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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.349 OF 2019

The State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant

            Versus

Laxmi Narayan and others ..Respondents

       With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 350 OF 2019

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Criminal Appeal No.349 of 2019

A two Judge bench of this Court vide its order dated 08.09.2017,

in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Court

in the cases of  Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466

and State of  Rajasthan vs.  Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC 149,  has

referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and that is how the

matter is placed before a Bench of three Judges.

1.1 Vide order dated 19.11.2018, since the same question of law is

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involved,  this  Court  tagged  the  connected  appeal  with  the  main

appeal.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and  order  dated  7.10.2013  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Madhya

Pradesh,  Bench  at  Gwalior  in  Miscellaneous  Criminal  Case  No.

8000/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application,

preferred  by  the  respondents  herein/original  accused  (hereinafter

referred  to  as  the  ‘Accused’),  and  in  exercise  of  its  powers  under

Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  has  quashed  the

proceedings  against  the  accused for  the  offences  punishable  under

Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, relying upon the decision of this Court

in the case of Shiji @ Pappu & others vs. Radhika and another (2011)

10 SCC 705, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present

appeal.

2.1 Office  report  dated  18.08.2017  indicates  that  service  of  show

cause notice on the respondents is complete, and respondent nos. 1 to

3 are represented by Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advocate, but during

the course of hearing, nobody appeared for the respondents.

3. The  facts  leading  to  this  appeal  are,  that  an  FIR  was  lodged

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against the respondents herein and two unknown persons at Police

Station  Raun,  District  Bhind,  for  the  offences  punishable  under

Sections  307  and  34  of  the  IPC,  which  was  registered  as  Crime

No.36/13.  It was alleged that on 03.03.2013 at about 9:30 p.m., the

complainant – Charan Singh, who is an operator of LNT machine is

extracting sand of Sindh River at Indukhi Sand Mine and at that time

firing from other side of river started and the counter firing from this

side also started then he heard that take away your machine from

here.  It is alleged that some people came there from which Sanjeev

(respondent no.2 herein), Lature (respondent no.1 herein), Sant Singh

(respondent no.3 herein) and two unknown persons came near to the

complainant  and  his  machine  and  told  him  to  run  away,  then

somebody told to Sanjeev (respondent no.2 herein) to fire and then

Sanjeev  fired  on  the  complainant  and  then  they  ran  away.   The

complainant fell from the machine.  The bullet hit the complainant on

elbow of right hand.  Somehow the complainant managed to reach the

village and a person called a car and admitted the complainant in

District Hospital.

3.1 That  on  04.03.2013,  the  duty  doctor  in  the  District  Hospital

informed  the  police  and  on  the  basis  of  the  statement  of  the

complainant, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/13 was registered under

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Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.

3.2 That  the  medical  examination of  the  injured complainant  was

conducted at District Hospital and five injuries were found on his body

and injuries nos. 1 to 4 were opined to be caused by fire arm and

injury no.5 was advised for x-ray.

3.3 That on 05.03.2013, the police reached on the spot and prepared

spot map; statement of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of

the Cr.P.C. and the police seized simple soil, blood stained soil and

other articles from the spot of the incident and prepared their seizure

memos.

3.4 That the accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 of

2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya

Pradesh,  Bench  at  Gwalior  for  quashing  the  criminal  proceedings

against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the sole ground of a

compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant.

4. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in

exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the

criminal proceedings against the accused solely on the ground that the

accused  and  the  complainant  have  settled  the  disputes  amicably.

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While  quashing  the  criminal  proceedings  against  the  accused,  the

High Court has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court

in the case of Shiji (supra).

5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and

order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the

offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, the State of

Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

6. Learned advocate  appearing  on behalf  of  the  State  of  Madhya

Pradesh has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed

a grave error in quashing the FIR which was for the offences under

Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.

6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf  of  the appellant-State that in the present cases the High

Court has quashed the FIR mechanically and solely on the basis of the

settlement/compromise  between  the  complainant  and  the  accused,

without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences

alleged against the accused persons.

6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR, the High Court has

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not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were against the

society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the

two individuals.

6.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf  of  the  appellant-State  that  the  High Court  has  misread  the

decision of this Court in the case of  Shiji (supra), while quashing the

FIR.  It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High

Court  ought  to  have  appreciated  that  in  all  the  cases  where  the

complainant  has  compromised/entered  into  a  settlement  with  the

accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of

recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be

exercise of futility.  It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that in a given case despite

the complainant may not support in future and in the trial in view of

the settlement and compromise with the accused, still the prosecution

may prove the case against  the accused persons by examining the

other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the medical evidence

and/or other evidence/material.  It is submitted that in the present

cases the investigation was in progress and even the statement of the

witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also collected. It

is submitted that therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case,

the High Court has clearly erred in considering and relying upon the

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decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra).

6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf  of  the  appellant-State  that  the  accused  were  hard  core

criminals and many criminal cases were registered against them and

they are a serious threat to the society.  It is submitted that all these

aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused

were required to be considered by the High Court while quashing the

FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,

and  more  particularly  when  the  offences  alleged  were  against  the

society  at  large,  namely,  attempt  to  murder,  which  is  a

non-compoundable offence.  In support of his submissions, learned

counsel for the appellant-State has placed reliance on the decisions of

this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC

303; State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State

of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya

Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana

Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh

(2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC

641;  and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan

Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019,  State of

Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 in Criminal

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Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013.

6.5 Making  the  above  submissions  and  relying  upon  the

aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of  the  appellant-State  has  prayed  to  allow  the  present  appeal  and

quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the

High  Court  quashing  and  setting  aside  the  FIR,  in  exercise  of  its

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

7. As  observed  hereinabove,  nobody  appeared  on  behalf  of  the

respondents – accused.

8. We have  heard the  learned counsel  for  the  appellant  at  great

length.  

9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present

appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307

and 34 of the IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the

complainant and the accused.  That in view of the compromise and

the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this

Court in the case of  Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that

there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons

and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High

Court has quashed the FIR.  

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9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact

that  the  offences  alleged  were  non-compoundable  offences  as  per

Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.  From the impugned judgment and order, it

appears that the High Court has not at  all  considered the relevant

facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness

of the offences and its social impact.  From the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court

has mechanically  quashed the FIR,  in exercise of  its  powers under

Section 482 Cr.P.C.   The High Court has not at  all  considered the

distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong

and the social impact.  As observed by this Court in the case of State

of  Maharashtra  vs.  Vikram Anantrai  Doshi,  (2014)  15  SCC  29,  the

Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C.  to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings,  should  be  to  scan  the

entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the

settlement.  As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes

to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution,

circumspection and courageous prudence.  In the case at hand, the

High  Court  has  not  at  all  taken  pains  to  scrutinise  the  entire

conspectus  of  facts  in  proper  perspective  and  has  quashed  the

criminal proceedings mechanically.  Even, the quashing of the FIR by

the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307

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and 34 of the IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court

in a catena of decisions.

9.2 In  the  case  of  Gian  Singh  (supra),  in  paragraph 61,  this

Court has observed and held as under:

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing  a  criminal  proceeding  or  FIR  or  complaint  in exercise  of  its  inherent  jurisdiction  is  distinct  and different  from  the  power  given  to  a  criminal  court  for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent  power  is  of  wide  plenitude  with  no  statutory limitation but it  has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.:  (i)  to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any  court.  In  what  cases  power  to  quash  the  criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the  offender  and  the  victim  have  settled  their  dispute would  depend  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of  such power,  the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity  of  the crime.  Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,  rape,  dacoity,  etc.  cannot  be  fittingly  quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation  to  the  offences  under  special  statutes  like  the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public  servants  while  working  in  that  capacity,  etc.; cannot  provide  for  any  basis  for  quashing  criminal proceedings  involving  such  offences.  But  the  criminal cases  having  overwhelmingly  and  predominatingly  civil flavour stand on a different  footing for  the purposes of quashing,  particularly  the  offences  arising  from commercial,  financial,  mercantile,  civil,  partnership  or such  like  transactions  or  the  offences  arising  out  of

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matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings  if  in  its  view,  because  of  the  compromise between  the  offender  and  the  victim,  the  possibility  of conviction is  remote and bleak and continuation of  the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other  words,  the  High  Court  must  consider  whether  it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the  criminal  proceeding  would  tantamount  to  abuse  of process  of  law  despite  settlement  and  compromise between  the  victim and  the  wrongdoer  and whether  to secure  the  ends  of  justice,  it  is  appropriate  that  the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above  question(s)  is  in  the  affirmative,  the  High  Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

9.3 In the case of  Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6

SCC 466,  after  considering  the  decision in  the  case  of  Gian Singh

(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would  be  guided  in  giving  adequate  treatment  to  the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under  Section  482  of  the  Code  while  accepting  the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has  inherent  power  to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings

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even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on  that  basis  petition  for  quashing  the  criminal proceedings  is  filed,  the  guiding  factor  in  such  cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such  a  power  is  not  to  be  exercised  in  those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious  impact  on  society.  Similarly,  for  the  offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  or  the  offences committed  by  public  servants  while  working  in  that capacity  are  not  to  be quashed merely  on the  basis  of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On  the  other  hand,  those  criminal  cases  having overwhelmingly  and  predominantly  civil  character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or  arising  out  of  matrimonial  relationship  or  family disputes  should  be  quashed  when  the  parties  have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While  exercising its  powers,  the High Court  is  to examine  as  to  whether  the  possibility  of  conviction  is remote  and  bleak  and  continuation  of  criminal  cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and  extreme  injustice  would  be  caused  to  him  by  not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall  in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would  not  rest  its  decision  merely  because  there  is  a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section

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307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to  proving  the  charge  under  Section 307 IPC.  For  this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature  of  injury  sustained,  whether  such  injury  is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of  conviction are remote and bleak.  In  the  former  case  it  can  refuse  to  accept  the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in  the  latter  case  it  would  be  permissible  for  the  High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the  Court  can  also  be  swayed  by  the  fact  that  the settlement  between  the  parties  is  going  to  result  in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a  crucial  role.  Those  cases  where  the  settlement  is arrived  at  immediately  after  the  alleged commission of offence  and the  matter  is  still  under  investigation,  the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash  the  criminal  proceedings/investigation.  It  is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the  circumstances/material  mentioned  above.  On  the other  hand,  where  the  prosecution  evidence  is  almost complete  or  after  the  conclusion  of  the  evidence  the matter  is  at  the  stage of  argument,  normally  the High Court  should  refrain  from  exercising  its  power  under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by

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the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before  the  High  Court,  mere  compromise  between  the parties  would  not  be  a  ground  to  accept  the  same resulting  in  acquittal  of  the  offender  who  has  already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

9.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Court has

had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the

FIR/complaint/criminal  proceedings,  in  exercise  of  the  inherent

jurisdiction  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.   Considering  a  catena  of

decisions  of  this  Court  on  the  point,  this  Court  summarised  the

following propositions:

“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers.  It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction  for  the  purpose  of  compounding  an  offence. While  compounding  an  offence,  the  power  of  the  court  is governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC.  The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if  the offence is non-compoundable.

(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint  should  be  quashed in exercise  of  its  jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends  of  justice  would  justify  the  exercise  of  the  inherent power.

(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i)  to secure the

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ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

(5) the  decision  as  to  whether  a  complaint  or  first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender  and  victim  have  settled  the  dispute,  revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate.

(6) In the exercise  of  the power under  Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the  High  Court  must  have  due  regard  to  the  nature  and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental  depravity  or  offences  such  as  murder,  rape  and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the  family  of  the  victim  have  settled  the  dispute.   Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society.  The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute.  They stand on a distinct footing insofar  as  the  exercise  of  the  inherent  power  to  quash  is concerned.

(8) Criminal  cases  involving  offences  which  arise  from commercial,  financial,  mercantile,  partnership  or  similar transactions  with  an  essentially  civil  flavour  may  in appropriate  situations  fall  for  quashing  where  parties  have settled the dispute.

(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding  if  in  view  of  the  compromise  between  the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(10) There is  yet an exception to the principle set  out in Propositions (8) and (9) above.  Economic offences involving the  financial  and  economic  well-being  of  the  State  have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between  private  disputants.   The  High  Court  would  be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in  an  activity  akin  to  a  financial  or  economic  fraud  or misdemeanour.  The consequences  of  the  act  complained of upon  the  financial  or  economic  system  will  weigh  in  the balance.”

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9.5 In the case of  Manish (supra),  this  Court  has  specifically

observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding

an offence  under  Sections  307,  294  and  34  IPC,  by  no  stretch  of

imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private

parties  simpliciter.   It  is  observed  that  such  offences  will  have  a

serious impact  on the society  at  large.   It  is  further  observed that

where  the  accused  are  facing  trial  under  Sections  307  read  with

Section  34  IPC,  as  the  offences  are  definitely  against  the  society,

accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by

demonstrating their innocence.

9.6 In the case of  Deepak (supra),  this  Court  has  specifically

observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable

and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between

the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the

proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible.  Similar

is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the

case of Kalyan Singh (supra) and Dhruv Gurjar (supra).

10. Now so  far  as  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of

Narinder  Singh  (supra)  is  concerned,  this  Court  in  paragraph  29.6

admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall  in the

category  of  heinous  and  serious  offences  and  therefore  are  to  be

17

generally  treated  as  crime against  the  society  and  not  against  the

individual alone.  However, this Court further observed that the High

Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of

Section  307  IPC  in  the  FIR  or  the  charge  is  framed.   Its  further

corroboration with the  medical  evidence  or  other  evidence  is  to  be

seen, which will be possible during the trial only.  Hence, the decision

of  this  case  in  the  case  of  Narinder  Singh  (supra)  shall  be  of  no

assistance to the accused in the present case.   

11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this

Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR by observing

that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is

no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would

be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the

High Court  has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid

ground.  It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the

said decision to the facts of the cases on hand.  The High Court ought

to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant

has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any

conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too

early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still

can  prove  the  guilt  by  leading  cogent  evidence  and  examining  the

other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly

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when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of  a civil

nature and/or is not a private wrong.  In the case of Shiji (supra), this

Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between

the parties,  which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this

Court observed that,  ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution

where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations…will be

a futile exercise that will serve no purpose’.  In the aforesaid case, it

was  also  further  observed  ‘that  even  the  alleged  two  eyewitnesses,

however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the

prosecution version’, and to that this Court observed and held ‘that

the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality

and Section 482 Cr.P.C.  can,  in  such circumstances,  be justifiably

invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and

thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below.  Even in

the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:

“18. Having  said  so,  we  must  hasten  to  add  that  the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes  it  obligatory  for  the  High  Court  to  exercise  the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature  of  the  power  itself  demands  that  its  exercise  is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is,  for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise

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that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if  it  is  called upon to appreciate  evidence for  it  cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition  under  Section  482  of  the  Criminal  Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case  to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.”

11.1 Therefore,  the  said  decision may  be  applicable  in  a  case

which  has  its  origin  in  the  civil  dispute  between  the  parties;  the

parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the

society  at  large  and/or  the  same may  not  have  social  impact;  the

dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc.  The aforesaid decision

may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very

serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under

Section 307 IPC.  Therefore, without proper application of mind to the

relevant  facts  and circumstances,  in our view,  the  High Court  has

materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that

in  view  of  the  compromise,  there  are  no  chances  of  recording

conviction and/or the further  trial  would be an exercise  in futility.

The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of

this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant

facts and circumstances of the case.  

12. Now so  far  as  the  conflict  between  the  decisions  of  this

Court  in  the  cases  of  Narinder  Singh  (supra)  and  Shambhu Kewat

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(supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court

has  noted  the  difference  between  the  power  of  compounding  of

offences  conferred  on  a  court  under  Section  320  Cr.P.C.  and  the

powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal

proceedings  by  the  High  Court.   In  the  said  decision,  this  Court

further observed that  in compounding the offences,  the power of  a

criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section

320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while,

on the other hand, the formation of  opinion by the High Court for

quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section

482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of

justice  would  justify  such  exercise  of  power,  although  ultimate

consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.  However, in

the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very

Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would  be  guided  in  giving  adequate  treatment  to  the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under  Section  482  of  the  Code  while  accepting  the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has  inherent  power  to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings

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even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on  that  basis  petition  for  quashing  the  criminal proceedings  is  filed,  the  guiding  factor  in  such  cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such  a  power  is  not  to  be  exercised  in  those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious  impact  on  society.  Similarly,  for  the  offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  or  the  offences committed  by  public  servants  while  working  in  that capacity  are  not  to  be quashed merely  on the  basis  of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On  the  other  hand,  those  criminal  cases  having overwhelmingly  and  predominantly  civil  character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or  arising  out  of  matrimonial  relationship  or  family disputes  should  be  quashed  when  the  parties  have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While  exercising its  powers,  the High Court  is  to examine  as  to  whether  the  possibility  of  conviction  is remote  and  bleak  and  continuation  of  criminal  cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and  extreme  injustice  would  be  caused  to  him  by  not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall  in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would  not  rest  its  decision  merely  because  there  is  a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section

22

307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to  proving  the  charge  under  Section 307 IPC.  For  this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature  of  injury  sustained,  whether  such  injury  is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of  conviction are remote and bleak.  In  the  former  case  it  can  refuse  to  accept  the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in  the  latter  case  it  would  be  permissible  for  the  High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the  Court  can  also  be  swayed  by  the  fact  that  the settlement  between  the  parties  is  going  to  result  in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a  crucial  role.  Those  cases  where  the  settlement  is arrived  at  immediately  after  the  alleged commission of offence  and the  matter  is  still  under  investigation,  the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash  the  criminal  proceedings/investigation.  It  is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the  circumstances/material  mentioned  above.  On  the other  hand,  where  the  prosecution  evidence  is  almost complete  or  after  the  conclusion  of  the  evidence  the matter  is  at  the  stage of  argument,  normally  the High Court  should  refrain  from  exercising  its  power  under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by

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the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before  the  High  Court,  mere  compromise  between  the parties  would  not  be  a  ground  to  accept  the  same resulting  in  acquittal  of  the  offender  who  has  already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of

this Court on the point,  referred to hereinabove, it is observed and

held as under:

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to

quash  the  criminal  proceedings  for  the  non-compoundable

offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having

overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly

those  arising  out  of  commercial  transactions  or  arising  out  of

matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties

have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii) such  power  is  not  to  be  exercised  in  those  prosecutions

which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity

or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.  Such offences are not

private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences

under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the

offences  committed  by  public  servants  while  working  in  that

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capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise

between the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.

would fall  in the category of  heinous and serious offences and

therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not

against  the  individual  alone,  and  therefore,  the  criminal

proceedings  for  the  offence  under  Section  307  IPC  and/or  the

Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot

be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,

on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute

amongst themselves.  However, the High Court would not rest its

decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in

the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.  It would be

open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of

Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected  sufficient  evidence,  which  if  proved,  would  lead  to

framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.  For this purpose, it

would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury

sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate

parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.  However, such an

exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after  the

evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is

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filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial.  Such exercise is

not  permissible  when  the  matter  is  still  under  investigation.

Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of

the decision of this Court in the case of  Narinder Singh (supra)

should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the

circumstances stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of  the

Code  to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings  in  respect  of

non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do

not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a

settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the

High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;

the  conduct  of  the  accused,  namely,  whether  the  accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed

with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

14. Insofar  as  the  present  case  is  concerned,  the  High

Court  has  quashed  the  criminal  proceedings  for  the  offences

under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the

investigation  was  under  progress.  Somehow,  the  accused

managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and

sought quashing of the FIR on the  basis of a settlement.  The

allegations are serious in nature.  He used the fire arm also in

26

commission of the offence.  Therefore, the gravity of the offence

and the conduct of  the accused is not at all  considered by the

High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the

accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically

quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the

Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court

has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.

15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the present

appeal  is  allowed.   The  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated

07.10.2013 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case

No.  8000  of  2013  is  hereby  quashed  and  set  aside,  and  the

FIR/investigation/criminal  proceedings  be  proceeded  against  the

accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.

Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019

16. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 is

concerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has

quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under

Sections 323, 294, 308 & 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that the

accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of

27

the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be

any possibility of recording a conviction against the accused.  Offence

under  Section  308  IPC  is  a  non-compoundable  offence.   While

committing the offence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are

also absconding, and in the meantime, they have managed to enter

into a compromise with the complainant.  Therefore, for the reasons

stated above, this appeal is also allowed, the impugned judgment and

order dated 28.05.2018 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous

Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside, and

the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the

accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.

……………………………….J. [A.K. SIKRI]

……………………………….J. [S. ABDUL NAZEER]

NEW DELHI; ……………………………….J. MARCH  05, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]