REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 698 OF 2010

THANGASAMY Appellant(s)

VS.

THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU  Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Maheshwari, J

In  this  appeal,  the  appellant-accused  has  called  in  question  the

judgment and order dated 07.01.2009 in Crl. R.C. No. 232 of 2006 whereby,

the Madras High Court  at its Madurai Bench, while dismissing the criminal

revision petition, has upheld the conviction of the appellant for offences under

Sections 279, 337(3 counts) and 304-A (4 counts) of the Indian Penal Code

('IPC').

2. Put  in  brief,  the  accusation  against  the  appellant  had  been  that  on

24.02.2001 at about 07:15 p.m., while driving a government passenger bus

bearing registration No. TN-72-N-0891 in a negligent manner, he caused an

accident near Korampallam on Tuticorin-Tirunelveli Main Road, which resulted

in the death of four persons namely, Jayaraj, Muniasamy, Gopal and Dharma

Nadar  whereas  three  persons  namely,  Murugan,  Senthur  Pandian  and

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Krishnan were injured. For the incident in question, FIR came to be registered

as Crime No. 70 of 2001; and after investigation, the accused was charge-

sheeted for the offences as aforesaid.  

3. In  trial,  the  prosecution,  inter  alia, relied  on  the  testimony  of  PW-1

Chellathrai (the informant), who asserted that at the time of the accident, he

was standing near Thangaiah STD booth and saw the accused driving the

offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, without even blowing the

horn; and having caused the accident whereby, four out of five persons, who

were  standing  near  the  booth,  came  beneath  the  vehicle  and  those  four

persons succumbed to their injuries whereas, the fifth person was taken to the

hospital. PW-2 Samadhana Raj, who had a cycle shop on Korampallam main

road, corroborated the testimony of PW-1 and stated that Dharamraj, Gopal,

Jayraj etc. had come to his shop to fix a puncture and they were standing on

the mud side of the road when the vehicle in question came at a fast speed

from Tirunelveli and dashed against them; that a TVS 50 vehicle also came

under  the  offending  vehicle;  and  that  he  helped  the  injured  to  reach  the

hospital. PW-3 Adhisaya Pandi, who was taking tea at a nearby place, further

corroborated the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2. Moreover, PW-4 Murugan,

also a victim of the accident, testified that while he was standing and talking to

Muniasamy,  Dharma,  Senthur  Pandian  and  Murugan,  a  government  bus,

which  was  over-speeding  from  the  right  side,  caused  the  accident.  This

witness also stated that the driver of the bus left the vehicle and fled away

from the scene of  the accident.  PW-5 Senthur Pandian,  the only surviving

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member of the five who came beneath the bus, testified in the same manner

as PW-4. He, of course, stated in the cross examination that the driver of the

offending bus having ran away, his identity was not known. However, in the

examination-in-chief this witness stated thus: "The person who drove the bus

is the accused here. He alighted and went away." This witness also deposed

in the cross-examination that a lorry from the opposite direction of the bus

came fast after overtaking a bullock cart; and that southern side of the road in

question had a slope and any vehicle taking to that side of the road would turn

upside down.

4. The accused-appellant attempted to suggest that there was neither any

oral evidence nor any documentary proof that he was driving the bus and had

caused the accident; and that, since the driver of the bus allegedly fled from

the scene, his identification was a matter of serious doubt.

5. In its order dated 24.09.2004 in C.C. No. 205 of 2001, on appreciation

of evidence, the Trial Court rejected the contentions urged on behalf of the

accused and found it proved that he did cause the accident which resulted in

the death of four persons apart from causing injuries to three. Accordingly, the

Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant for the offences

under  Sections 279,  337 (3  counts)  and 304-A (4  counts)  in  the following

manner:

"14A.  Finally,  in  the  light  of  the  evidence that  was elicited in the case and the documents marked and the material objects produced and after analysing the evidence,  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the charges laid against  he accused have been proved

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and hold him guilty under Sections 279, 337 IPC (3 counts) and Section 304-A IPC (4 counts). Therefore, I impose a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default one month imprisonment for the offence under Section 279 IPC, Rs. 100/- for each count of the offence under Section 337  IPC  (3  counts)  and  in  default  one  month imprisonment,  four  months  imprisonment  for  the offence under Section 304-A IPC (4 counts) for each count.  I  order  that  the  accused  will  serve  the sentences simultaneously. The total fine is Rs. 500/-"

6. The appeal  preferred by the accused-appellant against  the judgment

and order aforesaid, being Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 2004, was considered

and  dismissed  by  the  Sessions  Judge,  Tuticorin  in  the  judgment  dated

28.11.2005, after re-examination of the entire evidence on record.

7. Against the judgment aforesaid, the accused-appellant filed a revision

petition,  being  Crl.R.C.  No.  232  of  2006,  before  the  Madras  High  Court,

Madurai  Bench  which  was  also  dismissed  by  the  impugned  order  dated

07.01.2009. The High Court approved the conviction and sentencing of the

appellant while observing as under:

"11.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  due  to accident four persons have passed away and three others  have  sustained  injuries.  Considering  the nature of the accident and also considering that four persons have lost their lives, it is needless to say that no  leniency  can  be  shown  in  awarding  sentence against the revision petitioner/accused.

12. The courts below, after evaluating all the evidence available  on  record,  have  rightly  found  that  the accused has committed offences under Sections 279, 337 (3  counts)  and 304-A (4  counts)  of  the  Indian Penal  Code  and  in  view  of  the  discussion  made earlier, this court has not found even a filmsy ground to impinge the concurrent judgments passed by the courts  below  and  altogether  the  present  criminal revision case deserves dismissal."

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8. Assailing the order aforesaid, learned counsel for the accused-appellant

has contended that the orders passed by the High Court  as also the sub-

ordinate  Courts  are  contrary  to  law  and  that  the  order  of  conviction  was

passed while completely ignoring the portion of the statements of PW-4 and

PW-5 wherein, they had also deposed that the accident had occurred due to

rash and negligent driving of a lorry coming from the opposite direction; and

further that the bus had to swerve to north instead of going south, since there

was a valley like slope on the southern plank of the road. Learned counsel has

further submitted that the identity of the driver of the bus remained doubtful, as

could be noticed from the testimony of prosecution witnesses, who admit that

the driver of the bus had immediately fled from the scene of the accident and,

for want of identification parade,  the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses

could not  have been relied upon as regards identity  of  the appellant.  The

learned counsel would submit that without strict proof of the identity of the bus

driver, the appellant could not have been convicted in this case. The learned

counsel  would also pray for  waiving of  the sentence of  imprisonment  with

reference to  the passage of  time and the circumstances of  the case.  Per

contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State has duly supported the order

impugned and has submitted that looking to the gravity of the offence, no case

for any interference is made out.  

9. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having

examined the record with reference to the law applicable, we find no reason to

show any interference in this matter at the instance of the appellant.

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  10. The grounds on which the appellant seeks exoneration in this case are

twofold: one, that there was no evidence to prove that he was driving the bus

involved in the accident; and second, in the alternative, that the incident in

question  took  place  for  the  reason  of  the  vehicle  from  the  opposite  side

approaching in a negligent manner and if the driver of the bus in question had

not taken to the northern side, the passengers of the bus would have been at

the greater risk because of a valley like slope on the southern plank of the

road. The submissions remain totally bereft of substance.

11. So far the question of identity of the appellant as driver of the offending

bus is concerned, the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and then the High Court

have found the fact duly proved with reference to the overwhelming evidence

on  record,  including  the  testimony  of  PW1  to  PW5.  In  this  regard,  the

observations of the Appellate Court could be usefully taken note of as under:-

“... Regarding the submissions of the defence that the prosecution witnesses could not tell who actually was driving  the  bus  because  PWs  1  to  5  could  not establish  during  their  cross-examination  that  the accused was a driver and that they had stated that the driver ran away and they did not know who was the  driver.  But  the  trial  court  which  examined  this submission in the light of the testimonies and other necessary evidence, has held that PWs 1 to 5 had identified the accused as the person who was driving the bus No. TN-72-0891 and that the accused was present in the court and accordingly identified him. In view of this, this court rejects the arguments of the appellant-accused.”

12. The suggestion that the accident in question occurred for the fault of the

on-coming vehicle  from the opposite direction has also been rejected with

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reference to the evidence on record wherein the witness, including the injured

persons, uniformly stated that the accident occurred for rash and negligent

driving of the offending vehicle by the appellant.

13. The  contentions  urged  before  this  Court  essentially  relate  to  the

appreciation of evidence. Having regard to the contentions urged, we have

examined the material  placed on record in this  appeal  and find nothing of

infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the sub-ordinate Courts and by the

High Court, who have concurrently reached to the definite conclusion that the

accident occurred for rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the appellant

that resulted in the death of four persons apart from causing injuries to three.

The devastation in terms of casualties and injuries, as brought about by the

appellant,  was  bound  to  result  in  his  conviction  for  the  offences  under

Sections 304-A IPC (four counts) and 337 IPC (three counts).

14. So far the plea for reducing the period of imprisonment is concerned,

the same has only been noted to be rejected. In this regard, we may usefully

refer  to the decision of  this  Court  in  Alister  Anthony Pareira v.  State of

Maharashtra:  (2012)  2  SCC  648 wherein,  the  allegations  against  the

appellant had been that while driving a car in drunken condition, he ran over

the pavement, killing 7 persons and causing injuries to 8. He was charged for

the offences under Sections 304 Part II and 338 IPC; was ultimately convicted

by the High Court  under Sections 304 Part  II,  338 and 337 IPC; and was

sentenced to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs for the

offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and to rigorous imprisonment for 1 year

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and for 6 months respectively for the offences under Section 338 and 337

IPC. Apart from other contentions, one of the pleas before this Court was that

in view of fine and compensation already paid and willingness to make further

payment  as  also his  age and family  circumstances,  the appellant  may be

released  on  probation  or  his  sentence  may  be  reduced  to  that  already

undergone.  As  regards  this  plea  for  modification  of  sentence,  this  Court

traversed through the principles of penology, as enunciated in several of the

past decisions including those in State of M.P. v. Ghansyam Singh: (2003) 8

SCC 13 as also in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana: (2000) 5 SCC 82; and,

while  observing  that  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  show  'a

despicable  aggravated offence warranting punishment  proportionate to  the

crime', this Court found no justification for extending the benefit of probation or

for  reduction  of  sentence.  On  the  question  of  sentencing,  this  Court  re-

emphasised as follows:-

"84. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is  imposition  of  appropriate,  adequate,  just  and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an  accused  on  proof  of  crime.  The  courts  have evolved  certain  principles:  the  twin  objective  of  the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case  and  the court  must  keep  in  mind  the  gravity  of  the  crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances.

85.  The  principle  of  proportionality  in  sentencing  a crime-doer  is  well  entrenched  in  criminal jurisprudence. As a matter of law, proportion between

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crime and punishment bears most relevant influence in determination of sentencing the crime-doer.  The court has  to  take  into  consideration  all  aspects  including social  interest  and  consciousness  of  the  society  for award of appropriate sentence.’’

(underlining supplied for emphasis)

15. It shall also be apposite to recapitulate the observations of this Court in

the case of  Dalbir Singh (supra), guarding against leniency in relation to the

drivers found guilty of rash driving, in the following passages:

"1.  When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at  the risk of  further  escalation of road  accidents.  All  those  who  are  manning  the steering  of  automobiles,  particularly  professional drivers,  must  be  kept  under  constant  reminders  of their  duty  to  adopt  utmost  care  and  also  of  the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One  of  the  most  effective  ways  of  keeping  such drivers under mental  vigil  is to maintain a deterrent element in sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and frolic.

*** ***  ***

13.  Bearing  in  mind  the  galloping  trend  in  road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section  4  of  the  PO  Act.  While  considering  the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing  death  by  rash  or  negligent  driving  of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be  deterrence.  A  professional  driver  pedals  the accelerator of  the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness  when  his  leg  is  on  the  pedal  of  a vehicle in locomotion……. He must  always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the

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offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.’'

(underlining supplied for emphasis)

16.   We may also usefully refer to a decision of this Court in the case of State

of  Karnataka  v.  Muralidhar :  (2009)  4  SCC 463,  wherein,  for  rash  and

negligent driving, the respondent caused accident resulting in demise of a 16

year old boy while another person sustained grievous injuries. The Trial Court

sentenced the respondent to six months imprisonment and to a fine of Rs.

1,000/-  with  default  stipulation  for  offence  under  Section  338  IPC  and  to

rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  with  fine  of  Rs.  5,000/-  with  default

stipulation  for  the  offence  under  Section  304-A  IPC.  The  appeal  was

dismissed by the Sessions Court. However, the High Court waived custodial

sentence and only fines were imposed. This Court referred to the principles

related  with  the  offence  under  Section  304-A IPC  as  also  the  problems

associated with the road traffic injuries and found absolutely no reason that

the High Court  waived the custodial  sentence awarded to the respondent.

Hence, the impugned judgment of the high Court was set aside and that of the

Trial Court restored.

17. In the light of the principles aforesaid, when we examine the facts of the

present case, it is noticed that for rash and negligent driving by the appellant,

as many as four persons died and three other sustained injuries. Yet, the Trial

Court had been considerate in awarding the sentence only of four months'

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imprisonment for each count of the offence under Section 304-A IPC and only

of fine of Rs. 100 for each count of the offence under Section 337 IPC and Rs.

200/- for the offence under Section 279 IPC. To say the least, the punishment

awarded in this matter had been rather on the lower side. There being no

appeal for enhancement of sentence and looking to the time that has elapsed,

we  would  not  be  making  any  further  comment  in  the  matter.  Suffice  it  to

conclude that no case for reducing the punishment awarded to the appellant is

made out.  

18. Accordingly, and in view of the above, this appeal fails and is, therefore,

dismissed. The appellant shall surrender before the Court concerned within a

period of  4 weeks from today and shall  undergo the remaining part  of  the

sentence. In case he fails to surrender within the period aforesaid, the Trial

Court will take necessary steps to ensure that he serves out the remaining

part  of  sentence,  of  course,  after  due  adjustment  of  the  period  already

undergone.

...............................................J.     (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

      ..............................................J.    (DINESH MAHESHWARI)   1

New Delhi  Dated:  20th February, 2019.

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