REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6996 OF 2019 (Arising from SLP(C) Nos. 23921/2018)

The State of Maharashtra and others ..Appellants

Versus

M/s Moti Ratan Estate and another ..Respondents WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6998 OF 2019 (Arising from SLP(C) Nos.21390/2019)

                         Diary No. 3189/2019 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2019 (Arising from SLP(C) Nos. 6194/2019)

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Delay condoned in Special Leave Petition (C) Diary

No.3189/2019.  Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

2. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of

appeals, they are being disposed of by this common judgment

and order.  

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3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgments and orders dated 24.03.2017 and 27.04.2018 passed

by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at

Aurangabad in Writ Petition Nos. 7867/2012, 10894/2016 and

9088/2016, by which the High Court has allowed the said writ

petitions and has quashed the entire acquisition proceedings

with respect to the acquired lands solely on the ground that the

acquisition has  lapsed as  the awards under Section 11 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’)

were not declared within a period of two years from the date of

declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, the State of

Maharashtra and others have preferred the present appeals.

3.1 For the sake of convenience, the facts in the appeal arising

out of special leave petition No. 23921/2018 arising out of the

impugned judgment and order dated 24.03.2017 passed by the

High Court in Writ Petition No. 7867/2012 are considered as the

facts in other two appeals are identical.

4. That the acquired land  in question  is situated within the

local limits of village Asarjan, Taluka and District Nanded.  That

the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and

published in the Official Gazette on 01.03.2012.   The same was

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published  at  Village  Chawdi  Asarjan  by beating of drums on

12.04.2012.   That thereafter notification under Section 6 of the

Act was published on 07.02.2013 and the notification under

Section 6 of the Act was published at Village Chawdi Asarjan by

beating of drums on 13.02.2013.

4.1 That the original land  owners challenged the acquisition

and the notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 01.03.2012

by filing Writ Petition No. 7867 of 2012 on 09.05.2012.  That vide

order dated 11.10.2013, the High Court directed that the

possession of the original writ petitioners shall not be disturbed.

The other land owners, whose lands were acquired for the very

project and under the very Section 4 notification dated

01.03.2012, also challenged the acquisition proceedings and

Section 4 notification with respect to their lands by filing Writ

Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.  In those writ petitions

also the High Court granted stay to the acquisition proceedings

vide  order  dated  12.11.2013.   It appears that  by  order  dated

20.11.2013, the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and

3159/2013 modified the earlier interim order and directed that

till the next date, final award shall not be declared.  However, the

State was permitted to move an application seeking leave of the

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Court to  declare the  award, if the  award is ready.  That the

aforesaid  two writ  petitions came to be disposed of  vide order

dated 08.01.2014.   However, the High Court continued the

interim order  dated  20.11.2013  by  12  weeks.  The  12  weeks

period got over on 02.04.2014.  That thereafter the award under

Section 11 of the Act was passed on 08.05.2015 with respect to

the acquired lands in question, i.e., in the case of Writ Petition

No. 7867/2012.  At this stage, it is required to be noted that the

acquisition was challenged on number of grounds.   However, at

the time of hearing of Writ Petition No. 7867/2012, it was

submitted that the entire acquisition  has  been lapsed as the

award was not declared within a period of two years from the

date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

It was submitted on behalf of the State that in view of the

pending  proceedings challenging the  acquisition  as  well as in

view of the interim stay granted by the High Court directing that

the possession of the acquired land shall not be disturbed and in

view of the specific stay order granted in Writ Petition Nos.

3051/2013 and 3159/2013 restraining the State from declaring

final award, the period during which stay was operating is

required to be excluded and if such period is excluded, in that

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case, the award was declared within a period of two years and

therefore there is no question of lapsing the acquisition

proceedings.  However, by the impugned judgment and order, the

High Court has set aside the acquisition proceedings solely on

the ground that the acquisition has lapsed as the award under

Section 11 of the Act has not been declared within a period of two

years from the date of publication of the declaration under

Section 6 of the Act.   It is required to be noted that so far as

challenge to the acquisition on other grounds is concerned, the

High Court held against the original writ petitioners.   However,

set  aside the acquisition solely  on  the  ground  that the  award

under Section 11 of the Act has not been declared within a period

of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the

Act.

4.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court in quashing and

setting aside the acquisition, the State has preferred the present

appeal.   So far as other two appeals are concerned, the original

writ  petitioners subsequently challenged the acquisition  in the

year 2016 after the declaration of the award under Section 11 of

the Act challenging the acquisition proceedings also on the

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ground that as the award has not been declared within a period

of two years from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the

Act the acquisition proceedings have been lapsed.  Accepting the

submission on behalf of the original writ petitioners, by the

impugned common judgment and order, the High Court has

quashed and set  aside the acquisition proceedings considering

Section 11A of the Act and on the ground that the acquisition

proceedings have been lapsed as the award under Section 11 of

the Act has not been declared within a period of two years from

the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  Hence, these

appeals by grant of special leave petitions.  

5. Shri Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, learned

Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant – State has

vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the

case, the High Court has materially erred in quashing and setting

aside the acquisition on the ground that the award under Section

11 of the Act has not been declared within a period of two years

from the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

5.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Katneshwarkar, learned

Advocate appearing for the appellants that the High Court has

materially erred in not properly appreciating the fact that in view

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of the challenge to the acquisition proceedings and stay of

possession granted by the High Court in Writ Petition No.

7867/2012 and even the stay of the acquisition proceedings and

against declaring the award in Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and

3159/2013, the award under Section 11 of the Act was not

declared.  It is submitted that excluding the period during which

the stay  was granted,  more particularly stay granted in Writ

Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013, subsequent declaration

of the award can be said to be within the period prescribed under

Section 11 of the Act.

5.2 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on

behalf of the appellants that the High Court has erred in holding

that as respondent no.1 herein – original writ petitioner was not a

party to Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013, the

extension of  period during which stay was  in operation  in the

said writ petitions was not applicable to the case of respondent

no.1.  It is submitted that as such writ petition Nos. 3051/2013

and 3159/2013 were with respect to the lands acquired under

the same notification and with respect to the very village and the

project and therefore the authority was justified in not declaring

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the award  in the present case during the period the stay was

operating in writ petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.

5.3 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on

behalf of the appellants that even in the present case there was a

stay against  possession and the entire acquisition proceedings

were under challenge and therefore the authority was justified in

not declaring the award, which was declared subsequently, more

particularly after the vacation of the stay granted in writ petition

Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.

5.4 In support of his submission that in the facts and

circumstances of  the case the authorities were  justified  in not

proceeding with the acquisition proceedings including not

declaring the award and therefore acquisition proceedings would

not  lapse,  Shri Katneshwarkar, learned Advocate appearing on

behalf of the appellants has relied upon the following decisions of

this Court in the cases of  G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of

Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 261; Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya

v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 531; Gandhi Grah Nirman

Sahkari Samiti Ltd. V. State of Rajasthan (1993) 2 SCC 662;

Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra (1993) 3 SCC 634;

Sangappa Gurulingappa  Sajjan  v.  State  of  Karnataka (1994)  4

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SCC 145; Abhey Ram v. Union of India  (1997) 5 SCC 421; Om

Prakash v. Union of India (2010) 4 SCC 17;  and the recent

decision of this Court in the case of  Raj Kumar Gandhi v.

Chandigarh Administration and others (2018) 7 SCC 763.

5.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the

aforesaid decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and

quash and set aside the impugned judgments and orders passed

by the High Court.

6. Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Advocate has appeared

on behalf of the respondents – original writ petitioners.

6.1 While opposing the present appeals and supporting the

impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, Shri

Navare, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the

original  writ  petitioners  has  vehemently  submitted  that in the

facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly

quashed and set aside the acquisition proceedings on the ground

that the award under Section 11 of the Act has not been declared

within a period of two years from the date of declaration under

Section 6 of the Act.   It is submitted that in the facts and

circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly observed

that Section 11A of the Act would be attracted and therefore due

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to non­declaration of the award within a period of two years from

the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the acquisition

proceedings have been lapsed.

6.2 It is further submitted by Shri Navare, learned Senior

Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners that

in fact there was no stay by the High Court restraining the

authorities from declaring the award and the only stay was

granted with respect to possession and therefore it was always

open for the authorities to declare the award under Section 11 of

the  Act to  avoid lapsing  of  proceedings.   It is submitted that

however the authorities did not declare the award.   It is

submitted that therefore as there was no stay either to the

acquisition proceedings and/or against declaring the final award,

as rightly observed by the High Court, there is no question of any

exclusion of the period.  It is submitted that therefore the award

under Section 11 of the Act was beyond the period of two years

and therefore considering Section 11A of the Act, the entire

acquisition proceedings would lapse.

6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Navare, learned Senior

Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners that

as rightly observed by the High Court the stay to the acquisition

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proceedings and/or against declaring the final award was in

other petitions, i.e., Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and

3159/2013 and not relating to the petitioners land  and therefore

the exclusion of period of stay granted in writ petition Nos.

3051/2013 and 3159/2013 shall not be available to the

State/authorities with respect to the original writ petitioners

land.

6.4 Now  so far as reliance placed  upon the  decision  of this

Court in the case of   Raj Kumar Gandhi (supra), relied upon by

the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State is

concerned,  Shri  Navare, learned Senior  Advocate appearing on

behalf of the original writ petitioners has submitted that the said

decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand

as in the instant case the Land Acquisition Officer has chosen to

keep the land, with respect to which stay was granted, away from

the declaration of the award (Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and

3159/2013) and the award was declared with respect to rest of

the land. It is submitted that therefore the award in the case of

the  writ petitioners  will have to comply  with the  mandate of

Section 11A of the Act.

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6.5 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the

present appeals.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties

at length.

7.1 (A) The short question posed for the consideration of this

Court is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the

High Court is justified in quashing and setting aside the entire

acquisition proceedings on the ground that the same have lapsed

under  Section 11A of the  Act?   (B)  The  moot  question which

arises for our consideration is whether the stay of

action/proceedings by some of the land holders

prohibiting/preventing the State authorities to make the award

under  Section 11 of the  Act,  within  a  statutory  period of two

years  provided under  Section 11A of the  Act from declaration

under Section 6 of the Act would be equally extendable to the

other alike cases of land holders/persons interested/respondents

in the instant case?

7.2 Now so far as the appeal arising out of the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.

7867/2012 is concerned, immediately on publication of the

notification under Section 4 of the Act, the original writ

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petitioners challenged the acquisition proceedings including the

notification under Section 4 of the Act.   The High Court passed

the interim order directing that the possession of the original writ

petitioners shall  not  be  disturbed.  Simultaneously, the  other

land owners  whose lands were  acquired under the  very  same

notification and of the very village Asarjan and acquired for the

very project also challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing

Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.   The High Court

granted stay to the acquisition proceedings on 12.11.2013 which

subsequently came to be modified and it was directed that the

final award shall not be declared.  Other two writ petitions being

Writ Petition Nos. 10894/2016 and 9088/2016 were filed after

the award was declared under Section 11 of the Act challenging

the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the same have

been lapsed under Section 11A of the Act as the award has not

been declared within a period of two years.  The State authorities

pleaded for extension of time during which the stay was operating

in writ petition nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.   It has not been

accepted by the High Court on the ground that the stay of the

acquisition proceedings was granted not relating to the writ

petitioners but was with respect to the other land owners.

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Therefore, the  question which  is required to  be  considered  is,

whether the authorities were justified in not declaring the award

in the case of other land owners in view of granting of the stay to

the acquisition proceedings with respect to other lands acquired,

which were acquired under the very notification and for the very

project.

7.3 In the recent  decision in the  case  of  Raj  Kumar  Gandhi

(supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the applicability

of Section 11A of the Act.  After considering  catena of decisions

of this Court on the applicability of Section 11A of the Act, this

Court observed and held that  where scheme of the acquisition is

one, interim stay granted in respect of one pocket of land would

operate  even in respect of other pockets of land and therefore the

authorities were justified in not proceeding with the acquisition

proceedings and consequently the acquisition proceedings would

not lapse.   In the same decision, this Court has considered the

earlier decisions of this Court in the cases of G. Narayanaswamy

Reddy (supra); Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya (supra); Gandhi

Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.(supra); Hansraj H. Jain (supra);

Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan (supra); Abhey Ram (supra); and

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Om Prakash(supra).   In the case of Raj Kumar Gandhi (supra), in

which one of us (Brother Arun Mishra, J. was a member), this

Court has dealt with and considered the earlier decisions of this

Court with respect to applicability of Section 11A of the Act in

paragraphs 11, 12, 15 and 16 as under:

“11. In Abhey  Ram [Abhey  Ram v. Union  of India, (1997) 5  SCC  421] this  Court has considered the extended meaning of the words “stay of the action or proceedings” and referring to various decisions, observed that any type of the orders passed by the Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. This Court has observed thus: (SCC pp. 428­29, para 9)

“9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union of India [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150] are obvious with reference to the quashing of the publication of the declaration under Section  6  vis­à­vis the  writ  petitioners therein. The question that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from publication  of the  declaration  under  Section  6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellants.  We  proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High  Court in some of the  cases  has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court  has not  restricted the  declaration  in the impugned orders in support of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the  matters  were  disposed  of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders

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of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] ; Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra [Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634] ; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] ; Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662] ; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka [G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261] and Roshanara Begum v. Union of India [Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, (1986) 1 Apex Dec 6 (SC)] . The words “stay of the action or proceeding” have been widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an enquiry under Section 5­A was put in issue and the declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that enquiry under Section 5­A was properly conducted and the declaration published under Section 6  was valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Section 5­A enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt.”

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12. In Om Parkash v. Union of India [Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] , this Court as to the effect of interim stay has observed thus: (SCC p. 44, para 72)

“72.  Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to  issue notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court. The language employed in the interim orders of  stay  is  also such that it  had completely restrained the respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing declaration/notification  under  Section  6 of the Act.”

15. The learned counsel has also relied upon Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] in which this Court has opined that the Explanation to Section 11­A is in the widest  possible terms  and there is  no  warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11. Therefore, the period of  an  injunction obtained by  the  landholder from the High Court restraining the land acquisition authorities from taking possession of the land has to be excluded  in computing  the period of two years. The decision is of no help to the submission espoused on behalf of the appellant. This Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya[Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of  Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] observed: (SCC p. 535, para 8)

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“8. The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why the aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand,  it appears to us that Section 11­A is  intended to confer a benefit  on a  landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition  proceedings  would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the  Gujarat  High  Court  was right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment.”

16. Reliance has also been placed on Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of  Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] , in which this Court has laid down that in case there  was  a stay of dispossession,  no  useful purpose  would be served  by issuing a declaration

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under Section 6. Therefore, the period during which the order of dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be excluded in the computing period. In Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of  Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] this Court observed: (SCC pp. 147­48, para 2)

“2. The petitioner contends that the declaration under Section 6 was not published within three years from the date of the Notification dated 17­ 5­1984 and, therefore, the Notification under Section 4(1) shall stand lapsed. We find no substance in the contention. Firstly, the case would be dismissed on a short ground that though this plea was available to the petitioner, he did not raise the same in the first  instance and that, therefore,  by operation of  Section 11 CPC, it operates as constructive res judicata. Under first proviso to Section 6(1), as amended in Land  Acquisition (Amendment)  Act  68  of  1984 through Section 6 thereof that (i) no declaration in respect  of  any  particular land covered by  a notification under Section 4, sub­section (1) shall be published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the notification; or (ii) after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication  of the  notification. In other  words, under the pre­Amendment Act the declaration under Section 6(1) shall  not be published after the expiry of three years from the date of Section 4(1) publication and after the commencement of the Amendment Act, the State has no power to proceed with the matter and publish the declaration under Section 6(1) after the expiry of

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one year from the date of the publication of the notification.  Explanation 1  thereto provides the method  or  mode of computation of the period referred to in the first proviso, namely, the period during which “any action or proceeding” be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub­section (1) of Section 4 being “stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded”. In other words, the period occupied by the order of stay made by a court shall be excluded. Admittedly, pending writ petition on both the occasions the High Court granted “stay of dispossession”. Admittedly, the validity or tenability of the notification issued and published under Section 4(1) is subject of adjudication  before the  High Court. Till the writ petitions are disposed of or the appeals following its heels, the stay of dispossession was in operation. Though there is no specific direction prohibiting the publication of the declaration under Section 6, no useful purpose would be served by publishing Section 6(1) declaration pending adjudication of the legality of Section 4(1) notification. If any action is taken to pre­empt the proceedings, it would be stigmatised either as “undue haste” or action to “overreach the court's judicial process”. Therefore, the period during which the order of dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be excluded in computation of the period of three years covered by clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land Acquisition Act. When it is so computed, the declaration published on the second occasion is perfectly valid. Under these circumstances, we do not find any justification to quash the notification published under Section 6 dated 17­5­1984. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed. No costs.”

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7.4 That thereafter in paragraphs 13 and 17, this Court

has observed and held as under:

“13. Thus, it is apparent that when the stay has been granted  in one matter  and when  the  scheme was one, authorities were justified in the facts and circumstances of the instant case to stay their hands.  Moreover, a large  number  of  writ petitions have been dismissed by the High Court and orders have attained finality and this Court has also dismissed the appeals/SLPs. Thus, we are not inclined to take a different view in the instant case.

17. In the instant case,  various notifications and declarations under Sections 4 and 6 were issued on the same date with respect to the same scheme. Thus, they were part and parcel of the same scheme. Thus, the submission raised by the learned counsel for the appellant stands rejected.”

7.5 On considering catena of decisions of this Court, referred to

hereinabove, the following propositions of law can be culled out:

(i) when the scheme  of the acquisition is one, interim  stay

granted in respect of one pocket of land would operate even with

respect to  other  pockets  of land  and in such  a situation the

authorities  are justified  in not  proceeding with the acquisition

proceedings and therefore the acquisition proceedings would not

lapse;

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(ii) interim order of stay granted in respect of one of the land

owners  would have  a  complete restraint for the  authorities to

proceed further;

(iii) when the stay has been granted in one matter and where

the scheme was one, the authorities were justified to stay their

hands;

(iv) the extended meaning of the words “stay of the action or

proceedings under Section 11A of the Act” would mean that any

interim effective order passed by the court which may come in

the way of the authorities to proceed further;

(v) Explanation to  Section  11A  of the  Act is   in the  widest

possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or

proceedings, referred to in the explanation, to actions or

proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11

of the Act and therefore the period of injunction obtained by the

land holders staying the acquisition  and authorities from taking

possession of the land  has to be excluded in computing the

period of two years.   

7.6 Now so far as submission  on  behalf of the original  writ

petitioners that when subsequently the award was declared, the

lands with respect to Writ Petition Nos. 3051/2013 and

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3159/2013 were excluded and therefore the decision of this

Court in the case of  Raj Kumar Gandhi (supra)  shall not be

applicable has no substance.  Merely because to avoid contempt

proceedings and/or in view of the stay granted in the aforesaid

two writ petitions which was continued subsequently till the

representations are considered, the authorities excluded the

lands for which writ petitions were filed, it cannot be said that

the period during which the stay was operating in Writ Petition

Nos.  3051/2013  and  3159/2013 shall  not  be excluded.  The

words “stay of the action or proceedings under Section 11A of the

Act” would mean that any order of stay in one or the other matter

if passed by Court of law, which either prohibits or prevents the

State authorities from passing of an award, such a period of stay

of action/proceedings deserves to be excluded while computing

the statutory period of two years in passing of an award by the

authority under Section 11 of the Act.   Even otherwise, as

observed hereinabove, there was already a stay of possession in

Writ  Petition No.  7867/2012 and therefore  even otherwise  the

authorities were justified in not proceeding further with the

acquisition proceedings.

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7.7 It is true that there is no bar to have more than one

declaration under Section 6 or the award under Section 11 of the

Act in reference to the self­same acquisition proceedings initiated

under Section 4 followed with Section 6 of the Act but if there is a

stay of the proceedings by a Court of law in any of the matter,

that certainly prevents the authorities in taking its decision to

complete the acquisition proceedings within the statutory period

as mandated by law in passing of award within two years from

the date of declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

7.8 In meeting out a complex situation, the conclusion which

emerges is that if there is any stay over the action or proceeding

by a Court of law, in one or the other matter arising from the self­

same acquisition proceedings in reference to Section 4 followed

with Section 6 of the Act, the authorities are said to be justified

in  the  given  facts  and circumstances  to  stay  their  hands and

await the decision of the Court and such a period during which

there is a stay over the action or proceeding by a Court of law in

a matter, that has to be excluded for all practical purposes, in

computing the  statutory  period  of two  years in  passing  of  an

award under Section 11 of the Act.

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8. Applying the aforesaid principles of law to the facts of the

case  on hand and considering the fact that there  was  a  stay

granted by the High Court in writ petition Nos. 3051/2013 and

3159/2013 against declaring the final award and the said writ

petitions  were  with respect to the lands  acquired of the very

village under the very notification   and for the very project and

there was stay of possession in writ petition no. 7867/2012

during the pendency of the said petition, the period during which

the aforesaid stay/s was/were operative is to be excluded and if

the said period is excluded, in that case, the acquisition

proceedings would not lapse, considering explanation to Section

11A of the Act.   Under the circumstances, the High Court has

erred in quashing and setting aside the acquisition proceedings

on the ground that the same have lapsed as the award was not

declared within a period of two years from the date of declaration

under Section 6 of the Act.   The High Court has committed a

grave error in not excluding the period of interim stay granted by

it in writ petition nos. 3051/2013 and 3159/2013.  As observed

hereinabove, even grant of interim stay of possession would also

save lapsing of the acquisition.

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9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all

these appeals succeed.  The impugned judgments  and  orders

passed by the  High Court  are  hereby  quashed and set  aside.

Consequently, the writ petitions filed before the High Court stand

dismissed.   In the facts  and circumstances  of the  case, there

shall be no order as to costs.

……………………………………J. [ARUN MISHRA]

……………………………………J. [M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI; …………………………………..J. SEPTEMBER 04, 2019. [AJAY RASTOGI]

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