REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5740-5741 OF 2005

The Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai ..Appellant(s)

       Versus

R. Sivasankara Mehta and Another ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J.

1. We have heard learned counsel for the parties  

including  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  

Chennai  Metro  Rail  Limited.   The  Interlocutory  

Application Nos. 5-6 filed on behalf of the Chennai  

Metro Rail Limited for being impleaded are allowed.

2. The  Commissioner,  Municipal  Corporation  of  

Chennai is in appeal before us, impugning the judgment  

and order passed by the Division Bench of the Madras  

High Court dated 18.1.2005, whereby the learned Judges  

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of the Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned  

Single  Judge  dated  24th September,  1999  on  two  writ  

petitions  filed  by  the  land  owners  who  are  

respondent(s) herein.  The facts leading to this case  

are  that  by  notification  dated  3rd January,  1949  an  

Award  was  passed  by  the  Special  Secretary  for  Land  

Acquisition, Madras in respect of the land which was  

acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition  

Act.  It is not in dispute that reference proceedings  

were  initiated  in  1949  itself  and  upon  getting  the  

enhanced compensation, the land owners did not take the  

challenge any further.  Under Section 16 of the Act,  

the land acquired, vested in the State in 1962, free  

from  all  encumbrances.  Long  thereafter,  in  1995  

representation was made by the respondent(s) herein for  

release/re-conveyance of a portion of the land which  

was acquired in 1949 inter alia on the ground that the  

appellant-Corporation was not utilising the same.  

3. On such a representation, the Government by an  

Order  dated  10th March,  1995  directed  the  appellant-

Corporation  to  re-convey  a  portion  of  the  lands  

measuring 5 grounds and 416 sq. ft. in R.S. No.324/2 to  

Thiruvalargal  R.  Neelakanta  Mehta  and  R.  Sivasankara  

Mehta and to their legal heirs or their nominees under  2

ex-owner  category,  on  collection  of  the  compensation  

amount paid by the government for the acquisition of  

lands measuring 5 grounds and 416 sq. ft. in R.S. No.  

324/2 with interest after completing all formalities.  

After the said order was passed, a representation was  

made  by  the  appellant-Corporation  to  the  Secretary,  

Government of Tamil Nadu, M.A. and W.S. Department to  

the effect that the said area can be better utilised  

for the purpose of parking of vehicles  in view of  

manifold increase in traffic in that part of the city.  

A request was, therefore, made to stay the operation of  

the  notification  relating  to  re-conveyance  for  

consideration of the request of the Corporation.   

4. Upon  such  representation  from  the  appellant-

Corporation, the Government of Tamil Nadu by an Order  

dated  25th July,  1995  cancelled  the  order  of  re-

conveyance issued in G.O. Ms. No.45, M.A. & W.S. dated  

10th March, 1995.   

5. This order of 25th July, 1995 was impugned by the  

respondent(s) herein by filing two writ petitions.  The  

learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions inter  

alia  on  the  ground  that  the  Government  is  bound  by  

provisions of promissory estoppel and also by reason of  3

the  fact  that  the  order  of  cancellation  of  re-

conveyance was passed without affording any opportunity  

of hearing to the land owners.  The said decision of  

the learned Single Judge was challenged by the present  

appellant before the Division Bench of the High Court.  

The Division Bench of the High Court, in paragraph 17  

of its judgment quoted from the judgment of the learned  

Single Judge and in paragraph 19 of the judgment quoted  

the provisions of Section 48-B which was introduced by  

Tamil  Nadu  Amendment  Act,  1996  (Act  16  of  1996).  

Ultimately, the Division Bench held that the decision  

of the Government in rescinding its initial order of  

re-conveyance  is  bad.   The  Division  Bench  was  not,  

therefore, inclined to interfere with the order passed  

by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeal of  

the  Corporation  and  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  

learned Single Judge.

6. Assailing both these judgments, learned senior  

counsel  for  the  appellant  urged  various  contentions  

before us.  The first question which was urged before  

us was that at the time when the exercise was made by  

the Government for re-conveyance, Section 48-B was not  

in existence.

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7. Admittedly,  Section  48-B  came  on  the  statute  

book  in  1997  by  the  Land  Acquisition  (Tamil  Nadu  

Amendment)  Act,  1996  (being  Act  16  of  1997).   The  

assent of the President to the said Act was received on  

14th March, 1997.

8. Section 48-B runs as follows:-

“48-B. Transfer of land to original owner  in certain cases.-Where the Government are  satisfied  that  the  land  vested  in  the  Government under this Act is not required  for the purpose for which it was acquired,  or  for  any  other  public  purpose,  the  Government  may  transfer  such  land  to  the  original owner who is willing to repay the  amount paid to him under this Act for the  acquisition of such land inclusive of the  amount  referred   to  in  sub-section  (1-A)  and (2) of Section 23, if any, paid under  this Act.”

9. On perusal of Section 48-B it is clear that the  

same  is  not  retrospective  in  operation.   The  said  

provision, which is a departure from Section 48 can  

apply only prospectively.   

10. This Court also considered the purport of that  

provision  in  Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board v.  Keeravani  Ammal and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1691.  The  

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learned  Judges  in  paragraph  11  of  Keeravani  Ammal  (supra) held as follows:-

“Section  48-B  introduced  into  the  Act  in  the State of Tamil Nadu is an exception to  this  rule.   Such  a  provision  has  to  be  strictly  construed  and  strict  compliance  with its terms insisted upon.  Whether such  a  provision  can  be  challenged  for  its  validity, we are not called upon to decide  here.”

11. In this connection, it is necessary to have a  

look  at  provisions  of  Section  48  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894, which was holding the field in  

1995, when re-conveyance was purportedly ordered by the  

State  Government  vide  its  order  dated  10.3.1995.  

Section 48 of the Act is set out below:

“48.  Completion  of  acquisition  not  compulsory,  but  compensation  to  be  awarded  when not completed.- (1) Except in the case  provided for in section 36, the Government  shall  be  at  liberty  to  withdraw  from  the  acquisition of any land of which possession  has not been taken.

(2) Whenever the Government withdraws from  any  such  acquisition,  the  Collector  shall  determine the amount of compensation due for  the  damage  suffered  by  the  owner  in  consequence  of  the  notice  or  of  any  proceedings  thereunder,  and  shall  pay  such  amount  to  the  person  interested,  together  with all costs reasonably incurred by him in  the prosecution of the proceedings under this  Act relating to the said land.

(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act  shall  apply,  so  far  as  may  be,  to  the  

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determination  of  the  compensation  payable  under this section.”

12. Under  the  provisions  of  Section  48  of  the  

principal Act, we are afraid, the respondent(s) has no  

right of asking for re-conveyance in 1995 inasmuch as  

it is an admitted case of the parties that possession  

of the property was taken over by the State as early as  

in 1949 when the Award was passed and the land vested  

in the State Government in 1962.  Thereafter it was  

transferred to the Corporation.  This aspect of the  

case,  which  goes  to  the  root  of  the  question,  was  

totally missed by the High Court.  

13. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument,  

that  Section  48-B  was  available  in  1995  when  re-

conveyance was ordered even then the respondent(s) has  

no case.   

14. In a recent judgment rendered by this Court in  

the  case  of  Tamil  Nadu  Housing  Board v.  L.  Chandrasekaran (Dead) by Lrs. and Others reported in  2010 (2) SCC 786, it has been held that before an order  

of  release  can  be  made  under  Section  48-B,  the  

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Government must be satisfied that the land  which is  

sought to be released is not required for the purpose  

for which it was acquired or for any public purpose.

15. Admittedly, in the instant case such condition  

has not satisfied in view of the representation of the  

appellant-Corporation  that  they  need  the  land  for  

utilising  it  as  parking  space  in  view  of  ever  

increasing  growth  of  car  population  in  the  city  of  

Chennai.  This is certainly a public purpose.   

16. The learned Counsel for the Metro Rail has filed  

an  affidavit  to  the  effect  that  the  Government  is  

contemplating the use of the said land for its ongoing  

project which is again, very much a public purpose.  

17. The  second  question  is  that  the  land  is  no  

longer vested in the Government as it divested itself  

by giving it over to the Corporation.  Therefore, the  

conditions stated in L. Chandrasekaran (supra) are not  satisfied  herein.   So  the  exercise  of  power  by  the  

State Government in cancelling its previous order of  

re-conveyance cannot be faulted.

18. No case of malafide or perversity has been made  8

out in the writ petitions.  The learned counsel for the  

respondent(s)  stated  that  its  only  case  of  alleged  

malafide has been made out in ground (c) at page 35 of  

the paper book.  The said ground is set out herein  

below:-

“Cancellation  of  reconveyance  order  is  colourable  exercise  of  power.   All  materials  have  been  considered  including  the views of the Corporations in detail in  G.O.  Ms.  No.  48  dated  10.3.1995.  Corporation  stated  that  there  is  a  proposal  to  construct  fully  air  conditioned  office  cum  shopping  complex.  However,  Government  has  rejected  the  proposal and ordered reconveyance.  As per  the impugned order, Corporations has given  a proposal for using it as parking space.  It  is  submitted  that  above  proposal  is  dated  5.6.1998,  long  after  Bankers  pay  order  has  been  received  from  the  petitioner.   It  is  submitted  that  facts  set  out  above  make  it  very  clear  that  impugned  order  is  based  on  extraneous  considerations  and  purely  colourable  exercise of power.”

19. Unfortunately we are of the opinion that the  

said  ground  does  not  make  out  any  case  of  malafide  

exercise  of  power  by  the  Government.   Specific  

pleadings with particulars must be there to make out a  

case of malafide and the person against whom malafide  

is alleged must be impleaded. No such pleadings are at  

all present in this case. 9

20. Apart  from  the  aforesaid  question,  in  L.  Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court held that if any re- conveyance is to be made that has to be done on the  

basis of the present market value.  The purported order  

of re-conveyance initially made by the Government was  

not made on that basis either.

21. In  the  facts  of  this  case  there  can  be  no  

question of promissory estoppel which is an equitable  

doctrine.  In the context of the clear provision of  

Section 48 of the principal Act which was governing its  

field  in  1995,  when  re-conveyance  was  purportedly  

ordered, equity has no application.  Nor is there any  

scope for principle of natural justice to operate when  

the person complaining of its infraction cannot show  

any right of his which has been violated.  In the given  

facts of the case and the clear mandate of Section 48  

of the principal Act, we do not discern any right of  

the landowners to apply for re-conveyance in respect of  

a land which had vested in the Government long ago.  

22. Therefore,  examining  the  matter  from  all  its  

angles,  we  do  not  find  any  reason  to  sustain  the  

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impugned judgment passed by the High Court.

23. The  appeals  are,  therefore,  allowed.   The  

judgment of the High Court is set aside.   

24. No order as to costs.

                             .......................J.

            (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

 .......................J.

       (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, April 13, 2011   

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