REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1884  OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21343 of 2004]

Union of India      …. Appellant

Versus

Giani    …. Respondent WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1885  OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21344 of 2004]

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1886   OF 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22631 of 2004]

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1887   OF 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14207 of 2005]

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1.  Leave granted in all the petitions.

2. We  propose  to  dispose  of  all  these  appeals  by  this  

common judgment  and order.  In all  these  appeals  not

only the issues arising for our consideration on merit are  

identical  but  also  all  these  appeals  were  filed  by  the  

appellants herein after considerable delay.  

3. Having examined the averments made in the applications  

for condonation of delay in filing all the appeals and after  

hearing  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  we  are  

satisfied that the application for condonation of delay in  

preferring the appeals must be allowed as the statements  

in the applications for condonation of delay, in our view,  

do  constitute  sufficient  cause  in  not  preferring  the  

appeals  within  the  period  of  limitation.  We,  therefore,  

condone delay in all the appeals.  We have taken such a  

view  in  this  matter  as  we  feel  that  there  is  a  strong  

arguable case on behalf of the appellants and, therefore,  

it  is  felt  necessary  that  the  court  should  decide  the  

matter on merit by giving the expression sufficient cause  

a pragmatic justice oriented approach.  

4. In all these appeals counsel appearing for the appellant  

has raised just one issue, namely, that the respondent in  

each  of  the  appeals  is  not  entitled  to  receive  

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compensation  under  Section  23  (1A)  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short “the Act”] which has been  

granted in their favour by the orders of the High Court.

5. On 06.03.1995 by issuing notification under Section 4 of  

the Act, land situated in village-Ziauddinpur, Delhi was  

sought  to  be  acquired  for  public  purpose,  namely,  

planned development of Delhi. The aforesaid notification  

was followed by issuance of a declaration under Section 6  

of the Act which was issued on 07.01.1969. The Collector  

passed  the  award  on  09.07.1980  vide  his  award  No.  

39/80-81.  

6. Section 23 (1A)  of  the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 was  

inserted, w.e.f., 24.9.1984, by way of amendment to the  

Act which was made applicable to proceedings pending  

on  or  after  30.04.1982.  The  said  sub-section  (1A)  

provides  that  in  additional  to  the  market  value  of  the  

land, the Court would in every case award an amount  

calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on  

such market  value  for  the  period commencing  on and  

from the date of the publication of the notification under  

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Section 4, sub-Section (1), in respect of such land to the  

date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking  

possession  of  the  land,  whichever  is  earlier.  In  sub-

section 2 of Section 23 of the Act the words “thirty per  

centum” replaced the words “fifteen per centum”, w.e.f.,  

24.09.1984 and it  was also made applicable to certain  

awards  made  and  order  passed  after  30.04.1982.  The  

specific  and the  only  issue  which was agitated  by  the  

counsel appearing for the appellant before us, during the  

course  of  hearing  was  that,  since  the  aforesaid  

amendment  by  Act  No.  68  of  1984  inserted  a  new  

provision in the nature of  sub-section (1A),  which was  

inserted, w.e.f., 24.09.1984 [and was made applicable to  

proceedings pending on or after 30.04.1982] sub-section  

(1A)  would  not  be  applicable  in  the  present  case.  In  

support of the said contention reference was made to the  

decision of the Constitutional Bench of this Court in K.S.  

Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others reported in  

(1994) 5 SCC 593 in which this Court upon a combined  

reading of  Section 23(1A)  and Section 30(1)  of  the Act  

held as follows: -

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“74. ………. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section  30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the  proceedings  for  acquisition  of  land  which  had  commenced prior to the date of the commencement  of  the  amending  Act  into  two  categories,   proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4- 1982  and  proceedings  which  had  commenced  after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1)   deals  with  proceedings  which  had  commenced  prior  to  30-4-1982,  clause  (b)  deals  with   proceedings  which  commenced  after  30-4-1982.   By virtue of clause (a),  Section 23(1-A) has been  made  applicable  to  proceedings  which  had  commenced prior  to  30-4-1982 if  no  award  had  been made by the Collector in those proceedings  before 30-4-1982. It  covers (i)  proceedings which   were  pending  before the  Collector  on  30-4-1982  wherein  award  was  made  after  30-4-1982  but  before  the  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  amending Act, and (ii)  such proceedings wherein  award was made by the Collector after the date of  the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly  Section 30(1)(b)  covers (i)  proceedings which had  commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was   made prior to the commencement of the amending  Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was   made  after  the  commencement  of  the  amending  Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses (a)  and  (b)  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  30  cover  proceedings for acquisition which were pending on  the  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  amending  Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A)   have  been made  applicable  by  virtue  of  Section  30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section   30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were   pending on the date of the commencement of the   amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1)   would  have  been confined to proceedings which   had commenced prior to the commencement of the  amending  Act  and  had  concluded  before  such  commencement  because  by  virtue  of  Section  15  

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the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been  applicable  to  proceedings  pending  before  the  Collector  on  the  date  of  commencement  of  the  amending  Act.  There was  no need to  so phrase   Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section   23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before  the Collector on the date of the commencement of   the amending Act. This only indicates that but for  the  provisions contained in Section 30(1)  Section  23(1-A)  would  not  have  been  applicable  to  proceedings  pending  before  the  Collector  on  the   date of commencement of the amending Act.”

7. A similar issue again came up for consideration before  

this  Court  in  Pralhad  and  Others  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra and another reported in  (2010) 10 SCC  

458 wherein reference was made and reliance was placed  

in the decision of K.S. Paripoornan (supra).

8. In  the  present  case  the  acquisition  proceeding  

commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued  

on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award  

by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982,  

the date from which the amending Act  68 of 1984 was  

made  applicable  to  the  pending  and  subsequent  

proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by  

the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case  

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of  K.S.  Paripoornan (supra)  the  respondents  are  not  

entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).

9. All  the  appeals,  therefore,  are  partly  allowed  to  the  

aforesaid extent  and disposed of  leaving  the parties  to  

bear their own costs.

............................................J         [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ]

............................................J         [ Anil R. Dave ]

New Delhi, February 17, 2011.

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