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REPORTABLE

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 739 OF 2012                            

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7944 OF 2010

Union of India         ....   Petitioner(s)

Versus

Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors.              ....   Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) This review petition has been filed by the Union of India,  

Ministry of Mines, seeking review of the judgment and order  

dated  13.09.2010 passed in  Sandur Manganese & Iron  

Ores Ltd. vs.  State of Karnataka & Others, 2010 (13)  

SCC 1 (Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2010 and Civil Appeal Nos.  

7945-54 and 7955-61 of 2010).  

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2) In  Sandur (supra), this Court had interpreted various  

provisions  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals  (Development  and  

Regulation)  Act,  1957  (in  short  “the  MMDR Act”)  and  the  

Mineral  Concession Rules,  1960 (in  short  “the  MC Rules”)  

framed  thereunder.   It  is  the  grievance  of  the  petitioner  

herein  that  this  review  is  instituted  since  the  Ministry  of  

Mines, Government of India, could not put forth its view on  

the  interpretation  of  the  provisions  of  the  MMDR  Act  in  

Sandur (supra) for the reason that the copy of the special  

leave  petition  was  not  served  upon  the  review  petitioner  

which is a necessary and relevant party to the subject-matter  

in  issue/dispute  and  the  review petitioner  did  not  get  an  

opportunity of being heard.  

3) It  is  also  brought  to  our  notice  that  vide  notification  

dated  30.01.2003,  the  Ministry  of  Coal  and  Mines  was  

bifurcated  into  separate  Ministries  since  the  petitioners  in  

various SLPs furnished the name of the Ministry as “Ministry  

of Coal and Mines” in all the matters and according to them,  

it was not noticed by the Department concerned, namely, the  

Department of Mines.  

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4) We  are  conscious  of  the  fact  that  the  principles  of  

natural justice guarantee every person the right to represent  

his/her case in the court of law, wherein the final verdict of  

the court would adversely affect his/her interest. Considering  

the above principle, this Court, vide order dated 04.10.2012,  

granted the opportunity to the Union of India to represent its  

case.

5) Before considering the claim of the Union of India about  

acceptability  or  otherwise  of  various  conclusions  in  the  

impugned  judgment,  we  have  to  consider  whether  the  

petitioner has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay  

of 320 days.

6) The  details  furnished  in  I.A.  No.  1  of  2011  filed  for  

condoning  the  delay  in  filing  the  above  review  petition  

sufficiently prove that steps were taken at various levels in  

the  Ministry  of  Mines,  accordingly,  we accept  the  reasons  

furnished  therein.   In  view  of  the  same,  the  delay  is  

condoned.

7) Taking note of the reasons stated for the delay and the  

stand  of  the  Department  that  the  Ministry  concerned,  

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namely,  Department  of Mines was not  duly  projected  and  

represented  before  this  Court,  we  heard  Mr.  Goolam  E.  

Vahanvati,  learned  Attorney  General  for  the  review  

petitioner,  on  merits,  particularly,  with  reference  to  the  

points formulated for consideration and ultimate conclusion  

arrived therein and Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,  

Mr.  A.M.  Singhvi,  Mr.  Krishnan  Venugopal,  Mr.  L.N.  Rao,  

learned senior counsel  for the contesting respondents and  

Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka.

8) Now, let us consider whether the review petitioner has  

made out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated  

13.09.2010  and  satisfies  the  criteria  for  entertaining  the  

matter in review jurisdiction.    

Review Jurisdiction

9) Article  137  of  the  Constitution  of  India  provides  for  

review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court which  

reads as under:

“Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or   any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall   have power to review any judgment pronounced or order   made by it.”

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10) Further, Part VIII Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules,  

1966 deals with the review and consists of four rules. Rule 1  

is important for our purpose which reads as under:  

“The  Court  may  review  its  judgment  or  order,  but  no   application  for  review  will  be  entertained  in  a  civil   proceeding  except  on  the  ground  mentioned  in  Order   XLVII  Rule  1  of  the  Code  and  in  a  criminal  proceeding   except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of   the record.”

11)  Order  XLVII,  Rule  1(1)  of the  Code of Civil  Procedure,  

1908 provides for an application for review which reads as  

under:

“Any person considering himself aggrieved-

a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but  from which no appeal has been preferred,

b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or  evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not  within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the  time  when  the  decree  was  passed  or  order  made,  or  on  account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the  record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a  review of the decree passed or order made against him, may  apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the  decree or made the order.”  

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12)  Thus,  in  view of  the  above,  the  following  grounds  of  

review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

i) Discovery  of  new  and  important  matter  or  evidence  which,  after  the  exercise  of  due  diligence,  was  not  within  knowledge  of  the  petitioner  or  could  not  be  produced by him;  

ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

iii)Any other sufficient reason

13) The  words  “any  other  sufficient  reason”  has  been  

interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and  

approved  by  this  Court  in  Moran  Mar  Basselios  

Catholicos vs.  Most  Rev.  Mar  Poulose  Athanasius  &  

Ors.,  (1955)  1  SCR 520,  to  mean  “a  reason sufficient  on  

grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”.  

With the above statutory provisions, let us discuss the claim  

of the petitioner-Union of India.

Discussion

14) The respondent – Company  (Sandur Manganese & Iron  

Ores Ltd.) by filing S.L.P.(C) No. 22077 of 2009 (converted  

into Civil  Appeal  No. 7944 of 2010) challenged before this  

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Court the final judgment and order dated 05.06.2009 passed  

by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal  

No. 5084 of 2008 and allied matters wherein the High Court  

dismissed the appeals and held that the decision of the State  

Government  in  not  recommending  mining  lease  to  the  

Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. and instead preferring  

two  other  Companies  for  grant  of  mining  lease  does  not  

suffer  from  any  irregularity,  illegality,  discrimination,  

arbitrariness, unreasonableness or violative of principles of  

natural justice.

15) This Court, in Sandur (supra), allowed the appeal filed  

by  Sandur  Manganese  &  Iron  Ores  Ltd.  and  quashed  the  

impugned  order  dated  05.06.2009  passed  by  the  Division  

Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Appeal No. 5084  

of  2008  etc.  etc.  as  well  as  the  decision  of  the  State  

Government  dated  26/27.02.2002  and  the  subsequent  

decision of the Central  Government dated 29.07.2003 and  

directed the State Government to consider all  applications  

afresh in light of this Court’s interpretation of Section 11 of  

the MMDR Act and Rules 35, 59 and 60 of the MC Rules in  

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particular,  and  make  recommendation  to  the  Central  

Government within a period of four months.   

16) Consequently, the UOI has raised mainly two issues on  

merits  of  the  case,  thereby  challenging  the  impugned  

judgment. They are:-

(1)  Firstly,  that  the  impugned  judgment  has  incorrectly  

reported  the  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  to  Review the  

Existing  Laws  and  Procedures  for  Regulation  and  

Development of Minerals’. As a consequence, the ratio of  

impugned  judgment,  which  relies  on  this  Expert  

Committee Report, shall stand erroneous in the eyes of  

law.  

(2)  Secondly,  Section  11(2)  and  Section  11(4)  should  be  

applicable to both virgin and previously held areas.

Now  we  shall  discuss  the  above  mentioned  issues  respectively.  

First Contention:

17) The first contention of learned Attorney General is two  

fold viz., that the Expert Committee’s Report was misquoted  

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and as a result the impugned judgment which relies on the  

same, shall stand erroneous on the face of law. We accede to  

the  above  contention  partially.  It  is  true  that  the  Expert  

Committee’s  Report  has  been  misquoted  to  the  extent  of  

adding  four  lines,  which  was  originally  not  a  part  of  the  

report.  Thus,  this  Court  has  the  power  to  modify  the  

impugned  judgment  to  the  extent  of  deletion  of  the  

misquoted statement under review jurisdiction.  

18) The Report of the Committee to Review the Existing Laws  

and Procedures for Regulation and Development of Minerals,  

referred in the impugned judgment reads as under:

Para 2.1.21 of the Report:

“49……  The  concept  of  first-come,  first-serve  has  become necessary in view of the fact that the Act does   not  provide  for  inviting  applications  through  advertisement  for  grant  of  PL/ML in  respect  of  virgin   areas. No doubt, there is provision in Rule 59 of the MC  Rules for advertisement of an area earlier held under   PL/ML  with  provision  for  relaxation.  In  this  background,  the  Committee  recommended  the  introduction of the proviso to S. 11(2) permitting  calling for applications by way of a notification.  There is a distinction between virgin areas and  areas covered under Rule 59 and S. 11(2) ought  to be interpreted to cover virgin areas alone.”

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19) Hence, the above underlined portion of the report which  

is  misquoted  in  the  impugned  judgment  owing to  clerical  

mistake requires to be deleted, accordingly, we do so.

20) However, we are not in agreement with learned Attorney  

General  that  the  impugned judgment  is  erroneous on the  

face  of law merely  because the  Expert  Committee  Report  

was  misquoted.  In  our  considered  view,  the  impugned  

judgment  stands  good  of  reason  even  without  these  

misquoted lines as well. Hence, mere deletion of these lines  

along  with  removal  of  certain  portion  of  para  51  of  the  

impugned judgment will clarify the mistake.

Portion of Para 51 of Sandur (supra) to be deleted:

“51…..The analysis of the Report makes it clear that   the  main  provision  in  Section  11(2)  applies  to   “virgin areas”. It further makes it clear that to the   extent  that  an  area  that  is  previously  held  or   reserved  would  require  a  notification  for  it  to  become available.”

Thus  the  first  contention  is  considered  as  per  the  above  terms.  

Second Contention:

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21) With regard to the second contention that both Section  

11(2) and Section 11(4) should be applicable to both virgin  

and previously held areas, the same has been well reasoned  

in the impugned judgment and the mere fact that different  

views  on  the  same  subject  are  possible  is  no  ground  to  

review the earlier judgment passed by this Bench.  

22) It has been time and again held that the power of review  

jurisdiction can be exercised for the correction of a mistake  

and not to substitute a view. In  Parsion Devi & Ors.  vs.  

Sumitri Devi & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 715, this Court held as  

under:-

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to  review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent  on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident  and  has  to  be  detected  by  a  process  of  reasoning,  can  hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the  record justifying the court  to exercise its power of review  under Order 47 Rule I  CPC. In exercise of  the jurisdiction  under  Order  47  Rule  1  CPC  it  is  not  permissible  for  an  erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review  petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and  cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".

23) This Court, on numerous occasions, had deliberated upon  

the very same issue, arriving at the conclusion that review  

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proceedings are not by way of an appeal  and have to be  

strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of  

CPC.

24)  In  the  present  case,  the  error  contemplated  in  the  

impugned judgment is not one which is apparent on the face  

of the  record rather  the dispute  is  wholly founded on the  

point of interpretation and applicability of Section 11(2) and  

11(4)  of  the  MMDR  Act.  In  review  jurisdiction,  mere  

disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the  

ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already  

dealt  with  and  answered,  the  parties  are  not  entitled  to  

challenge  the  impugned  judgment  in  the  guise  that  an  

alternative  view  is  possible  under  the  review  jurisdiction.  

Hence,  in  review jurisdiction, the court shall  interfere only  

when there is a glaring omission or patent mistake or when a  

grave error has crept in the impugned judgment, which we  

fail to notice in the present case.  

25)  For  the  above reasons,  the  second ground for  review  

petition is liable to be rejected.  

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26) Further, the contention regarding MoU entered into by  

the State Government and investments made thereunder is  

concerned, this Court has noticed this fact and rejected the  

contention made by the respondents in Sandur (supra).  It  

is relevant to point out that the State of Karnataka is stated  

to have committed to JSW Steels Limited on 11.10.1994 for  

grant of mining leases but the same has been invoked by  

JSW Steels after a lapse of 8 years and more precisely, after  

5 years of commencing commercial  operations in  its  steel  

plant by making an application on 24.10.2002. Once an area  

is notified for re-grant and applications are invited from the  

mining public for grant of mining lease, the applications must  

be disposed of in terms of the provisions of the MMDR Act  

and the MC Rules and not  de hors.  In para 80 of  Sandur  

Manganese (supra), this Court has held as follows:

“80. It  is  clear  that  the  State  Government  is  purely  a  delegate of Parliament and a statutory functionary, for the  purposes of Section 11(3) of the Act, hence it cannot act in  a  manner  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  Section  11(1)  of  the  MMDR  Act  in  the  grant  of  mining  leases.  Furthermore,  Section  2  of  the  Act  clearly  states  that  the  regulation  of  mines  and  mineral  development  comes within the purview of the Union Government and  not  the  State  Government.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  respondents  have not  been  able  to  point  out  any other  provision  in  the  MMDR  Act  or  the  MC  Rules  permitting  

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grant  of  mining  lease  based  on  past  commitments.  As  rightly pointed out, the State Government has no authority  under the MMDR Act to make commitments to any person  that it will, in future, grant a mining lease in the event that  the  person  makes  investment  in  any  project.  Assuming  that  the  State  Government  had  made  any  such  commitment,  it  could  not  be  possible  for  it  to  take  an  inconsistent  position  and  proceed  to  notify  a  particular  area.  Further,  having  notified  the  area,  the  State  Government  certainly  could  not  thereafter  honour  an  alleged commitment  by  ousting other  applicants  even if  they are more deserving on the merit criteria as provided  in Section 11(3).

Hence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the  

very same point.  

27) Regarding the issue of Mineral Policies, this Court has  

already held in  Sandur (supra) that in view of the specific  

parliamentary declaration as discussed and explained by this  

Court in various decisions, there is no question of the State  

having any power to frame a policy  de hors the MMDR Act  

and the MC Rules.  

28) In view of the above, the petitioner-Union of India has  

not invoked any valid ground for exercising the power under  

review  jurisdiction.   In  addition  to  the  same,  after  the  

judgment in  Sandur (supra), another coordinate Bench of  

this Court followed the ratio decidendi in Monnet Ispat and  

Energy Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., 2012 (11) SCC 1.

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29) For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept any  

of  the  contentions  raised  by  Learned  Attorney  General,  

therefore, the review petition is disposed of by deleting the  

misquoted lines in the Expert Committee Report.   

30) In view of the above order and the directions issued by  

us in para 98 of Sandur (supra), we grant a further period  

of 4 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order to  

comply with the same.

31) In view of the dismissal of the review petition filed by  

the  Union  of  India,  the  impleadment  applications  stand  

dismissed.   

     ...…………………………………J.                  (P. SATHASIVAM)

...…………………………………J.   (H.L. DATTU)    

NEW DELHI; APRIL 23, 2013

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