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REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO.7780     OF     2012   (Arising out of SLP(C)No.2418 OF 2012)

Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. thr. Power of Attorney Holder        ……. Appellant (s)

Versus  

M.I.D.C. & Ors.                                   ……..Respondent(s)

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T      

Dr.     B.S.     Chauhan,     J.   

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has arisen from the impugned judgment and order  

dated 14.11.2011, passed by the High Court of Bombay in Writ  

Petition No.9513 of 2009, by way of which the High Court has  

rejected the claim of the appellants for any compensation due to them  

for the land taken by the respondent authorities, without resorting to  

any procedure prescribed by law.

3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as  

under:

A. The land in dispute admeasuring 0-2-3 and 0-7-1 (9500  

sq.mtrs.) in Survey nos. 2 and 3 respectively, situate in the revenue

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estate of village Shirwame Taluka and District Thane, was owned by  

the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, namely, Kana Ganpat  

Joshi, Maruti Kana Joshi, Dinanath Ganpat Joshi and Gopinath  

Ganpat Joshi.  A very large chunk of land including the said land  

stood notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) on 6.6.1964 for the establishment  

of the Ulhas Khore Project i.e. a project for industrial development.  

However, no subsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter, and  

the acquisition proceedings lapsed.  The predecessors-in-interest of  

the appellants were not merely illiterate farmers, but were also  

absolutely unaware of their rights and hence too inarticulate to claim  

them. Thus, they could be persuaded by the officers of the respondent  

authorities to hand over possession of the said land.  Actual physical  

possession of the said land was taken by the State authorities and  

handed over to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation  

(hereinafter called as  the ‘Development Corporation’) in the year  

1964 itself.  

B. Similarly situated persons who were also deprived of their  

rights in a similar manner were granted compensation vide order dated  

17.6.1966.  

C. The respondent-authorities realised in 1981 that grave injustice

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had been done to the appellants. Thus, in respect of the land in  

dispute, a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act dated  

14.5.1981 was issued.  However, no further proceedings under the Act  

were initiated. The appellants had been pursuing the authorities  

persuading them to complete the deemed acquisition proceedings, but  

despite their efforts, even a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was  

not issued and therefore, such proceedings also died a natural death.  

D. On 30.4.1988, the Development Corporation, under the  

instructions of the Government of Maharashtra handed over the  

possession of the said land to the City Industrial Development  

Corporation of Maharashtra (hereinafter referred to as ‘CIDCO’).  The  

appellants were unable to get any compensation for the said land or  

even for that matter, any land in lieu of the lands so taken, in spite of  

their best efforts made in this regard. Various beneficial schemes were  

floated by the State authorities in favour of persons who had been  

deprived of their livelihood and those, whose land had been acquired  

for the same purpose and under such schemes, such uprooted persons  

were granted a particular piece of developed land, proportionate to  

their area acquired.  But, appellants’ efforts in this regard also could  

not be fruitful.

E. As the appellants were unable to get any relief from any

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authority, though they were continuously pursuing their remedies by  

approaching the Special Land Acquisition Officer, as well as the  

Revenue Authorities of the State, without any success whatsoever,  

they then, feeling totally distraught/frustrated, approached the High  

Court of Bombay as a last resort, by filing Writ Petition No. 9513 of  

2009. The same was dismissed by the High Court only on the grounds  

of delay, and the non-availability of certain documents.  

Hence, this appeal.  

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused  

the record.  

5. This Court has dealt with this case on several occasions in the  

past and has repeatedly asked the State authorities to be sensitive,  

sympathetic and requested them to put forward suggestions before the  

court, to enable it to redress the grievances of the appellants. The  

respondents herein have placed various affidavits on record and the  

facts of the case have fairly been admitted.  

6. The appellants were deprived of their immovable property in  

1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution was still intact and the right  

to property was a part of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the  

Constitution.  It is pertinent to note that even after the Right to  

Property seized to be a Fundamental Right, taking possession of or

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acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to  

deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in accordance  

with the  "law", as the said word has specifically been used in Article  

300-A of the Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting  

to a procedure prescribed by a statute.  The same cannot be done by  

way of executive fiat or order or administration caprice. In Jilubhai  

Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 1995  

SC 142, it has been held as follows: -  

"In other words, Article 300-A only limits the power of  the State that no person shall be deprived of his property  save by authority of law. There is no deprivation without  due sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is  not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A.  In other words, if there is no law, there is no  deprivation."  

7. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional  

or a statutory right, but also a human right.  Though, it is not a basic feature  

of the Constitution or a fundamental right.  Human rights are considered to  

be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to  

livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human  

rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to  

property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension.

(Vide: Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 448;  Amarjit  

Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 43; Narmada

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Bachao Andolan v.  State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. AIR 2011 SC 1989;  

State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 559 and Delhi  

Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P & Anr. AIR 2012 SC 573)

8. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that  

emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is  

supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to  

deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter  

would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and  

interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest  

of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches  

as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal.  

9. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the  

right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service  

jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago,  

recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other  

categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few  

authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking  

remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or  

226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario  

altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land  

belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had

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asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must  

either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or  

any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and  

concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police  

power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the  

State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present  

case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A  

question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the  

State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to  

encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is  

also called abuse of power or use of  muscle power. To further clarify this  

position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a  

'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution.  

10.  The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of  

Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the  

Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and  

laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to  

grant relief.  There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial  

discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the  

cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It  

is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of

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cause action, etc.  That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience,  

then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party  

interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of  

delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of  

action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial  

conscience.  

11. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be  

decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from  

case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and  

the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.  It is not that  

there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under  

Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot  

interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may  

be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court  

would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a  

matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be  

exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The  

validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles substantially  

equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271;  

State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251; and  

Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,  (2009) 1

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SCC 768;)

12. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court  

should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it  

after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be  

exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the  

applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words,  

where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is  

manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial  

justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of  

substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to  

have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate  

delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact  

emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v.  

Chief  Controller of  Imports and Exports & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 769;  

Collector, Land Acquisition,  Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji &  

Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353; Dehri  Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v.  

District Board, Bhojpur & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802; Dayal Singh & Ors. v.  

Union of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1140; and Shankara Co-op Housing  

Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2161)

13. In the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,  AIR 1984  

SC 866,  this Court condoned a 30 year delay in approaching the court where

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it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the  

requisition of premises made by the State was assailed.

14. The High Court committed an error in holding the appellants non-

suited on the ground of delay and non-availability of records, as the court  

failed to appreciate that the appellants had been pursing their case  

persistently.  Accepting their claim, the Statutory authorities had even  

initiated the acquisition proceedings in 1981, which subsequently lapsed for  

want of further action on the part of those authorities.  The claimants are  

illiterate and inarticulate persons, who have been deprived of their  

fundamental rights  by the State, without it resorting to any procedure  

prescribed by law, without the court realising that the enrichment of a  

welfare State, or of its instrumentalities, at the cost of poor farmers is not  

permissible, particularly when done at the behest of the State itself.  The  

appellants belonged to a class which did not have any other vocation or any  

business/calling to fall back upon, for the purpose of earning their livelihood.  

15. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties, was a clear  

violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory  

authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is  

also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-

fulfillment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted  

persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such

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sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment.  

Therefore, it is not permissible  for any welfare State to uproot a person and  

deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb  

of industrial development.   

16. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about  

half a century. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class  

of citizens, the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard  and  

what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom  

Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law.  

17. The appellants have been seriously discriminated against qua other  

persons, whose land was also acquired. Some of them were given the  

benefits of acquisition, including compensation in the year 1966. This kind  

of discrimination not only breeds corruption, but also dis-respect for  

governance, as it leads to frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to  

take the law into their own hands. The findings of the High Court, that  

requisite records were not available, or that the appellants approached the  

authorities at a belated stage are contrary to the evidence available on record  

and thus, cannot be accepted and excused as it remains a slur on the system  

of governance and justice alike, and an anathema to the doctrine of equality,  

which is the soul of our Constitution.  Even under valid acquisition  

proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to

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complete such acquisition proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment  

of requisite compensation. The appeals etc. are required to be decided  

expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a person is not paid compensation in  

time,  he will be unable to purchase any land or other immovable property,  

for the amount of compensation that is likely to be paid to him at a belated  

stage.  

18. While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in K. Krishna Reddy  

& Ors. v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD  

Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 2123, held as under:  

“….After all money is what money buys. What the  claimants could have bought with the compensation in  1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it.  It is a common experience that the purchasing power of  rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed  payment may lose all charm and utility of the  compensation. In some cases, the delay may be  detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian  agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally  depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves  nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no  savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon.  They know no other work. They may even face starvation  unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost  importance that the award should be made without  delay. The enhanced compensation must be determined  without loss of time….”

19. In view of the above, the instant case represents a highly  

unsatisfactory and disturbing situation prevailing in one of the most  

developed States of our country.

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20. Be that as it may, ultimately, good sense prevailed, and  

learned senior counsel appearing for the State came forward with a  

welcome suggestion stating that in order to redress the grievances of  

the appellants, the respondent-authorities would notify the land in  

dispute under Section 4 of the Act within a period of 4 weeks from  

today. Section 6 declaration will be issued within a period of one  

week thereafter. As the appellants have full notice and information  

with respect to the proceedings, publication in the newspapers either  

of the notification or of the declaration under the Act are dispensed  

with. Notice under Section 9 of the Act will be served within a period  

of 4 weeks after the publication of Section 6 declaration and award  

will be made within a period of three months thereafter.  The deemed  

acquisition proceedings would thus, be concluded most expeditiously.  

Needless to say, the market value of the land in dispute will be  

assessed as it prevails on the date on which the Section 4 notification  

is published in the Official Gazette. Payment of compensation/award  

amount will be made to the claimants/persons-interested immediately  

thereafter, alongwith all statutory benefits.  The appellants shall be  

entitled to pursue the statutory remedies available to them for further  

enhancement of compensation, if so desired.  

21. Before parting with the case, we appreciate the gesture shown

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by the State Government for coming forward with a most appropriate  

suggestion to enable us to resolve the controversy involved herein, in  

a manner so cordial and sympathetic.  

22. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of.  

……..…….......................J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

……..…….......................J. (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

New Delhi, November  2, 2012