REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 533 OF 2011

V.K. Naswa            …

Petitioner

Versus

Home Secretary, U.O.I. and Ors.           …

Respondents

O R D E R

1. This  writ  petition  has been filed making  grievance that  the  

respondents, namely, Yog Guru Baba Ramdev; Shri Anna Hazare,  

Mrs. Kiran Bedi and others have, on several occasions insulted  the  

National Flag and violated the norms of waiving of National Flag, as  

provided in the Flag Code 2002.  Thus,  the petitioner  has sought  

relief  that  a  sum  of  Rs.10,00,000,00/-  (Rupees  Ten  crores)  be  

recovered from Baba Ramdev for misusing National Flag for gaining

undue mileage benefiting his commercial  ends (yoga business)  as  

well as the political gain drive during agitations; Shri Anna Hazare  

and others be directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000,00/- (Rupees Ten  

crores)  to  the  Prime  Minister’s  Relief  Fund  for  using/misusing  

National Flag for gaining the political mileage during agitations, and  

further  to  issue  direction  to  the  Central  Government  through  

Ministry of Law & Justice to revise the Flag Code of India 2002 and  

amend  the  same  incorporating  the  amendment  suggested  by  the  

petitioner himself.   

2. The petitioner appears in person and on being asked by the  

court it has been pointed out by him that against the above referred  

respondents he has filed the criminal complaints before the police  

authorities and he has been pursuing the said remedy simultaneously.

3. The issue  involved in  the  case  has  been dealt  with  by this  

Court elaborately in Union of India v. Naveen Jindal & Anr., AIR  

2004 SC 1559, interpreting the clauses contained in the Flag Code  

2002 and explained as under what circumstances and in what manner  

the National Flag can be hoisted by the individuals.  The Flag Code  

is divided into 3 parts. Part II provides for the mode and manner of  

hoisting/displaying/use  of  National  Flag  by  Members  of  Public,  

Private Organisations, Educational Institutions etc.  From reading of  

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clause  2.1  of  Section  1  appear  in  Part  II  of  the  Flag  Code,  it  is  

evident that there is no restriction on the display of National Flag by  

members  of  general  public,  private  organizations  and  educational  

institutions etc. except to the extent provided in the Emblems and  

Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950 and Prevention of  

Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 and any other law enacted on  

the subject.  This Court has further held that Flag Code is not the law  

within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India.  

However, right to fly National Flag is a fundamental right.  Further  

the Flag Code provides guidelines to be observed for preservation of  

dignity and respect to the National Flag.

4. In view of the above, the National Flag is both a benediction  

and  a  beckoning.   Thus,  in  case  a  person  shows  any  kind  of  

disrespect  to  the  National  Flag  or  does  not  observe  the  terms  

contained in the Code, legal action may be taken against him under  

the relevant statutory provisions.  However, these are the questions  

of facts as to whether on a particular event a particular person has  

shown any kind of disrespect to the National Flag.  For that purpose,  

the  petitioner  has  already  filed  complaint  before  the  authorities  

concerned.  Thus, he cannot pursue the remedy simultaneously by  

filing the writ petition and on that count the petition is liable to be  

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dismissed.  More so, such a factual controversy cannot be examined  

in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  

5. The  petitioner-in-person  has  emphasised  that  he  has  

approached this Court to issue directions to the Central Government  

through Ministry of Law & Justice to amend the law in this regard  

and  in  the  alternative,  this  court  itself  may  issue  appropriate  

directions in this regard.   

             It is a settled legal proposition that the court can neither  

legislate  nor  issue  a  direction  to  the  Legislature  to  enact  in  a  

particular manner.  

6. In Mullikarjuna Rao & Ors. etc. etc. v.   State of Andhra  

Pradesh & Ors. etc. etc., AIR 1990 SC 1251; and  V.K. Sood v.  

Secretary, Civil Aviation & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2285,  this Court  

has held that Writ Court, in exercise of its power under Article 226,  

has no power even indirectly require the Executive to exercise its  

law-making power. The Court observed that it is neither legal nor  

proper for the High Court to issue direction or advisory sermons to  

the Executive in respect of the sphere which is exclusively within the  

domain of the Executive under the Constitution. The power under  

Article  309  of  the  Constitution  to  frame  rules  is  the  legislative  

power. This power under the Constitution has to be exercised by the  

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President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be. The Courts  

cannot  usurp  the  functions  assigned  to  the  Executive  under  the  

Constitution  and  cannot  even  indirectly  require  the  Executive  to  

exercise its  law-making power in any manner.  The Courts cannot  

assume to itself a supervisory role over the rule-making power of the  

Executive under Article 309 of the Constitution.

7. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance on a  

large number of judgments, particularly M/s. Narinder Chand Hem  

Raj  & Ors.  v.  Lt.  Governor,  Administrator,  Union Territory,  

Himachal Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2399, where it has been  

held that legislative power can be exercised only by the legislature or  

its delegate and none else.  

8. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of  

Medical  College,  Shimla & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 910, this  Court  

deprecated the practice adopted by the Courts to issue directions to  

the legislature to enact  a legislation to meet  a particular  situation  

observing :

 “...The direction given by the Division Bench was  really  nothing  short  of  an  indirect  attempt  to   compel the State Government to initiate legislation  with  a  view  to  curbing  the  evil  of  ragging,  for   Otherwise it is difficult to see why, after the clear   and categorical  statement  by the chief  Secretary   

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on  behalf  of  the  State  Government  that  the   Government  will  introduce  legislation  if  found  necessary  and  so  advised,  the  Division  Bench  should  have  proceeded  to  again  give  the  same  direction. Thus the Division Bench was clearly not   entitled  to  do.  It  is  entirely  a  matter  for  the   executive  branch  of  the  Government  to  decided  whether  or  not  to  introduce  any  particular  legislation.”

9. In  Asif Hameed & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir &  

Ors., AIR 1989 SC 1899, this Court while dealing with a case like  

this at hand observed:  

  “While doing so, the Court must remain within  its self-imposed limits. The Court sits in judgment   on  the  action  of  a  co-ordinate  branch  of  the   Government.  While  exercising  power  of  judicial   review of administrative  action, the Court is  not   an Appellate Authority. The Constitution does not   permit the Court to direct or advise the Executive   in  matter  of  policy  or  to  sermonize  qua  any  matter which under the Constitution lies within  the sphere of Legislature or Executive.”                                                       (Emphasis added)

10. In Union of India & Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR  

1992 SC 96, this Court similarly observed :

“It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge   the  scope  of  the  legislation.....The  Court  cannot   rewrite,  recast  or reframe the legislation for the  very good reason that it has no power to legislate.   The power to legislate has not been conferred on  the Court.”

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11. Similarly  in  Ajaib  Singh  v.   Sirhind  Co-operative  

Marketing-cum-Processing  Service  Society  Ltd.  &  Anr.,  AIR  

1999 SC 1351, this  Court  held  that  Court  cannot  fix a  period of  

limitation,  if  not  fixed  by  the  legislature,  as  “the  Courts  can  

admittedly  interpret  the  law  and  do  not  make  laws.”  The  Court  

cannot  interpret  the  statutory  provision  in  such a  manner  “which  

would  amount  to  legislation  intentionally  left  over  by  the  

legislature”.

12. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in  Union of  

India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., AIR 2002  

SC  2112, observing  that  the  Court  cannot  issue  direction  to  the  

legislature for amending the Act or Rules. It is for the Parliament to  

amend the Act or Rules.

13. In District Mining Officer & Ors. v. Tata Iron & Steel Co.  

& Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 358, this Court held that function of the Court  

is only to expound the law and not to legislate.

14. Similarly,  in  Supreme  Court Employees’  Welfare  

Association v. Union of India & Anr.,  (1989) 4 SCC 187,   this  

Court  held  that  Court  cannot  direct  the  legislature  to  enact  a  

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particular law for the reason that under the constitutional scheme the  

Parliament exercises sovereign power to enact law and no outside  

power or authority can issue a particular piece of legislation.

(See also: State of Jammu & Kashmir v. A.R. Zakki & Ors., AIR  

1992 SC 1546).

15. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja & Anr., AIR 2003  

SC 2612,  this Court held that if the Court issues a direction which  

amounts  to  legislation  and  is  not  complied  with  by  the  State,  it  

cannot be held that the State has committed the Contempt of Court  

for  the  reason  that  the  order  passed  by  the  Court  was  without  

jurisdiction and it has no competence to issue a direction amounting  

to legislation.

16. The  issue  involved  herein  was  considered  by  this  Court  in  

University of Kerala v. Council, Principals’, Colleges, Kerala &  

Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2532.  The Court elaborately explained the scope  

of separation of powers of different organs of the State under our  

Constitution;  the  validity  of  judicial  legislation  and if  it  is  at  all  

permissible, its limits; and the validity of judicial activism and the  

need for judicial restraint, etc. The Court observed:  

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“At  the  outset,  we  would  say  that  it  is  not   possible for this Court to give any direction for  amending the Act or the statutory rules.  It is for   the Parliament to amend the Act and the Rules.”  

17. In  State of U.P. & Ors. v. Jeet S. Bisht & Anr., (2007) 6  

SCC  586,  this  Court  held  that  issuing  any  such  direction  may  

amount  to  amendment  of  law  which  falls  exclusively  within  the  

domain of the executive/legislature and the Court cannot amend the  

law.  

18. In  Delhi Jal Board v. National Campaign for Dignity and  

Rights of Sewerage and Allied Workers & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC  

568, this Court while dealing with the issue made the observation  

that  in  exceptional  circumstances  where  there  is  inaction  by  the  

executive, for whatever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise  

of its Constitutional obligations to provide a solution till such time  

the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper legislation  

to cover the field.  

(See also: Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1997  

SC 3011; Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India &  

Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2116; and  Destruction of Public and Private  

Properties v. State of A.P. & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 2266)

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19. Thus, it is crystal clear that the Court has a very limited role  

and in exercise of that,  it  is  not open to have judicial  legislation.  

Neither the Court can legislate, nor it has any competence to issue  

directions to the legislature to enact the law in a particular manner.

    20.      In view of the above, the petition lacks merit.  Facts of the  

case do not warrant any interference by this Court.  In such a fact-

situation, no relief can be granted to the petitioner.  The writ petition  

is, accordingly, dismissed.

          ..………………………

…J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

..……………………… …J.

(SWATANTER  KUMAR) New Delhi, January 9, 2012

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