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                                                 REPORTABLE  

                                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1441 OF 2013      

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                ... APPELLANT(S)          

VS.    LEELA RAM @ LEELA DHAR                         ... RESPONDENT(S)       

J U D G M E N T      

DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.  

1  This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of  

Judicature for Rajasthan dated 13 August 2008.  The High Court, while allowing the  

appeal filed by the respondent, convicted him under Section 304 Part-II of the Indian  

Penal Code ('Penal Code') instead of Section 302.  The High Court sentenced the  

respondent to the period which was already undergone, stated to have been  

approximately five years and five months. The State is in appeal against the decision.  

2 A First Information Report was lodged by Satya Narayan Swami (PW-2) at

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Singhana (Rajasthan), that at about 6.30 p.m. on 27 February 2003, the deceased-Ram  

Kumwar Swami - was proceeding for some work at a chakki.  While he was passing by  

the hand pump near the house of Sriram Swami, three persons - Rajesh, Jagdish and  

Leela Ram (the respondent herein) attacked the deceased and caused serious injuries  

to him.  The case of the prosecution is that the respondent inflicted an axe injury on the  

skull of the deceased which was the cause of death. Rajesh, Jagdish and the  

respondent were tried for offences under Sections 341, 323, 336 and 302, read with  

Section 34 of the Penal Code.  The case of the prosecution rested principally on the  

evidence of  PW-1 Basanti Devi, the complainant PW-2 Satya Narayan Swami, PW-3  

Nathu Ram and PW-4 Gyarsi Lal.  PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 were all eye-

witnesses to the incident.  PW-4 is also an injured witness.  

3 The cause of death, as deposed to by PW-5 Dr. Hari Singh   Gothwal, was the  

injury which was sustained on the skull by the deceased.  While conducting the post-

mortem, PW-5 observed the following injury on the body of the deceased:  

 "Injury No.1 :- Crush injury 10 cm x 0.5 cm x depth of  

bone in the middle of the skull.  The left eye was closed  

as an impact of this injury.  The injury was caused with  

the help of sharp edged weapon.  The injury was caused  

within the duration of six hours."   

4  PW-4 Gyarsi Lal had also sustained the following injuries :  

 "(1) Contusion 5x3 cm in the lower region of  

    left thigh.  

(2) Abrasion and deformity 1x0.5 cm in the  

    lower region of the right forearm."  

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5 The Trial Court believed the depositions of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4.   

Adverting to the evidence of PW-2, the Trial Court held that the accused had launched  

an assault on his brother with an intention to grab the possession of his land.  All the  

above eye-witnesses stated that the respondent-Leela Ram had attacked the deceased  

with an axe on the skull.  PW-5 stated that the injury on the skull was the cause of  

death and was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. Besides the ocular  

evidence of PW-1 to PW-4, the medical evidence and the  deposition of PW-5, the  

prosecution relied on the recovery of a blood stained axe at the behest of the  

respondent.  The axe was recovered vide seizure memo Exh. P-18.  The Trial Court  

convicted Leela Ram for the offences under Sections 341, 323 and 302 of the Penal  

Code.  He was, however, acquitted of the offence under Section 336.  Rajesh and  

Jagdish were acquitted by the Trial Court.  

 6 Criminal Appeal No.580/2005 was filed by the respondent against the judgment  

of conviction.  A criminal revision, being Criminal Revision Petition No.958/2005, was  

filed by the complainant against the acquittal of the two co-accused.    

 7 The High Court by its judgment dated 13 August 2008, allowed the appeal of the  

respondent in part and convicted him of an offence under Section 304 Part-II of the  

Penal Code.  In coming to this conclusion, the High Court adverted to the following  

circumstances, which in its view emerged from the evidence adduced by the  

prosecution:  

 “(i) Prosecution is able to establish that appellant  

inflicted injury with blunt object on the head of

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the deceased.  

(ii)  Injury on head attributed to appellant gets  

corroboration from the post mortem report.  

(iii) The death was caused without premeditation and  

the appellant did not act in a cruel or unusual  

manner.  Incident appears to have  occurred on a  

spur of moment.  Something sparked suddenly  

and appellant inflicted single blow on the head of  

Ram Kumar.  

(iv) There is no trustworthy evidence on record to  

prove that co-accused Rajesh Kumar and  

Jagdish Prasad had shared common intention  

with the appellant."  

8 The revision filed by the complainant was dismissed.  

9 Assailing the judgment of the High Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  

the State of Rajasthan submits that :  

(i)  The consistent account of four eye-witnesses - PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4  

indicates that it was the respondent who had inflicted an injury with an axe on a  

vital part of the body of the deceased, namely, his skull;  

(ii) The medical evidence in the form of the post-mortem report and the deposition of  

PW-5 establishes beyond doubt that the death was caused as a result of the  

injury sustained because of a sharp-edged weapon; and  

(iii) The fact that the injury was caused by the axe is also corroborated by its  

recovery vide seizure memo Exh.P-18 and by the FSL report which reported  

blood stains on the axe.   

Learned counsel submits that the finding of the High Court that an incident took place  

without pre-meditation, so as to bring the case within the Exception 4 of Section 300 of

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the Penal Code, is based on no evidence whatsoever.  On the contrary, the evidence  

clearly establishes that the respondent was armed with a lethal weapon which was  

used to inflict a serious injury on a vital part of the body of the deceased. Learned  

counsel submits that the mere fact that there was a single blow, is not a circumstance  

which would warrant the conviction under Section 302 being altered to one under  

Section 304 Part-II.  On the contrary, learned counsel submitted that the case would fall  

under Section 300 (Fourthly) since the act of the respondent was so imminently  

dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to  

cause death.  

10 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent  

submitted that the case of the prosecution has been disbelieved by the Trial Court in  

regard to the two co-accused - Rajesh and Jagdish.  According to this submission, the  

prosecution had sought to adduce evidence to the effect that a lathi had been used in  

the course of the incident by the two co-accused.  This was not accepted by the Trial  

Court.  Hence, emphasis was placed on the evidence of PW-5 that the injury could  

have been caused due to a blunt object.  The judgment of the High Court convicting the  

respondent under 304 Part-II, it was urged, ought not to be disturbed.    

11 In assessing the rival submissions, it would be necessary to advert to the  

evidence of the four eye-witnesses who have been believed, both by the Trial Court and  

by the High Court, insofar as the complicity of the respondent is concerned.  PW-2, who  

is the complainant, has deposed to the genesis of the incident.  According to him, when  

the deceased was passing by the house of Sri Ram Swamy, he was seized upon by the  

respondent (together with the two co-accused).  Leela Ram, the respondent, inflicted an

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axe blow on the skull of the deceased.  The evidence of PW-2 on the involvement of the  

respondent finds abundant corroboration in the deposition of PW-1 Basanti Devi, the  

complainant PW-2 Satya Narayan Swami, PW-3 Nathu Ram and PW-4 Gyarsi Lal.   

PW-4, is an injured eye-witness.  His presence is hence established in any event  

beyond all reasonable doubt.  From the evidence of these witnesses coupled with the  

medical evidence, it has emerged that the respondent inflicted an axe blow in the centre  

of the skull of the deceased.  The evidence of PW-5 was clear in indicating that the  

injury was caused with the help of a sharp edged weapon.  PW-5 also stated that the  

cranium and spinal cord and the parietal bone had been fractured.  The injury on the  

skull, lead to coma and was the cause of death. Coupled with these circumstances is  

the recovery of the weapon of offence which was found to be blood stained.  On the  

basis of this unimpeachable evidence, it is clear that : (i) death was caused as a result  

of the injury inflicted upon the skull of the deceased by the use of the axe; and (ii) the  

respondent was the author of the injury and wielded the axe, as a result of which death  

was the immediate and natural cause.    

12 In Mahesh Balmiki v State of M P 1 , this Court while deciding the question of  

whether a single blow with a knife on the chest of the deceased would attract Section  

302, held thus:  

“9. … there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow  

Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A single blow may, in some  

cases, entail conviction under Section 302 IPC, in some  

cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under  

Section 326 IPC. The question with regard to the nature of  

offence has to be determined on the facts and in the  

circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether  

it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon  

                                                 1  (2000) 1 SCC 319

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used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the  

manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors  

which may go to determine the required intention or  

knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him.  

In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving  

himself because he was held by the associates of the  

appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the  

description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the  

appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In any event,  

he can safely be attributed the knowledge that the knife-blow  

given by him was so imminently dangerous that it must in all  

probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to  

cause death.”  

In Hukam Chand v State of Haryana 2 , this Court while dealing with the question of  

whether a blow on the skull with a pharsa would attract a conviction under Section 302,  

held thus :    

“15. Coming back to the issue raised as regards the  

invocation of Section 304 Part II IPC, strong reliance was  

placed on a decision of this Court in Pularu v. State of  

M.P.[1993 SCC (Cri) 1023 : AIR 1993 SC 1487] , wherein K.  

Jayachandra Reddy, J., as His Lordship then was, speaking  

for the Bench in para 7 of the Report stated: [SCC (Cri) p.  

1025, para 7]  

“7. That takes us to the nature of the offence. All the three  

eyewitnesses have spoken that the appellant dealt only one  

blow with the agricultural implement. Having regard to the  

time and the surrounding circumstances it is difficult to hold  

that he intended to cause the death of the deceased  

particularly, when he was not armed with any deadly weapon  

as such. As an agriculturist he must have been having a  

tabbal in his hands and if in those circumstances he dealt a  

single blow it is difficult to convict him by invoking clause 1stly  

or 3rdly of Section 300 IPC. It cannot be said that he intended  

to cause that particular injury which unfortunately resulted in  

the fracture of bones. Therefore, the offence committed by  

him would be one amounting to culpable homicide punishable  

under Section 304 Part II IPC…  

16. While it is true that there was only one blow but the  

medical evidence on record definitely indicates that the  

severity of the blow was such that it was sufficient for causing  

                                                 2  (2002) 8 SCC 421

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death. In Pularu [1993 SCC (Cri) 1023 : AIR 1993 SC 1487]  

the appellant dealt only one blow with an agricultural  

implement. This Court having regard to the fact that Pularu  

was an agriculturist came to a conclusion that question of  

there being any intent to cause death of the deceased would  

not arise since he was not armed with any deadly weapon as  

such. Presently, however, the situation is slightly different.  

Hukam Chand was in the house. He was called in and he  

arrived at the scene and place of occurrence with a pharsa  

which by all means is a deadly weapon and it is this pharsa  

which was used to hit the deceased at his head resulting in  

his immediate collapse and subsequent death. The story set  

up by the appellant, as noticed hereinbefore belies the  

incident and cannot but be ascribed to be a totally fabricated  

one. Injuries suffered by Udai Chand, the deceased, cannot  

be said to be inflicted as a matter of chance while grappling  

with each other. The nature of the injuries, as noticed  

hereinbefore, depicts it otherwise. If that be the case which  

stands to reason that there was in fact a deliberate pharsa-

blow on the deceased, then and in that event, a simple  

question by itself would negate the plea of the accused,  

namely, as to the reason why Hukam Chand arrived at the  

place of occurrence with a pharsa in his hand. The factum of  

bringing in the pharsa at the place of occurrence from his  

house when he was sent for cannot be ignored. It definitely  

indicates the intent to use it and thereby cause death.”  

In Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v State of Gujarat 3 , this Court while discussing the  

ingredients of the Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, held thus:    

“11. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts  

done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case  

of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first  

exception, after which its place would have been more  

appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same  

principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But,  

while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of  

self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of  

passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to  

deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is  

provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury  

done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In  

fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding  

                                                 3  (2003) 9 SCC 322

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that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given  

in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may  

have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties  

puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A “sudden  

fight” implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The  

homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral  

provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be  

placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more  

appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no  

previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight  

suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less  

to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the  

other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not  

have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual  

provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the  

share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of  

Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without  

premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders  

having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual  

manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person  

killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients  

mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight”  

occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in  

IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that  

there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in  

this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on  

account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a  

combat between two and more persons whether with or  

without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general  

rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a  

question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must  

necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For  

the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that  

there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It  

must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue  

advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The  

expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision  

means “unfair advantage”.”  

In Pulicherla Nagaraju v State of A P 4 , this Court while deciding whether a case falls  

under Section 302 or 304 Part I of 304 Part II, held thus :    

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal  

question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide  

whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304  

Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a  

                                                 4  (2006) 11 SCC 444

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fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude  

word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to  

altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual  

motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be  

totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention.  

There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even  

be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be  

cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the  

penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there  

was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure  

that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are  

not converted into offences punishable under Section 304  

Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to  

murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302.  

The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from  

a combination of a few or several of the following, among  

other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii)  

whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was  

picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a  

vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in  

causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of  

sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether  

the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any  

premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or  

whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there  

was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause  

for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of  

passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken  

undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual  

manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or  

several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course,  

not exhaustive and there may be several other special  

circumstances with reference to individual cases which may  

throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”  

In Singapagu Anjaiah v State of A P 5 , this Court while deciding the question of  

whether a blow on the skull of the deceased with a crowbar would attract Section 302,  

held thus :   

“16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the  

accused, his intention has to be gathered from the weapon  

used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the  

nature of the injuries caused. Here, the appellant had chosen  

a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further chosen a  

vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which  

                                                 5  (2010) 9 SCC 799

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had caused multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the  

force with which the appellant had used the weapon. The  

cumulative effect of all these factors irresistibly leads to one  

and the only conclusion that the appellant intended to cause  

death of the deceased.”  

In Som Raj v State of H P 6 , this Court while deciding the question of whether a single  

blow on the skull with a darat would attract conviction under Section 302, held thus :   

 “16.2. From the statements of Dr Suman Saxena (PW 4) and  

Dr B.M. Gupta (PW 5), the nature of injuries caused to the  

deceased has been brought out. A perusal thereof would  

leave no room for doubt that the appellant-accused had  

chosen the sharp side of the darat and not the blunt side. The  

ferocity with which the aforesaid blow was struck clearly  

emerges from the fact that the blow resulted in cutting  

through the skull of the deceased and caused a hole therein,  

resulting in exposing the brain tissue. When a blow with a  

deadly weapon is struck with ferocity, it is apparent that the  

assailant intends to cause bodily injury of a nature which he  

knows is so imminently dangerous, that it must in all  

probability cause death.  

16.3. The place where the blow was struck (at the back of the  

head of the deceased) by the appellant-accused, also leads  

to the same inference.  

16.4. It is not the case of the appellant-accused that the  

occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel. It is also not his  

case that the blow was struck in the heat of the moment. It is  

not even his case that he had retaliated as a consequence of  

provocation at the hands of the deceased. He has therefore  

no excuse for such an extreme act.  

16.5. Another material fact is the relationship between the  

parties. The appellant-accused was an uncle to the  

deceased. In such circumstances, there is hardly any cause  

to doubt the intent and knowledge of the appellant-accused.  

16.6. Besides the aforesaid factual position, it would be  

incorrect to treat the instant incident as one wherein a single  

blow had been inflicted by the accused. As many as five  

witnesses of the occurrence have stated in unison, that the  

appellant-accused was in the process of inflicting a second  

blow on the deceased, when they caught hold of him,  

                                                 6  (2013) 14 SCC 246

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whereupon one of them (Mohinder Singh, PW 6) snatched  

the darat from the appellant-accused, and threw it away. In  

such a situation, it would be improper to treat/determine the  

culpability of the appellant-accused by assuming that he had  

inflicted only one injury on the deceased.  

16.7. Keeping in mind the parameters of the judgments  

referred to by the learned counsel for the rival parties (which  

have been extracted above), we have no doubt in our mind  

that the appellant-accused must be deemed to have  

committed the offence of “culpable homicide amounting to  

murder” under Section 302 of the Penal Code, as the  

appellant-accused Som Raj had struck the darat-blow with  

the intention of causing such bodily injury, which he knew was  

so imminently dangerous, that it would in all probability cause  

the death of Sardari Lal. Having recorded the aforesaid  

conclusion, we are satisfied, that the appellant-accused was  

justifiably convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the  

Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment  

for life, as also, to pay a fine of Rs 10,000 (and in default, to  

undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of one  

year).  

17. In view of our aforesaid conclusions, the instant appeal  

being devoid of merit, is dismissed.”  

13 The High Court has, in our view, proceeded entirely on the basis of surmise in  

opining that the death was caused without pre-meditation and on the spur of the  

moment.  In arriving at that inference, the High Court has evidently ignored the  

evidence, bearing upon the nature of the incident, the consistent account that it was the  

respondent who had inflicted the blow, the weapon of offence and the vital part of the  

body on which the injury was inflicted. The fact that the co-accused, Rajesh and  

Jagdish, have been acquitted by the Trial Court, is in our view no reason to doubt the  

testimony of all the eye-witnesses which implicated the respondent. The death was  

attributable to the assault by the respondent on the deceased, during the course of the  

incident.  Having regard to the above facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident  

that the injury which was caused to the deceased was [within the meaning of Section  

300 (Fourthly)] of a nature that the person committing the act knew that it was so

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imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as  

is likely to cause death.    

14 In seeking to place the facts of the present case within the Exception 4, the High  

Court has dwelt on whether the incident took place without pre-meditation.  Exception 4  

is extracted below :  

"Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is  

committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the  

heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the  

offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a  

cruel or unusual manner."  

15 Under Exception 4, culpable homicide is not murder if the stipulations contained  

in that provision are fulfilled. They are : (i) that the act was committed without pre-

meditation; (ii) that there was a sudden fight; (iii) the act must be in the heat of passion  

upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the offender should not have taken undue advantage or  

acted in a cruel or unusual manner.  

16 While learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent sought to place  

reliance on the statement of the respondent under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal  

Procedure, 1973, that it was the deceased who came to their house and started pelting  

stones, it is evident that this defence has no basis in the evidence. Above all, the  

deceased was unarmed when he was seized upon and assaulted by the respondent.  

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17 In the above circumstances, we are affirmatively of the view that the judgment of  

the High Court is manifestly perverse and is totally contrary to the evidence on the  

record.  The interference of this Court is warranted to obviate a complete failure or  

miscarriage of justice.  

18 We allow the appeal and while setting aside the judgment of the High Court,  

restore the conviction of the respondent by the Trial Court under Section 302 of the  

Penal Code.  The respondent is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life.  The  

respondent shall forthwith surrender to his sentence.  A copy of this order shall be  

forwarded by the Registry to the Chief Judicial Magistrate of the area concerned to  

secure compliance.  

19 Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.  

    ………..…………………….............................J.                                                                            [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD]  

………………………………...........................J.                             [M R SHAH]  

New Delhi;  13th December, 2018.