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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3215 OF 2010

TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR                        Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS

S.M.KANTHA RAJU (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR.          Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

R.F. NARIMAN, J. 1) The present appeal arises out of a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 19.09.2006, in which it has construed Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, as referring only to the Principal District Court of the place where the society is registered.  The correctness of this  judgment  is  assailed  before  us  by  learned  counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. 2) Sometime in June, 2004, the appellant filed a petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 in which it asked for the following reliefs: “(a) For a declaration that none of the respondents,

their  men  or  agents  have  any  legal  right whatsoever to call, hold or organize the annual convention of the members of CBCNC (No.16/48-49) or conduct elections for the office bearers of CBCNC  (No.16/48-49)  or  its  various  boards,  at any place including at Kakinada or Visakhapatnam under any notification or in pursuance of the

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notifications/pamphlets already passed/issued or proposed  to  be  passed  or  issued  either  by themselves  or  through  their  nominees,  privies etc;

(b) For  a  consequential  relief  for  permanent injunction restraining the respondents their men and  agents,  from  proclaiming  or  projecting  as Office  bearers  of  CBCNC  (No.16/48-49)  or  from organizing the annual convention of the members of the CBCNC (No.16/48-49) or election of office bearers  of  CBCNC  (No.16/48-49)  members  or  its various  boards  at  any  place  including  at Kakinada or Visakhapatnam under any notification or in pursuance of the notifications/pamphlets already passed/issued or proposed to be passed or issued either by themselves or through their nominees, privies etc:

(c) To  appoint  an  Advocate  Commissioner  for  the purpose of holding an annual convention for all the members of the CBCNC (No.16/48-49), either in  the  month  of  January  2004  or  immediately thereafter, as per the constitution and bye-laws of  the  CBCNC  (No.16/48-49),  and  entrust  the administration and management of all assets of CBCNC  (No.16/48-49)  to  the  office  bearers  so elected in the said elections, who shall be the rightful  body  to  represent  the  CBCNC (No.16/48-49);

(d) For Costs; and (e) For  such  other  relief  or  reliefs  as  your

Honourable  Court  deems  fit  and  proper  in  the circumstances of the case.”

3) A preliminary objection was raised by means of an I.A. being I.A. No. 234 of 2004 in which it was contended that the

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petition filed at Visakhapatnam was filed in the wrong Court and hence was without jurisdiction.  4) The  learned  District  Judge,  by  his  judgment  dated 17.01.2005,  first  observed  that  the  expression  “District Court” was not defined by the 2001 Act, and that this being so, he opined:

“Now, the law is well settled that when the special enactment did not specify the limits territorial jurisdiction of any Court prescribed under the said Act  to  entertain  the  litigation,  the  general provisions  of  C.P.C.,  regarding  the  said territorial  jurisdiction,  can  be  take  into consideration.  As  can  be  seen  from  the  A.P. Societies Act, it has not ousted the application of C.P.C., specifically.  Therefore, when the Act is silent  regarding  the  limits  of  territorial jurisdiction, and when the Act did not oust C.P.C., specifically,  undoubtedly,  the  provisions  of C.P.C., can be taken into consideration to decide the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  District  Court concerned as envisaged U/sec.23 of the Act.  Sec.20 C.P.C.,  envisages  that  the  proceedings  can  be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action wholly or in part arises. Therefore, the present petition can also be filed within the jurisdiction of the Court where a part of cause of action arose.”  

Having held this, the learned District Judge dismissed the preliminary objection.  5) A  Revision  Petition  filed  before  the  High  Court  was, however, allowed, and the judgment of the District Judge was

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set aside by the High Court observing thus: “On a comparative look at the expression used in the provisions of the A.P. Societies Registration Act,  2001  as  already  pointed  out,  a  dispute  as under Section 23 of the said Act has to be raised in the District Court concerned.  Even though the District Court concerned in  its comprehensive term bodily  does  not  find  place  in  the  definition clause.   However,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the expression  “the  Court”  finds  its  place  amongst definition clauses in the Section 2(d) to mean that principal  civil  Court  of  original  jurisdiction. These two provisions have to be read together and gather not only the meaning but also the object. Thus, the Court having been specifically defined in the very same legislation it can only be looked on for  the  purpose  of  finding  out  the  competent District Court as referred to under Section 23 of the said Act.  It refers to that Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.  The District Court or Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction are  one  and  the  same  and  interchangeable expressions.  The court of concerned can only be that it exists or created or formed and registered. Necessarily it means that the District Court of that place and not otherwise.  It is needless to mention  that  the  said  legislation  is  a  special enactment and therefore, the general principles as applicable could not be brought in and therefore, no reliance as such can be brought in, in respect of  the  various  situations  contemplated  under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  The theory of part cause of action will not find place either to the facts of the case or very scope and object of the legislation under this Act.  Hence,

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it  has  to  be  necessarily  held  that  it  is  only concerned  District  Court,  where  the  society  is registered  that  which  will  have  jurisdiction  to entertain any dispute under Section 23 of the said Act and not otherwise.”

6) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed before us the difference in phraseology between Section 23  of  the  2001  Act  and  Section  13  of  the  Societies Registration Act, 1860.  Further, he has argued that since this distinction has not been kept in mind, the judgment of the  Division  Bench  is  obviously  incorrect  and  that  of  the District Judge is correct.  7) Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has, however, submitted before us that the question today is academic inasmuch as the prayers in the petition were confined to certain persons who are no longer relevant.  Further, fresh elections have already taken place in the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 and, therefore, the appeal has become infructuous.  8) We are inclined to observe that what learned counsel for the respondents has argued before us is correct.  However, in view  of  the  recurring  nature  of  the  question  that  arises before us, it is important to settle the law once and for all for future guidance in cases like the present one.  9) Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, with which we are concerned, reads thus:

“23. Dispute regarding management:- In the event of any dispute arising among the Committee or the members of the society, in respect of any matter

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relating to the affairs of the society, any member of the society may proceed with the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (Central Act 26 of 1996) or may file an application in the District Court concerned and the said Court shall after necessary inquiry pass such order as it may deem fit.

10) It  may  be  noted  that  this  statute  is  a  consolidating statute which applies to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh  on  and  from  10.12.2001.   Prior  to  this  Act,  the Societies Registration Act, 1860 applied to the Andhra Region of  the  State,  whereas  the  Andhra  Pradesh  (Telangana  Area) Public  Societies  Registration  Act,  1940  applied  to  the Telangana Area.  Section 11 of the 1940 Act is pari materia with Section 23 of the 2001 Act, and reads as under:-

“11. Dispute regarding management: - In the event of  any  dispute  arising  among  the  Managing Committee  or  the  members  of  the  Society  in respect of any management or dissolution of the Society, any member of the Society may file an application in the District Court concerned, and the  said  Court  shall  after  necessary  inquiry pass such order as it shall deem fit.”

11) On  the  other  hand,  Section  13  of  the  Societies Registration Act reads as under:-

“13. Provision  for  dissolution  of  Societies  and adjustment of their affairs: - Any number not less than three-fifths of the members of any Society may determine  that  it  shall  be  dissolved,  and thereupon, it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at

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the time then agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the  property  of  the  Society,  its  claims  and liabilities,  according to  the rules  of the  said Society applicable thereto if any, and if not, then as  the  governing  body  shall  find  expedient, provided that, in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing body or the members of the Society,  the adjustment  of its  affairs shall  be referred to the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction  of the  district in  which the  chief building of the Society is situate, and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite:

Provided that no Society shall be dissolved unless   three-fifths  of  the  members  shall  have expressed  a  wish  for  such  dissolution  by  their votes delivered in person or by proxy at a general meeting convened for the purpose:

Provided  that  whenever  any  Government  is  a member  of,  or  a  contributor  to,  or  otherwise interested  in  any  Society  registered  under  this Act, such Society shall not be dissolved, without the  consent  of  the  Government  of  the  State  of registration.”

12) It  will  be  apparent  that  the  scheme  of  the  Societies Registration  Act  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  the  Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Act and the consolidating Act of 2001 on the other is completely different.  On the one hand, the 1860 Act refers the dispute that arises under Section 13 only to the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction of the District  in  which  the  chief  building  of  the  Society  is

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situate.  Under this Act therefore, jurisdiction is confined to one court and one court only: that is the principal court of original civil jurisdiction where the actual physical main building  of  the  society  is  situate.   On  the  other  hand, Section 11 of the 1940 Act and Section 23 of the 2001 Act enable  the  person  aggrieved  to  file  an  application  in  the “District Court concerned”.  It is this expression that has to be construed by this Court in the present case.   13) As the District Judge correctly states in the impugned judgment  dated  17.01.2005,  where  the  expression  “District Court” is not defined by the special enactment in which it occurs, it must necessarily take with it all the trappings that go along with a District Court that is established under the  general  law.   This  would  necessarily  mean  that  the provisions  applicable  to   District  Courts  generally  would apply, and that therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it comes to determining the jurisdiction of such District Court, would necessarily apply.  14) In fact, the said conclusion is in consonance with National  Sewing  Thread  Co.  Ltd. vs.  James  Chadwick  & Bros.  Ltd. [1953]  SCR  1028.   The  question  that  arose before this Court was in the context of Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 which provided an appeal from any decision of the Registrar to “the High Court having jurisdiction”.  This Court held that the Trade Marks Act does not provide for or lay down any procedure for the

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conduct of an appeal in the High Court.  This being so, this Court held:

“The Trade Marks Act does not provide or lay down any procedure for the future conduct or career of that appeal in the High Court, indeed section 77 of the Act provides that the High Court can if it likes make rules in the matter.  Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted  and  which  confers  on  it  power  in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction.  The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already  established,  then  that  appeal  must  be regulated  by  the  practice  and  procedure  of  that Court.  This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in  National Telephone Co., Ltd. v.  Postmaster-General  [1913]  A.C.  546, in these terms : -  

“When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.”

The same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar V.  Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar (1947) 74 I.A. 264, wherein it was said :-

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“Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.”

Again  in  Secretary  of  State  for  India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (1916) I.L.R. 39 Madras 617, when dealing with the case under the Madras Forest Act their Lordships observed as follows : -

“It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way  of  appeal  were  incompetent,  these  being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not well-founded.  Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders,  and  decrees  the  ordinary  rules  of  the Civil Procedure Code apply.”

Though  the  facts  of  the  cases  laying  down  the above rule were not exactly similar to the facts of  the  present  case,  the  principle  enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite  application  to  the  facts  and circumstances of the present case.  Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the  High  Court  and  says  nothing  more  about  it. That being so, the High Court being seized at such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by section

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76  it  has  to  exercise  that  jurisdiction  in  the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction  and  when  such  jurisdiction  is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act.”

15) The  same  position  obtains  in  the  present  case  as Section 23 of the 2001 Act also does not provide for any procedure  for  the  conduct  of  the  application  in  the District Court concerned.  This judgment would therefore apply on all fours to the facts in the present case. However, learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice a judgment in Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. and Others vs.  Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd., and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 34.  The question for decision in the  appeal  before  this  Court  was  the  meaning  of  the expression  “the  High  Court”  in  Section  10-F  of  the Companies  Act,  1956.   The  Companies  Act  defined  “the Court” in Section 2(11) as follows:-

“(11) 'the Court' means,- (a) with respect to any matter relating to a company (other than any offence against this Act), the Court having jurisdiction  under  this  Act  with  respect  to that  matter  relating  to  that  company,  as provided in Section 10.”

and  then  went  on  to  speak  of  “the  court  having

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jurisdiction” in Section 10(1)(a) as follows: 10. Jurisdiction of Courts.- (1) The Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be- (a)  the  High  Court  having  jurisdiction  in relation to the place at which the registered office of the company concerned is situate, except to the extent to which jurisdiction has been conferred on any District Court or District  Courts  subordinate  to  that  High Court in pursuance of sub-section (2)”

16) This  being  the  case,  this  Court  came  to  the conclusion that the High Court in Section 10-F means the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the Registered Office of the Company concerned is  situate, as  indicated  by  Section  2(11)  read  with Section 10(1)(a) of the Companies Act.  17) This judgment would be relevant if the pari materia provision under Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 had fallen for decision.  As has been pointed out  above,  this  provision  gives  only  one  court jurisdiction  -  the  principal  court  of  original  civil jurisdiction of the District in which the chief building of the society is situate, somewhat like Section 10-F of the  Companies  Act.   Inasmuch  as  this  Section  is completely distinct from Sections 23 of the 2001 Act and 11 of the earlier Telangana Act, it is clear that the

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judgment in James Chadwick's case squarely applies to the present case, and not the aforesaid judgment.      18) In this view of the law, we set aside the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 19.09.2006.  We must indicate  that  the  impugned  judgment  is  wrong  on  two counts.  First, in applying the definition of “the Court” to “District Court” mentioned in Section 23, and then concluding  that  it  would  refer  only  to  the  principal Court of original jurisdiction of one particular place. It  is  also  wrong  in  stating  that  as  the  2001  Andhra Pradesh Act is a special enactment, general principles applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply, for the reasons given by us above.  19) The appeal is accordingly allowed.

.......................... J.       (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

.......................... J.           (SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)

New Delhi; August 16, 2017.

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ITEM NO.106               COURT NO.13               SECTION XII-A                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal  No(s).  3215/2010 TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR                          Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS S.M.KANTHA RAJU (DEAD) THR. LRS.  & ANR.            Respondent(s) Date : 16-08-2017 This appeal was called on for hearing today. CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL For Appellant(s)   Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, AOR                 Mr. Prabhat Kumar, Adv.

Ms. Ankita Sharma, Adv. Mr. Siddhartha Thalukdar, Adv.    

For Respondent(s) Mr. Y. Raja Gopala Rao, AOR Mr. Y. Vismai Rao, Adv. Mr. K. Sharat Kumar, Adv. Ms. Savita Singh, Adv.

                 Mr. Sibo Sankar Mishra, AOR Mr. K. Subba Rao, Adv.

                 Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, AOR Mr. Abhay Pratap Singh, Adv.

 Mr. Vipin Nair, AOR Mr. P.B. Suresh, Adv.                     

         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.  

(R. NATARAJAN)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)  COURT MASTER                                      COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)