REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 1854 OF 2008

TGN KUMAR — APPELLANT  

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA & ORS. — RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

1. Challenge  in  this  appeal,  by  special  leave,  is  to  the  order  dated  4th  

September, 2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of  

Kerala  in  Crl.  M.C.  No.1977  of  2007  whereby  a  number  of  general  

directions have been issued to all the criminal courts, which are called  

upon  to  hold  trials,  particularly  in  cases  involving  an  offence  under  

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the N.I.  

Act”), as also in all other cases involving offences which are technical in  

nature and do not involve any moral turpitude.

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2. In view of the controversy at hand, it  is unnecessary to state the facts  

giving rise to this appeal in detail, except to note that the present case  

arises  out  of a complaint  filed under Section 138 of the N.I.  Act.  On  

being  summoned  by  the  Magistrate,  the  accused  preferred  a  petition  

before  the  High  Court  under  Section  482  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  

Code, 1973 (for short “the Code”), inter alia, praying for dispensing with  

her personal appearance before the Magistrate.  As afore-stated, the High  

Court, while allowing the said application, and permitting the accused to  

appear before the Trial  Court  through her  counsel,  felt  that there  was  

great need for rationalising, humanising and simplifying the procedure in  

criminal courts with particular emphasis on the attitude to the "criminal  

with  no  moral  turpitude"  or  the  criminal  allegedly  guilty  of  only  a  

technical offence, including an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.  

Relying on the decision of  this  Court  in  Bhaskar Industries  Ltd.  Vs.   

Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. & Ors.1 and of the Kerala High Court  

in  Saseendran  Nair  Vs.  General  Manager2;  K.S.R.T.C.  Vs.  Abdul  

Latheef3 ;  Raman Nair  Vs.  State of Kerala4; Noorjahan  Vs.  Moideen5  

1 (2001) 7 SCC 401 2 1996 (2) KLT 482 3 2005 (3) KLT 955 4 1999 (3) KLT 714 5 2000 (2) KLT 756

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and Helen Rubber Industries & Ors.  Vs.  State of Kerala & Ors.6,   the  

learned  Judge  has  issued  the  following  ‘rules  of  guidance’,  with  a  

direction  that  these  can  and  must  certainly  be  followed  by  the  court  

below in the instant case as also by all criminal courts which are called  

upon to deal with trials under Section 138 of the N.I. Act:-

“i)    Hereafter in all 138 prosecutions, the very fact that  the  prosecution  is  one  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act  shall  be  reckoned  as  sufficient  reason  by  all  criminal  courts  to  invoke  the  discretion under Section 205 Cr.P.C and only a summons  under Section 205 Cr.P.C shall be issued by the criminal  courts at the first instance.  In all pending 138 cases also  applications under Section 205 Cr.P.C shall be allowed  and the accused shall be permitted to appear through their  counsel.  

ii)   The plea whether of guilty or of innocence can be  recorded  through  counsel  duly  appointed  and  for  that  purpose  personal  presence  of  the  accused  shall  not  be  insisted.

iii)  Evidence can be recorded in a trial under Section  138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the presence of  the counsel as enabled by Section 273 Cr.P.C when the  accused is exempted from personal  appearance and for  that purpose, the personal presence of the accused shall  not be insisted.

iv) Examination under Section 313(b) Cr.P.C can be  dispensed with under the proviso to Section 313(1) and if  the  accused  files  a  statement  explaining  his  stand,  the  same can be received by the court  notwithstanding the  absence of  a provision similar  to Section 233 and 243  

6 1972 K.L.T. 794

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Cr.P.C in the procedure for trial in a summons case. The  power  and  the  obligation  to  question  the  accused  to  enable  him  to  explain  the  circumstances  appearing  in  evidence  against  him  must  oblige  the  court  in  such  situation  to  accept  and  consider  the  written  statement  made by the accused.

v)  To receive the judgment also, it  is not necessary  or   essential to    insist on the personal presence of the  accused if the sentence is one of fine or the   judgment  is one   of   acquittal.      After the pronouncement of  judgment, the case can be posted to a specific date with  directions to the accused to appear in person to undergo  the sentence. By that date, it shall, of course, be open to  the accused to get the order of suspension of the superior  court produced before court.

vi) Where warrants are to be issued in a 138 prosecution,  ordinarily  a  bailable  warrant  under  Section  88  Cr.P.C  must be issued at the first instance before a non-bailable  warrant without any stipulations under Section 87 Cr.P.C  is issued.

vii) The     above   stipulations  can  only   be reckoned  as applicable in the ordinary circumstances and are not  intended to fetter the discretions of the  court to follow  any different procedure if there be compelling need. In  such event, the orders/directions of the Magistrate shall  clearly show the specific reasons as to why deviations are  resorted to.  

viii)  Needless to say, any person having a grievance that  the above procedure has not been followed unjustifiably  shall  always have the option of approaching this Court  for directions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.     The Sessions  Judges  and  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrates  must  also  ensure  that  these  directions  are  followed  in  letter  and  spirit by the subordinate courts. Commitment to human  rights  and  the  yearning  to  ensure  that  courts  are  user  friendly are assets to a modern judicial personality and  

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assessment of judicial performance by the superiors must  make note of such commitments of a judicial officer.

ix)   Even though the above directions are issued with  specific reference to prosecutions under Section 138 of  the Negotiable Instruments Act, they must be followed in  all other cases also where the offence alleged is technical  and involves no moral turpitude.”

3. Being  aggrieved  with  the  order  granting  a  general  exemption  to  the  

accused  from  personal  appearance  before  the  Trial  Court,  the  

complainant has filed this appeal.  

4. On 17th November, 2008,  while granting leave in this matter, a bench of  

two learned judges referred the instant case to a larger Bench, posing the  

following question for determination:

“One  of  the  questions  which  arises  for  consideration  in  this  special leave petition is as to whether the High court in exercise  of its jurisdiction under Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of the  Criminal  Procedure  and/or  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution of India could issue guidelines directing all courts  taking  cognizance  of  offences  under  section  138  of  the  Negotiable Instruments Act  inter alia  to invoke the discretion  under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and only  with a further direction that summons under Section 205 shall  be issued at the first instance. Keeping in view importance of  the question involved as also the various decisions of this Court  upon which the  learned  Judge of  the  High Court  has placed  reliance,  in our opinion, we think that this is a matter which  should be heard by a larger Bench. It is directed accordingly.”  

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This is how the present appeal has been placed before this Bench.  

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are convinced that the  

impugned order is unsustainable.   

6. Section 205 of the Code, which clothes the Magistrate with the discretion  

to dispense with the personal appearance of the accused, reads as follows:

“205. Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of  accused.—(1)  Whenever  a  Magistrate  issues  a  summons,  he  may,  if  he  sees  reason  so  to  do,  dispense  with  the  personal  attendance  of'  the  accused  and  permit  him to  appear  by  his  pleader.

(2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may,  in  his  discretion,  at  any stage of'  the  proceedings,  direct  the  personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary, enforce  such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided.”

7. The Section confers a discretion on the court to exempt an accused from  

personal appearance till  such time his appearance is considered by the  

court  to  be not  necessary during the trial.  It  is  manifest  from a plain  

reading  of  the  provision  that  while  considering  an  application  under  

Section 205 of the Code, the Magistrate has to bear in mind the nature of  

the case as also the conduct of the person summoned.  He shall examine  

whether any useful purpose would be served by requiring the personal  

attendance of the accused or whether the progress of the trial is likely to  

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be hampered on account of his absence. (See:  S.V. Muzumdar & Ors.   

Vs.  Gujarat  State  Fertilizer  Co.  Ltd.  &  Anr.7)  .    Therefore,  the  

satisfaction  whether  or  not  an  accused deserves  to  be exempted  from  

personal attendance has to be of the Magistrate, who is the master of the  

court in so far as the progress of the trial is concerned and none else.

8. In Bhaskar  Industries  Ltd.  (supra), this  Court  had  laid  down  the  

following guidelines, which are to be borne in mind while dealing with  

an application seeking dispensation with the  personal appearance of an  

accused in a case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act:  

“19. …it is within the powers of a Magistrate and in his judicial  discretion  to  dispense  with  the  personal  appearance  of  an  accused  either  throughout  or  at  any  particular  stage  of  such  proceedings  in  a  summons  case,  if  the  Magistrate  finds  that  insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous  suffering or tribulations on him, and the comparative advantage  would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare  instances where due to the far distance at which the accused  resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or  other good reasons the Magistrate feels that dispensing with the  personal  attendance  of  the  accused  would  only  be  in  the  interests of justice. However, the Magistrate who grants such  benefit  to  the  accused  must  take the  precautions  enumerated  above, as a matter of course.”

7 (2005) 4 SCC 173

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We respectfully concur with the above guidelines and while re-affirming the  

same, we would add that the order of the Magistrate should be such which  

does not result in unnecessary harassment to the accused and  at the same  

time does  not  cause  any  prejudice  to  the  complainant.   The  Court  must  

ensure that the exemption from personal appearance granted to an accused is  

not abused to delay the trial.  

9. In  light  of  the  afore-extracted  legal  principles,  the  impugned order  is  

clearly erroneous in as much as the discretion of the Magistrate under  

Section 205 of the Code cannot be circumscribed by laying down any  

general directions in that behalf. In  Manoj Narain Agrawal  Vs.  Shashi  

Agrawal & Ors.8, this Court, while observing that the High Court cannot  

lay down directions for the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate under  

Section 205 of the Code, had echoed the following views:

“Similarly, the High Court should not have, for all intent and  purport,  issued  the  direction  for  grant  of  exemption  from  personal  appearance.  Such a matter  undoubtedly shall  be left  for the consideration before the learned Magistrate. We are sure  that the Magistrate would exercise his jurisdiction in a fair and  judicious manner.”

10. It  is  equally  trite  that  the  inherent  powers  of  the  High  Court  under  

Section  482  of  the  Code  have  to  be  exercised  sparingly  with  

8 (2009) 6 SCC 385

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circumspection,  and  in  rare  cases  to  correct  patent  illegalities  or  to  

prevent  miscarriage  of  justice.  In  Madhu  Limaye  Vs.  The  State  of   

Maharashtra9, a  Bench  of  three  learned  Judges  of  this  Court  had  

observed that:

“…the following principles  may be noticed in relation to the  exercise of the inherent power of the High Court….: -

(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific  provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of  the aggrieved party;

(2) That  it  should  be  exercised  very  sparingly  to  prevent  abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the  ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar  of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

11. Similarly, while it is true that the power of superintendence conferred on  

the High Court  under Article 227 of the Constitution of  India is  both  

administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly  

and only  in  appropriate  cases  in  order  to  keep the  subordinate  courts  

within  the  bounds  of  their  authority.  In  any  event,  the  power  of  

superintendence  cannot  be  exercised  to  influence  the  subordinate  

9 (1977) 4 SCC 551  

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judiciary to pass any order or judgment in a particular manner. In Jasbir   

Singh Vs. State of Punjab10, this Court observed that:

“So, even while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the  Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise  such powers most  sparingly and only in appropriate  cases in  order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their  authority.  The  power  of  superintendence  exercised  over  the  subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High  Court  can  intervene  in  the  judicial  functions  of  the  lower  judiciary.  The  independence  of  the  subordinate  courts  in  the  discharge  of  their  judicial  functions  is  of  paramount  importance, just as the independence of the superior courts in  the discharge of their judicial functions. It is the members of the  subordinate judiciary who directly interact with the parties in  the course of proceedings of the case and therefore, it is no less  important  that  their  independence  should  be  protected  effectively  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  litigants.”  (See  also:  Trimbak Gangadhar Telang & Anr. Vs. Ramchandra Ganesh  Bhide & Ors.11; Mohd. Yunus  Vs.  Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors.12  and State, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu & Ors.13.)

12. As  regards  direction  (iv)  supra  to  accept  and  consider  the  written  

statement made by the accused, in our opinion, it is again not in accord  

with the language of Section 313 of the Code as also the dictum laid  

down by this Court in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka  

10 (2006) 8 SCC 294 11 (1977) 2 SCC 437 12 (1983) 4 SCC 566 13 (2003) 6 SCC 641

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& Ors.14.  Section 313 of the Code deals with the personal examination of  

the accused, and provides that:

“313. Power to examine the accused.—(1) In every inquiry or  trial,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  accused  personally  to  explain  any  circumstances  appearing  in  the  evidence  against  him, the Court—

(a) may  at  any  stage,  without  previously  warning  the  accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers  necessary;

(b)  shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been  examined  and  before  he  is  called  on  for  his  defence,  question him generally on the case:

Provided that in a summons-case,  where the Court has  dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may  also dispense with his examination under clause (b). …………………….……….…………………………………..”

(emphasis supplied by us)

13.On the plain language of Section 313, it  is evident that in a summons  

case, when the personal appearance of the accused has been dispensed  

with  under  Section  205  of  the  Code,  a  discretion  is  vested  in  the  

Magistrate  to dispense with the rigour of  personal  examination of  the  

accused under Section 313 of the Code as well.  

14. In  Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors.  (supra) while advocating a pragmatic and  

humanistic approach in less serious offences, Thomas, J. speaking for the  

14 (2000) 8 SCC 740

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majority  in  a   Bench of  three  learned Judges,  explained the  scope of  

clause (b) to Section 313(1) of the Code as follows :

“The word “shall” in clause (b) to Section 313(1) of the Code is  to be interpreted as  obligatory on the court  and it  should be  complied with when it is for the benefit of the accused. But if it  works to his great prejudice and disadvantage the court should,  in appropriate cases, e.g., if the accused satisfies the court that  he is unable to reach the venue of the court, except by bearing  huge expenditure or that he is unable to travel the long journey  due to physical incapacity or some such other hardship, relieve  him of such hardship and at the same time adopt a measure to  comply with the requirements in Section 313 of the Code in a  substantial manner. How could this be achieved?

If  the  accused  (who  is  already  exempted  from  personally  appearing  in  the  court)  makes  an  application  to  the  court  praying that he may be allowed to answer the questions without  making his physical presence in court on account of justifying  exigency  the  court  can  pass  appropriate  orders  thereon,  provided such application is accompanied by an affidavit sworn  to by the accused himself containing the following matters:

(a) A  narration  of  facts  to  satisfy  the  court  of  his  real  difficulties  to  be  physically  present  in  court  for  giving  such  answers. (b)  An assurance that no prejudice would be caused to him,  in any manner, by dispensing with his personal presence during  such questioning. (c) An undertaking that he would not raise any grievance on  that score at any stage of the case.”

15.It is manifest from the afore-extracted passage that dispensation with the  

personal  examination  of  an  accused  in  terms of  the  said  provision  is  

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within the trial court’s discretion, to be exercised keeping in view certain  

parameters, enumerated therein and not as a matter of course.  

16.It is true that in direction (vii) supra, the learned Judge has clarified that  

the stipulations in the preceding paragraphs are not intended to fetter the  

discretion  of  the  court  to  follow any  different  procedure,  if  there  be  

compelling need but the requirement of recording ‘specific reasons’ by  

the Magistrate for deviating  from the directions given in the order, as  

stipulated in the same paragraph, in our view, is by itself tantamount to  

putting fetters on the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.  This is not warranted  

in law.  

17. Thus, in the instant case, we have no hesitation in holding that the High  

Court  exceeded  its  jurisdiction  under  Section 482 of  the  Code and/or  

Article  227  of  the  Constitution  by  laying  down  the  afore-extracted  

general  directions,  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  clear  language  of  

Sections 205 and 313 of the Code, as noted above.  We feel that in light  

of the afore-noted guidelines laid down by this Court, further directions  

on the same issue by the High Court were wholly uncalled for.  In this  

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regard, the following observations in S. Palani Velayutham & Ors.  Vs.   

District Collector, Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu & Ors.15, are quite apt:

“The  courts  should  avoid  the  temptation  to  become  authoritarian. We have been coming across several instances,  where  in  their  anxiety  to  do  justice,  the  courts  have  gone  overboard, which results in injustice,  rather than justice.  It  is  said that all power is trust and with greater power comes greater  responsibility.”

18.In  light  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal  is  allowed,  and  the  

impugned order containing general directions to the lower courts is set  

aside.  However, we direct that if the accused moves the trial court with  

an  application  under  Section  205  of  the  Code  for  exemption  from  

personal attendance within four weeks of the receipt of a copy of this  

judgment, the exemption granted to her by the High Court shall continue  

to be in force till her application is disposed of by the trial court.

…….……………………………………       (D.K. JAIN, J.)  

…….……………………………………      (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.)  

15 (2009) 10 SCC 664

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                           …..…………………………………….        (H.L. DATTU, J.)

NEW DELHI; JANUARY 14, 2011. ARS

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