17 April 2017
Supreme Court
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THE SPL.AGR.PRODUCE MARKET COMMIT. FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES Vs N.KRISHNAPPA .

Bench: RANJAN GOGOI,NAVIN SINHA
Case number: C.A. No.-005248-005274 / 2017
Diary number: 39004 / 2011
Advocates: NANDA KISHORE Vs


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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5248-5274 OF 2017 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2355-2381 of 2012]

The Special Agricultural Produce Market Committee For Fruits and Vegetables … Appellant(s)

Versus N. Krishnappa and others etc. … Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5275-5278 OF 2017 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 39357-39360 of 2012]

N. Krishnappa and others … Appellant(s) Versus

The State of Karnataka and others … Respondent(s)

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.  5279-5287  OF 2017 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2834-2842 of 2014]

M. Suresh Kumar and another etc. … Appellant(s) Versus

The State of Karnataka and others … Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The controversy in these appeals relates to the acquisition of 42

acres 32 guntas of lands in village Golimangala, Sarjapur Hobli, Anchal

Taluk, District Bangalore, for expansion of the Appellant's marketing

yard. Noticing infirmities in the acquisition proceedings, but declining

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to quash the acquisition adverting to the larger public purpose, the

High Court shifted the date of the notification under Section 4 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to the

date of its order i.e. 22.11.2010, for determination of compensation.

Aggrieved by the order, both the Appellant and the landowners are in

appeal before this Court.

3. The  statutory  notification  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  was

published on 20.5.2002 and the Award made on 31.01.2005. On a

challenge  to  the  acquisition  proceedings  by  the  landowners,  the

Learned Single Judge, after perusing the original acquisition records,

held  that  the  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  of  the  Act  was  made

within statutory time from the last date of publication under Section

4(1)  of  the  Act.  But  that  the  acquisition  suffered  from  statutory

non-compliance with  regard  to  publication  in  two daily  newspapers

under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  and  improper  consideration  of  the

objections under Section 5A of the Act. Adverting to the public purpose

of  the  acquisition,  the  proceedings  were,  however,  declined

interference  and  instead,  the  relief  was  moulded  relying  upon

Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory & Ors., (2005)

13 SCC 477, by shifting the date of the Section 4(1) Notification.

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4. Appeals  were  preferred  both  by  the  Landowners  and  the

Appellant. The Division Bench summoned the original records afresh.

It arrived at a finding at variance with the Learned Single Judge for

reasons discussed in paragraph 40 of the Order that the declaration

under  Section  6(1)  of  the  Act  was  not  within  statutory  time.  But,

declining interference with  the  acquisition proceedings,  it  concurred

with the reasoning ascribed by the Learned Single Judge of the larger

public importance of the acquisition.

5. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

Appellant - Market Committee urged that the conclusion of the Learned

Single  Judge  from  the  original  records  that  the  declaration  under

Section 6(1) of the Act was made within statutory time of one year

was correct and warranted no interference by the Division Bench. The

last date of publication under Section 4(1) in the Chavdi of the village

was  05.08.2002.  The  declaration  made  under  Section  6(1)  on

02.08.2003  was  within  time.   The  date  of  the  notification  under

Section 4(1) of the Act could not have been shifted in the manner

done.

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6. Learned Counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that in the

facts of the case, the High Court rightly shifted the date of the Section

4(1) notification keeping in mind the larger public interest involved in

the acquisition as also the interest of the landowners.

7. Sri V.Lakshmi Narayanna, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the landowners, submitted that once the Division Bench arrived at a

finding that the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was beyond

the statutory time, the acquisition proceedings could not have been

sustained in the manner done. Without prejudice to the same, it was

further submitted that neither had possession been taken till date nor

had compensation been disbursed to the landowners. The acquisition

proceedings, therefore, additionally stood lapsed under Section 24(2)

of  The  Right  to  Fair  Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land

Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Act,  2013  (hereinafter

referred to as 'the 2013 Act').

8. We have considered the submissions on behalf  of the parties.

The original acquisition records had also been summoned by us. The

observations of the Division Bench appear justified. But in the nature

of the order passed, moulding the relief keeping in mind the larger

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public interest involved in the acquisition, and in view of  Barangore

Jute Factory (supra), we are not satisfied that the order of the High

Court calls for interference.  

9. In  Barangore  Jute  Factory (supra)  the  acquisition  suffered

from statutory non-compliance. In view of the larger public interest

involved in the acquisition, declining to set aside the acquisition the

relief was moulded in the interest of justice observing:-

"14.........No useful purpose will be served by quashing  the  impugned  notification  at  this stage.  We cannot  be  unmindful  of  the  legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being  quashed.  The  consequence  of  this  will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices  of  land,  the  amount  of  compensation payable  to  the  landowners  may  be  more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the landowners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will  give rise to several  difficulties  and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the  view  that  a  better  course  will  be  to compensate the landowners, that is,  the writ petitioners  appropriately  for  what  they  have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action."

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10. Since the contention with regard to the 2013 Act will  require

examination  of  facts  with  due  opportunity,  we  do  not  consider  it

necessary to deal with the same in the present proceedings and leave

it open for the aggrieved to pursue their remedies in accordance with

law before the appropriate forum, if so advised.  

11. All the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.

………………………………….J.  (Ranjan Gogoi)   

……….………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   

New Delhi, April 17, 2017

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