15 December 2017
Supreme Court
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UNION OF INDIA Vs PFIZER LIMITED

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
Case number: C.A. No.-022972-022972 / 2017
Diary number: 3271 / 2017
Advocates: GURMEET SINGH MAKKER Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  22972  OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.7061 OF 2017

 UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.          …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

PFIZER LIMITED AND ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 22973-22981 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.10170-10178 OF 2017)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 22982-23404 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.28960-29382 OF 2017)

                                                          TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.29 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.30 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.31 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.32 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.33 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.34 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.35 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.36 OF 2017

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TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.38 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.39 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.40 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.41 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.42 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.43 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.44 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.45 OF 2017

TRANSFER PETITION (C) NOS.1176-1182 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.258 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.259 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.260 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.261 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.262 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.263 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.264 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.265 OF 2017

TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.266 OF 2017

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 23405-23472 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 36044-36111 OF 2017

Diary No.28274 of 2017 2

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TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NOS. 308-317 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF T.P. (C) NOS.2108-2117 OF 2017)

J U D G M E N T  

R.F. Nariman, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. The present appeals and transfer petitions relate to the

interpretation of Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,

1940  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Drugs  Act”).  By  the

impugned judgment  of  the learned single Judge of  the Delhi

High Court dated 1.12.2016, the learned single Judge has held

that the mandatory condition precedent for the exercise of the

power  by the Central  Government  under  Section 26A of  the

Drugs  Act  is  the  prior  consultation  of  the  Drugs  Technical

Advisory Board (DTAB) set up under Section 5 of the said Act.

It  must be stated that the learned single Judge differed from

judgments  of  the Karnataka and Madras  High Courts in  this

regard, wherein two other learned single Judges of two other

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High Courts have held that such consultation with the DTAB is

not  mandatory before  exercise of  such power  under  Section

26A.  Since we are concerned only with this narrow question

that has been decided by the learned single Judge of the Delhi

High Court,  we are not going into any other contentions that

have been raised by learned counsel for the parties.  

3. The issue regarding the prevalence of many Fixed Dose

Combinations  (hereinafter  referred  to  “FDCs”)  that  were

flooding the Indian market and had not been tested for efficacy

or  safety  was  considered  by  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee on Health and Family Welfare in its 59th Report in

May, 2012.  The Standing Committee observed that some of

the  State  Licensing  Authorities  have  issued  manufacturing

licenses  for  a  very  large  number  of  FDCs  without  prior

clearance  from  the  Central  Drugs  Standard  Control

Organization (CDSCO).  Such FDCs can pose significant risks

to  persons  and  need  to  be  withdrawn  immediately  in  that

human lives can be at risk.  The Committee recommended that

a  clear  and transparent  policy may be framed for  approving

FDCs  based  on  scientific  principles,  and  that,  at  present,

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Section  26A of  the  Drugs  Act  is  adequate  to  deal  with  the

problem of FDCs not cleared by the CDSCO.  Pursuant to the

aforesaid report, the Ministry of Health in October, 2012 issued

directions to States and Union Territories under Section 33P of

the Drugs Act not to grant licenses to FDCs falling under the

definition  of  “new  drugs”  and  not  approved  by  the  Drug

Controller General of India (DCG(I)).  The DCG(I), in turn, had

requested all  States/Union Territories Drug Controllers to ask

concerned  manufacturers  in  their  respective  States/Union

Territories to prove the safety and efficacy of such FDC licenses

issued prior to 1.10.2012, without due approval of the DCG(I),

within a period of 18 months, failing which such FDCs would be

considered  for  being  prohibited,  both  qua  manufacture  and

marketing  in  the  country.   On  5.7.2013,  the  DCG(I)  vide  its

communication  to  the  State  Drug  Controllers  asked

manufacturers  to  make  applications  as  per  the  procedure

prescribed within this 18 month period.  We have been informed

that  a  large  number  of  applications  were  received  from the

manufacturers within the 18 month period for  2911 products,

which had to be subjected to examination.  

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4. With the approval  of  the Ministry  of  Health and Family

Welfare,  the CDSCO constituted 10 different  Committees for

examination of  the said applications which  were received on

3.2.2014.  As the said Committees could examine only about

295  applications,  on  16.9.2014,  the  Ministry  of  Health  and

Family  Welfare  constituted  a  Committee  under  the

Chairmanship of Professor C.K. Kokate, Vice Chancellor of KLE

University, Belgaum,  Karnataka for  examining the safety and

efficacy as per the following terms of reference:

a. Those  FDCs  which  are  considered  grossly irrational/unsafe  based  on  pharmacokinetic  and pharmacodynamic  interaction,  dosage compatibilities  of  FDCs  vis-a-vis  that  of  single ingredients  present  in  the  FDC  and  available literature/evidence. b. Those  FDCs  which  the  Committee  may consider necessary for further deliberation with any of the 10 Expert Committees already constituted.

c. Those  FDCs  which  are  considered  as  safe and  effective  based  on  pharmacokinetic  and pharmacodynamic  interaction,  dosage compatibilities  of  FDCS  vis-a-vis  that  of  single ingredients  present  in  the  FDC,  available literature/evidence,  clinical  experience  and  other data available.

d. Those  FDCs  which  may  be  considered  as rational,  based  on  present  data  and  knowledge available. However, data in post market scenario is

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required to be generated within a period of 1 to 2 years to confirm the same.

e. All the FDCs falling, under category “b” above would  be  referred  to  the  respective  Expert Committee  out  of  10  Expert  Committees  already constituted.

Composition of Expert Committee for examining the safety  &  efficacy  of  Fixed  Dose  Combinations (FDCs) is as under:

S.No. Name  of Expert

Name  & Address  of Institutions

Qualificati on

Status  in  the Committee

1 Prof. Chandrakant Kokate

Vice-Chancellor, KLE  University, Belgaum, Karnataka  & Ex-President  of Pharmacy Council of India.

M.  Pharm, Ph.D.  

Chairman

2 Dr. C.L. Kaul Former  Director, NIPER,  432, Mahatma Society,  Koth Road, Pune-38.

B.  Pharm, Ph.D.

Member

3 Prof.  Sanjay Singh

Deptt.  of Pharmaceutics, IIT,  BHU, Varanasi.

M.  Pharm, Ph.D.

Member

4 Dr.  C.D. Tripathi

Prof.  &  HOD (Pharmacology), Safdarjung Hospital,  New

MD, Pharamacol ogy

Member

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Delhi.

5 Dr.  Bikash Medhi

Deptt.  of Pharmacology, PGIMER, Chandigarh.

MD, Pharmacolo gy

Member

6 Dr.  Sanjeev Sinha

Prof.  (Medicine), AIIMS,New Delhi

MD, Medicine

Member

7 Dr. R.K. Khar Former  Dean  & Head,  Jamia Hamdard, 403,Lalleshwari Vatika,  GH-12, Sector-21D, Faridabad-1210 01.

M.  Pharm, Ph.D.

Co-opted Member

A  series  of  meetings  were  conducted  by  the Committee (6 meetings corresponding to 11 days) as  well  as  by  a  sub-group  of  the  Committee  (2 meetings)  for  examination  of  these  approx.  6320 applications.

5. The first  assessment report of the aforesaid Committee

was submitted to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on

19.1.2015 and was presented before the Ministry on 4.3.2015,

wherein  the  Committee  was  requested  to  mention  detailed

reasons  against  each  FDC considered  as  “irrational”  by  the

Committee.   The  Committee  did  not  discuss  FDCs  already

approved by the DCG(I)  and FDCs which were licensed pre

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21.9.1988  i.e.  before  the  introduction  of  Schedule  Y  to  the

Drugs  Act.   The  Committee  stated,  “in  case  the  Committee

made any comment with respect to the above inadvertently, it

shall be treated as not discussed.”  

6. On  16.4.2015,  a  detailed  report  in  this  regard  was

submitted by the Kokate Committee to the Ministry stating the

reasons  for  declaring  FDCs  as  irrational.   We  have  been

informed that for the FDCs which were considered as irrational

by  the  Committee,  the  Committee  wrote  to  various

manufacturers/associations  calling  upon  them  to  submit

material  to  establish  the  therapeutic  justification/rationality  of

the  FDCs.  Replies  received  from  such  associations  were

examined by the Expert Committee and final recommendations

therein were given only on 10.2.2016. In category A, following

the final recommendations of the Expert Committee, the Central

Government has banned 344 FDCs.  In category B, 944 FDCs

needed to be considered/deliberated upon further, which meant

that  they  would  be  referred  to  the  respective  Expert

Committees  out  of  the  10  Expert  Committees  already

constituted for further examination.  In category C, 1493 FDCs

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have  been  declared  “rational”  and  we  are  informed  that

approvals have since been issued by the DCG(I) in respect of

these FDCs.  In category D, 126 FDCs have to be considered

for further generation of data by the prospective applicants. It is

only  after  carrying  out  of  this  exercise,  that  by  notifications

dated  10.3.2016  issued  under  Section  26A,  the  Central

Government banned manufacture and sale of 344 FDCs.  

7. In March 2016, a large number of writ petitions were filed

in the Delhi High Court against the aforesaid notifications.  The

impugned judgment  then followed on 1.12.2016 disposing of

454 petitions, followed by an order dated 21.12.2016, in which

the  Delhi  High  Court  disposed of  51  further  writ  petitions  in

terms of the judgment dated 1.12.2016.  

8. Letters Patent Appeals were filed before the Delhi High

Court.  Meanwhile, the Union of India filed transfer petitions in

this Court. This is how these matters have been heard by us in

civil  appeals arising out of SLPs against the judgment of the

single Judge dated 1.12.2016 and in transfer cases in which the

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LPAs  pending  before  the  Delhi  High  Court  have  been

transferred to us.  

9. Ms.  Pinky  Anand,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General,

took  us  through  various  provisions  of  the  Drugs  Act,  and

emphasized that Section 26A does not expressly refer to the

DTAB.  According to her, a large number of provisions of the

Drugs Act expressly refer to the DTAB in various contexts and,

therefore, it is not permissible for the Court to read a mandatory

requirement  of  consultation with  the DTAB into  Section 26A,

when  such  mandatory  consultation  is  present  in  other

provisions, but is conspicuous by its absence in Section 26A.

She further went on to state that the provisions of Section 26A

are  legislative  in  nature,  and  ultimately,  once  the  Central

Government  arrives  at  a  satisfaction  based  on  relevant

materials,  judicial  review of  the Central  Government  decision

taken on the basis of  Expert  Committee reports is extremely

limited.  She  launched  an  all  out  attack  against  the  single

Judge’s judgment and stated that the Madras and Karnataka

view, with which the Delhi  High Court  differed,  is the correct

view in  law.   Shri  Colin  Gonsalves,  learned  senior  counsel, 11

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supported her arguments, and appeared in civil appeal arising

out of SLP(C) Nos.10170-10178 of 2017.   

10. By way of reply, Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior

counsel, argued that the impugned single Judge judgment was

based  on  an  earlier  Division  Bench  judgment  in  E.  Merck

(India)  Ltd.  and  another  v. Union  of  India  and  another,

(2001)  90 DLT 60, which upheld the constitutional  validity of

Section  26A on  the  ground  that  since  the  DTAB had  to  be

consulted before passing an order under Section 26A, the said

Section would pass constitutional muster.  He also referred us

to this Court’s judgment in Systopic Laboratories (Pvt) Ltd. v.

Dr. Prem Gupta & Ors., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 160 in furtherance

of  the same proposition.   According to learned counsel,  it  is

clear on a reading of  Section 5 of  the Drugs Act,  that  it  will

apply  to  both  the  Central  Government  and  the  State

Governments  on  all  technical  matters  that  arise  out  of  the

administration of the Drugs Act.  Since Section 26A deals only

with such technical matters, it is obvious that the DTAB’s advice

has to be taken in every such case as otherwise, if it were open

to the Central Government to pick and choose in which case 12

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they would take such advice and which case they would not

take such advice,  the provision itself  would  become arbitrary

and unreasonable.   According to the learned senior  counsel,

Section 5(5) of the Drugs Act is very important in that it is the

DTAB alone who may constitute sub-committees consisting of

persons who are not members of the DTAB, who may consider

particular matters, thereby making it clear that the DTAB alone

can  induct  experts  who  are  outside  Section  5  and  not  the

Central  Government.  He  further  referred  to  the  Drugs  and

Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the “Drugs

Rules”), in particular Rules 21, 68A, 122A, 122D and 122DA, to

buttress his submission that a detailed filtration process has to

be gone through before a drug can be manufactured and put on

the market and that the Central Government cannot ban such

drug without  consulting the technical  expert  under  the Drugs

Act namely, the DTAB, that is set up under Section 5.  He also

argued that Sections 10A and 26A were introduced by way of

an amendment in 1982 and this being so, it is clear that it is

assumed by Parliament that Section 5 of the Drugs Act will be

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read  along  with  both  of  them  so  as  to  make  the  DTAB  a

mandatory consultee before action is taken under Section 26A.

11. Shri Vashisht, learned senior counsel appearing for some

of the respondents, adverted to Section 5 and stated that it was

in two parts, the first being advice to the Central Government

on all technical matters arising out of the administration of the

Drugs Act and the second (and distinct part) being to carry out

other  functions assigned to  it  by  the  Drugs  Act.   It  is  clear,

therefore, that in all matters which fall within the first part, the

advice of  the Board would  be mandatory  before  the Central

Government were to take action under Section 26A.  He also

referred  us  to  Section 7A of  the  Drugs  Act  and  argued that

when  the  said  Drugs  Act  expressly  states  that  nothing  in

Section  5  is  to  apply,  it  is  expressly  so  stated  and  that,

therefore,  the  necessary  inference  would  be  that  Section  5

would  apply  in  all  situations  other  than  those  covered  by

Section 7A. He further argued that Section 26A does not have a

non obstante clause which puts out of harm’s way Section 5,

but only a “without prejudice” clause and that too restricted only

to Chapter IV, making it clear that Section 26A would have to be 14

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read along with Section 5.  According to him, therefore, there is

no  reason  to  interfere  with  the  judgment  of  the  Delhi  High

Court.  

12. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel, argued that on a

cursory  look  at  the  persons  who  constitute  the  DTAB under

Section 5,  it  is  an extremely high ranking body which  is  the

technical expert set up by the statute and, therefore, the High

Court judgment is right in stating that in all cases arising under

Section 26A prior  consultation with  the DTAB is  a  must.  He

argued, in the alternative, that on a purposive and harmonious

construction of the Drugs Act as a whole, a middle approach

could  be  that  the  Central  Government  may,  in  emergent

situations,  not  consult  the  DTAB,  but  in  all  other  situations

should  give  reasons  why  the  DTAB  was  not  consulted,

otherwise the exercise under Section 26A would be found to be

constitutionally infirm.  According to the learned senior counsel,

hearing  is  mandatory  under  the  said  Section  and  the  High

Court’s  reading  in  the  requirement  of  hearing  into  the  said

Section  was  absolutely  correct.  He  also  referred  us  to

judgments dealing with not only how hearing must be added 15

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when it is absent, but to a judgment of this Court which stated

that  conditional  legislation,  of  which  Section  26A is  a  clear

instance, would also require hearing the affected parties.  

13. In  answer  to these submissions,  the learned Additional

Solicitor  General,  in  rejoinder,  went  through  the  1982

amendment,  which  introduced  Section  26A,  and  stated  that

Sections  29  and  35  thereof  make  it  clear  that  amendments

were  made  in  certain  Sections  with  reference  to  the  DTAB

under  Section  5  and  that,  therefore,  the  omission  of  any

reference to the DTAB in Section 26A is deliberate.  She also

went on to state that Rule 66 of the Drugs Rules, which deals

with  cancellation  of  individual  licenses  and  which  requires

compliance  with  natural  justice,  should  be  contrasted  with

Section  26A of  the  Drugs  Act  which,  according  to  her,  is  a

legislative power as opposed to an administrative power.  

14. Having heard learned counsel  for  the parties,  it  is  first

important to set out some of the provisions of the Drugs Act.   

“5. The Drugs Technical Advisory Board.— (1) The Central Government shall, as soon as may be,  constitute  a  Board  (to  be  called  the  Drugs Technical  Advisory  Board)  to  advise  the  Central

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Government  and  the  State  Governments  on technical matters arising out of the administration of this  Act  and  to  carry  out  the  other  functions assigned to it by this Act.  

(2)  The  Board  shall  consist  of  the  following members, namely:—  

(i)  the  Director  General  of  Health  Services,  ex officio, who shall be Chairman;  

(ii) the Drugs Controller, India, ex officio;  

(iii)  the  Director  of  the  Central  Drugs  Laboratory, Calcutta, ex officio;  

(iv)  the Director  of  the Central  Research Institute, Kasauli, ex officio;  

(v) the Director  of  the Indian Veterinary Research Institute, Izatnagar, ex officio;

(vi) the President of the Medical Council of India, ex officio;  

(vii) the President of the Pharmacy Council of India, ex officio;  

(viii)  the  Director  of  the  Central  Drug  Research Institute, Lucknow, ex officio;  

(ix)  two  persons  to  be  nominated  by  the  Central Government  from  among  persons  who  are  in charge of drugs control in the States;  

(x)  one  person,  to  be  elected  by  the  Executive Committee of the Pharmacy Council of India, from among  teachers  in  pharmacy  or  pharmaceutical chemistry or pharmacology on the staff of an Indian university or a college affiliated thereto;

(xi)  one  person,  to  be  elected  by  the  Executive Committee  of  the  Medical  Council  of  India,  from among teachers in medicine or therapeutics on the

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staff  of  an Indian university  or  a  college affiliated thereto;

(xii)  one  person  to  be  nominated  by  the  Central Government from the pharmaceutical industry;

(xiii)  one  pharmacologist  to  be  elected  by  the Governing  Body of  the  Indian  Council  of  Medical Research;

(xiv)  one  person  to  be  elected  by  the  Central Council of the Indian Medical Association;

(xv) one person to be elected by the Council of the Indian Pharmaceutical Association;

(xvi)  two  persons  holding  the  appointment  of Government Analyst under this Act, to be nominated by the Central Government.

(3)  The  nominated  and  elected  members  of  the Board shall hold office for three years, but shall be eligible for re-nomination and re-election:

Provided that the person nominated or elected, as the case may be, under clause (ix) or clause (x) or clause (xi)  or  clause (xvi)  of  sub-section (2)  shall hold office for so long as he holds the appointment of the office by virtue of which he was nominated or elected to the Board.

(4) The Board may, subject to the previous approval of the Central Government, make bye-laws fixing a quorum and regulating its own procedure and the conduct of all business to be transacted by it.

(5) The Board may constitute sub-committees and may  appoint  to  such  sub-committees  for  such periods,  not  exceeding  three  years,  as  it  may decide,  or  temporarily  for  the  consideration  of particular matters, persons who are not members of the Board.

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(6)  The  functions of  the Board may be exercised notwithstanding any vacancy therein.

(7) The Central Government shall appoint a person to be Secretary of the Board and shall provide the Board  with  such  clerical  and  other  staff  as  the Central Government considers necessary.

6. The Central Drugs Laboratory.—

(1) The Central Government shall, as soon as may be, establish a Central Drugs Laboratory under the control of a Director to be appointed by the Central Government, to carry out the functions entrusted to it by this Act or any rules made under this Chapter:

Provided  that,  if  the  Central  Government  so prescribes,  the  functions  of  the  Central  Drugs Laboratory in respect of any drug or class of drugs or cosmetic or class of cosmetics shall be carried out at the Central Research Institute, Kasauli, or at any other prescribed Laboratory and the functions of the Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory in respect  of  such  drug  or  class  of  drugs  or  such cosmetic or class of cosmetics shall be exercised by the  Director  of  that  Institute  or  of  that  other Laboratory, as the case may be.

(2) the Central Government may, after consultation with the Board, make rules prescribing—

(a) the functions of the Central Drugs Laboratory;

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(d)  the  procedure  for  the  submission  of  the  said Laboratory  under  Chapter  IV  or  Chapter  IVA of samples of drugs or cosmetics for analysis or test, the forms of  Laboratory’s  reports thereon and the fees payable in respect of such reports;  

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(e)  such  other  matters  as  may  be  necessary  or expedient to enable the said Laboratory to carry out its functions;

(f)  the matters necessary to be prescribed for the purposes of the proviso to sub-section (1).

7. The Drugs Consultative Committee.—

(1)  The  Central  Government  may  constitute  an advisory  committee  to  be  called  “the  Drugs Consultative  Committee”  to  advise  the  Central Government, the State Governments and the Drugs Technical Advisory Board on any matter tending to secure  uniformity  throughout  India  in  the administration of this Act.

(2) The Drugs Consultative Committee shall consist of two representatives of the Central Government to be  nominated  by  that  Government  and  one representative  of  each  State  Government  to  be nominated by the State Government concerned.

(3)  The Drugs Consultative Committee shall  meet when required to do so by the Central Government and shall have power to regulate its own procedure.

7A. Sections 5 and 7 not to apply to Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs.—

Nothing contained in sections 5 and 7 shall apply to Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs.

8. Standards of quality.—

(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the expression “standard quality” means—

(a) in relation to a drug, that the drug complies with the standard set out in the Second Schedule, and

(b)  in  relation  to  a  cosmetic,  that  the  cosmetic compiles with such standard as may be prescribed.

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(2) The Central Government, after consultation with the  Board  and  after  giving  by  notification  in  the Official Gazette not less than three months’ notice of its intention so to do, may by a like notification add to or otherwise amend the Second Schedule, for the purposes  of  this  Chapter,  and  thereupon  the Second Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.

10.  Prohibition  of  import  of  certain  drugs  or cosmetics.—

From such  date  as  may  be  fixed  by  the  Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf, no person shall import—

(a) any drug or cosmetic which is not of standard quality;

(b) any misbranded drug or misbranded or spurious cosmetic;

(bb) any adulterated or spurious drug;

(c) any drug or cosmetic for the import of which a licence is prescribed, otherwise than under, and in accordance with, such licence;

(d) any patent or proprietary medicine, unless there is displayed in the prescribed manner on the label or container thereof the true formula or list of active ingredients  contained  in  it  together  with  the quantities thereof;

(e)  any  drug  which  by  means  of  any  statement, design or device accompanying it  or by any other means, purports or claims to cure or mitigate any such disease or ailment, or to have any such other effect, as may be prescribed;

(ee) any cosmetic containing any ingredient which may render it unsafe or harmful for use under the directions indicated or recommended;

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(f)  any  drug  or  cosmetic  the  import  of  which  is prohibited by rule made under this Chapter:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the import, subject to prescribed conditions, of small quantities  of  any  drug  for  the  purpose  of examination, test or analysis or for personal use:

Provided further that the Central Government may, after consultation with the Board, by notification in the  Official  Gazette,  permit,  subject  to  any conditions specified in the notification, the import of any drug or  class of  drugs not  being of  standard quality.

12. Power of Central Government to make rules. —

(1) The Central Government may, after consultation with  or  on the recommendation of  the Board and after  previous  publication  by  notification  in  the Official  Gazette,  make  rules  for  the  purpose  of giving effect to the provisions of this Chapter:

Provided that  consultation with  the Board may be dispensed  with  if  the  Central  Government  is  of opinion  that  circumstances  have  arisen  which render  it  necessary  to  make  rules  without  such consultation, but in such a case the Board shall be consulted  within  six  months  of  the making  of  the rules and the Central  Government  shall  take  into consideration any suggestions which the Board may make in relation to the amendment of the said rules.

(2) xxx xxx xxx

16. Standards of quality.—

(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the expression “standard quality” means—

(a) in relation to a drug, that the drug complies with the standard set out in the Second Schedule, and

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(b)  in  relation  to  a  cosmetic,  that  the  cosmetic complies with such standard as may be prescribed.

(2) The Central Government, after consultation with the  Board  and  after  giving  by  notification  in  the Official Gazette not less than three months’ notice of its intention so to do, may by a like notification add to or otherwise amend the Second Schedule for the purposes  of  this  Chapter,  and  thereupon  the Second Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.

18.  Prohibition  of  manufacture  and  sale  of certain drugs and cosmetics.—

From  such  date  as  may  be  fixed  by  the  State Government by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf, no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf—

(a) manufacture for sale or for distribution, or sell, or stock or exhibit or offer for sale, or distribute—

(i) any drug which is not of a standard quality, or is misbranded, adulterated or spurious;

(ii) any cosmetic which is not of a standard quality or is misbranded, adulterated or spurious;

(iii) any patent or proprietary medicine, unless there is displayed in the prescribed manner on the label or container thereof the true formula or list of active ingredients  contained  in  it  together  with  the quantities thereof;

(iv)  any  drug  which  by  means  of  any  statement, design or device accompanying it  or by any other means,  purports  or  claims  to  prevent,  cure  or mitigate any such disease or ailment, or to have any such other effect as may be prescribed;

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(v)  any  cosmetic  containing  any  ingredient  which may render it unsafe or harmful for use under the directions indicated or recommended; and

(vi) any drug or cosmetic in contravention of any of the  provisions  of  this  Chapter  or  any  rule  made thereunder;

(b)  sell,  or  stock  or  exhibit  or  offer  for  sale,  or distribute  any  drug  or  cosmetic  which  has  been imported or manufactured in contravention of any of the  provisions  of  this  Act  or  any  rule  made thereunder;

(c) manufacture for sale or for distribution, or sell, or stock or  exhibit  or  offer  for  sale,  or  distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accordance with  the  conditions  of,  a  licence  issued  for  such purpose under this Chapter:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the manufacture,  subject  to  prescribed conditions, of  small  quantities of  any drug for  the purpose of examination, test or analysis:

Provided further that the Central Government may, after consultation with the Board, by notification in the  Official  Gazette,  permit,  subject  to  any conditions  specified  in  the  notification,  the manufacture  for  sale,  or  for  distribution,  sale, stocking  or  exhibiting  or  offering  for  sale  or distribution of any drug or class of drugs not being of standard quality.

26A. Powers of Central Government to prohibit manufacture,  etc.,  of  drug  and  cosmetic  in public interest.—

Without prejudice to any other provision contained in  this  Chapter,  if  the  Central  Government  is satisfied,  that  the use of  any drug or  cosmetic  is likely to involve any risk to human beings or animals

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or that any drug does not have the therapeutic value claimed or purported to be claimed for it or contains ingredients and in such quantity for which there is no  therapeutic  justification  and  that  in  the  public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, then, that Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,  regulate,  restrict  or  prohibit  the manufacture,  sale  or  distribution  of  such  drug  or cosmetic.

33. Power of Central Government to make rules. —

(1) The Central Government may after consultation with, or on the recommendation of, the Board and after  previous  publication  by  notification  in  the Official  Gazette,  make  rules  for  the  purpose  of giving effect to the provisions of this Chapter:

Provided that  consultation with  the Board may be dispensed  with  if  the  Central  Government  is  of opinion  that  circumstances  have  arisen  which render  it  necessary  to  make  rules  without  such consultation, but in such a case the Board shall be consulted  within  six  months  of  the making  of  the rules and the Central  Government  shall  take  into consideration any suggestions which the Board may make in relation to the amendment of the said rules.

(2)  Without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the foregoing power, such rules may—

(a) provide for the establishment of laboratories for testing and analysing drugs or cosmetics;

(b)  prescribe  the  qualifications  and  duties  of Government  Analysts  and  the  qualifications  of Inspectors;

(c) prescribe the methods of test or analysis to be employed  in  determining  whether  a  drug  or cosmetic is of standard quality;

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(d)  prescribe,  in  respect  of  biological  and organometallic compounds, the units or methods of standardisation;

(dd) prescribe under clause (d) of section 17A the colour or colours which a drug may bear or contain for purposes of colouring;

(dda)  prescribe under clause (d) of section 17E the colour  or  colours  which  a  cosmetic  may  bear  or contain for the purpose of colouring;

(e)  prescribe  the  forms  of  licences  for  the manufacture for sale or for distribution, for the sale and  for  the  distribution  of  drugs  or  any  specified drug  or  class  of  drugs  or  of  cosmetics  or  any specified cosmetic or class of cosmetics, the form of application for such licences, the conditions subject to which such licences may be issued, the authority empowered to issue the same, the qualifications of such authority and the fees payable therefor;  and provide for the cancellation or suspension of such licences  in  any  case  where  any  provision  of  this Chapter  or  the  rules  made  thereunder  is contravened  or  any  of  the  conditions  subject  to which they are issued is not complied with;

(ee)  prescribe  the  records,  registers  or  other documents to be kept and maintained under section 18B;

(eea) prescribe the fees for the inspection (for the purposes  of  grant  or  renewal  of  licences)  of premises, wherein any drug or cosmetic is being or is proposed to be manufactured;

(eeb) prescribe the manner in which copies are to be certified under sub-section (2A) of section 22;

(f)  specify  the diseases or  ailments  which  a  drug may not purport or claim to prevent, cure or mitigate

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and such other effects which a drug may not purport or claim to have;

(g) prescribe the conditions subject to which small quantities  of  drugs  may  be  manufactured  for  the purpose of examination, test or analysis;

(h) require the date of manufacture and the date of expiry of potency to be clearly or truly stated on the label or container of any specified drug or class of drugs, and prohibit the sale, stocking or exhibition for sale, or distribution of the said drug or class of drugs after the expiry of a specified period from the date of manufacture or after the expiry of the date of potency;

(i)  prescribe the conditions to  be observed in  the packing in bottles, packages, and other containers of drugs or cosmetics, including the use of packing material  which  comes into  direct  contact  with  the drugs and prohibit the sale, stocking or exhibition for sale, or distribution of drugs or cosmetics packed in contravention of such conditions;

(j)  regulate the mode of labelling packed drugs or cosmetics, and prescribe the matters which shall or shall not be included in such labels;

(k)  prescribe  the  maximum  proportion  of  any poisonous  substance  which  may  be  added  or contained  in  any  drug,  prohibit  the  manufacture, sale or stocking or exhibition for sale, or distribution of any drug in which that  proportion is exceeded, and specify substances which shall be deemed to be poisonous for the purposes of this Chapter and the rules made thereunder;

(l) require that the accepted scientific name of any specified drug shall be displayed in the prescribed manner  on the label  or  wrapper  of  any patent  or proprietary medicine containing such drug;

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[****]

(n)  prescribe the powers and duties of  Inspectors and the qualifications of the authority to which such Inspectors  shall  be  subordinate  and  specify  the drugs or classes of drugs or cosmetics or classes of cosmetics in relation to which and the conditions, limitations  or  restrictions  subject  to  which,  such powers and duties may be exercised or performed;

(o)  prescribe  the  forms  of  report  to  be  given  by Government  Analysts,  and  the  manner  of application for test or analysis under section 26 and the fees payable therefor;

(p) specify the offences against this Chapter or any rule made thereunder in relation to which an order of confiscation may be made under section 31;  

(q)  provide  for  the  exemption,  conditionally  or otherwise, from all or any of the provisions of this Chapter  or  the  rules  made  thereunder,  of  any specified drug or class of drugs or cosmetic or class of cosmetics; and

(r)  sum  which  may  be  specified  by  the  Central Government under section 32-B.

33EED. Power of Central Government to prohibit manufacture, etc., of Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs in public interest.—

Without prejudice to any other provision contained in  this  Chapter,  if  the  Central  Government  is satisfied  on  the  basis  of  any  evidence  or  other material  available  before  it  that  the  use  of  any Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drug is likely to involve any risk  to  human beings or  animals  or  that  any such  drug  does  not  have  the  therapeutic  value claimed or purported to be claimed for it and that in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do then, that Government may, by notification in the

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Official  Gazette,  prohibit  the  manufacture,  sale  or distribution of such drug.

33N.  Power  of  Central  Government  to  make rules.—

(1) The Central Government may, after consultation with, or on the recommendation of, the Board and after  previous  publication  by  notification  in  the Official  Gazette,  make  rules  for  the  purpose  of giving effect to the provisions of this Chapter:

Provided that  consultation with  the Board may be dispensed  with  if  the  Central  Government  is  of opinion  that  circumstances  have  arisen  which render  it  necessary  to  make  rules  without  such consultation, but in such a case, the Board shall be consulted  within  six  months  of  the making  of  the rules and the Central  Government  shall  take  into consideration any suggestions which the Board may make in relation to the amendment of the said rules.

(2)  Without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the foregoing power, such rules may—

(a) provide for the establishment of laboratories for testing and  analysing  Ayurvedic,  Siddha or  Unani drugs;

(b)  prescribe  the  qualification  and  duties  of Government  Analysts  and  the  qualifications  of Inspectors;

(c) prescribe the methods of test or analysis to be employed  in  determining  whether  any  Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drug is labelled with the true list of the ingredients which it is purported to contain;

(d)  specify  any  substance  as  a  poisonous substance;

(e)  prescribe  the  forms  of  licences  for  the manufacture for sale of Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani

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drugs, and for sale of processed Ayurvedic, Siddha or  Unani  drugs,  the  form  of  application  for  such licences,  the  conditions  subject  to  which  such licences may be issued, the authority empowered to issue the same and the fees payable therefor; and provide for the cancellation or suspension of such licences  in  any  case  where  any  provision  of  this Chapter or rules made thereunder is contravened or any  of  the  conditions  subject  to  which  they  are issued is not complied with;

(f)  prescribe the conditions to be observed in  the packing  of  Ayurvedic,  Siddha  and  Unani  drugs including the use of packing material which comes into direct contact with the drugs, regulate the mode of labelling packed drugs and prescribe the matters which shall or shall not be included in such labels;

(g) prescribe the conditions subject to which small quantities of Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs may be  manufactured  for  the  purpose  of  examination, test or analysis;

(gg) prescribe under clause (d) of section 33EE the colour  or  colours  which  an  Ayurvedic,  Siddha  or Unani  drug  may  bear  or  contain  for  purposes  of colouring;

(gga) prescribe the standards for Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs under section 33EEB;

(ggb)  prescribe  the  records,  registers  or  other documents to be kept and maintained under section 33 KB; and

(h)  any  other  matter  which  is  to  be  or  may  be prescribed under this Chapter.”

15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it  is clear

that  Section  26A has  been  introduced  by  an  amendment  in

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1982.  A bare reading of this provision would show, firstly, that it

is  without  prejudice  to  any  other  provision  contained  in  this

Chapter (meaning thereby Chapter IV).  This expression only

means that apart from the Central Government’s other powers

contained in  Chapter  IV, Section 26A is  an additional  power

which must be governed by its own terms. Under Section 26A,

the Central  Government  must  be “satisfied” that  any drug or

cosmetic  is  likely  to  involve (i)  any risk  to  human beings  or

families;  or  (ii)  that  any  drug  does  not  have  the  therapeutic

value claimed or purported to be claimed for it; or (iii) contains

ingredients in such quantity for which there is no therapeutic

justification.  Obviously, the Central Government has to apply its

mind to any or all of these three factors which has to be based

upon its “satisfaction” as to the existence of any or all of these

factors. The power exercised under Section 26A must further be

exercised only if it is found necessary or expedient to do so in

public  interest.  When  the  power  is  so  exercised,  it  may

regulate, restrict or prohibit manufacture, sale or distribution of

any drug or cosmetic.  

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16. Undoubtedly, Section 26A has to be read with the rest of

the Drugs Act.   So read,  it  is  clear  that  unlike Section 6(2),

Section 8(2), second proviso to Section 10, proviso to Section

12(1), Section 16(2), proviso to Section 18(2), Section 33 and

Section  33N,  there  is  no  explicit  requirement  to  consult  the

DTAB set up under Section 5 of the Drugs Act. The question is

did the Parliament do so deliberately or is it something that the

Court should read into the provision?  

17. As  has  been  stated  hereinabove,  Section  26A  was

brought  in  by  an  amendment  in  1982.   The  amendment

specifically made changes in Sections 33 and 33N in which it

added the words “on the recommendation of the Board”. From

this, it is clear that Parliament in the very Amendment Act which

introduced Section 26A made certain changes which involved

the DTAB under Section 5 of the said Act.  It is clear that the

additional power that is given to the Central Government under

Section  26A does  not  refer  to  and,  therefore,  mandate  any

previous  consultation  with  the  DTAB.  On  the  contrary,  the

Central Government may be “satisfied” on any relevant material

that a drug is likely to involve any risk to human beings etc. as a 32

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result  of  which  it  is  necessary  in  public  interest  to  regulate,

restrict or prohibit manufacture, sale or distribution thereof.  So

long as the Central Government’s satisfaction can be said to be

based on relevant  material,  it  is  not  possible to say that  not

having consulted the DTAB, the power exercised under the said

Section would be non est.   Take the case of an FDC that is

banned in 50 countries of the world owing to the fact that the

said FDC involved significant risk to human beings.  Assuming

that  the  Central  Government  is  satisfied  based  on  this  fact

alone, which in turn is based on expert committee reports in

various nations which pointed out the deleterious effects of the

said drug, can it be said that without consulting the DTAB set up

under Section 5, the exercise of the power under Section 26A

to prohibit the manufacture or sale or distribution of a drug that

is banned in 50 countries would be bad only because the DTAB

has not been consulted? The obvious answer is no inasmuch

as  the  Central  Government’s  satisfaction  is  based  upon

relevant material, namely, the fact that 50 nations have banned

the aforesaid drug, which in turn is based on expert committee

reports taken in each of those nations.  Take another example.

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Suppose the Central Government were to ban an FDC on the

ground that, in the recent past, it has been apprised of the fact

that the FDCs taken over a short period of time would lead to

loss  of  life,  which  has  come  to  the  notice  of  the  Central

Government through reports from various district authorities, in

let us say, a majority of districts in which the said FDC has been

consumed.  Could  not  the  Central  Government  then  base  its

ban order on material collected from district authorities which

state  that  this  particular  drug  leads  to  human  mortality  and

ought, therefore, to be prohibited? The obvious answer again is

yes  for  the  reason  that  the  Central  Government  has  been

satisfied  on  relevant  material  that  it  is  necessary  in  public

interest  to  ban  such  drug.   Examples  of  this  nature  can  be

multiplied to show that the width of the power granted under

Section 26A cannot be cut down by artificially cutting down the

language of Section 26A.  

18. We were referred to a judgment of this Court in Systopic

Laboratories  (supra)  at  169.  Paragraph  19  of  the  said

judgment reads as follows:-

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“19.  Having considered the submissions made by the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  and  the learned Additional  Solicitor General  in this regard, we  must  express  our  inability  to  make  an assessment about the relative merits of the various studies and reports which have been placed before us. Such an evaluation is required to be done by the Central  Government  while  exercising  its  powers under Section 26-A of the Act on the basis of expert advice and the Act  makes  provision  for  obtaining such advice through the Board and the DCC.”

19. It is clear that a stray sentence in a judgment without a

focused argument cannot be considered as the ratio of such a

judgment.  Also, on a careful reading of the second sentence in

paragraph 19, it is clear that all that is stated by this Court is

that, while exercising its power under Section 26A of the Drugs

Act,  the basis of  the Central Government’s decision must be

“expert advice”.  The sentence then goes on to add that the

Drugs Act makes provision for obtaining such advice through

the Board and the DCC. According to us, there was no focused

argument on whether such advice is or is not mandatory before

powers under Section 26A of the Drugs Act can be exercised,

and merely reading a stray sentence in this judgment does not

lead to such a conclusion. Equally, the single Judge’s reliance

upon a Division Bench judgment contained in E. Merck (supra), 35

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where,  in holding Section 26A to be constitutional,  the Court

stated:

“Before the Government records its satisfaction to prohibit the manufacture, sale, distribution etc. of a particular drug, opinion of the DTAB and/or Drugs Consultative Committee is obtained.”

This  is  an  equally  stray  sentence  and  what  has  been

stated with respect to  Systopic Laboratories (supra), applies

equally to this sentence.  

20. We have now to consider certain other arguments made

on behalf of the respondents.  One argument was that Section

5 is in two parts and that the first part necessarily applies to all

technical  matters  that  arise  out  of  the  administration  of  the

Drugs  Act,  and  that,  therefore,  the  Central  Government  is

bound to take the advice of the DTAB in all such matters.  We

must first advert to the fact that the DTAB is only an advisory

body.   No  doubt,  it  would  be  desirable  for  the  Central

Government to take its advice on technical matters arising out

of the administration of the Drugs Act, but this does not lead to

the conclusion  that  if  such  advice is  not  taken  power  under

Section  26A  cannot  be  exercised.  Indeed,  the  Central

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Government’s  satisfaction  may  be  based  on  a  number  of

factors, one of which may be advice tendered to it by the DTAB

under Section 5.  There is no warrant to read Section 26A to

constrict the wide powers granted to the Central Government

by a so-called harmonious construction of the statute. Another

argument made is that Section 5 makes it clear that the DTAB

alone can constitute sub-committees which may have persons

who are not members of the Board on them.  We are afraid that

this again does not lead us very far. It is clear that the reason

for Section 5(5) is completely different.  Sub-committees may

be appointed  for  such  periods  not  exceeding three  years  or

temporarily  for  the consideration of  particular  matters.   Such

sub-committees may be set up in the wisdom of the DTAB for

short periods of time or temporarily to consider certain matters

and make reports which the DTAB may then utilize.  This is a

power of  the DTAB which can be exercised when the DTAB

deems it desirable.  From this power, it cannot be inferred, as a

matter of logic, that since Section 5(5) permits persons who are

not members of the board to sit on sub-committees, the Central

Government may not, under Section 26A, refer to any persons

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other  than  those  who  are  board  members.  This  argument,

therefore, is also rejected.  

21. Yet another argument has been made that since Section

10A and 26A were brought in together by an Amendment Act in

1982,  it  must,  therefore,  somehow  be  assumed  that  the

Amendment Act necessarily included a mandatory consultation

with  the  DTAB  set  up  under  Section  5.   We  have  already

pointed  out  how  the  very  amendment  Act  of  1982  also

amended Sections 33 and 33N by referring to the DTAB and

that, therefore, it is obvious that the omission of any reference

to the DTAB under Sections 10A and 26A cannot but be said to

be deliberate.  This argument also need not detain us further.   

22. A negative argument was made stating that Section 7A of

the Drugs Act  makes it  clear that  Section 5 will  not apply to

Ayurvedic,  Siddha or  Unani  drugs  and  that,  therefore,  it  will

apply to all  other drugs.  The reason for Section 7A is again

something very different from what has been argued.  It must

first be pointed out that under Chapter IVA, which is a separate

Chapter introduced by Act 13 of 1964, Ayurvedic, Siddha and

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Unani  drugs  are  completely  separately  dealt  with.   Indeed,

Section 33A, which must be read with Section 7A, expressly

provides  that  save  as  provided  in  this  Drugs  Act,  nothing

contained  in  this  Chapter,  i.e.  Chapter  IV,  shall  apply  to

Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs.  Chapter IVA consists of a

separate  and  distinct  drill  to  be  followed  in  the  case  of

Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs. Under Section 33C, there

is a separate technical advisory board for Ayurvedic and Unani

drugs  and  a  separate  consultative  committee  for  Ayurvedic,

Siddha and Unani drugs (see Section 33D).  When Section 7A

says that nothing in section 5 shall apply to Ayurvedic, Siddha

or Unani drugs, all that it affirms is that the DTAB set up under

Section 5 will  apply to all  drugs except Ayurvedic,  Siddha or

Unani  medicines.  The  Latin  maxim  “expressio unius est

exclusio alterius” cannot apply, as has been held in  State of

Karnataka v Union of India & Ors., (1977) 4 SCC 608 at 662,

making it  clear that  the said maxim should be very carefully

applied and when misapplied would turn out to be a “dangerous

master” as opposed to a “useful servant”. This has also been

held  in  Assistant  Collector  of  Central  Excise,  Calcutta

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Division  v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., (1972) 2 SCC

560 at 575 as follows:

“The High Court's view was based on an application of  the  rule  of  construction  that  where  a  mode of performing a duty is  laid down by law it  must  be performed in that mode or not at all. This rule flows from  the  maxim:  “Expressio  unius  ast  exclusio alterius”.  But,  as  was  pointed  out  by  Wills,  J., in Colguoboun v. Brooks [(1888)  21  QBD  52,  62] this  maxim  “is  often  a  valuable  servant,  but  a dangerous master….”. The rule is subservient to the basic  principle  that  Courts  must  endeavour  to ascertain  the  legislative  intent  and  purpose,  and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may defeat these. “

This argument, therefore, also need not detain us.   

23. It was also argued that Section 26A had no non obstante

clause  to  keep  Section  5  out  of  harm’s  way.   On  our

construction  of  Section  26A,  it  is  clear  that  no  such  non

obstante  clause  was  necessary  in  that  the  width  of  the

expression “is satisfied” contained in Section 26A cannot be cut

down by reference to Section 5.   As has been stated by us

hereinabove, the expression “without prejudice” makes it clear

that  Section 26A is  an additional  power given to the Central

Government which must be exercised on its own terms.  

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24. An  argument  was  made  that  unless  the  provisions  of

Section 5 requiring consultation with the DTAB are read into

Section  26A,  the  said  Section  would  be  arbitrary.   In  our

opinion, there are sufficient indicators in the Section to eschew

any ground of arbitrariness.  The power can only be exercised

based on  satisfaction  of  material  that  is  relevant  to  form an

opinion that the drug in question falls within any of the three

categories  outlined  by  the  Section  and  that,  further,  it  is

necessary  or  expedient  to  either  regulate,  restrict  or  prohibit

manufacture,  sale  or  distribution  of  the  said  drug  in  public

interest.  Indeed, this is made explicit in Section 33 EED of the

Drugs  Act,  wherein  a  similar  power  is  given  to  the  Central

Government qua Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drugs, where the

Section states:

“… the Central Government is satisfied on the basis of any evidence or other material available before it that …”

25. If the power under Section 26A is exercised on the basis

of  irrelevant  material  or  on  the  basis  of  no  material,  the

satisfaction itself that is contemplated by Section 26A would not

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be there and the exercise of the power would be struck down

on this ground.  Further, it is argued that the provision may be

read  down  to  make  it  constitutionally  valid,  but  in  so  doing,

words cannot be added as a matter of constitutional doctrine.   

26. In Cellular Operators Association of India and others

v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and others, (2016)

7 SCC 703 at 740-741, this Court held as under:

“50.  But it  was said that  the aforesaid Regulation should be read down to mean that it  would apply only when the fault is that of the service provider. We are afraid that such a course is not open to us in law, for it is well settled that the doctrine of reading down would apply only when general words used in a  statute  or  regulation  can  be  confined  in  a particular  manner  so  as  not  to  infringe  a constitutional right. This was best exemplified in one of the earliest judgments dealing with the doctrine of reading down, namely, the judgment of the Federal Court  in  Hindu  Women’s  Rights  to  Property  Act, 1937, In re [Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, In re, AIR 1941 FC 72]. In that judgment, the word “property” in Section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act was read down so as not to include agricultural land, which would be outside the Central Legislature’s powers under the Government of  India  Act,  1935.  This  is  done  because  it  is presumed  that  the  legislature  did  not  intend  to transgress  constitutional  limitations.  While  so reading down the word “property”, the Federal Court held:  

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“… If the restriction of the general words to  purposes  within  the  power  of  the legislature would be to leave an Act with nothing or next to nothing in it, or an Act different  in  kind,  and  not  merely  in degree, from an Act in which the general words  were  given  the  wider  meaning, then it  is plain that the Act as a whole must  be held  invalid,  because in  such circumstances it is impossible to assert with any confidence that the legislature intended the general words which it has used  to  be  construed  only  in  the narrower sense: Owners of SS Kalibia v. Wilson [(1910)  11  CLR  689  (Aust)], Vacuum Oil Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Queensland [(1934)  51  CLR  677  (Aust)],  R.  v. Commonwealth  Court  of  Conciliation and  Arbitration,  ex  p  Whybrow  &  Co. [(1910)  11  CLR  1  (Aust)]  and  British Imperial Oil Co. Ltd.  v. Federal Commr. of Taxation [(1925) 35 CLR 422 (Aust)].”

51.  This  judgment  was followed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in  DTC v.  Mazdoor  Congress [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213]. In  that  case,  a  question  arose  as  to  whether  a particular  regulation which conferred power  on an authority to terminate the services of a permanent and  confirmed  employee  by  issuing  a  notice terminating his services, or by making payment in lieu of  such notice without  assigning any reasons and  without  any  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the employee,  could  be  said  to  be  violative  of  the appellants’ fundamental rights. Four of the learned Judges who heard the case, the Chief Justice alone dissenting  on  this  aspect,  decided  that  the regulation  cannot  be  read  down,  and  must, therefore, be held to be unconstitutional. In the lead

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judgment on this aspect by Sawant, J.,  this Court stated: (SCC pp. 728-29, para 255)

“255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially  used,  firstly,  for  saving  a statute  from  being  struck  down  on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations  are  possible  —  one rendering it constitutional and the other making  it  unconstitutional,  the  former should  be  preferred.  The unconstitutionality  may  spring  from either  the  incompetence  of  the legislature to enact the statute or  from its violation of  any of the provisions of the  Constitution.  The  second  situation which  summons  its  aid  is  where  the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it  is  possible to gather the intentions of the legislature from the object  of  the  statute,  the  context  in which  the  provision  occurs  and  the purpose for which it is made.  However, when the provision is cast in a definite and  unambiguous  language  and  its intention  is  clear,  it  is  not  permissible either to mend or bend it  even if  such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the court to remake the statute.  Its  only  duty  is  to  strike  it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if  the  remaking  of  the  statute  by  the courts  is  to  lead  to  its  distortion  that course  is  to  be  scrupulously  avoided. One of the situations further where the

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doctrine can never be called into play is where  the  statute  requires  extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part  of  the  court’s  duty  to  undertake such  exercise,  but  it  is  beyond  its jurisdiction to do so.”

(emphasis supplied)

52.  Applying  the  aforesaid  test  to  the  impugned Regulation,  it  is  clear  that  the  language  of  the Regulation  is  definite  and  unambiguous  — every service  provider  has  to  credit  the  account  of  the calling consumer by one rupee for every single call drop  which  occurs  within  its  network.  The Explanatory  Memorandum  to  the  aforesaid Regulation further makes it clear, in Para 19 thereof, that the Authority has come to the conclusion that call  drops  are  instances  of  deficiency  in  service delivery on the part of the service provider. It is thus unambiguously clear that the impugned Regulation is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  service  provider  is alone at fault and must pay for that fault. In these circumstances, to read a proviso into the Regulation that it will not apply to consumers who are at fault themselves  is  not  to  restrict  general  words  to  a particular  meaning,  but  to  add  something  to  the provision  which  does  not  exist,  which  would  be nothing short of the court itself legislating. For this reason,  it  is  not  possible  to  accept  the  learned Attorney  General’s  contention  that  the  impugned Regulation be read down in the manner suggested by him.”

27. Also,  as a matter  of  statutory interpretation,  words can

only be added if the literal interpretation of the Section leads to

an absurd result.  As has been stated by us, the construction of

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Section 26A on a literal reading thereof does not lead to any

such result.  Dr. Singhvi’s argument to read in words to save

Section 26A must, therefore, be rejected.  

28. We may also mention that the Madras High Court in its

judgment in  Macleods Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Union of

India  &  Ors.,  Writ  Petition  Nos.21933  and  25442  of  2011,

specifically held as under:

“38.  Thus,  the  Act  gives  in  every  Chapter,  an indication of  the functions to be exercised by the DTAB. In other words, the territory within which the DTAB is  to  operate  and  exercise  its  functions,  is clearly demarcated in various provisions of the Act such  as  5(1),  6(2),  7(1),  8(2),  second  proviso  to Section  10,  12(1)  and  33(1).  But  Section  26-A is completely silent about any consultation with DTAB. It is so even with Section 26-B.

39. While the advisory role of DTAB is indicated in broad  and  general  terms  in  Section  5(1),  it  is indicated  in  specific  terms  in  Sections  6(2),  7(1), 8(2), second proviso to Section 10, 12(1) and 33(1). Therefore,  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  such requirement  of  consultation  in  Section  26-A assumes  great  significance.  It  is  a  well  settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the Courts are  not  expected  to  supply  the  omission.  The Parliament  had  consciously  incorporated  the expressions  “after  consultation with  the Board”  or “on the recommendation  of  the Board”,  in  certain provisions of  the Act  such as Sections 5(1),  6(2), 7(1), 8(2), second proviso to Section 10, 12(1) and 33(1). But it has deliberately omitted to include any

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of those expressions while inserting Sections 26-A and 26-B. It is a case of casus omisus. Therefore, the argument that the Central Government ought to have  taken  the  consultation  of  the  DTAB  before issuing the ban order, can hold good only if  I can supply into Section 26-A, what was deliberately left out by the Parliament. This cannot be done by me and hence the first contention has to be rejected.”

29. To similar effect is the judgment of a single Judge of the

Karnataka High Court in Lundbeck India Pvt. Ltd. v Union of

India, (2014) 5 Kant LJ 440.  

30. We approve of these two judgments as having laid down

the correct law on the construction of Section 26A of the Drugs

Act.  

31. Though  arguments  have  been  made  as  to  whether

Section  26A  is  legislative  in  nature  and  therefore  excludes

natural  justice,  we  do  not  propose  to  go  into  the  same

inasmuch as since the learned single Judge’s judgment is being

set aside on one point and one point alone.  In this view of the

matter, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment dated

1.12.2016 deserves to be set aside.  

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32. On the facts of these cases, a suggested course of action

was  stated  by  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

petitioners/appellants.   This  course  is  that  instead  of  now

remitting  the  matter  back  to  the  Delhi  High  Court  for  an

adjudication on the other points raised in the writ petitions, the

case of 344 FDCs that have been banned, plus another 5 FDCs

that have been banned, which comes to 349 FDCs, (barring 15

FDCs  that  are  pre  1988  and  17  FDCs  which  have  DCG(I)

approval)  pursuant  to  the  Kokate  Committee  report,  by

notifications of the Central Government under Section 26A of

the Drugs Act, should be sent to the DTAB, constituted under

Section 5 of the Drugs Act, so that it can examine each of these

cases and ultimately send a report to the Central Government.

We reiterate that only on the peculiar facts of these cases, we

think that such a course commends itself to us, which would

obviate  further  litigation  and  finally  set  at  rest  all  other

contentions raised by the petitioners.  We say so because we

find that the Kokate Committee did deliberate on the 344 FDCs

plus 5 FDCs and did come to a conclusion that the aforesaid

FDCs be banned, but we are not clear as to what exactly the

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reasons  for  such  conclusions  are,  and  whether  it  was

necessary  in  the  public  interest  to  take  the  extreme step  of

prohibiting such FDCs, instead of restricting or regulating their

manufacture and supply.  In order that an analysis be made in

greater depth, we, therefore, feel that these cases should go to

the DTAB and/or a Sub-Committee formed by the DTAB for the

purpose of having a relook into these cases.  It  is important,

however,  that  the  DTAB/Sub-Committee  appointed  for  this

purpose will not only hear the petitioners/appellants before us,

but that  they also hear submissions from the All  India Drugs

Action  Network.  The  DTAB/Sub-Committee  set  up  for  this

purpose will  deliberate on the parameters set  out  in  Section

26A of the Drugs Act, as follows.

33. First  and  foremost  in  each  case,  the

DTAB/Sub-Committee appointed by it must satisfy itself that the

use of the Fixed Dose Combinations (FDC) in question is likely

to involve any one of the aforesaid three things:

(a) that they are likely to involve any risk to human beings or

animals; or

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(b)  that  the  said  FDCs  do  not  have  the  therapeutic  value

claimed or purported to be claimed for them; or

(c) that such FDCs contain ingredients and in such quantity for

which there is no therapeutic justification.

34. The DTAB/Sub-Committee must also apply its mind as to

whether it is then necessary or expedient, in the larger public

interest, to regulate, restrict or prohibit the manufacture, sale or

distribution of such FDCs.  In short, the DTAB/Sub-Committee

must clearly indicate in its report:  

(1)  as  to  why,  according  to  it,  any  one  of  the  three  factors

indicated above is attracted;  

(2) post such satisfaction, that in the larger public interest, it is

necessary or expedient to (i) regulate, (ii) restrict, or (iii) prohibit

the manufacture, sale or distribution of such FDCs.

35. The DTAB/Sub-Committee must also indicate in its report

as to why, in case it  prohibits a particular FDC, restriction or

regulation is not sufficient to control the manufacture and use of

the FDC.  We request the DTAB/Sub-Committee to be set up

for  this  purpose  to  afford  the  necessary  hearing  to  all 50

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concerned, and thereafter submit a consolidated report, insofar

as  these  FDCs  are  concerned,  to  the  Central  Government

within  a  period  of  six  months  from  the  date  on  which  this

judgment is received by the DTAB.  We may also indicate that

the Central Government, thereafter, must have due regard to

the report of the DTAB and to any other relevant information,

and ultimately  apply its  mind to the parameters contained in

Section 26A of the Drugs Act and, accordingly, either maintain

the  notifications  already  issued,  or  modify/substitute  them or

withdraw them.   

36. With  these  directions  given  on  the  peculiar  facts  and

circumstances of these cases, the appeals are disposed of.

37. Insofar as the drugs that have been banned and which

were manufactured pre 21st September, 1988, a list of 15 such

drugs has been given to us by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior

counsel  for  the  respondents.   We  set  aside  the  Central

Government  notifications banning them as these cases were

never meant to be referred to the Kokate Committee.  It will be

open, however, for the Central Government, if it so chooses, de

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novo, to carry out an inquiry as to whether such drugs should

be the subject matter of a notification under Section 26A of the

Drugs Act.  

38. Insofar as the list of 17 cases handed over by Shri Sibal,

in which DCG(I) approvals have allegedly been granted, we are

of the view that since the Parliamentary Standing Committee

itself refers to DCG(I) approvals and the manner in which they

were  granted,  we  do  not  accede  to  Mr.  Sibal's  request  that

these 17 cases be kept outside the purview of the fresh look

that  has  to  be  given  by  the  DTAB/Sub-Committee  in  these

cases.

39. Insofar  as  the  status  quo,  obtaining  as  on  today,  is

concerned, that will continue in all cases (including the 5 FDCs

which are not the subject matter of stay orders already made)

until  the Central Government issues fresh notifications in this

behalf.

MADRAS CASES (TRANSFERRED CASES)

T.C.(C)Nos. 308-317_of 2017 @ T.P.(C)Nos.2108-2117 of 2017

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40. Mr.  Gopal  Subramanium,  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the original petitioners in these cases,

stated  that  these  cases  have  been transferred  to  this  Court

from the Madras High Court.   A Section 33 ban,  which  was

imposed on 294 FDCs in these cases, has been stayed by the

Madras  High  Court,  and  the  very  exercise  that  we  have

proposed in the Delhi cases has apparently been carried out in

this group of cases.  A report of the expert committee of the

DTAB to review the rationality and safety of 294 FDCs is taken

on record.  The report indicates that 42 FDCs reportedly were

repeated  or  duplicate;  44  were  already  prohibited  for

manufacture  in  the  country;  83  were  considered  rational;  56

were considered not rational; 49 required further generation of

data; 17 were considered inadequate so far as rationality, safety

and efficacy  is  concerned;  and  3  other  cases  were  sent  for

further examination by an expert committee constituted by the

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.  The DTAB after review

of  the  report  and  deliberations  recommended  that  the  FDC

Ofloxacin  and  Prednisolone  at  serial  number  75  under  the

category of GI in Annexure C does not appear to be rational

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and should be re-examined.  The list of the drugs mentioned in

Annexure D are required to be prohibited/withdrawn from the

market  as these are not  rational.  Considering that  an expert

body has already deliberated upon and decided these cases,

we accept the report, and accordingly dispose of these petitions

in accordance therewith.

……………………….J. (R.F. Nariman)

……………………….J. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul)

New Delhi; December 15, 2017.  

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