Reportable    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL   No  . 7011   of   2009

The State Bank of India & Others. ....  Appellants    

Versus

P. Soupramaniane           …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

1. The Respondent who was working as a Messenger in

the State Bank of India at Puducherry was discharged from

service by an order dated 15.05.1986. The appeal filed by

the  Respondent  against  the  order  of  discharge  was

dismissed on 03.07.1986.  Later, the Staff Union took up

the cause of the Respondent and made a representation

on  his  behalf  which  was  also  rejected  on  04.05.1992.

Challenging  the  aforementioned  orders,  the  Respondent

filed  a  Writ  Petition  in  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at

Madras which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on

07.06.2000.   Aggrieved  thereby,  the  Respondent  filed

a Writ Appeal which was allowed by the Division Bench of

the  Madras  High  Court.   The  order  of  discharge  of  the

Respondent from service was set aside and the Appellants

were directed to reinstate the Respondent.  The Appellants

were directed to pay 1/4th of the salary from the date of

discharge  till  the  date  of  reinstatement  as  back  wages.

Notice was issued by this Court in Special Leave Petition

filed by the Appellants on 01.09.2009 and the judgment of

the High Court was stayed.  Thereafter, leave was granted

on 19.10.2009 and the interim order was made absolute.

We are informed that the Respondent has attained the age

of superannuation on 31.12.2012.  

2. Since the discharge of the Respondent from service is

on the basis of conviction for an offence involving moral

turpitude,    it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  the  facts  of  the

criminal  case.   A  report  was  submitted  by  the  Station

House  Officer  (SHO),  Grand  Bazaar  Police  Station,

Puducherry that  on  17.06.1983  at  9.00  hours  the

Respondent  voluntarily  stabbed  Karthiban s/o

Dharamssivam and  Sivagurunathan s/o  Brame Dhanabal

with a broken soda bottle.  On completion of investigation,

charge  sheet  was  filed  against  the  Respondent.

Thereafter,  charge  was  framed  under  Section  307  IPC.

After appreciation of the evidence on-record, the          trial

court found that the Respondent had no intention to cause

murder of the victims who were examined as PWs-1 and 2.

The injuries were certified as simple by PW-5.  The trial

court  was  of  the  opinion  that  there  was  no  material  to

convict the Respondent under Section 307 IPC.  However,

the trial court convicted the Respondent under Section 324

IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for three

months.  The motive for the crime was an earlier dispute

between two groups belonging to different political parties.

The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court.  The

Appellate Court released the Respondent on probation as it

was of the opinion that the Respondent was a fit person to

be dealt with under Section 360 CrPC.  One of the reasons

given by the Appellate Court to release the Respondent on

probation  was  that  the  Respondent  was  employed  as  a

Messenger in a Bank and any sentence of imprisonment

would affect his career.  

3. As stated earlier, discharge of the Respondent from

service was on the ground of his conviction by a criminal

court for an offence involving moral turpitude.  

4. Section  10(1)(b)(i)  of  the  Banking  Regulation  Act,

1949 provides  that  conviction  by  a  criminal  court  of  an

offence involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a person

from  continuing  in  employment  of  a  banking  company.

The Writ Appeal filed by the Respondent was allowed by a

Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that the

criminal court released the Respondent under probation in

exercise of its power under Section 360 CrPC to enable the

Respondent to continue in service.  The High Court was of

the opinion that the purpose of the order of the criminal

court would be defeated if the Respondent is discharged

from service.  Another reason given by the High Court is

that the provision of law under which the bank discharged

the Respondent from service was not mentioned and no

reasons  were  assigned  by  the  bank  in  the  order  of

discharge.  

5. We do not agree with the reasons given by the High

Court for setting aside the order of discharge and directing

the reinstatement of the Respondent in service.  A show-

cause notice was issued to the Respondent in which it was

categorically  mentioned  that  the  Respondent  cannot

continue in service after his conviction in a criminal case

involving moral turpitude in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of

the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.  After considering the

explanation of the Respondent, an order of discharge was

passed.   The High Court  is  not  right  in  holding  that  no

reasons had been given by the bank for discontinuing the

Respondent from service.  The High Court committed an

error in holding that the order of discharge should be set

aside on the ground that the provision of law under which

the Respondent was discharged was not mentioned in the

order.   Yet  another  reason  given  by  the  High  Court  for

interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal

court released the Respondent on probation only to permit

him to  continue in  service.  The release under  probation

does not entitle an employee to claim a right to continue in

service.   In  fact  the employer  is  under  an obligation to

discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an

offence involving moral turpitude.1 The observations made

by a criminal court are not binding2 on the employer who

has the liberty of dealing with his employees suitably.    

6. Though we do not agree with the reasons given by

the High Court for setting aside the order of discharge of

the Respondent from service, it  is necessary to examine

whether Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act is

applicable  to  the  facts  of  the  case.   Conviction  for  an

offence  involving  moral  turpitude  disqualifies  a  person

from continuing in service in a bank.  The conundrum that

arises  in  this  case  is  whether  the  conviction  of  the

Respondent under Section 324 IPC can be said to be for an

offence involving moral turpitude.   

7. Moral  Turpitude’  as  defined  in  the  Black’s  Law

Dictionary (6th ed.) is as follows:  

“The Act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to

1 Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573  2 This  Court  has  observed  on  multiple  occasions  that  in  criminal  jurisdiction, Courts do not have the power to pass a direction that the said conviction will not have any impact on the convict’s services.  See:  Girraj Prasad Meena v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 13 SCC 674

his follow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.”3  “implies something immoral in itself regardless of it  being  punishable  by  law”;  “restricted  to  the gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes,  and  those  that  are  malum  in  se  and disclose a depraved mind.” 4  

According  to  Bouvier’s  Law  Dictionary,  ‘Moral

Turpitude’ is :

“An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted  and  customary  rule  of  right  and  duty between man and man.”

 Burton Legal Thesaurus defines ‘Moral  Turpitude’

as :  

“Bad  faith,  bad  repute,  corruption,  defilement, delinquency,  discredit,  dishonor,  shame,  guilt, knavery,  misdoing,  perversion,  shame,  ice, wrong.”

3 p. 1008 4 p. 1517

8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the

Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an

employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for

an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude.5  Though  every

offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from

service  according  to  the  Banking  Regulation  Act  can  be

only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude.

Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character

can be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude.

Whether  an  offence  involves  moral  turpitude  or  not

depends  upon  the  facts6 and  the  circumstances7 of  the

case.  Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging

an offence involving moral turpitude are:  

a)  Whether  the  act  leading  to  a  conviction  was

such  as  could  shock  the  moral  conscience  or

society in general; b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a

base one, and  c)  Whether  on  account  of  the  act  having  been

committed the perpetrators could be considered

5 Sushil Kumar Singhal (supra)  6 Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola  7 Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17 ¶12

to  be of  a  depraved character  or  a  person who

was to be looked down upon by the society. 8   

The  other  important  factors  that  are  to  be  kept  in

mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude

are  :–  the  person who commits  the  offence;  the  person

against  whom  it  is  committed;  the  manner  and

circumstances  in  which  it  is  alleged  to  have  been

committed; and the values of the society.9  According to

the National Incident – Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a

crime data collection system used in the United States of

America,  each  offence  belongs  to  one  of  the  three

categories  which  are:  crimes  against  persons,  crimes

against  property,  and  crimes  against  society.  Crimes

against persons include murder, rape, and assault where

the victims are always individuals.             The object of

crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary

is  to  obtain  money,  property,  or  some  other  benefits.

Crimes against society for example gambling, prostitution,

and drug violations, represent society’s prohibition against

engaging in certain types of activities.  Conviction of any

8 Mangali v. Chakki Lal, AIR 1963 ALL 527  9 Jorabhai Hirabhai Rabari v. District Development Officer, Mehsana, AIR 1996 Guj  3.

alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for

deportation  under  the  Immigration  Law  in  the  United

States of America.  To qualify as a crime involving moral

turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible

conduct  and  scienter,  whether  with  specific  intent,

deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness.10           9. There  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt  about  certain

offences which can straightaway be termed as involving

moral  turpitude  e.g. offences  under  the  Prevention  of

Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc.  The question that arises

for  our  consideration in  this  case is  whether  an offence

involving  bodily  injury  can  be  categorized  as  a  crime

involving moral turpitude.  In this case, we are concerned

with  an  assault.   It  is  very  difficult  to  state  that  every

assault  is  not  an  offence  involving  moral  turpitude.

A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault.  All

cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes

involving  moral  turpitude.  On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  a

dangerous weapon which can cause the death of  the victim

may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude.  In the

instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause

10 Cristoval Silva – Trevina 241 & N Dec 687 (AG 2008)

the death of the victims.  The criminal courts below found that

the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature.  On an

overall  consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the

opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not

involve moral turpitude.  As the Respondent is not guilty of an

offence  involving  moral  turpitude,  he  is  not  liable  to  be

discharged from service.  

10. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment

of the High Court.  The Appeal is dismissed accordingly.   

                          .................................J.

             [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

 ..................................J.               [M.R.SHAH]

New Delhi, April 26, 2019.