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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 919   OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 35974 of 2011)

University of Rajasthan and another ...  Appellants

Versus

Prem Lata Agarwal                                ...Respondent With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 920   OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7156 of 2012)

University of Rajasthan and another ...  Appellants

Versus

Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Kabra                 ...Respondent

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 921    OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 33969 of 2011)

University of Rajasthan and another ...  Appellants

Versus

Dr. Janki D. Moorjani                               ...Respondent

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With

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 922   OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 18020 of 2012)

University of Rajasthan ... Appellant

Versus

Dr. B.K. Joshi                                ...Respondent

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 923   OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 20637 of 2012)

University of Rajasthan and another ...  Appellants

Versus

Dr. M.C. Goyal                                ...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

2. The controversy that arises for consideration in this  

batch  of  appeals  is  whether  the  respondents,  who  

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were  appointed  to  the  teaching  post,  namely,  

Assistant  Professors/Lecturers  in  different  subjects  

and continued as such for more than two decades,  

would be entitled to get the benefit of pension under  

the University  Pension Regulations,  1990 (for  short  

“the  Regulations”)  framed  by  the  University  of  

Rajasthan  which  came  into  force  with  effect  from  

1.1.1990,  regard  being  had  to  the  language  

employed in Regulation 2 that deals with the scope  

and  application  of  the  Regulations  read  with  

Regulations 22 and 23 that stipulates the conditions  

of  qualifying  service  and  the  period  that  is  to  be  

counted towards pension in addition to the fact that  

the University had accepted the contribution to the  

Pension Fund as defined in Regulation 3(5), despite  

the stand and stance put forth by the University that  

the respondents were not regularly appointed to the  

posts in question in accordance with the provisions  

contained  in  Section  3(3)  of  the  Rajasthan  

Universities’  Teachers  and  Officers  (Selection  for  

Appointment) Act, 1974 (for brevity “the Act”) and,  

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hence, are not entitled to the benefit provided under  

the Regulations.

3. Be it noted, as the main judgment was rendered in  

the case of Prem Lata Agarwal, we shall refer to the  

facts adumbrated therein.  However, the initial dates  

of appointment and the dates of superannuation in  

case  of  every  respondent  as  the  same  would  be  

relevant  in  the  course  of  delineation  of  the  lis  in  

question  are  stated  herein.   Prem  Lata  Agarwal,  

Vijaya Kabra, Janki D. Moorjani,  B.K. Joshi and M.C.  

Goyal,  the  respondents  herein,  were  appointed  on  

5.1.1981,  22.8.1984,  20.8.1985,  16.5.1978  and  

5.8.1983  and  stood  superannuated  on  31.3.2001,  

31.8.2007,  30.6.2007,  31.1.2002  and  30.11.2007  

respectively.   Respondent-Prem  Lata  Agarwal  and  

some others were appointed vide Office Order dated  

5.1.1981 by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of power  

vested in him for making the stop gap arrangement  

under Section 3(3) of the Act as Assistant Professors  

(Lecturers) in the subject of Chemistry.  It was clearly  

mentioned in the letter of appointment that it was ad  

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hoc  in  nature  and  it  would  continue  upto  the  last  

working day of the current academic session or till  

further  orders,  whichever  was  earlier.   The  

respondent and others were allowed to continue on  

the basis of the appointment letters issued from time  

to time.  It  may be noted that their  services were  

terminated every year and fresh appointment orders  

were  issued.   In  this  manner,  the  respondent  was  

allowed to continue upto 31.7.1988.

4. At that juncture, the ad hoc teachers had invoked the  

jurisdiction of the High Court seeking a mandamus  

for the regularization of the services but such a relief  

was  declined.   S.L.P.  No.  18993  of  1991  was  

preferred  wherein  two  questions  were  raised,  

namely, (i)  whether a lecturer duly selected by the  

selection committee for being appointed temporarily  

should automatically be confirmed on the post which  

he was holding for  the past  7  years on temporary  

basis  after  being  selected  by  a  duly  constituted  

selection committee under the provisions of the Act  

and approved by the syndicate of the university; and  

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(ii)  whether  apart  from  the  considerations  of  

selection by the selection committee, did a lecturer  

teaching  for  the  past  7  years  acquire  a  right  to  

continue on that post.  This Court vide order dated  

20th April,  1992,  dismissed  the  said  special  leave  

petition.   Though  the  special  leave  petition  was  

dismissed and their right to be regularized was not  

accepted by this Court, yet they continued in service  

as  the  orders  of  termination  could  not  be  

implemented.   It  is  worth  noticing  that  another  

petition  by  ad  hoc  appointees  was  filed  in  1985  

before  the  High  Court  wherein  they  claimed  equal  

pay  on  the  foundation  of  parity  with  the  regularly  

appointed Assistant Lecturers.  The High Court, vide  

order dated 1.3.1986, passed the following order:-

“Consequently,  this  special  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  order  dated  8.03.1995  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  is  hereby  set  aside  and  accordingly  it  is  declared that the appellants who have been  appointed on honorarium basis to cover the  uncovered  load  of  the  respective  departments  are  entitled  to  the  salary  equivalent to the minimum of the pay scale  of  the  regularly  appointed  lecturer  of  the  Rajasthan  University  from  today.   The  respondents  are  also  restrained  from  

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discontinuing services of the appellants till  regular  appointments  to  the  post  of  lecturers are made in accordance with law.  The  respondents  shall  be  at  liberty  to  assign the work to the appellants, which is  assigned  to  the  regularly  appointed  lecturers.”

5. The university, being grieved by the aforesaid order,  

preferred Special Leave Petition No. 13 of 1998 and  

number  of  S.L.Ps.  wherein  this  Court  passed  the  

following order:-

“The special leave petitions are dismissed.  It  is  clarified  that  the  continuation  of  the  respondents  shall  be  only  till  regular  selections  are  made  and  it  is  upto  the  University  to  take  expeditious  steps  for  making regular selections.”

6. In view of the aforesaid order, the teachers were paid  

salary  equivalent  to  the  minimum  pay  scale  of  

regularly  appointed  teachers  and  continued  in  

service  due  to  various  orders  of  the  High  Court  

passed from time to time.  The university, despite its  

best efforts, could not obtain the permission of the  

State  Government  to  fill  up  the  vacant  posts  on  

regular basis as various litigations were continuing in  

the  Court  at  various  stages  as  a  consequence  of  

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which  the  respondent  and  her  likes  continued  in  

service.

7. It is apt to note here that the university brought the  

regulations which came into force with effect  from  

1.1.1990.  After the regulations came into force, the  

respondent  gave  her  option  for  the  purpose  of  

availing the benefit of pension and, thereafter, there  

was  deduction  from  her  salary  in  view  of  the  

postulates  in  the  regulations  till  her  date  of  

retirement, i.e., 31.3.2001.   

8. It  is  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  the  Rajasthan  

Universities’  Teachers  (Absorption  of  Temporary  

Teachers)  Ordinance,  2008  (3  of  2008)  was  made  

and promulgated by the Governor with a purpose of  

providing absorption of temporary teachers of long  

standing,  working  in  the  universities  of  Rajasthan.  

After the said regulations came into existence on 12th  

June,  2008,  the  respondent  preferred  Writ  Petition  

No.  2740 of  2010 putting forth  the grievance that  

pensionary  benefits  had  been  denied  to  her  after  

retirement.  The learned Single Judge referred to the  

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regulations and took note of the fact that she had  

continued in service for a period of 20 years and her  

option  for  grant  of  pension  was  accepted  by  the  

university  and  pursuant  to  such  acceptance  they  

deposited  their  contribution  and,  hence,  the  

university  was  estopped  to  take  a  somersault  the  

stand that she was not entitled to receive pension  

under  the  Regulations  of  1990.   That  apart,  the  

learned single Judge opined that the nature of her  

appointment  could  not  be  treated  as  ad  hoc  and  

temporary, regard being had to the length of service.  

Being of this view, he allowed the writ petition and  

directed the pensionary benefits be extended to her  

within a period of three months after completing the  

formalities.         

9. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, the university  

preferred Special Appeal (Writ) No. 292 of 2011.  The  

Division  Bench,  after  adverting  to  the  facts  and  

referring to various regulations and the provisions of  

the Act, came to hold that the action of the university  

was  wholly  unjustified  and  arbitrary.   The  said  

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conclusion of the Division Bench was founded on the  

base  that  there  was  default  on  the  part  of  the  

university in not appointing even a single person in  

the  service  of  the  universities  of  Rajasthan  in  a  

regular manner for a long period; that the university  

had invited the teachers to give their option and they  

deposited  their  contribution  in  the  C.P.F.  in  the  

pension  scheme;  that  the  appointments  of  the  

teachers were not in contravention of the provisions  

of  the  Act;  and  that  they  were  deemed  to  be  

confirmed  in  view  of  the  provisions  contained  in  

Regulation 23 of the Regulations.  After arriving at  

the said conclusions, the Division Bench adverted to  

the issue whether the teachers were entitled for the  

pensionary benefits in terms of the regulations and  

eventually,  interpreting the regulations and placing  

reliance on the authorities in S.B. Patwardhan and  

another  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  and others1,  

D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India and  

others2 and paragraph 53 of the pronouncement in  

Secretary,  State  of  Karnataka  and  others  v.  1 AIR 1977 SC 2051 2 (1983) 1 SCC 305

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Uma Devi (3) and others3, came to hold that the  

appointments were made following due procedure of  

law and further the teachers, having been appointed  

in the cadre of substantive posts, could not be denied  

the pensionary benefits under the regulations.  Being  

grieved, the University is in appeal by way of Special  

Leave Petitions.

10. We have heard Mr.  Manoj  Swarup,  learned counsel  

for the appellants,  Mr.  S.K. Keshote,  learned senior  

counsel for the respondents in Civil  Appeals arising  

out Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 35974 of 2011  

and  18020  of  2012,  Dr.  Manish  Singhvi,  learned  

Additional  Advocate General  for  the State,  and Mr.  

Sushil  Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents in Civil Appeals arising out Special Leave  

Petitions (C) Nos. 33969 of 2011 and 20637 of 2012.

11. Before we proceed to scrutinize the defensibility of  

the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  it  is  apposite  to  

survey the scheme of the Act and the regulations.  

Section 3(3) of the Act, as it  stood at the relevant  

3 (2006) 4 SCC 1

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time, being of immense signification, is reproduced  

in entirety hereinbelow: -

“3. Restrictions  on  appointments  of  teachers  and  officers.  –  (1)  Notwithstanding any thing contained in the  relevant law, as from the commencement  of this Act, no teacher and no officer in any  university in Rajasthan shall be appointed  except  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Selection  Committee  constituted  under  Section 4.

2. Save  as  otherwise  provided  in  sub- section  (3),  every  appointment  of  a  teacher or of an officer in any University  made in  contravention  of  sub-section  (1)  shall be null and void.

3. Nothing herein contained shall  apply  to  the  appointment  of  a  teacher  or  an  officer  as  a  stop-gap  arrangement  for  a  period  not  exceeding  one year  or  to  the  appointment of a part-time teacher or of a  teacher  or  officer  in  the  pay scale  lower  than that of Lecturer or Assistant Registrar  respectively.

Explanation: The expression “appointed”  in  sub-section  (1)  shall  mean  appointed  initially  and  not  appointed  by  way  of  promotion.”

12. Section  4  at  the  relevant  time  pertained  to  the  

constitution  of  Selection  Committees.   It  read  as  

follows:-

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“4.  Constitution  of  selection  committees. – (1) For every selection of a  teacher  or  of  an  officer  in  a  University,  there  shall  be  constituted  a  committee  consisting of the following: -

(i) Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University  concerned,  who  shall  be  the  Chairman of the committee;

(ii) an  eminent  educationist  to  be  nominated  by  the  Chancellor  for  a  period of one year;

(iii) an  eminent  educationist  to  be  nominated by the State Government  for a period of one year;

(iv) one member of  the Syndicate to be  nominated by the State Government  for a period of one year; and

(v) such  other  persons  as  members  specified in column 2 of the Schedule  for the selection of the teachers and  officers  mentioned  in  column  1  thereof:

Provided that where the appointment of a  teacher is to be made in the faculty of  agriculture in any University or in any  University-College  imparting  instruction  of  guiding  research  in  agriculture  there  shall  be  one  more  expert  to  be  nominated  by  the  Syndicate  out  of  a  panel  of  names  recommended by  the  Indian  Council  of Agriculture Research:

Provided  further  that  the  Selection  Committee for  teaching posts in the  faculty of engineering and technology  shall  also  include  an  expert  to  be  nominated by the Syndicate out of a  

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panel of names recommended by the  All  India  Council  of  Technical  Education.

(2) The eminent educationists nominated  under  clause  (ii)  and  clause  (iii)  of  sub- section  (1)  and  the  member  of  the  Syndicate nominated under clause (iv)  of  the said sub-section shall  be members of  every  Selection  Committee  constituted  during  the  course  of  one  year  from  the  date of his nomination:

Provided  that  the  member  for  a  Selection  Committee  nominated  under  clauses (ii),  (iii)  or  (iv)  of  sub-section (1)  shall continue to be the member of every  Selection Committee even after the expiry  of  his  term  until  a  fresh  nomination  is  made  by  the  Chancellor  or,  as  the  case  may be, by the State Government subject,  however,  that  fresh  nomination  of  such  member for Selection Committee shall be  made within a period not exceeding three  months from the date of expiry of his term.

(3) No  person  shall  be  eligible  to  be  nominated as an expert on any Selection  Committee in any one year if he has been  a  member  of  any  two  Selection  Committees during the course of the same  year.”

13. Section 5 of the Act at the time of appointment dealt  

with the procedure of Selection Committee.  It was as  

follows: -

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“5. Procedure  of  Selection  Committee –  (1)  The  Syndicate  of  the  University  concerned  shall  prescribe,  by  rules,  the  quorum  required  for  the  meeting  of  a  selection  committee  required  to  be  constituted under section 4 which shall not  be less than one-half  of  the members  of  each selection committee.

(2). The selection  committee  shall  make  its recommendations to the Syndicate.  If  the  Syndicate  disapproves  the  recommendations  of  the  selection  committee,  the  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University  concerned  shall  submit  such  recommendations  alongwith  reasons  for  disapproval given by the syndicate to the  Chancellor  for  his  consideration  and  the  decision of the chancellor thereon shall be  final.

(3) Every  selection  committee  shall  be  bound  by  the  qualifications  laid  down  in  the  relevant  law  of  the  University  concerned for the post of a teacher or, as  the case may be, of an officer.”

14. We  may  note  with  profit  that  the  1974  Act  was  

amended by Act No. 24 of 1976 and Act No. 18 of  

1984  and  afterwards,  many  insertions  were  made.  

We have reproduced the provisions after  the 1976  

Act  was  brought  into  existence.   Section  4  which  

dealt  with  the  constitution  of  selection  committee  

was renumbered by Act No. 18 of 1984 as Section 5  

and  Section  5  which  dealt  with  the  procedure  of  

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selection committee was amended by Act No.  9 of  

1977 and Act No. 18 of 1984 and was renumbered as  

Section 6.  Certain amendments were carried out in  

the said provision by which the quorum required for  

the  selection  committee  was  changed  and  sub-

section  (4)  was  added  on  15.11.1984.   For  proper  

appreciation, we reproduce the said sub-section (4): -

“(4) The  Selection  Committee,  while  making  its  recommendations  to  the  Syndicate  under  sub-section  (2)  shall  prepare a list of candidates selected by it  in order of merit and shall further prepare  a reserve list in the same order and to the  extent of 50% of the vacancies in the posts  of  teachers  or  officers  for  which  the  Selection  Committee  was  constituted  under sub-section (1) of Section 5 and shall  forward  the  main  list  in  the  reserve  list  along  with  its  recommendations  to  the  Syndicate.”

15. Presently, we shall refer to the relevant regulations.  

Regulation  2  that  deals  with  the  scope  and  

application reads as follows:-

“Reg. 2 : Scope and Application :

(i) These  regulations  shall  apply  to  all  persons  regularly  appointed  to  the  service of the University of Rajasthan  on or after 1.1.1990.

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(ii) These regulations  shall  also  apply  to  all existing employees – both teaching  and non-teaching- who opt for pension  scheme under these regulations within  the  period  specified  in  Reg.  4  for  exercising  option.  In  case  of  employees who do not exercise option  within  the specified period,  it  will  be  deemed that the concerned employee  has  opted  for  the  pension  scheme  under these regulations.  

Provided  that  these  regulations  shall  not  apply to :

(a) Persons  employed  on  contract  or  part-time basis,

(b) Persons  on  deputation  to  the  University.

(c) Purely  temporary  and  daily  wages  staff.

(d)     Re-employed pensioners.”

Thus,  from the aforesaid,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  

regulations are only applicable to the persons who have  

been regularly appointed and do not take in its sweep the  

persons  employed  on  contract  or  part-time  basis  and  

purely temporary and daily wages staff.

16. Regulation  3(5)  defines  ‘pension  fund’.   It  is  as  follows:-

“Reg. 3(5) “Pension Fund” means the fund  created for the purpose of transferring the  total  accumulated  amount  of  University  

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contribution in C.P.F. (including the amount  of loan taken out of it) and interest thereon  as  on  date  of  commencement  of  these  regulations and monthly contribution made  thereafter  in  respect  of  such  employees  who opted or are deemed to have opted the  pension  scheme  under  these  regulations.  The pension paid to the retired employees  shall be charged to this Fund.”  

17. Regulation 4 deals with the exercise of option.  The  

relevant  part  of  the  said  regulation  is  reproduced  

below:-

“Reg. 4 : Exercise of Option :

All existing employees who were in service  on  1.1.1990  shall  have  to  exercise  their  option  in  writing,  either  for  the  pension  scheme  under  these  regulations  or  for  continuance  under  the  existing  C.P.F.  Scheme, within 3 months from the date of  notification  of  these  regulations  and  shall  submit  the  same  to  the  Comptroller  of  Finance/Finance  Officer  in  the  prescribed  form.”

18. Be  it  noted,  though  there  are  three  provisos  to  

regulation 4, yet the same need not be referred to as  

they are  not  necessary  for  the adjudication of  the  

present case.

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19. Regulation 22 provides for  calculation of qualifying  

service.  It reads as follows:-

“Reg.  22 :   Conditions  of  Qualifying  Service:

The service of an employee does not  qualify  for  pension  unless  it  conforms  to  the following conditions: (1)  It  is  a  paid  service  of  a  regularly  

appointed  employee  under  the  University.

(2) The  employment  is  in  substantive,  temporary or officiating capacity.”  

20. Regulation 23 which has been taken aid of by the  

High Court to confer the benefit  of pension on the  

respondent is as follows: -

“Reg. 23:

(a) The  service  of  an  employee  transferred  from  a  temporary  to  permanent post shall be counted, if the  post was at first created experimentally  or temporarily.

(b) The  officiating  services  of  an  employee,  without  a  substantive  appointment, in a post which is vacant  or  the  permanent  incumbent  of  which  does not  draw any  part  of  the  pay or  count service, shall be counted if he is  confirmed  without  interruption  in  his  service.”

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21. Regulation 47 provides for  creation of  the pension  

fund.  It is as under:-

“Reg 47 : Creation of the Pension Fund :

In case of all such employees who opt for  the pension scheme and are governed under  these  regulations,  the  total  accumulated  amount  of  University  contribution  in  C.P.F.  (including the amount of loan taken out of it)  and interest there on as on 1st January 1990  will be transferred to the pension fund created  under  these  regulations.   Thereafter,  the  University’s  share of  monthly contribution in  respect  of  all  such  employees,  as  aforesaid  will  be  deposited  in  the  pension  fund every  month latest by 10th of the next month.”   

22. On a studied scrutiny, it is found that the High Court  

has placed reliance on Section 3(3) of the Act and  

the  regulations  which  we  have  reproduced  

hereinabove  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the  

respondents were entitled to be treated as regular  

teachers and, therefore, it was obligatory on the part  

of  the University  to extend the benefit  of  pension.  

The provisions of the Act,  when read in  a conjoint  

manner, make it crystal clear that the legislature had  

imposed  restrictions  on  the  appointment,  provided  

for the constitution of Selection Committee and also  

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laid down the procedure of the said committees.  The  

intention of the legislature is, as it seems to us, to  

have  teachers  appointed  on  the  basis  of  merit,  

regard  being  had  to  transparency,  fairness,  

impartiality and total objectivity.  Under sub-section  

(2),  it  has  been  clearly  postulated  that  any  

appointment  made barring  the  arrangement  under  

sub-section (3) of Section 3 would be null and void.  

The language is clear and categorical.  The exception  

that had been carved out under Section 3(3) is for an  

extremely  limited  purpose.   It  permits  stop-gap  

arrangements and only covers ad hoc or  part-time  

teachers  with  a  small  duration.   It  is  intended  to  

serve the purpose of meeting the situation where an  

emergency occurs.  It was never intended to clothe  

any  authority  with  the  power  to  make  any  

appointment beyond what is prescribed therein.  The  

scheme of the aforesaid provisions go a long way to  

show that the legislature, in fact, had taken immense  

care to see that no one gets a back door entry and  

the  selections  are  made  in  a  seemly  manner.   A  

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proper  schematic  analysis  of  the  provisions  

enumerated hereinabove do not envisage any kind of  

ad  hoc  appointment  or  part-time  appointment  to  

remain in continuance.  As is demonstrable from the  

factual depiction in the present batch of cases, some  

of the respondents continued with certain breaks and  

also due to intervention of the court.  That apart, this  

Court  had  not  acceded  to  their  prayer  of  

regularization.  The only direction that was issued in  

Special Leave Petition (c) No. 3238 of 1997 and other  

connected matters, was that they would continue in  

service till  the regular selections were made.  It  is  

noteworthy that a distinction has to be made and we  

are  obliged  to  do  so  because  of  the  language  

employed  in  the  provisions  between  a  regular  

teacher and an ad hoc teacher or a part-time teacher  

who continues to work in the post sometimes due to  

fortuitous circumstances and sometimes due to the  

interdiction by the court.   Their initial  appointment  

could be regarded as legal for the limited purposes of  

Section 3(3) of the Act.  That would only protect the  

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period fixed therein.  Thereafter, they could not have  

been allowed to continue, as it was only a stop gap  

arrangement  and  was  bound  to  be  so  under  the  

statutory scheme.  Their continuance thereafter by  

operation of law has to be regarded as null and void  

regard  being  had  to  the  language  employed  in  

Section 3(2) of the Act.   

23. Be it stated, the High Court has placed reliance on  

Section 3(3) to come to the conclusion that as they  

were  appointed  legally,  they  are  entitled  to  be  

regularized  in  terms  of  paragraph  53  of  the  

pronouncement  in  Uma Devi  (supra).   Before  we  

proceed  to  deal  with  the  question  whether  the  

protection  granted  to  certain  employees  in  

paragraph  53  in  Uma  Devi (supra)  would  be  

applicable  to  the  present  case  or  not,  we  think  it  

appropriate to refer to certain authorities in the field.

24. In  University  of  Kashmir  and  others  v.  Dr.   

Mohd.  Yasin  and  others4, the  question  arose  

whether  the  continuance  of  a  lecturer  made  in  

4 (1974) 3 SCC 546

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violation  of  the  ordinance  of  the  university  would  

confer any right on him solely on the ground that he  

had  de facto continued subsequent to the statutory  

cessation  of  office  and  whether  the  principle  of  

implied employment could be attracted.  The Court,  

after  referring  to  the  powers  and  duties  and  the  

canalisation by the statutory body like the University,  

came to hold that when the selection committee had  

not  considered  or  recommended  the  respondent  

therein for appointment and there was no suggestion  

that the university council appointed the respondent  

to the post of Professor, regard being had to the said  

fact situation, the ad hoc arrangement by which the  

respondent therein remained to teach did not acquire  

any legal validity because the Vice-Chancellor went  

through the irregular exercise of extending his period  

of probation.  We think it apt to quote an instructive  

passage from the said judgment: -

“When a statute creates a body and vests it  with authority and circumscribes its powers  by  specifying  limitations,  the  doctrine  of  implied engagement de hors the provisions  and  powers  under  the  Act  would  be  subversive  of  the  statutory  scheme  

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regarding  appointments  of  officers  and  cannot  be  countenanced  by  the  Court.  Power in this case has been vested in the  University Council only and the manner of  its  exercise  has  been  carefully  regulated.  Therefore,  the  appointment  of  the  respondent  could  be  made  only  by  the  Council and only in the mode prescribed by  the  statute.  If  a  Vice-Chancellor  by  administrative  drift  allows  such  employment it cannot be validated on any  theory  of  factum  valet.  We  cannot  countenance the alleged continuance of the  respondent  in  the  University  campus  as  tantamount  to  regular  service  under  the  University with the sanction of law. In short,  the  respondent  has  no  presentable  case  against the direction to quit.”

25. In  Anuradha  Mukherjee  (Smt)  and  others  v.  

Union  of  India  and  others5,  this  Court,  while  

dealing with the issue of seniority, opined that when  

an  employee  is  appointed  de  hors the  Rules,  he  

cannot  get  seniority  from  the  date  of  his  initial  

appointment  but  from  the  date  on  which  he  is  

actually selected and appointed in accordance with  

the Rules.

26. In  State  of  Haryana  v.  Haryana  Veterinary  &  

AHTS  Association  and  another6,  while  dealing  

5 (1996) 9 SCC 59 6 (2000) 8 SCC 4

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with the issue of regular service under the Haryana  

Service  of  Engineers,  Class  II,  Public  Works  

Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1970, a three-

Judge Bench observed that under the Scheme of the  

said Rules, the service rendered on ad hoc basis or  

stop-gap  arrangement  could  not  be  held  to  be  

regular service for grant of revised scale of pay.

27. In  R.S. Garg  v.  State of U.P. and others7, while  

dealing with the concept of recruitment,  this Court  

has  categorically  laid  down  that  the  expression  

“recruitment” would mean recruitment in accordance  

with the Rules and not  dehors the same and if  an  

appointment is made  dehors the Rules, it is not an  

appointment in the eye of law.

28. Coming back to the decision in  Uma Devi (supra),  

the  Constitution  Bench,  after  survey  of  all  the  

decisions in the field relating to recruitment process  

and the claim for regularization, in paragraph 43, has  

held  that  consistent  with  the  scheme  for  public  

employment, it is the duty of the court to necessarily  

7 (2006) 6 SCC 430

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hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the  

relevant rules, the same would not confer any right  

on the appointee.  The Bench further proceeded to  

state that merely because a temporary employee or  

a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond  

the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled  

to  be  absorbed  in  regular  service  or  made  

permanent,  merely  on  the  strength  of  such  

continuance,  if  the  original  appointment  was  not  

made  by  following  a  due  process  of  selection  as  

envisaged by the relevant rules.  After so stating, it  

has  been  further  ruled  that  merely  because  an  

employee had continued under cover of an order of  

the court, he would not be entitled to any right to be  

absorbed or made permanent in service.

29. It is worthy to note that while repelling the contention  

pertaining to the legitimate expectation of a person  

to be regularized, the Court held that when a person  

enters a temporary employment or gets engagement  

as  a  contractual  or  casual  worker  and  the  

engagement is  not  based on a proper selection as  

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recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is  

aware of the consequences of the appointment being  

temporary, casual or contractual in nature.  Such a  

person  cannot  invoke  the  theory  of  legitimate  

expectation for being confirmed in the post when an  

appointment  to  the  post  could  be  made  only  by  

following a proper procedure.

30. The  Court,  eventually,  in  paragraph  53,  issued  

certain  directions  relating  to  regularization  of  

irregular appointments.  We think it apt to reproduce  

the relevant part from the said paragraph: -

“One aspect  needs to  be clarified.  There  may  be  cases  where  irregular  appointments (not illegal appointments) as  explained  in  State  of  Mysore  v.  S.V.  Narayanappa8,  R.N.  Nanjundappa v.  T.  Thimmiah9 and B.N. Nagarajan v.  State of  Karnataka10 and  referred  to  in  para  15  above,  of  duly  qualified  persons  in  duly  sanctioned vacant posts might have been  made and the employees have continued  to work for ten years or more but without  the intervention of orders of the courts or  of tribunals. The question of regularisation  of  the  services  of  such  employees  may  have  to  be  considered  on  merits  in  the  light of the principles settled by this Court  

8 (1967) 1 SCR 128 9 (1972) 1 SCC 409 10 (1979) 4 SCC 507

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in  the cases abovereferred to and in the  light of this judgment. In that context, the  Union of India, the State Governments and  their instrumentalities should take steps to  regularise  as  a  one-time  measure,  the  services of such irregularly appointed, who  have worked for ten years or more in duly  sanctioned  posts  but  not  under  cover  of  orders  of  the  courts  or  of  tribunals  and  should  further  ensure  that  regular  recruitments  are  undertaken  to  fill  those  vacant sanctioned posts that require to be  filled  up,  in  cases  where  temporary  employees or daily wagers are being now  employed.”  

31. To  appreciate  what  has  been  stated  in  the  said  

paragraph, it is imperative to refer to paragraph 15  

of the judgment wherein it has been held thus: -

“Even at the threshold, it is necessary to  keep  in  mind  the  distinction  between  regularisation  and  conferment  of  permanence  in  service  jurisprudence.  In  State of Mysore v.  S.V. Narayanappa this  Court stated that it was a misconception to  consider  that  regularisation  meant  permanence.  In  R.N.  Nanjundappa v.  T.  Thimmiah this  Court  dealt  with  an  argument that regularisation would mean  conferring  the  quality  of  permanence  on  the appointment.  This Court stated: (SCC  pp. 416-17, para 26)

“Counsel on behalf of the respondent  contended  that  regularisation  would  mean  conferring  the  quality  of  permanence  on  the  appointment  whereas  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  

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State  contended  that  regularisation  did not mean permanence but that it  was  a  case  of  regularisation  of  the  rules  under  Article  309.  Both  the  contentions  are  fallacious.  If  the  appointment  itself  is  in  infraction  of  the rules or if it is in violation of the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  illegality  cannot  be  regularised.  Ratification  or  regularisation  is  possible of an act which is within the  power and province of  the authority  but  there  has  been  some  non- compliance with procedure or manner  which does not go to the root of the  appointment.  Regularisation  cannot  be said to be a mode of recruitment.  To accede to such a proposition would  be  to  introduce  a  new  head  of  appointment in defiance of rules or it  may  have  the  effect  of  setting  at  naught the rules”.”

32. From the aforesaid delineation, it is quite vivid that  

the Constitution Bench made a distinction between  

an illegal appointment and an irregular appointment  

and for  the said purpose, as noted above, reliance  

was placed on the earlier decision in  T. Thimmiah  

(supra) which makes a distinction between the power  

of ratification which is possible within the power of  

the  authority  and  some  non-compliance  with  the  

procedure or the manner which does not go to the  

root of the appointment.

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33. We have already analysed the scheme of Section 3  

and  stated  that  there  could  not  have  been  

continuance of the service after the fixed duration as  

provided  under  Section  3(3)  of  the  Act  and  such  

continuance is to be treated as null and void.  That is  

how the Act operates in the field.  That apart, regular  

selection was required to be made by a High Powered  

Committee as provided under Section 4.  It  is also  

pertinent  to  state  that  the  Act  lays  down  the  

procedure of the selection committee not leaving it  

to  any  authority  to  provide  the  same  by  rules  or  

regulations.

34. In view of the aforesaid, the irresistible conclusion is  

that the continuance after the fixed duration goes to  

the root of the matter.  That apart, the teachers were  

allowed  to  continue  under  certain  compelling  

circumstances and by interdiction by courts.  Quite  

apart  from the  above,  this  Court  had  categorically  

declined to accede to the prayer for regularization.  

In such a situation, we are afraid that the reliance  

placed  by  the  High  Court  on  paragraph  53  of  the  

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pronouncement in Uma Devi (supra) can be said to  

be justified.  In this regard, another aspect, though  

an ancillary one, may be worth noting.  Prem Lata  

Agarwal and B.K. Joshi had retired on 31.3.2001 and  

31.1.2002,  and by no stretch of  imagination,  Uma  

Devi (supra)  lays  down  that  the  cases  of  any  

category  of  appointees  who  had  retired  could  be  

regularized.  We may repeat at the cost of repetition  

that  the  protection  carved  out  in  paragraph  53  in  

Uma  Devi (supra)  could  not  be  extended  to  the  

respondents basically for three reasons, namely, (i)  

that the continuance of appointment after the fixed  

duration was null  and void by operation of law; (ii)  

that  the  respondent  continued  in  the  post  by  

intervention of the court; and (iii) that this Court had  

declined to regularize their services in 1998.

35. Though we have dealt with the statutory scheme, yet  

as  the  High  Court  has  heavily  relied  on  various  

regulations to extend the benefit, we think it seemly  

to advert to the approach of the High Court to find  

out  whether  it  has  appositely  appreciated  the  

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purpose and purport  of  the  regulations.   The High  

Court,  as is  manifest  from the orders,  has made a  

distinction  between  a  permanent  employee  and  

purely  temporary  appointee and observed that  the  

services of the respondent could not be termed to be  

purely temporary or daily wages.  In that context, it  

has referred to Regulation 22 which uses the words  

“regularly appointed employee”.  We may reproduce  

the said part of the ratiocination:-

“Regulation 2(ii) is applicable to all existing  employees  except  the  persons appointed  on contract or part time basis; persons on  deputation;  purely  temporary  and  daily  wages staff; and re-employed pensioners.  The case of the petitioners is not covered  under any of the aforesaid four categories.  Even  otherwise,  it  cannot  be  said  that  appointments of the petitioners were made  as  stop  gap  arrangements.   They  have  continued for more than two decades and  therefore,  they cannot in any manner be  termed as  “purely  temporary”.   Also  the  word  “purely  temporary”  contained  in  regulation 2(ii)(c) is used in company with  daily wages staff and there is distinction in  concept  of  purely  temporary  and  temporary as provided in regulation 2 and  22  of  the  pension  scheme  purely  temporary  is  not  covered  whereas  temporary  or  officiating  appointment  is  

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covered under the purview of the pension  regulation.”

36. The aforesaid analysis, according to us, is not correct  

inasmuch  as  the  regulations  do  not  take  in  their  

sweep an employee who is not regularly appointed.  

The  distinction  between  temporary  and  purely  

temporary,  as  made  by  the  High  Court,  does  not  

commend acceptance as there is an inherent fallacy  

in  the  same  inasmuch  as  Regulation  2(i)  clearly  

provides “regularly  appointed to the service of  the  

University” which has been reiterated in Regulation  

22.   In  fact,  as  we  perceive,  the  High  Court  has  

proceeded on the basis that their services have to be  

treated as regular.  Once it is not regular service, the  

infrastructure collapses as a consequence of  which  

the superstructure is bound to founder and, hence,  

the distinction made by the High Court is flawed.   

37. The  High  Court,  as  has  been  stated  earlier,  has  

pressed into service Regulation 23 and relying on the  

same,  it  has  held  that  the  services  of  the  

respondents  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  

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confirmed as in the instant cases the University has  

never  opined  that  their  services  were  not  

satisfactory.   The  language  of  Regulation  23  is  

couched  in  a  different  manner.   It  fundamentally  

deals with the computation of the period of service of  

an employee.  That apart, Regulation 23(b) uses the  

words “if he is confirmed”.  It is a conditional one and  

it relates to officiating services.  Both the concepts  

have their own significance in service jurisprudence.  

The respondents were not in the officiating service  

and by no stretch of  imagination,  they could  have  

been treated to be confirmed because the words “if  

he is  confirmed” required an affirmative fact to be  

done by the University.  The High Court, as we find,  

has applied the doctrine of deemed confirmation to  

the  case  at  hand  which  is  impermissible.   In  this  

context, we may, with profit, refer to the decision in  

Head  Master,  Lawrence  School,  Lovedale  v.  

Jayanthi Raghu and another11 wherein it has been  

ruled thus: -

11 (2012) 4 SCC 793

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“A confirmation,  as is  demonstrable from  the language employed in the Rule, does  not  occur  with  efflux  of  time.   As  it  is  hedged by  a  condition,  an  affirmative  or  positive  act  is  the  requisite  by  the  employer.   In  our  considered opinion,  an  order  of  confirmation  is  required  to  be  passed.”

Thus  analyzed,  the  conclusion  of  the  High  Court  

which also rests on the interpretation of the regulations  

does not commend acceptation.

38. Consequently,  the  appeals  are  allowed  and  the  

orders  passed  by  the  High  Court  are  set  aside.  

However, if any amount has been paid on any count  

to any of the respondents in the appeals pursuant to  

the orders passed by the High Court, the same shall  

not  be recovered on any count.  There shall  be no  

order as to costs.

……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

……………………………….J.                                            [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;

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February 05, 2013   

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