfectly honest and bona fide and, in fact, in fulfilment of  a contractual obligation, the assessee who has sold the  property should be liable to pay tax on capital gains which  have not accrued or arisen to him. It would indeed be most  harsh and inequitable to tax the assessee on income which  has neither arisen to him nor is received by him, merely  because he has carried out the contractual obligation  undertaken by him. It is difficult to conceive of any rational  reason why the legislature should have thought it fit to  impose liability to tax on an assessee who is bound by law  to carry out his contractual obligation to sell the property at  the agreed price and honestly carries out such contractual  obligation. It would indeed be strange if obedience to the law  should attract the levy of tax on income which has neither  arisen to the assessee nor has been received by him. If we  may take another illustration, let us consider a case  where A sells his property to B with a stipulation that after  some time which may be a couple of years or more, he shall  re-sell the property to A for the same price. Could it be  contended in such a case that when B transfers the property  to A for the same price at which he originally purchased it,  he should be liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has  received the market value of the property as on the date of  re-sale, if, in the meanwhile, the market price has shot up  and exceeds the agreed price by more than 15 per cent?  Many other similar situations can be contemplated where it  would be absurd and unreasonable to apply Section 52 sub- section (2) according to its strict literal construction. We must  therefore eschew literalness in the interpretation of Section  52 sub-section (2) and try to arrive at an interpretation which  avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provision  rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied  and we cannot find any escape from the tyranny of the literal  interpretation. It is now a well-settled rule of construction that  where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision  produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could  never have been intended by the legislature, the court may

44    

modify the language used by the legislature or even “do  some violence” to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention  of the legislature and produce a rational construction  (vide Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1963) AC  557] ). The Court may also in such a case read into the  statutory provision a condition which, though not expressed,  is implicit as constituting the basic assumption underlying  the statutory provision. We think that, having regard to this  well-recognised rule of interpretation, a fair and reasonable  construction of Section 52 sub-section (2) would be to read  into it a condition that it would apply only where the  consideration for the transfer is understated or in other  words, the assessee has actually received a larger  consideration for the transfer than what is declared in the  instrument of transfer and it would have no application in  case of a bona fide transaction where the full value of the  consideration for the transfer is correctly declared by the  assessee. There are several important considerations which  incline us to accept this construction of Section 52 sub- section (2).”  

30. In CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985) 4 SCC 343, the true construction of  

Section 24(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 was before the Court.   

Following Verghese’s case (supra), the Court held:  

“44. Our attention was also drawn to the decision in the case  

of Manickam and Co. v. State of T.N. [(1977) 1 SCC 199 :  

1977 SCC (Tax) 165 : (1977) 39 STC 12, 18] as well  

as Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn), p. 147.  

45. In the case of K.P. Varghese v. IT0 [(1981) 4 SCC 173 :  

1981 SCC (Tax) 293 : (1981) 131 ITR 597] this Court  

emphasised that a statutory provision must be so construed,  

if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided.  

46. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory  

provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could  

never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court

45    

might modify the language used by the Legislature so as to  

achieve the intention of the Legislature and produce a  

rational construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory  

provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the  

Legislature from the language used. It is necessary to  

remember that language is at best an imperfect instrument  

for the expression of human intention. It is well to remember  

the warning administered by Judge Learned Hand that one  

should not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember  

that statutes always have some purpose or object to  

accomplish and sympathetic and imaginative discovery is  

the surest guide to their meaning.  

47. We have noted the object of Section 16(3) of the Act  

which has to be read in conjunction with Section 24(2) in this  

case for the present purpose. If the purpose of a particular  

provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the  

Act which in this case is, to counteract the effect of the  

transfer of assets so far as computation of income of the  

assessee is concerned then bearing that purpose in mind,  

we should find out the intention from the language used by  

the Legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an  

absurd result i.e. result not intended to be subserved by the  

object of the legislation found in the manner indicated  

before, and if another construction is possible apart from  

strict literal construction then that construction should be  

preferred to the strict literal construction.  

xxx xxx xxx  

48. In view of the aforesaid and in view of the attitude of the  

law-makers in dealing with this problem as evidenced by the  

amendment and in the circular originally issued prior thereto  

and bearing in mind that under the scheme of the Act where  

the wife or minor child carries on a running business, the  

right to carry forward the loss in the running business would  

be available to the wife or minor child if they themselves  

were assessed but the right would be completely lost if the

46    

individual in whose total income the loss is to be included is  

not permitted to carry forward the loss under Section 24(2);  

since that would be the result of the strict literal construction  

it is apparent that that could not have been the intent of the  

Parliament. Therefore, where Section 16(3) of the Act  

operates, the profits or loss from a business of the wife or  

minor child included in the total income of the assessee  

should be treated as the profit or loss from a “business  

carried on by him” for the purpose of carrying forward and  

set-off of such loss under Section 24(2) of the Act.”  

In another tax case, this Court, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal  

Motor Union (P) Ltd. (1986) 3 SCC 91, while construing Section 10-

A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, held:  

“17. The courts must always seek to find out the intention of  the legislature. Though the courts must find out the intention  of the statute from the language used, but language more  often than not is an imperfect instrument of expression of  human thought. As Lord Denning said it would be idle to  expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine  prescience and perfect clarity. As Judge Learned Hand said,  we must not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember  that statutes must have some purpose or object, whose  imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. We need not  always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavour to  avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not make a  mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily  worded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the  judicial eve “some” violence to language is permissible.  (See K.P. Varghese v. ITO [(1981) 4 SCC 173, 180-82 :  1981 SCC (Tax) 293, 300-302 : (1981) 131 ITR 597, 604- 606] and Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1964) 54  ITR 692 (HL)] .)  

xxx xxx xxx   

19. … The presumption canvassed to be raised that the true  effect of the words “if the offence had not been committed”

47    

was to presume a situation in which the undertaking given  by the assessee had been carried out even though in fact  the same had not been carried out. That would be an absurd  result. In our opinion the use of the expression “if” simpliciter,  was meant to indicate a condition, the condition being that  at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be  visualised wherein there was no scope of committing any  offence. Such a situation could arise only if the tax liability  fell under sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. The  scheme of Section 8 indicated that concessional rates  contemplated by sub-section (1) thereof would be available  only with reference to those goods which are covered by the  declarations in Form ‘C’. The moment it is found that in  respect of particular quantity of goods the undertaking given  by the assessee in Form ‘C’ declaration has not been carried  out, the goods were presumed to be such in respect of which  no undertaking was existing. Therefore such goods would  be liable to normal tax contemplated under sub-section (2)  of Section 8. Therefore, the penalty should be worked out  only on the basis of the normal rates prescribed under sub- section (2) of Section 8. That would make sense. That is a  reasonably possible construction. That would avoid absurd  result.”   

 31. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohanlal (1988) 2 SCC  

513, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent  

Control) Act, 1960 was read harmoniously with the other provisions of  

the Act, as a result of which the words “if the landlord required it for his  

own use or for the use of any member of his family” were read into sub-

clause (iii).  This was done for the reason:  

“10. …If the two sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead  to an absurd result. The non-residential building referred to  in sub-clause (ii) is a building which is used for the purpose  of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use and all other  non-residential buildings fall under sub-clause (iii). The State  Legislature cannot be attributed with the intention that it

48    

required a more stringent proof by insisting upon proof of  bona fides of his requirement or need also when a landlord  is seeking eviction of a tenant from a garage than in the case  of a non-residential building which is occupied by large  commercial house for carrying on business. The learned  counsel for the respondent was not able to explain as to why  the State Legislature gave greater protection to tenants  occupying premises used for keeping vehicles or adapted  for such use than to tenants occupying other types of non- residential buildings. It is no doubt true that the court while  construing a provision should not easily read into it words  which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to  the context in which a provision appears and the object of  the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court  should construe it in a harmonious way to make it  meaningful.”    

32. This judgment was followed in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of  

India (1991) 2 SCC 87 as follows:  

“19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute  which are not there, but “where the alternative lies between  either supplying by implication words which appear to have  been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which  deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is  permissible to supply the words” (Craies Statute Law, 7th  edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia  Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC  513, 524-25] where it was observed that the court construing  a provision should not easily read into it words which have  not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context  in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in  which the said provision is enacted the court should  construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An  attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant  provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the  statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of  Waqf [1959 SCR 1287, 1299 : AIR 1959 SC 198] .)    

20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant  contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords.

49    

The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide  requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the  landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the  tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every  claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one.  There is also enough indication in support of this  construction from the title of Section 25-B which states  “special procedure for the disposal of applications for  eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement”.”  

33. In C.W.S. (India) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax  

(1994) Supp. 2 SCC 296, Section 40(c)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961  

came up for discussion.  The Court held:  

“10. Now, it may be noticed that Section 40(a)(v) is only an  expanded version of Section 40(c)(iii). The idea was to bring  the allowances in respect of the assets owned by the  assessee, which assets are used by its employee for his own  purposes or benefit, within the net of ceiling. Section  40(c)(iii) did not cover such allowances and this was sought  to be remedied. The idea was certainly not to bring about a  different treatment of two situations in Section 40(a)(v)  referred to as clauses (i) and (ii) in this judgment. The  consequence of accepting the assessee's interpretation  would be that while the ceiling on expenditure would apply  to a case falling under clause (i), no such ceiling would apply  to a case falling under clause (ii) unless the employee  governed by clause (ii) is also provided a benefit, amenity or  perquisite falling under clause (i). The consequence would  not only be discriminatory but also very incongruous, almost  absurd. In principle, there is no distinction between the two  cases or two situations, as they may be called. We are  satisfied that the mere use of the word “such” in clause (ii)  should not have the effect of driving the court to place an  interpretation upon the said clause which is not only  discriminatory but is highly incongruous…In this connection,  we may refer to the well-recognised rule of interpretation of  statutes that where a literal interpretation leads to absurd or  unintended result, the language of the statute can be

50    

modified to accord with the intention of Parliament and to  avoid absurdity. The following passage from Maxwell's  Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) may usefully be  quoted:  

“1. Modification of the language to meet the  intention.—Where the language of the statute, in its  ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,  leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent  purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience  or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a  construction may be put upon it which modifies the  meaning of the words and even the structure of the  sentence. This may be done by departing from the  rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to  particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on  the ground that the legislature could not possibly  have intended what its words signify, and that the  modifications made are mere corrections of careless  language and really give the true meaning. Where  the main object and the intention of a statute are  clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the  draftman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law,  except in a case of necessity, or the absolute  intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has  said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of  the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a  deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: ‘The  canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent  a realistic solution.’”  

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Full Bench of the  Kerala High Court was right in taking the view it did on this  aspect and we agree with it.”  

34. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.  (2000) 4 SCC 285, this  

Court construed a provision of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and  

Eviction) Act, 1973 by interpreting the proviso to Section 13(3) of the  

said Act by adding certain words as follows:

51    

“12. …We agree with this contention of the landlord that  normally the courts will have to follow the rule of literal  construction which rule enjoins the court to take the words  as used by the legislature and to give it the meaning which  naturally implies. But, there is an exception to this rule. That  exception comes into play when application of literal  construction of the words in the statute leads to absurdity,  inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in  which the words are used or by reading the statute as a  whole, it requires a different meaning. In our opinion, if the  expression “entitled to apply again” is given its literal  meaning, it would defeat the very object for which the  legislature has incorporated that proviso in the Act inasmuch  as the object of that proviso can be defeated by a landlord  who has more than one tenanted premises by filing multiple  applications simultaneously for eviction and thereafter  obtain possession of all those premises without the bar of  the proviso being applicable to him. We are of the opinion  that this could not have been the purpose for which the  proviso is included in the Act. If such an interpretation is  given then the various provisos found in sub-section (3) of  Section 13 would become otiose and the very object of the  enactment would be defeated. Any such interpretation, in  our opinion, would lead to absurdity. Therefore, we have no  hesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the  restriction contemplated under that proviso extends even up  to the stage when the court or the tribunal is considering the  case of the landlord for actual eviction and is not confined to  the stage of filing of eviction petition only.”    

35. In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273, this Court  

construed Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by  

eschewing a literal interpretation thereof, and reading into the Section  

the words “and that reference is entertained and answered”. The Court  

stated:  

“9. …It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the  Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one)

52    

who might have not made a reference earlier under Section  18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a  reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the  ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A  of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes  a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament  having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it  would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given  to the expression “had not made an application to the  Collector under Section 18” in Section 28-A of the Act. The  aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has  made an application for reference under Section 18 and that  reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it  may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference  and get it answered and then subsequently make another  application when some other person gets the reference  answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep  Kumari case [(1995) 2 SCC 736] the three learned Judges,  while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter  an application under Section 28-A can be moved, had  categorically stated (SCC p. 743, para 10) “the person  moving the application did not make an application to the  Collector under Section 18”. The expression “did not make  an application”, as observed by this Court, would mean, did  not make an effective application which had been  entertained by making the reference and the reference was  answered. When an application under Section 18 is not  entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not  fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount  to an effective application and consequently the rights of  such applicant emanating from some other reference being  answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot  be denied. We, accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding  that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under  Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not  filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”    

36. Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment, which is  

an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tiller of the soil

53    

statutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and, given the fact that  

the literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) would be contrary to  

justice and reason and would lead to great hardship qua persons who  

are similarly circumstanced; as also to the absurdity of land going back  

to an absentee landlord when he has lost the right of personal  

cultivation, in the teeth of the object of the 1956 Amendment as  

mentioned hereinabove, we delete the words “.. of the fact that he has  

attained majority..”. Without these words, therefore, the landlord  

belonging to all three categories has to send an intimation to the tenant,  

before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to  

terminate the tenancy under Section 31.    

 Section 32-F to be read in conformity with Article 14 of the  Constitution of India    

37. In R.L. Arora v. Union of India (1964) 6 SCR 784, this Court  

laid down that:  

“It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in  one way will be consistent with the constitution, and if  another interpretation would render them unconstitutional,  the Court would lean in favour of the former construction:  (see Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar) [(1962) Supp 2  SCR 769].”     

38. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar  

(1959) SCR 279, this Court summarised the case law under Article 14

54    

in the form of six propositions.  We are concerned here with proposition  

(d), which reads as follows:  

“… The principle enunciated above has been consistently  adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of  this Court further establish—    xxx xxx xxx    (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm  and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the  need is deemed to be the clearest;”    

Based on this proposition, Shri Bhasme has argued that the legislature  

in the present case has recognised a certain degree of harm, namely,  

to tenants of minor landlords and may, therefore, confine itself to such  

cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.    

39. Proposition (d) has been later clarified in the seminal judgment  

of this Court, In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979)1 SCC 380.   A  

Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 72 of the aforesaid  

judgment, after referring to Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case (supra) and  

other judgments, stated 13 propositions insofar as Article 14 is  

concerned. We are directly concerned with propositions (1), (3), (6) and  

(8) which are set out as follows:  

“72. As long back as in 1960, it was said by this Court  in Kangsari Haldar that the propositions applicable to cases  arising under Article 14 “have been repeated so many times  during the past few years that they now sound almost  platitudinous”. What was considered to be platitudinous

55    

some 18 years ago has, in the natural course of events,  become even more platitudinous today, especially in view of  the avalanche of cases which have flooded this Court. Many  a learned Judge of this Court has said that it is not in the  formulation of principles under Article 14 but in their  application to concrete cases that difficulties generally arise.  But, considering that we are sitting in a larger Bench than  some which decided similar cases under Article 14, and in  view of the peculiar importance of the questions arising in  this reference, though the questions themselves are not  without a precedent, we propose, though undoubtedly at the  cost of some repetition, to state the propositions which  emerge from the judgments of this Court insofar as they are  relevant to the decision of the points which arise for our  consideration. Those propositions may be stated thus:  

“(1) The first part of Article 14, which was adopted from the  Irish Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the civil rights  of all persons within the territories of India. It enshrines a  basic principle of republicanism. The second part, which is a  corollary of the first and is based on the last clause of the  first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American  Constitution, enjoins that equal protection shall be secured  to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and  liberties without discrimination of favouritism. It is a pledge  of the protection of equal laws, that is, laws that operate alike  on all persons under like circumstances.    xxx xxx xxx    (3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal  protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the  invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore,  classification need not be constituted by an exact or  scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The  courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply  doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification  in any given case. Classification is justified if it is not palpably  arbitrary.    xxx xxx xxx    (6) The law can make and set apart the classes according  to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested

56    

by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the  classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.    xxx xxx xxx    (8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and  the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary  is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while  Article 14 forbids class discrimination by conferring  privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily  selected out of a large number of other persons similarly  situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred  or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid  classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such  classification is not arbitrary in the sense abovementioned.”    

To proposition (d) in Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case (supra) an  

exception has been engrafted in proposition (6) contained  

hereinabove.   The law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doing  

the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. This is  

repeated by way of a proviso to proposition (8) as well.  We have  

referred to the Statement of the Objects and Reasons for the 1969  

Amendment.  Paragraph 2 thereof stated that a large number of cases  

involving minor landlords had come to the notice of the legislature, for  

which reason the amnesty scheme mentioned in sub-section (1A) of  

Section 32-F was enacted.  However, what was forgotten by the  

draftsman when the addition to Section 32-F(1)(a) was made was the  

fact that Section 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords and  

not only one. The words added by the 1969 amendment thus gave  

relief to tenants only qua minor landlords and not the other two

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categories. Obviously, the classification made in favour of tenants of  

minor landlords as opposed to tenants of landlords of the other two  

categories is a classification which is arbitrary in nature. This being the  

case, such classification would ordinarily have to be struck down as  

being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.  

 40. However, instead of striking down such classification as a whole,  

what can be done is to strike down the words “..of the fact that he has  

attained majority..”, as a result of which, what is added by the 1969  

Amendment to Section 32-F(1)(a)  now ceases to be discriminatory, as  

it is applicable to tenants of all three categories of landlords.  

 41.  In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1, this Court  

referred to the positive aspect of the fundamental right contained in  

Article 14 thus:  

“62. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of  

equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the Preamble  

to the Constitution. The Article naturally divides itself into two  

parts—(1) equality before the law, and (2) the equal  

protection of the law. Judgments of this Court have referred  

to the fact that the equality before law concept has been  

derived from the law in the UK, and the equal protection of  

the laws has been borrowed from the 14th Amendment to  

the Constitution of the United States of America. In a  

revealing judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in State of  

U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v. Deoman  

Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 : 1960  

Cri LJ 1504] , AIR p. 1134 para 26 : SCR at p. 34 further

58    

went on to state that whereas equality before law is a  

negative concept, the equal protection of the law has  

positive content. The early judgments of this Court referred  

to the “discrimination” aspect of Article 14, and evolved a  

rule by which subjects could be classified. If the  

classification was “intelligible” having regard to the object  

sought to be achieved, it would pass muster under Article  

14's anti-discrimination aspect. Again, Subba Rao, J.,  

dissenting, in Lachhman Dass v. State of  

Punjab [Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR  

353 : AIR 1963 SC 222] , SCR at p. 395, warned that: (AIR  

p. 240, para 50)  

“50. … Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an  

anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for  

classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the  

Article of its glorious content.”  

He referred to the doctrine of classification as a “subsidiary  

rule” evolved by courts to give practical content to the said  

Article.  

63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer  

to the “rule of law” or “positive” aspect of Article 14, the  

concomitant of which is that if an action is found to be  

arbitrary and, therefore, unreasonable, it would negate the  

equal protection of the law contained in Article 14 and would  

be struck down on this ground.”    

42. Hiralal P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016) 10  

SCC 165, is a case in point. In this judgment, this Court struck down a  

portion of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic  

Violence Act, 2005.  Section 2(q) of the said Act defined “Respondent”  

as meaning any adult male person who is, or has been in a domestic  

relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the

59    

aggrieved person has sought any relief.   This Court having regard to  

the object sought to be achieved by the Act, struck down the  

expression “adult male” as follows:  

“39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the  result that the microscopic difference between male and  female, adult and non-adult, regard being had to the object  sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real or  substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object  of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled  in Subramanian Swamy [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI,  (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC  (L&S) 36] judgment, the words “adult male person” are  contrary to the object of affording protection to women who  have suffered from domestic violence “of any kind”. We,  therefore, strike down the words “adult male” before the  word “person” in Section 2(q), as these words discriminate  between persons similarly situate, and far from being in tune  with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the  2005 Act.  

xxx xxx xxx  

44. An application of the aforesaid severability principle  would make it clear that having struck down the expression  “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, the rest of the  Section is left intact and can be enforced to achieve the  object of the legislation without the offending words. Under  Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, while defining “respondent”, a  proviso is provided only to carve out an exception to a  situation of “respondent” not being an adult male. Once we  strike down “adult male”, the proviso has no independent  existence, having been rendered otiose.”    

43. In Secretary, Mahatama Gandhi Mission v. Bhartiya Kamgar  

Sena (2017) 4 SCC 449, this Court referred copiously to the judgment  

in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, and then held:

60    

“88. What is the remedy open to the citizen and the  corresponding obligation of the judiciary to deal with such a  situation, where the inequalities are created either by the  legislation or executive action? Traditionally, this Court and  the High Courts have been declaring any law, which created  inequalities to be unconstitutional, but in Nakara case [D.S.  Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC  (L&S) 145] this Court realised that such a course of action  would not meet with the obligations emanating from a  combined reading of the directive principles and Article 14.  Therefore, this Court emphatically laid down in Nakara  case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 :  1983 SCC (L&S) 145] that it is possible to give an  appropriate inductive relief by eliminating the factors, which  creates the artificial classification leading to a discriminatory  application of law.”  

44. Respectfully following the law laid down in these judgments, and  

in order to read Section 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14, we  

eliminate the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..” so that  

the intimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made to  

tenants of all the three categories of landlords covered by the provision.   

45. It now remains to deal with some of the judgments of this Court  

on the interpretation of Section 32-F.   In Anna Bhau Magdum v.  

Babasaheb Anandrao Desai (1995) 5 SCC 243, a minor landlord  

attained majority in 1965 i.e. before the 1969 Amendment Act came  

into force. After adverting to the amendments made in 1969, this Court  

held that for this reason the amendment did not apply to the facts of  

that case.  It was also found, as a matter of fact, that despite knowing  

that the Respondent landlord would attain majority on 17.1.1965, the

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tenant gave no intimation as required by sub-section (1A) to Section  

32-F even within the amnesty period of two years granted by the said  

sub-section. The only argument made on behalf of the tenant in that  

case was that since there is an automatic purchase, the provisions of  

sub-section (1A) are directory in nature. This was turned down stating  

that the consequences of non-compliance of Section 32-F (1A) are laid  

down in Section 32-P(1) and that, therefore, the time period contained  

in sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F is mandatory in nature.  This case  

is wholly distinguishable on its facts and lays down the law on Section  

32-F(1A) with which we are not immediately concerned.    

46. However, in Appa Narsappa v. Akubai Ganapati (1999) 4 SCC  

453, this Court referred to the landlady widow on the facts of that case  

who had died in 1965, prior to the coming into force of the Amendment  

Act of 1969. In this factual scenario, since the tenant did not comply  

with the timeline of one year given to him, the right to purchase of the  

tenant was stated to have come to an end.   The argument that one  

year should be from the date of knowledge was turned down in the  

following terms:  

“4. It was submitted by the learned counsel that this being a  welfare legislation enacted for the benefit of tenants should  be construed in a liberal manner. He also submitted that the  heirs of the landlady had not given any intimation to the  appellant about her death and therefore he could not have  known who were the heirs of the landlady and given

62    

intimation to them. He submitted that the period of one year  should be counted from the date of the knowledge of the  tenant. We cannot accept this submission because the  language of Sections 32-F and 31 is quite clear and the  period of one year will have to be counted in accordance  with the said provisions and not from the date of the  knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear,  we cannot in such a case grant relief on the basis of equity.”  

Since this judgment does not square with object sought to be achieved  

by the 1956 Amendment to the 1948 Act or to the declaration of law in  

this judgment, it does not state the law correctly and is, therefore,  

overruled.   

47. The next judgment that was cited before us is Sudam Ganpat  

Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram (2006) 7 SCC 200.  After setting out  

the relevant provisions of the Act, this Court held that on the facts of  

that case since Section 31(3) had ceased to apply, Section 32-F(1) did  

not apply at all, as a result of which there was no need for the tenant  

to issue any notice of intimation to the landlord. The other judgments  

that were cited were distinguished in paragraph 27 stating that they  

were all judgments in which Section 32-F(1A) would apply.  The facts  

of this case again are far removed from the facts of the present case  

and the judgment has, therefore, no application to the law laid down in  

the present case.   

63    

48. The next judgment cited before us is Tukaram Maruti Chavan  

v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358. This judgment  

followed the law laid down in Appa Narsappa (supra) and on facts held  

that the Appellant tenant had complete knowledge of the death of the  

widow in that case, as a result of which the Appellant’s contention that  

he was confused as to who was the true owner was turned down. To  

the extent that this judgment follows the law laid down in Appa  

Narsappa (supra), this judgment also does not lay down the law  

correctly and is overruled to this extent.     

49. It now only remains to consider some of Shri Bhasme’s other  

arguments. The argument made based on Section 14(1)(a) that since  

a tenant is bound to pay the rent every year before the 31st May thereof,  

the tenant is bound to know that the person to whom he is paying rent  

has since died and that, therefore, knowledge cannot be brought in to  

the construction of Section 32-F need not detain us.  On facts in the  

present case, the landlady was actually at Mumbai, whereas the tenant  

was at Ratnagiri. Also, Section 14(1)(b) makes it clear that in case the  

tenant fails to pay rent before the 31st May of every year, the landlord  

must first give a three months’ notice in writing informing the tenant  

that he has not so paid the rent, within which period the tenant is given  

time to remedy the breach.  On facts, there is nothing to show that any

64    

such notice was given. The other emotive argument that in the  

agricultural village world everyone knows about everybody else and  

that, therefore, it may be assumed that a villager at Ratnagiri will know  

about his landlord’s death equally cannot apply on the facts of this case  

as the landlord lived and died in Mumbai.   The other emotive argument  

about the reverse situation obtaining today as opposed to the situation  

obtaining in 1956, namely, that it is tenants who are now well off and  

landlords who are poor is again a perception of learned counsel which  

has no bearing either on the facts of this case or the law that needs to  

be laid down.    

50. The questions referred to us are now answered as follows:   

(i)  The object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevant and  

applicable in deciding the scope of the right to purchase by a  

tenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from mental or  

physical disability on Tillers’ day.  

(ii)  The successor-in-interest of a widow is obliged to send an  

intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow to  

enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase.   

(iii)  The decision in Appa Narsappa (supra) stands overruled. The  

decision in Sudam Ganpat (supra) stands distinguished as  

stated in paragraph 47 of the judgment. The decision in Tukaram

65    

Maruti (supra), to the extent that it follows the law laid down in  

Appa Narsappa (supra), stands overruled.    

We, therefore, allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the  

High Court dated 1st August, 2014.   As a result, the tenant’s intimation  

of purchase of 2008 will now be taken on record by the authorities  

under the Act, who may now proceed under the Act to determine  

purchase price and its payment consequent upon which the postponed  

right of the tenant in this case to own the land will then come into being  

upon the statutory conditions being met.  The appeals are disposed of  

accordingly.     

          …………………………J.                                              (R.F. Nariman)               …………………………J.                                              (R. Subhash Reddy)               …………………………J.   

New Delhi              (Surya Kant)  September 18, 2019.