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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6342-6343  OF 2012

V. Chandrasekaran & Anr.                   …Appellants

Versus

The Administrative Officer & Ors.                                 …Respondents

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1.   These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment  

and order dated 24.1.2012, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras  

in  Writ  Appeal  Nos.  805-806  of  2011,  by  which,  the  Division  Bench  

reversed  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge,  dated  

1.11.2010 passed in relation to land acquisition proceedings.  

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are as under:

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A. A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  

(hereinafter referred to as `the Act’), was issued on 15.5.1978 with respect to  

land measuring 58.59 acres,  in  the revenue estate  of  Tambaram Village,  

Saidapet  Taluk,  Chengalpet  District,  Tamil  Nadu,  including the suit  land  

measuring  2.26  acres  in  Survey  Nos.  283/1  (extent  of  27  cents),  284/1  

(extent  of  70 cents),  284/2 (extent  of  65 cents)  and 284/3 (extent  of  64  

cents).  As the provisions of the Urgency Clause under Section 17 of the Act  

were not invoked, the persons interested were at liberty to file objections  

under Section  5-A of the Act.  A declaration under Section 6 of the Act with  

respect to the said land was issued on 6.6.1981. Very few among the persons  

interested, challenged the land acquisition proceedings by way of filing 8  

writ  petitions,  including  Writ  Petition  Nos.  8897  and  8899  of  1983  etc.  

which were filed by some of the original tenure-holders of the suit land on  

several  grounds.  However,  the  said  petitioners  did  not  challenge  the  

acquisition proceedings so far as the suit land is concerned, rather they chose  

to restrict their cases to the other parts of their lands.   The batch of said writ  

petitions  was  allowed  by  way  of  a  common  judgment  and  order,  dated  

16.12.1983, quashing the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on  

the ground that the inquiry was not conducted fairly, and that the objections  

raised by the said writ petitioners under Section 5-A,  were also not dealt  

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with properly.  However, the learned Single Judge upheld the Notification  

issued  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  and  hence,  granted  liberty  to  the  

Government  of  Tamil  Nadu  to  continue  with  the  said  acquisition  

proceedings, in accordance with law.   

B. Being  aggrieved  by  this,  the  writ  petitioners  including  the  

predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, preferred Writ Appeal Nos. 214 to  

225 and 435 of 1984, before the Division Bench of the High Court, against  

the  judgment  and  order  dated  16.12.1983,  praying  for  quashing  of  the  

Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, as well. The Government did  

not  challenge  the  judgment  and  order  dated  16.12.1983.  The  said  writ  

appeals were allowed vide judgment and order dated 23.8.1985, and the said  

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, only in respect of the land, which  

constituted the subject matter of the aforementioned appeals, was quashed.  

Against the judgment and order dated 23.8.1985, the Government of Tamil  

Nadu  preferred  a  Special  Leave  Petition  before  this  Court,  which  was  

dismissed vide order dated 6.5.1992. Thus, those orders attained finality.

C. In the meantime, an Award was passed with respect to the said land,  

including the suit land, on 28.6.1983, to the extent of 4.26 acres i.e. Survey  

Nos. 283/1, 284/1 and 284/3.  

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D. A second  batch  of  writ  petitions  was  filed  before  the  High  Court  

challenging the acquisition proceedings, as well as the Award. All the said  

writ  petitions  were  allowed,  following  the  earlier  judgments  dated  

16.12.1983 and 23.8.1985 vide judgment and order dated 22.12.1986.   

E. A second award was made on 14.8.1986, in relation to the remaining  

part of said land, including a part of the suit land, i.e. Survey No. 284/2.  

F. So  far  as  the  suit  land is  concerned,  the  persons-interested/tenure-

holders never filed any objection under Section 5-A of the Act, and nor have  

they  challenged  the  acquisition  proceedings,  at  any  stage.  Instead,  they  

accepted the compensation amount under protest. Possession of the suit land  

was taken over by the authority subsequently. There is nothing on record to  

show whether the claimants had filed any application for making a reference  

under Section 18 of the Act.  

G. The tenure-holders/persons-interested in the suit land, after receiving  

compensation,  and  handing  over  the  possession  to  the  respondents  

authorities with respect to the suit land, transferred the said land to some  

persons, and ultimately, after undergoing multiple sales, the suit land was  

purchased  by  the  appellants  herein,  vide  sale-deeds  dated  4.3.2004,  

10.11.2004, 7.7.2005 and 11.8.2005.  As a result thereof, they claim to have  

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acquired  possession  of  the  said  suit  land.   The  appellants  planned  to  

construct flats upon the said land, for the purpose of which, they had also  

obtained permission from the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority  

on 16.3.2007. Applications were filed by the original tenure-holders for re-

conveyance  of  the  suit  land  which  stood  as  rejected  vide  order  dated  

7.7.2008.     

H. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 6108 of 2009  

for the quashing of the Notification dated 15.5.1978, issued under Section 4  

of  the  Act,  pertaining  to  the  land  that  comprised  9  Survey  Numbers,  

including the suit land contending that the declaration under Section 6 had  

been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was subsequently issued. The  

proceedings  therefore,  automatically  lapsed  as  there  could  be  no  Award  

without a fresh declaration, and therefore, all subsequent proceedings would  

be void ab-initio.  Another Writ Petition No. 20896 of 2009, was also filed  

seeking totally inconsistent/contrary reliefs i.e. praying for the quashing of  

the letter dated 7.7.2005, as also for the issuance of directions to re-convey  

the suit land in favour of the appellants.  

I. A  learned  Single  Judge,  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  1.11.2010  

allowed both Writ Petitions, observing that as the Section 6 declaration had  

been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was issued thereafter, the land  

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acquisition proceedings had lapsed and the suit land was hence, free from  

any and all acquisition proceedings.   

J. Being aggrieved, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (hereinafter referred  

to as `the Board’) – the respondents, then filed writ appeals which have been  

allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated 24.1.2012, reversing the  

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.   

Hence, these appeals.  

3. Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi and Mr. Rajiv Dutta, learned senior counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellants,  have  submitted  that,  since  the  Section  6  

declaration dated 6.6.1981 has been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration  

was  made  thereafter,  subsequent  proceedings  are  void  ab-initio.  The  

appellants, before purchasing the suit land made various inquiries and were  

informed in writing by various authorities,  that the said land was not the  

subject matter of any acquisition proceedings at the relevant time.  More so,  

a  high  powered  committee,  constituted  by  the  Board  itself,  submitted  a  

report that the suit land was not required by the Board, and that even though  

the  possession  of  the  land had been  taken,  the  land vested  in  the  State.  

There was no approach road to the suit land and thus, the said land could not  

be utilised for the purpose for which, it was acquired. The Board was not in  

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a position to utilise the suit land and, thus, it could be released in favour of  

the appellants,  subject to refunding the compensation amount received by  

the land owners.  More so, the compensation amount received by the persons  

aggrieved in 1983 was received under protest, and was refunded to them in  

2010, by way of demand draft, though the same was not accepted by the  

Board and was therefore, returned to the tenure-holders.  The appellants are  

still willing to refund the amount of compensation received by the persons-  

interested, in pursuance of the illegal and void awards, dated 28.6.1983 and  

14.8.1986.  Therefore, the impugned judgment and order are liable to be set  

aside and the present appeals should  be allowed.  

4. On  the  contrary,  Shri  S.  Gomathi  Nayagam,  learned  Additional  

Advocate General appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed  

the appeals, contending that the predecessor-in-interest, of the appellants did  

not raise any objection under Section 5-A of the Act,  with respect to such  

acquisition proceedings at any stage, rather they accepted the compensation  

granted  under  protest.  To  receive  an  award  under  protest  is  a  legal  

requirement for the purpose of making a reference under Section 18 of the  

Act.  The quashing of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act would not  

automatically  apply  to  the  suit  land,  as  it  was  not  the  subject  matter  of  

challenge  with  respect  to  the  acquisition  proceedings  before  court.   The  

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appellants did not make any inquiry whatsoever, with respect to the title of  

the suit land, though inquiry was sought to be made in relation to the said  

land, by different persons in altogether different contexts. The report of the  

high powered committee appointed by the Board itself, is self-contradictory,  

as they clearly provided that possession had been taken and, in view of the  

fact that once possession is  taken, the said land vests in the State, free from  

all encumbrances under Section 16 of the Act, the same cannot be divested.  

Therefore,  the  question  of  re-conveying  the  suit  land  in  favour  of  the  

appellants  cannot  possibly  arise.   Land can be  released  from acquisition  

proceedings  either under Section 48 of the Act, or in exercise of  powers  

under the General Clauses Act, 1897, but this can be done only prior to the  

vesting of the land in the State, which in itself is prior to taking possession  

thereof.   The appellants, being purchasers of the said suit land, after more  

than 20 years of the Award, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings at  

such a belated stage.  More so, the vendors were not competent to make any  

transfer, as none of them had good title over the suit land.  Therefore, any  

and all sale transactions are illegal and void.   The sale-deeds executed in  

favour of the appellants, do not confer upon them, any title.  More so, the  

subsequent purchasers cannot challenge the validity of the land acquisition.  

The appeals lack merit and are therefore liable to be dismissed.   

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5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  the  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the records.

However, before coming to the merit  of the case,  it  is desirable to  

consider the legal issues involved herein.    

Whether  subsequent  purchaser  can  challenge  the  acquisition  proceedings:

6. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person who  

purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued under Section 4  

of the Act has been considered by this Court time and again.

   In  Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112, this  

Court held that, any one who deals with the land subsequent to a Section 4  

notification being issued, does so, at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State  

of  Uttar  Pradesh, AIR  1996  SC 540,  this  Court  held  that  a  Section  4  

notification gives a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to  

which it has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further points  

out  that  there  will  be  "an  impediment  to  any one  to  encumber  the  land  

acquired thereunder." The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the  

beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive  

compensation.  While  deciding  the  said  case,  reliance  was  placed  on  an  

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earlier  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Union  of  india  v.  Shri  Shiv  Kumar  

Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.  

7. Similarly,  in  U.P. Jal Nigam v.  M/s.  Kalra Properties Pvt.  Ltd.,  

AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that, purchase of land after publication  

of a Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is void against the State  

and at the most, the purchaser may be a person-interested in compensation,  

since  he  steps  into  the  shoes  of  the  erstwhile  owner  and may therefore,  

merely claim compensation. (See also:  Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of  

Haryana & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 698).

8. In  Ajay Kishan Singhal  v.  Union of  India, AIR 1996 SC 2677;  

Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC 335;  

Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 528; and  Meera Sahni v.  

Lieutenant  Governor  of  Delhi  & Ors.,  (2008)  9  SCC  177,  this  Court  

categorically held that, a person who purchases land after the publication of  

a Section 4 notification with respect to it,  is not entitled to challenge the  

proceedings for the reason, that his title is void and he can at best claim  

compensation on the basis of vendor’s title. In view of this, the sale of land  

after issuance of a Section 4 notification is void and the purchaser cannot  

challenge the acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P.,  

(2009) 10 SCC 689).

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9. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the  

effect  that  a  person who purchases  land subsequent  to  the issuance  of  a  

Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not competent to challenge the  

validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the  

reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him,  

any title  and at  the most  he can claim compensation on the basis  of  his  

vendor’s title.

The acquisition challenged by one – whether others can also take the  benefit of the same.

10. The  relief  obtained  by  some  persons,  by  approaching  the  Court  

immediately after the cause of action has arisen, cannot be the basis for other  

persons who have belatedly filed their petition, to take the benefit of earlier  

relief provided, for the reason that, such persons cannot be permitted to take  

impetus  of  an  order  passed  by  the  court,  at  the  behest  of  another  more  

diligent  person.  (Vide:  Ratan Chandra Sammanta & Ors.  v.  Union of  

India & Ors.,  AIR 1993 SC 2276;  State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M.  

Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267; and Jagdih Lal & Ors. v. State of  

Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366).  

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11. In  Abhey Ram (dead) by L.Rs.  & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,  

AIR 1997 SC 2564, a three Judge Bench of this Court, dealt with an issue  

similar to the one involved herein. The question that arose was whether the  

quashing of the notification/declaration under the Act by the court in respect  

of other matters, would confer benefit upon non-parties also.  The Court held  

as under:

“The question then arises is whether the quashing of   the declaration by the Division Bench in respect  of   the  other  matters  would  enure  the  benefit  to  the   appellants also.  Though, prima facie, the argument   of  the  learned  counsel  is  attractive,  on  deeper   consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the   contention…..  If  it  were a case entirely relating to   Section  6  declaration  as  has  been  quashed  by  the   High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit   to others also, though they did not file any petition,   except to those whose lands were taken possession   of  and were vested in the State under Sections 16   and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances.”

          (Emphasis   added)  

12. In H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader &  

Ors.,  AIR  1995  SC  2244,  this  Court  quashed  the  land  acquisition  

proceedings in toto, wherein the land had been acquired by the Government  

for the use of the cooperative society which had planned a housing scheme  

upon  it,  in  view of  the  conclusion  that  it  could  not  be  called  a  “public  

purpose”, within the meaning of the Act.   The Court further directed the  

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respondents  therein  to  restore  the  possession  of  the  land  to  the  tenure-

holders/persons-interested,  and  such  persons  were  thereafter,  directed  to  

refund the amount received by them as compensation. (See also:  H.M.T.  

House Building Cooperative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa & Ors.,  

(1995) 3 SCC 128)  

13. The said judgment has subsequently been approved and followed by  

this Court, in Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors., AIR 1999 SC  

3822, wherein this Court held as follows:  

“Quashing the notification in the cases of individual   writ  petitions  cannot  be  treated  as  quashing  the   whole of it. That was what was held in  Abhey Ram  case (supra). The main points raised before us are   fully  covered  by  the  judgment  of  the  three-Judge   Bench in Abhey Ram’s case.”

14. In Om Prakash v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2430, this  

Court considered a similar issue and reiterated the view taken by this Court  

in Abhey Ram (supra), wherein it was held that, in case a person interested  

has not filed any objection to the notice issued under Section 5-A of the Act,  

or challenged the acquisition proceedings, he cannot claim that the order of  

quashing the declaration in some other matter, would also cover his case.  

The Court held as under:

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“The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in   the case in hand as many as four declarations under   Section 6 of the Act were issued from time to time.   Finally when declaration is quashed by any Court, it   would  only  enure  to  the  benefit  of  those  who  had   approached the Court. It would certainly not extend  the  benefit  to  those  who  had  not  approached  the   Court or who might have gone into slumber.”

15. Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised to state that, in the  

event  that  the person interested  has not  filed objections in  response to  a  

notice  issued  under  Section  5-A,  and  has  not  challenged  the  acquisition  

proceedings, the quashing of the declaration issued under Section 6 in some  

other case, would not enure any benefit to such  person.  More so, where the  

possession of land has already been taken, and such land stands vested in the  

State, free from all encumbrances as provided under Sections 16 and 17(2)  

of the Act, prior to the date of decision of the Court quashing the declaration  

in  toto,  no  benefit  can  be  taken  by  him.  Where  a  party  has  not  filed  

objections to the notice issued under Section 5-A, the declaration qua such  

persons is generally neither quashed, nor does it stand vitiated qua him, by  

any error of law warranting interference.  There is also another view with  

respect to this matter, which is that, in case the said land has been acquired  

for a Scheme, which does not fall within the ambit of “public purpose” then,  

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in such a case, it would not be a case of acquisition under the Act, instead, it   

would amount to colourable exercise of power.  

Land once vested in the Government – whether can be divested:  

16. It  is  a settled legal  proposition,  that once the land is vested in the  

State,  free from all  encumbrances,  it  cannot be divested and proceedings  

under the Act would not  lapse,  even if  an award is not made within the  

statutorily stipulated period. (Vide: Avadh Behari Yadav v. State of Bihar  

&. Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31;  U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.  

(Supra);   Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors.,  

(1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,  

(2000) 4 SCC 322; and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar &  

Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492).  

17. The  said  land,  once  acquired,  cannot  be  restored  to  the  tenure  

holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it  

was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be  

withdrawn/abandoned  under  the  provisions  of  Section  48  of  the  Act,  or  

under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land  

has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances.  

(Vide:  State of  Madhya Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593; Lt.  

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Governor of Himachal Pradesh &  Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR  

1970 SC 1576; Satendra Prasad  Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993  

SC  2517;  Rajasthan  Housing  Board  & Ors.  v.  Shri  Kishan  & Ors.,  

(1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India v.  

Subodh Singh & Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 100).   

18.  The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by this Court  

time and again. In  Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi  

Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of  

word  'vesting'  varies  as  per  the  context  of  the  Statute,  under  which  the  

property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is  

concerned, the Court held as under.-  

"In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17,   the  property  acquired  becomes  the  property  of   Government without any condition or ; limitations   either as to title or possession. The legislature has   made it clear that vesting of the property is not for   any limited purpose or limited duration.”

19. In  Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR  

1977 SC 448, in a similar situation, this Court held as under:-  

"Once  the  original  acquisition  is  valid  and title   has  vested  in  the  Municipality,  how  it  uses  the   excess  land is no concern of  the original  owner   

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and  cannot  be  the  basis  for  invalidating  the   acquisition. There is no principle of law by which   a  valid  compulsory  acquisition  stands  voided  because long later the requiring Authority diverts   it to a  public purpose other than the one stated in   the ….declaration.”

20.     Similarly, in  State of Kerala & Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai &  

Anr.,  (1997) 5 SCC 432, this Court held as under:  

“It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a   public  purpose,  after  the  public  purpose  was   achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any   other  public  purpose.  In  case  there  is  no  other   public purpose for which the land is needed, then   instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile   owner,  the land should be put to public auction   and the amount fetched in the public auction can   be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged   in the Directive Principles of the Constitution.

(See also:  C. Padma & Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of  

Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. &  

Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436;  Niladri  Narayan Chandradhurja v.  State  of  

West Bengal, AIR 2002 SC 2532;  Northern Indian Glass Industries v.  

Jaswant Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; and Leelawanti & Ors. v. State  

of Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 66).

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21. In  Government   of   Andhra   Pradesh  & Anr.  v.  Syed  Akbar  

(Supra), this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land  

has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of  

the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons-interested/tenure holders,  

and that  therefore,  the question of  restitution of  possession to the tenure  

holder, does not arise. (See also:  Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996  

SC  1296;  Chandragaudaj  Ramgonda  Patil  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  

(1996) 6 SCC 405;  State of  Kerala & Ors.  v.  M. Bhaskaran Pillai  &  

Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703;  Printers (Mysore) . Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed &  

Ors. (2004)  4  SCC  460;  Bangalore  Development  Authority  v.  R.  

Hanumaiah, (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. &  

Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 354).  

22. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that once  

the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is  

not the concern of the land owner, whether the land is being used for the  

purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes  

persona non-grata  once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only  

receive  compensation  for  the  same,  unless  the  acquisition  proceeding  is  

itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the  

land  to  the  person-interested,  nor  can  such  person  claim  any  right  of  

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restitution  on  any  ground,  whatsoever,  unless  there  is  some  statutory  

amendment to this effect.

23. The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a better  

title than he himself possesses;  Nemo dat quod non habet.  However, this  

Rule has certain exceptions and one of them is, that the transfer must be in  

good faith for value, and there must be no misrepresentation or fraud, which  

would render the transactions as void and also that the property is purchased  

after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferee has the requisite  

power to transfer the said land, and finally that, the parties have acted in  

good faith, as is required under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act,  

1882. (Vide: Asa Ram & Anr. v.  Mst. Ram Kali & Anr., AIR 1958 SC  

183; State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh & Ors., AIR 1969 SC  

401,  Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra, AIR 1981 SC  

102;  Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mohal Lal, AIR 1988 SC 299; and  

State of Punjab v. Surjit Kaur (Dead) through LRs., JT (2001) 10 SC 42).

24. This Court has earlier taken the view that, in case the award is not  

accepted under protest, the persons interested cannot make an application to  

make a reference under Section 18, (Vide: Wardington Lyngdoh & Ors. v.  

Collector, Mawkyrwat, (1995) 4 SCC 428), wherein this Court held that, a  

person who has received the amount of award made under Section 11 of the  

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Act,  without  protest,  will  not  be  entitled  to  make  an  application  under  

Section 18 of the Act.  Therefore, receipt of the said amount under protest, is  

a condition precedent for making an application under Section 18, within the  

limitation prescribed under the Act.   

25. The aforesaid view however, has not been consistently reiterated,  as  

is evident from the judgment in  Ajit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab &  

Ors.,  (1994)  4 SCC 67,  wherein it  was  held that,  merely an  application  

under Section 18 of the Act would make it clear that the person-interested  

has not accepted the award made by the authority.  

26. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid  

legal propositions.  

From the  facts  it  is  evident  that,  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  

appellants  approached  the  court  by  filing  Writ  Petitions  as  well  as  writ  

appeals, with respect to some of their lands, but for the reasons best known  

to them, they did not challenge the acquisition proceedings so far as the suit  

land is concerned.  The appellants filed a writ petition for quashing the land  

acquisition proceedings and/or seeking a declaration to the effect that the  

notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on 15.5.1978, in relation to  

Survey Nos.  282/1, 282/2, 283/1, 283/2, 284/1, 284/2, 284/3, 284/4 situated  

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in  Tambaram Village,  Chennai,  had  lapsed  and  become  inoperative  and  

consequently, to issue a mandamus, barring the respondents, their men, their  

agents, subordinates, servants or anyone acting under them, from interfering  

in any manner, with the peaceful enjoyment of the properties belonging to  

the appellants, as stipulated in the aforementioned  surveys.   

27. The appellants also filed another writ petition for quashing the orders  

passed in relation to the applications of their predecessors-in-interest with  

respect to re-conveyance of the said land.  The reliefs claimed therein inter-

alia, are as under:   

“Issue a writ  of  Certiorarified Mandamus or any   other  order  or  direction  in  the  nature  of  a  writ  of   Certiorarified  Mandamus  by  calling  for  the  records   comprised  in  the  proceedings  of  the  4th  respondent   bearing Letter No. 2899/LAI(1)/2007-6 dated 7.7.2008   and  quash  the  same  as  illegal  and  unconstitutional   and consequently issue a Writ of Mandamus directing   the  respondents  to  reconvey  the  property  situate  at   Survey No. 283/1 measuring about 0.27 cents, Survey   No.  284/1  measuring  about  0.70  cents,  Survey   No.284/2  measuring  about  0.65  cents  and  Survey   No.284/3  measuring  about  0.64  cents  in  166  of   Tambaram Village, Old State Bank Colony, Saidapet   Taluk,  Chengalpat  District  as  per  the  provisions   contained in Sec.48-B of the Land Acquisition (Tamil   Nadu Amendment) Act 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act of 16 of   1997) and pass such further or other orders as this   Hon'ble Court  may deem fit  and proper in the facts   and  circumstances  of  the  case  and  thus  render   justice.”

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28. It is evident from the relief clauses of the two writ petitions filed by  

the appellants, that the reliefs sought by them are  mutually inconsistent and  

contradictory. In the event that the appellants wanted a declaration to the  

effect  that  the  acquisition  proceedings  in  pursuance  of  issuance  of  the  

Section 4 notification, dated 15.5.1978 had lapsed or were void, the question  

of seeking re-conveyance of  the said land could not  arise.  More so,  it  is  

difficult to understand, how the appellants can claim relief in respect of 9  

survey numbers.  In the present appeals, relief is restricted only to 4 of the  

survey  numbers.   Dr.  A.M.  Singhvi  has  not  pressed  for  the  relief  of  

reconveyance.  However, it is apparent that the appellants’ claim cannot co-

exist and can be said to be blowing hot and blowing cold, simultaneously.

29. In  Cauvery  Coffee  Traders,  Mangalore  v.  Hornor  Resources  

(International)  Company  Limited, (2011)  10  SCC  420,  this  Court  

considered a large number of judgments on the issue of estoppels and held  

as under:  

“A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and   cold”,  “fast  and  loose”  or  “approbate  and   reprobate”.  Where  one  knowingly  accepts  the   benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order,   is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect   on him of such contract or conveyance or order.   This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must   

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not  be  applied  in  a  manner  as  to  violate  the   principles of right and good conscience…..  

……….The doctrine of estoppel by election is   one  of  the  species  of  estoppels  in  pais  (or   equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By   that law, a person may be precluded by his actions   or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak,   from asserting a right which he otherwise would   have had.”

30. In the instant case, the tenure holders/person-interested neither filed  

objections under Section 5-A of the Act, nor have they challenged the land  

acquisition proceedings,  so far as the suit  land is concerned, instead they  

chose to withdraw the compensation awarded in 1983 and 1986; after the  

expiry  of  about  three  decades  and  hence,  they  cannot  be  permitted  to  

challenge  the  acquisition  proceedings  on  any  ground  whatsoever.  The  

appellants cannot claim title/relief better than what the original vendors were  

entitled to.  

31. In fact, the appellants have claimed reliefs in the writ petitions with  

respect to not just the suit land but also in relation to the land which was the  

subject matter of an earlier litigation by their predecessors-in-interest.  We  

fail  to understand for what purpose the relief of quashing the acquisition  

proceedings  has  been  sought  when,  in  respect  of  the  said  land,  the  

proceedings already stood quashed.   

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32. The  High  Court  dealt  with  the  proceeding,  issued  in  RC  No.  

8222/95/F5,  which  is  purported  to  have  been  issued  by  one  K.Muthu,  

Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), and observed that the said proceeding  

itself stood cancelled and somehow a xerox copy of the said proceeding was  

obtained by the appellants and they utilised the same to secure permission  

for sanctioning their plan of construction of flats on the said land.  Thus, the  

appellant have played fraud  upon the authorities in order to obtain the said  

sanction.   Even  as  per  the  RC  No.  8222/95/F5,  it  is  evident  that  the  

possession of the suit land was taken over ages ago and therefore, the said  

suit land was the subject matter of the earlier litigation.  

33. The High Court also recorded findings to the effect that the appellants  

have “managed”, not only to obtain certain orders from the department, but  

have also misused the process of the court to achieve a sinister design. The  

court  further  took note  that  one of  the  appellants  had filed  an  additional  

affidavit  before  the  High Court  in  a  writ  petition  by way  of  which,  had  

attempted to mislead the court through furnishing of false information.

It has even been admitted at the Bar, that the letter dated 7.7.2005  

which was placed on the record by the appellants before the High Court, was  

in fact, a forged document.  

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34. The appellants have not approached the court with clean hands, and  

are therefore, not entitled for any relief. Whenever a person approaches a  

Court  of  Equity,  in  the  exercise  of  its  extraordinary  jurisdiction,  it  is  

expected that he will approach the said court not only with clean hands but  

also with a clean mind, a clean heart and clean objectives. Thus, he who  

seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim “Jure Naturae Aequum Est   

Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem”, means  

that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by causing loss or  

injury  to  another.  (Vide:  The Ramjas Foundation & Ors.  v.  Union of  

India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 852; Nooruddin v. (Dr.) K.L. Anand, (1995)  

1 SCC 242; and Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra &  

Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236).

35. The judicial process cannot become an instrument of oppression or  

abuse,  or a means  in the process of the court to subvert justice,  for the  

reason that the court exercises its jurisdiction, only in furtherance of justice.  

The interests of justice and public interest coalesce, and therefore, they are  

very  often  one  and  the  same.   A  petition  or  an  affidavit  containing  a  

misleading  and/or  an  inaccurate  statement,  only  to  achieve  an  ulterior  

purpose, amounts to an abuse of process of the court.  

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36. In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 114, this Court  

noticed an altogether new creed of litigants, that is, dishonest litigants and  

went  on  to  strongly  deprecate  their  conduct  by  observing  that,  the  truth  

constitutes  an integral  part  of  the justice  delivery system.  The quest  for  

personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not  

hesitate to seek shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of  

facts in the course of court proceedings.  A litigant who attempts to pollute  

the stream of justice, or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted  

hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.  

37. The truth should  be the guiding star  in  the entire  judicial  process.  

“Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest”.  An action  

at law is not a game of chess, therefore, a litigant cannot prevaricate and take  

inconsistent  positions.  It  is  one  of  those  fundamental  principles  of  

jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and candour  in their  

pleadings. (Vide: Ritesh Tewari & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,  

(2010) 10 SCC 677; and Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69).  

38. In  Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack  

de Sequeria (dead), (2012) 5 SCC 370), this Court taking note of its earlier  

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judgment in  Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249  

held:

“False  claims  and  defences  are  really  serious   problems with real estate litigation, predominantly   because of ever-escalating prices of the real estate.   Litigation  pertaining  to  valuable  real  estate   properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants   in the hope that the other party will tire out and   ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge   amount.  This  happens  because  of  the  enormous   delay  in  adjudication  of  cases  in  our  courts.  If   pragmatic approach is adopted, then this problem  can be minimised to a large extent.”

The Court  further  observed that  wrongdoers  must  be  denied  profit  

from  their  frivolous  litigation,  and  that  they  should  be  prevented  from  

introducing  and  relying  upon,  false  pleadings  and  forged  or  fabricated  

documents in the records furnished by them to the court.   

39. In view of the above, the appellants have disentitled themselves for  

any equitable relief.

40. Section 16-A has been added to the Act by the State Amendment Act,  

1996, and the same imposes a complete restriction on the sale of acquired  

land by the tenure holder.  In case the land is transferred in contravention of  

these  provisions,  the  Government  may,  by way of  an  order,  declare  the  

transfer  to  be null  and void,  and on such declaration,  the land shall,  as  

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penalty,  be  forfeited  to,  and  vest  in,  the   Revenue  Department  of  the  

Government,  free from all encumbrances.

In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the sale  

deeds in favour of the appellants are void and unenforceable.

41. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand how the appellants came  

to possess the suit land which had been vested in the State ages ago, in the  

years 1983 and 1986.  Such a course is not possible without the collusion of  

the officers of  the State/Board.

42. After  considering  the  entire  material  on  record,  we  reach  the  

following inescapable conclusions:-

i) The  suit  land  stood  notified  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  as  on  

15.5.1978.   There is  nothing on record to show, nor  have the appellants  

made any pleadings to the effect that, the persons interested at the relevant  

time ever filed any objections whatsoever, in response to the notice issued  

under Section 5-A of the Act.

ii) Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants have filed two writ petitions  

challenging the validity of acquisition of some of their land but they did not  

raise the issue of validity of the acquisition in respect of the suit land.

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iii) Award  no.14/1983  was  made  on  28.6.1983,  in  respect  of  Survey  

Nos.283/1, 284/1 and 284/3.  The amount of compensation, was withdrawn  

by the original  tenure holders/persons-interested,  though of course,  under  

protest, and the same was limited to the extent of quantum of compensation,  

so that they could approach the Collector  for  making a reference  to the  

Court under Section 18 of the Act.   

iv) The  judgment  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  is  subsequent  to  the  

aforesaid  award.   As  the  compensation  related  to  the  land  had  been  

withdrawn,  and  the  land  stood  vested  in  the  State,  free  from  all  

encumbrances, quashing the declaration under Section 6 in cases filed by  

others, would not enure any benefit to the original tenure holders/appellants,  

as has been explained by this Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra), and  

furthermore, even if the declaration stood quashed in toto, it could not save  

the  suit land, as its possession had already been taken over.

v) In the instant  case,  the  High Court  did  not  declare  the  acquisition  

proceedings to be void, or the purpose for which the land had been acquired  

not to be a “public purpose” within the meaning of the Act.  There has also  

been no direction whatsoever, to restore the possession of the said land to  

the tenure holders, upon refund of the compensation amount by them.

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vi)    Another award no.11/1986 in respect of Survey No.284/2 was made on  

14.8.1986. Compensation awarded in relation to the said piece of land was  

withdrawn.  The land thus, vested in the State, free from all encumbrances.    

vii) In the instant case, as the original vendors i.e. vendors of the first sale  

were not vested with any title over the said land, the transfer by them, was  

itself  void  and  all  subsequent  transfers  would  also,  as  a  result,  remain  

ineffective and unenforceable in law.  Therefore, sale deeds executed in the  

years 2004-05 would not confer any title on the appellants.   

viii)     The appellants claimed to have made some enquiries in relation to  

the  acquisition  proceedings  qua  the  suit  land,  to  which  the  competent  

authorities  replied, that the land was free from acquisition proceedings and  

therefore, the appellants proceeded to purchase the said suit land.  The letters  

written by the Authorities dated 4.3.2004, 7.7.2005 and 12.5.2006 do not  

make  any  reference  to  the  present  appellants,  nor  was  any  information  

sought by any of them in this regard.  Some of the said letters had been  

addressed to the original tenure holders and other were merely found to be  

inter-departmental communications.

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ix) Letter  dated  7.7.2005,  filed  by  the  appellants  before  the  Court  is  

admittedly a forged document.

x) So  far  as  the  matter  relating  to  the  proceedings  issued  in  R.C.  

No.8222/95/F-5, it is clearly revealed that the appellants have used unfair  

means to obtain sanction for their plan of construction of flats.

xi) The appellants filed an affidavit before the High Court only to mislead  

the court by furnishing false information.

xii) The  appellants  also  managed  to  obtain  certain  orders  from  the  

Department and further have abused the process of the court.

xiii) The appellants  did neither  approach the  statutory authority  nor  the  

court with clean hands.  

xiv) Compensation  was paid to  the original  tenure holders  in 1983 and  

1986.  The same was refunded by the present appellants in the name of the  

original tenure holders in 2010 i.e. after 27 years, and the same has not been  

accepted by the Board and has been duly returned to the appellants.

xv) The  recommendations  of  the  High  Level  Committee  contained  in  

Annexure-P.11 make it clear that the said Committee was constituted, only  

upon  the  request  of  the  appellants  to  consider  their  grievances.   The  

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recommendations  suggest  that  although  possession  of  the  suit  land  was  

taken, as the land was inaccessible, it remained unutilized for the purpose for  

which it was acquired.  Therefore, reconveyance of the same was suggested.  

xvi) An  application  for  re-conveyance  was  filed  by  the  original  tenure  

holders and their legal heirs, and not by the appellants with respect to the  

said part of the suit land, as is evident from the orders dated 18.12.2007 and  

7.7.2008. The said letters, in fact, were addressed to Tmt. K. Palaniammal,  

Tmt.  Girija,  Tmt.  Nagammal,  Thiru  A.E.  Kothandaraman  Mudaliar,  and  

Thiru M. Mahalingam in response to an application made by them.  

xvii) It  is  evident  from  the  record  that  there  was  no  application  for  

reconveyance of the land in Survey No.284/2, though the appellants have  

sought relief in relation to this land also.

xviii)  The  appellants  filed  applications  for  re-conveyance  through  the  

original tenure holders/legal heirs.  This clearly reveals that the appellants  

themselves had been of the view that the suit land had already vested in the  

State, otherwise there could be no question of re-conveyance.

(xix) The land once vested in the State, free from all encumbrances cannot  

be divested.  

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xx) The  appellants  had  attempted  to  be  succeeded  in  

illegally/unauthorisedly encroaching upon public land, by connivance with  

the officers of the State Govt./Board and raised a huge construction upon the  

said  land,  after  getting the Plan sanctioned from the competent  statutory  

authority.

xxi) The  State/Board  authorities  never  made  an  attempt  to  stop  the  

construction. Nor the Board approached the court to restrain the appellants  

from encroaching upon its land and construction of the flats. Connivance of  

the officers of the Board in the scandal is writ large and does not require any  

proof.   

Facts of the case reveal a very sorry state of affairs as how the public  

property can be looted with the connivance and collusion of the so called  

trustees of the public properties. It reflects on the very bad governance of the  

State authorities.    

43. The aforesaid conclusions do not warrant any relief to the appellants.  

The appeals are dismissed with the costs of Rupees Twenty Five lacs, which  

the appellants are directed to deposit with the Supreme Court Legal Services  

Authority within a period of six weeks.

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44. In addition thereto, the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu is requested to  

examine  the  issues  involved  in  the  case  and  find  out  as  who  were  the  

officials  of  the  State  or  Board  responsible  for  this  loot  of  the  public  

properties and proceed against them in accordance with law. He is further  

directed to ensure eviction of the appellants from the public land forthwith.   

  …………..………………………J.

   (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

       ……….….………………………J.

       (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

New Delhi,  

September 18, 2012

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