REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 838  OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1675 of 2019)

TEJASWINI GAUD AND ORS.    ...Appellants

VERSUS

SHEKHAR JAGDISH PRASAD TEWARI AND OTHERS                     ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal  arises out  of  the judgment  dated 06.02.2019

passed by the High Court of Bombay in Crl.W.P. No. 5214 of 2018

in and by which the High Court  held that  the first  respondent-

father of the child being the surviving parent and in the interest of

welfare of the child, the custody of the child must be handed over

to the first respondent-father and issued writ  of habeas corpus

directing the appellants to handover the custody of the minor child

to respondent No.1-father of the child.

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3. Brief facts of the case are that marriage of respondent No.1

was solemnized with Zelam on 28-05-2006. During the fifth month

of her pregnancy i.e. in May 2017, Zelam was detected with breast

cancer. Respondent No.1 and Zelam were blessed with a girl child

named  Shikha  on  14-08-2017.   While  Zelam  was  undergoing

treatment, child  Shikha was with  her  father  respondent  No.1  till

November, 2017. Unfortunately, on 29-11-2017, respondent No. 1

was  suddenly  hospitalised  and  he  was  diagnosed  with

Tuberculosis  Meningitis  and  Pulmonary  Tuberculosis.  While  he

was undergoing treatment, appellant No.1-Tejaswini Gaud – one of

the two sisters of Zelam and appellant No.4-Dr. Pradeep Gaud who

is the husband of Tejaswini, took Zelam along with Shikha to their

residence  at  Mahim,  Mumbai  for  continuation  of  the  treatment.

Later, in June 2018, Zelam was shifted to her paternal home along

with  Shikha  in  Pune  i.e.  residence  of  appellant  No.3-Samir

Pardeshi, brother of Zelam. In July 2018, they were again shifted to

the house of  appellant  No.1 in  Mumbai.  On 17-10-2018,  Zelam

succumbed to  her  illness.   Child  Shikha continued to  be in  the

custody of  the appellants  in  Pune at  the residence of  appellant

No.3  till  17-11-2018.  Respondent  No.1-father  was  denied  the

custody  of  child  and  on  17-11-2018,  he  gave  a  complaint  to

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Dattawadi Police Station, Pune. Thereafter, respondent No.1-father

approached the High Court by filing a writ petition seeking custody

of minor child Shikha. Respondent No.1-father is a post-graduate

in  Management  and  is  working  as  a  Principal  Consultant  with

Wipro Limited.

4. The High Court held that respondent No.1-father, the only

surviving parent of the child is entitled to the custody of the child

and the child needs love, care and affection of the father.  The

High  Court  took  into  account  that  respondent  No.1  was

hospitalised for a serious ailment and in those circumstances, the

appellants  have looked after  the  child  and in  the  interest  and

welfare of the child, it is just and proper that the custody of the

child is handed over back to the first respondent. However, the

High Court observed that the efforts put in by the appellants in

taking care of the child has to be recognized and so the High

Court granted appellants No.2 and 3 access to the child.

5. The appellants contend that the writ of habeas corpus cannot

be  issued  when  efficacious  alternative  remedy  is  available  to

respondent  No.  1  under  Hindu  Minority  and  Guardianship  Act,

1956.   It  was submitted that  the child was handed over to the

appellants by the ailing mother of the child who has expressed her

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wish that they should take care of the child and therefore, it is not a

fit case for issuance of writ of habeas corpus which is issued only

in  cases  of  illegal  detention.  It  is  also  their  contention  that  the

question  of  custody  of  the  minor  child  is  to  be  decided  not  on

consideration of the legal rights of the parties; but on the sole and

predominant  criterion of  what  would best  serve the interest  and

welfare of the minor and, as such, the appellants who are taking

care  of  the  child  since  more  than a year,  they  alone would  be

entitled  to  have  the  custody  of  the  child  in  preference  to

respondent No.1-father of the child.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that

though  the  first  respondent-father  is  a  natural  guardian  of  the

minor  child  Shikha  and  has  a  preferential  right  to  claim  the

custody of the minor child, but in matters concerning the custody

of a minor child, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the

minor and not the legal right of a particular party, in this case, the

father.  It  was  further  submitted  that  Section  6  of  the  Hindu

Minority  and  Guardianship  Act,  1956  cannot  supersede  the

dominant consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of

the minor child and the welfare of the minor child has to be the

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sole  consideration.  In  support  of  his  contention,  the  learned

counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon:-

(i) Dr. Veena Kapoor v. Varinder Kumar Kapoor (1981) 3

SCC 92;

Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma (2000) 3 SCC 14;

G. Eva Mary Elezabath v. Jayaraj and Others  2005 SCC Online

Mad 472 : AIR 2005 Mad 452;

L. Chandran v. Mrs. Venkatalakshmi & Another 1980 SCC Online

AP 80 : AIR 1981 AP 1;

Ravi Kant Keshri & Another v. Krishna Kumar Gupta and Others

1992 SCC Online All 548 : AIR 1993 All 230;

Suriez v. M. Abdul Khader and Others 2017 SCC Online Kar 4935;

Murari  Lal  Sharma and Another  v.  State of  West  Bengal  and

Others 2013 SCC Online 23045 : AIR 2013 Cal 213;

R.  Suresh  Kumar  v.  K.A.  Kavathi  and  Others

MANU/TN/8529/2006;

Athar Hussain v.  Syed Siraj  Ahmed and Others  (2010) 2 SCC

654;

Nil Ratan Kundu and Another v. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413;

Kirtikumar Maheshankar Joshi v. Pradipkumar Karunashanker

Joshi (1992) 3 SCC 573;

Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42;

Baby Sarojam v. S. Vijayakrishnan Nair AIR 1992 Ker 277;

Abhimanyu Poria v. Rajbir Singh and Others  2018 SCC Online

Del 6661 : AIR 2018 Del 127;

A.V. Venkatakrishnaiah and Another v. S.A. Sathyakumar  1978

SCC Online Kar 241 : AIR 1978 Kar 220.

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7. Per  contra,  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  first

respondent has submitted that in view of Section 6 of the Hindu

Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, father has the paramount

right to the custody of the children and he cannot be deprived of

the custody of the minor child unless it is shown that he is unfit to

be her guardian.  The learned counsel submitted that in view of

his illness and the illness of the mother Zelam, mother and child

happened to be in Mumbai and Pune and considering the welfare

of the child, she had to be handed over to the first respondent.  It

was further submitted that father being a natural guardian as per

the  provisions  of  Section  6  of  the  Hindu  Minority  and

Guardianship Act, 1956, the appellants have no legal right for the

custody  of  the  infant  and  the  High  Court  rightly  ordered  the

custody  of  the  child  to  respondent  No.1.  In  support  of  his

contention, learned counsel for the respondents inter alia placed

reliance upon number of judgments:-

(i) Gohar Begam v. Suggi @ Nazma Begam and Others

AIR 1960 SC 93;

(ii) Smt.  Manju  Malini  Sheshachalam  D/o  Mr.  R.

Sheshachalam  v.  Vijay  Thirugnanam  S/o

Thivugnanam & Others 2018 SCC Online Kar 621;

(iii) Amol  Ramesh  Pawar  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  &

Others 2014 SCC Online Bom 280;

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(iv) Marggarate Maria Pulparampil Nee Feldman v. Dr.

Chacko  Pulparampil  and  Others  AIR  1970  Ker  1

(FB);

(v) Thirumalai Kumaran v. Union Territory of Dadra and

Nagar Haveli 2003 (2) Mh.L.J.;

(vi) Capt.  Dushyant  Somal  v.  Smt.  Sushma  Somal  &

Others (1981) 2 SCC 277;

(vii) Syed  Saleemuddin  v.  Dr.  Rukhsana  and  Others

(2001) 5 SCC 247;

(viii) Nirmaljit  Kaur  (2)  v.  State  of  Punjab and Otherrs

(2006) 9 SCC 364;

(ix) Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others

(2015) 5 SCC 450;

(x) Ruchika  Abbi  &  Anr.  v.  State  (National  Capital

Territory of Delhi) and Another (2016) 16 SCC 764;

(xi) Kanika Goel v. State of Delhi through Station House

Officer and Another (2018) 9 SCC 578.

8. We  have  carefully  considered  the  rival  contentions  and

perused  the  impugned  judgment  and various  judgments  relied

upon by the parties.  

9. The question falling for consideration is whether in the writ

of habeas corpus filed by respondent No.1 seeking custody of the

minor  child  from  the  appellants,  the  High  Court  was  right  in

ordering  that  the  custody  of  minor  child  be  handed  over  to

respondent No.1-father.  Further question falling for consideration

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is whether handing over of the custody of the child to respondent

No.1-father  is  not  conducive to the interest  and welfare of  the

minor child.   

10. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

enacts as to who can be said to be a natural guardian.  As per

Section 6 of the Act, natural guardian of a Hindu Minor in respect

of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property

(excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property) is

the father, in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl and after him,

the mother.  Father continues to be a natural guardian, unless he

has ceased to be a Hindu or renounced the world.  Section 13 of

the Act deals with the welfare of a minor.  Section 13 stipulates

that in the appointment or declaration of any person as guardian

of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the

paramount  consideration.    Section  13(2)  stipulates  that  no

person  shall  be  entitled  to  the  guardianship  by  virtue  of  the

provisions  of  the  Act  if  the  court  is  of  opinion  that  his  or  her

guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor.

11. Maintainability  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus:-   The

learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the law is well-

settled  that  in  deciding  the  question  of  custody  of  minor,  the

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welfare  of  the  minor  is  of  paramount  importance and  that  the

custody of the minor child by the appellants cannot be said to be

illegal or improper detention so as to entertain the habeas corpus

which is  an extraordinary  remedy and the High Court  erred in

ordering the custody of the minor child be handed over to the first

respondent-father.   Placing  reliance  on  Veena  Kapoor1 and

Sarita Sharma2 and few other cases, the learned counsel for the

appellants contended that  the welfare of children requires a full

and thorough inquiry and therefore, the High Court should instead

of allowing the habeas corpus petition, should have directed the

respondent to initiate appropriate proceedings in the civil  court.

The  learned  counsel  further  contended  that  though  the  father

being a natural guardian has a preferential right to the custody of

the minor child, keeping in view the welfare of the child and the

facts and circumstances of the case, custody of the child by the

appellants cannot be said to be illegal or improper detention so as

to justify invoking extra-ordinary remedy by filing of the habeas

corpus petition.   

12. Countering  this  contention,  the  learned  counsel  for

respondent No.1 submitted that in the given facts of the case, the 1 Dr. Veena Kapoor v. Varinder Kumar Kapoor (1981) 3 SCC 92

2 Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma (2000) 3 SCC 14

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High  Court  has  the  extraordinary  power  to  exercise  the

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the

High Court was right in allowing the habeas corpus petition. The

learned  counsel  has  placed  reliance  on  Gohar  Begum3 and.

Manju Malini Sheshachalam4. Contention of respondent No.1 is

that as per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,

respondent No.1, being the father, is the natural guardian and the

appellants have no authority to retain the custody of the child and

the refusal to hand over the custody amounts to illegal detention

of  the  child  and therefore,  the  writ  of  habeas corpus  was  the

proper remedy available to him to seek redressal.  

13. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for securing

the  liberty  of  the  subject  by  affording  an  effective  means  of

immediate release from an illegal or improper detention.  The writ

also extends its influence to restore the custody of a minor to his

guardian when wrongfully deprived of it.  The detention of a minor

by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as

equivalent  to  illegal  detention  for  the  purpose of  granting  writ,

directing  custody  of  the  minor  child.   For  restoration  of  the

custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal 3 Gohar Begum v. Suggi @ Nazma Begam and others AIR 1960 SC 93 4 Smt. Manju Malini Sheshachalam D/o Mr. R. Sheshachalam v. Vijay Thirugnanam S/o  Thivugnanam & Others 2018 SCC Online Kar 621

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law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the

writ court has jurisdiction.  

14. In  Gohar  Begum3 where  the  mother  had,  under  the

personal  law,  the  legal  right  to  the  custody  of  her  illegitimate

minor child, the writ was issued. In Gohar Begum3, the Supreme

Court dealt with a petition for habeas corpus for recovery of an

illegitimate  female  child.  Gohar  alleged  that  Kaniz  Begum,

Gohar’s  mother’s  sister  was  allegedly  detaining  Gohar’s  infant

female child illegally. The Supreme Court took note of the position

under the Mohammedan Law that the mother of an illegitimate

female child is entitled to its custody and refusal to restore the

custody of the child to the mother would result in illegal custody of

the child.  The Supreme Court held that Kaniz having no legal

right to the custody of the child and her refusal to make over the

child to the mother resulted in an illegal  detention of  the child

within the meaning of Section 491 Cr.P.C. of the old Code. The

Supreme Court held that the fact that Gohar had a right under the

Guardians and Wards Act is no justification for denying her right

under  Section  491  Cr.P.C.  The  Supreme  Court  observed  that

Gohar Begum, being the natural guardian, is entitled to maintain

the writ petition and held as under:-

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“7. On these undisputed facts the position in law is perfectly clear. Under

the Mohammedan law which applies to this case, the appellant is entitled to

the custody of Anjum who is her illegitimate daughter, no matter who the

father of Anjum is.  The respondent has no legal  right whatsoever to the

custody of the child.  Her refusal to make over the child to the appellant

therefore resulted in an illegal detention of the child within the meaning of

Section  491. This  position  is  clearly  recognised  in  the  English  cases

concerning writs of habeas corpus for the production of infants.

In  Queen   v.    Clarke     (1857)  7  EL &  BL 186:  119,  ER  1217 Lord

Campbell, C.J., said at p. 193:

“But with respect to a child under guardianship for nurture, the child is

supposed to be unlawfully imprisoned when unlawfully detained from

the custody of the guardian; and when delivered to him, the child is

supposed to be set at liberty.”

The courts in our country have consistently taken the same view. For

this purpose the Indian cases hereinafter cited may be referred to. The

terms of Section 491 would clearly be applicable to the case and the

appellant entitled to the order she asked.

8. We therefore think that the learned Judges of the High Court were clearly

wrong in their view that the child Anjum was not being illegally or improperly

detained. The learned Judges have not given any reason in support of their

view and we are clear in our mind that view is unsustainable in law.

……..

10. We further see no reason why the appellant should have been asked to

proceed under the Guardian and Wards Act for recovering the custody of

the child. She had of course the right to do so. But she had also a clear right

to an order for the custody of the child under Section 491 of the Code. The

fact  that  she  had  a  right  under  the  Guardians  and  Wards  Act  is  no

justification  for  denying  her  the  right  under  Section  491.  That  is  well

established as will appear from the cases hereinafter cited.”  (Underlining

added)

15. In  Veena  Kapoor1,  the  issue  of  custody  of  child  was

between  the  natural  guardians  who  were  not  living  together.

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Veena, the mother of the child, filed the habeas corpus petition

seeking custody of the child from her husband alleging that her

husband was having illegal custody of the one and a half year old

child.  The Supreme Court directed the District Judge concerned

to take down evidence, adduced by the parties, and send a report

to the Supreme Court on the question whether considering the

interest of the minor child, its mother should be given its custody.

16. In  Rajiv Bhatia5,  the habeas corpus petition was filed by

Priyanka, mother of  the girl,  alleging that  her daughter  was in

illegal custody of Rajiv, her husband’s elder brother.  Rajiv relied

on  an  adoption  deed.   Priyanka  took  the  plea  that  it  was  a

fraudulent  document.   The  Supreme Court  held  that  the  High

Court  was  not  entitled  to  examine  the  legality  of  the  deed  of

adoption and then come to the conclusion one way or the other

with regard to the custody of the child.

17. In  Manju Malini4 where the mother filed a habeas corpus

petition  seeking  custody  of  her  minor  child  Tanishka  from her

sister and brother-in-law who refused to hand over the child to the

mother, the Karnataka High Court held as under:-  

“24. The moment respondents 1 and 2 refused to handover the custody of

minor  Tanishka  to  the  petitioner  the  natural  and  legal  guardian,  the

5 Rajiv Bhatia v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others (1999) 8 SCC 525

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continuation  of  her  custody  with  them  becomes  illegal  detention.  Such

intentional act on the part of respondent Nos.1 and 2 even amounts to the

offence of kidnapping punishable under S.361 of IPC. Therefore there is no

merit  in  the  contention  that  the  writ  petition  is  not  maintainable  and

respondent Nos.1 and 2 are in legal custody of baby Tanishka.”  

18. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the

legality of the custody.  Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium

through  which  the  custody  of  the  child  is  addressed  to  the

discretion of the court.  Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which

is an extraordinary remedy and the writ  is issued where in the

circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided

by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ

will not be issued.  In child custody matters, the power of the High

Court  in  granting  the  writ  is  qualified only  in  cases  where  the

detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal

custody.  In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question

by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child

custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where

it  is  proved that  the detention of  a minor  child  by a parent  or

others was illegal and without any authority of law.   

19. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies only under

the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and

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Wards  Act  as  the  case  may  be.   In  cases  arising  out  of  the

proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction

of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides

within  the area on  which  the court  exercises  such jurisdiction.

There are significant differences between the enquiry under the

Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ

court which is of summary in nature.  What is important is the

welfare of the child.  In the writ court, rights are determined only

on the basis of affidavits.  Where the court is of the view that a

detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the

extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the

civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties

to  the  custody  of  the  minor  will  be  determined  in  exercise  of

extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus.   

20. In  the  present  case,  the  appellants  are  the  sisters  and

brother of the mother Zelam who do not have any authority of law

to have the custody of the minor child. Whereas as per Section 6

of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the first respondent-

father is a natural guardian of the minor child and is having the

legal right to claim the custody of the child.  The entitlement of

father to the custody of child is not disputed and the child being a

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minor aged 1½ years cannot express its intelligent preferences.

Hence, in our considered view, in the facts and circumstances of

this case, the father, being the natural guardian, was justified in

invoking the extraordinary remedy seeking custody of the child

under          Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. Custody of the child – removed from foreign countries

and brought to India:-  In a number of judgments, the Supreme

Court considered the conduct of a summary or elaborate enquiry

on the question of custody by the court in the country to which the

child has been removed.  In number of decisions, the Supreme

Court dealt with habeas corpus petition filed either before it under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India or the correctness of the

order passed by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the question of custody

of the child who had been removed from the foreign countries and

brought  to  India  and  the  question  of  repatriation  of  the  minor

children  to  the  country  from  where  he/she  may  have  been

removed by a parent or other person.  In number of cases, the

Supreme  Court  has  taken  the  view  that  the  High  Court  may

invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the validity of

the detention. However, the Court has taken view that the order of

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the  foreign  court  must  yield  to  the  welfare  of  the  child.  After

referring to various judgments, in  Ruchi Majoo6, it was held as

under:-

“58. Proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus are summary in nature,

where the legality of the detention of the alleged detenu is examined on the

basis of affidavits placed by the parties. Even so, nothing prevents the High

Court from embarking upon a detailed enquiry in cases where the welfare of

a minor is in question, which is the paramount consideration for the Court

while exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction. A High Court may, therefore,

invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the validity of the detention,

in  cases that  fall  within  its  jurisdiction and may also issue orders  as  to

custody of the minor depending upon how the Court views the rival claims,

if any, to such custody.

59. The Court may also direct repatriation of the minor child to the country

from where he/she may have been removed by a parent or other person; as

was directed by this Court in Ravi Chandran (2010) 1 SCC 174 and Shilpa

Aggarwal (2010) 1 SCC 591 cases or refuse to do so as was the position in

Sarita Sharma case (2000) 3 SCC 14. What is important is that so long as

the alleged detenu is within the jurisdiction of the High Court no question of

its  competence  to  pass  appropriate  orders  arises.  The  writ  court’s

jurisdiction to make appropriate orders regarding custody arises no sooner

it is found that the alleged detenu is within its territorial jurisdiction.”

22. After  referring  to  various  judgments  and  considering  the

principles for issuance of writ  of habeas corpus concerning the

minor child brought to India in violation of the order of the foreign

court, in Nithya Anand7, it was held as under:-  

6 Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479 7 Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 8 SCC 454

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“46. The High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return

of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind all

the attending facts and circumstances including the settled legal position

referred to above. Once again, we may hasten to add that the decision of

the  court,  in  each  case,  must  depend  on  the  totality  of  the  facts  and

circumstances of the case brought before it whilst considering the welfare of

the child which is of paramount consideration. The order of the foreign court

must yield to the welfare of the child. Further, the remedy of writ of habeas

corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement of the directions given by the

foreign  court  against  a  person  within  its  jurisdiction  and  convert  that

jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Indubitably, the writ petitioner can

take  recourse  to  such  other  remedy  as  may  be  permissible  in  law  for

enforcement of the order passed by the foreign court  or to resort to any

other proceedings as may be permissible in law before the Indian Court for

the custody of the child, if so advised.”

23. In Sarita Sharma2, the tussle over the custody of two minor

children  was  between  their  separated  mother  and  father.  The

Family Court of USA while passing the decree of divorce gave

custody rights to the father. When the mother flew to India with

the  children,  the  father  approached  the  High  Court  by  filing  a

habeas corpus petition. The High Court directed the mother to

handover the custody to the father. The Supreme Court in appeal

observed  that  the  High  Court  should  instead  of  allowing  the

habeas corpus petition should have directed the parties to initiate

appropriate  proceedings  wherein  a  thorough  enquiry  into  the

interest of children could be made.

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24. In  the  recent  decision  in  Lahari  Sakhamuri8,  this  court

referred to all the judgments regarding the custody of the minor

children  when  the  parents  are  non-residents  (NRI).  We  have

referred to the above judgments relating to custody of the child

removed from foreign country and brought to India for the sake of

completion and to point out that there is a significant difference in

so far the children removed from foreign countries and brought

into India.

25. Welfare  of  the  minor  child  is  the  paramount

consideration:- The court while deciding the child custody cases

is not bound by the mere legal right of the parent or guardian.

Though the provisions of the special statutes govern the rights of

the  parents  or  guardians,  but  the  welfare  of  the  minor  is  the

supreme consideration in cases concerning custody of the minor

child. The paramount consideration for the court ought to be child

interest and welfare of the child.

26. After referring to number of judgments and observing that

while  dealing  with  child  custody  cases,  the  paramount

consideration should be the welfare of the child and due weight

should be given to child’s ordinary comfort, contentment, health,

8 Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali 2019 (5) SCALE 97

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education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings,

in Nil Ratan Kundu9, it was held as under:-

“49. In Goverdhan Lal v. Gajendra Kumar, AIR 2002 Raj 148 the High Court

observed that it is true that the father is a natural guardian of a minor child

and therefore has a preferential right to claim the custody of his son, but in

matters  concerning  the  custody  of  a  minor  child,  the  paramount

consideration  is  the  welfare  of  the  minor  and  not  the  legal  right  of  a

particular party. Section 6 of the 1956 Act cannot supersede the dominant

consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor child. It

was also observed that keeping in mind the welfare of the child as the sole

consideration, it would be proper to find out the wishes of the child as to

with whom he or she wants to live.

50. Again, in  M.K. Hari Govindan v.  A.R. Rajaram, AIR 2003 Mad 315 the

Court  held  that  custody  cases  cannot  be  decided  on  documents,  oral

evidence or  precedents without  reference to “human touch”.  The human

touch  is  the  primary  one  for  the  welfare  of  the  minor  since  the  other

materials may be created either by the parties themselves or on the advice

of counsel to suit their convenience.

51. In Kamla Devi v. State of H.P. AIR 1987 HP 34 the Court observed:  

“13. … the Court while deciding child custody cases in its inherent and

general jurisdiction is not bound by the mere legal right of the parent or

guardian. Though the provisions of the special statutes which govern

the rights of the parents or guardians may be taken into consideration,

there is nothing which can stand in the way of the Court exercising its

parens patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases giving due weight to

the circumstances such as  a  child’s  ordinary  comfort,  contentment,

intellectual, moral and physical development, his health, education and

general maintenance and the favourable surroundings. These cases

have to be decided ultimately on the Court’s view of the best interests

of the child whose welfare requires that he be in custody of one parent

or the other.”

9 Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413

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52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well settled

and it is this: in deciding a difficult and complex question as to the custody

of a minor, a court of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and the

rights  flowing  therefrom.  But  such  cases  cannot  be  decided  solely by

interpreting legal provisions. It is a human problem and is required to be

solved  with  human  touch.  A court  while  dealing  with  custody  cases,  is

neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by

precedents.  In  selecting  proper  guardian  of  a  minor,  the  paramount

consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting

a  guardian,  the  court  is  exercising  parens  patriae jurisdiction  and  is

expected,  nay bound,  to  give  due  weight  to  a  child’s  ordinary  comfort,

contentment,  health,  education,  intellectual  development  and  favourable

surroundings.  But  over  and  above  physical  comforts,  moral  and  ethical

values cannot be ignored. They are equally,  or we may say,  even more

important,  essential  and indispensable considerations. If  the minor is old

enough  to  form  an  intelligent  preference  or  judgment,  the  court  must

consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with

the court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.”

27. Reliance  was  placed  upon  Gaurav  Nagpal10,  where  the

Supreme Court held as under:-

“32. In McGrath, (1893) 1 Ch 143, Lindley, L.J. observed: (Ch p. 148)

The dominant matter for the consideration of the court is the welfare of

the child. But the welfare of the child is not to be measured by money

only nor merely physical comfort. The word ‘welfare’ must be taken in

its widest sense. The moral or religious welfare of the child must be

considered  as  well  as  its  physical  well-being.  Nor  can  the  tie  of

affection be disregarded.” (emphasis supplied)

……… 50. When the court  is confronted with conflicting demands made by the

parents, each time it has to justify the demands. The court has not only to

look at  the issue on legalistic  basis,  in  such matters human angles are

relevant for deciding those issues. The court then does not give emphasis

10 Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42

21

on what the parties say, it has to exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at

the welfare of the minor. As observed recently in Mausami Moitra Ganguli

case (2008) 7 SCC 673, the court has to give due weightage to the child’s

ordinary  contentment,  health,  education,  intellectual  development  and

favourable surroundings but over and above physical comforts, the moral

and  ethical  values  have  also  to  be  noted.  They  are  equal  if  not  more

important than the others.

51. The word “welfare” used in Section 13 of the Act has to be construed

literally  and  must  be  taken  in  its  widest  sense.  The  moral  and  ethical

welfare of the child must also weigh with the court as well as its physical

well-being. Though the provisions of the special statutes which govern the

rights of the parents or guardians may be taken into consideration, there is

nothing which can stand in the way of the court exercising its parens patriae

jurisdiction arising in such cases.

28. Contending that however legitimate the claims of the parties

are, they are subject to the interest and welfare of the child, in

Rosy Jacob11, this Court has observed that:-

“7. .… the principle on which the court should decide the fitness of the

guardian mainly depends on two factors: (i) the father’s fitness or otherwise

to be the guardian, and (ii) the interests of the minors.”

…….. “15. ....  The children are not mere chattels : nor are they mere play-things

for their parents. Absolute right of parents over the destinies and the lives of

their children has, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded to the

considerations of their welfare as human beings so that they may grow up

in a normal balanced manner to be useful members of the society and the

guardian court in case of a dispute between the mother and the father, is

expected to strike a just and proper balance between the requirements of

welfare of the minor children and the rights of their respective parents over

them. The approach of the learned Single Judge, in our view, was correct

and we agree with him. The Letters Patent Bench on appeal seems to us to

11 Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC 840

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have erred in reversing him on grounds which we are unable to appreciate.”

29. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance

upon  G. Eva Mary Elezabath12 where the custody of the minor

child  aged  one  month  who  had  been  abandoned  by  father  in

church  premises  immediately  on  death  of  his  wife  was  in

question. The custody of the child was accordingly handed over

to the petitioner thereon who took care of the child for two and

half years by the Pastor of the Church. The father  snatched the

child after two and a half years from the custody of the petitioner.

The father of  the child who has abandoned the child though a

natural guardian therefore was declined the custody.  

30. In  Kirtikumar  Maheshankar  Joshi13,  the  father  of  the

children  was  facing  charge  under  Section  498-A IPC and  the

children expressed their willingness to remain with their maternal

uncle  who  was  looking  after  them  very  well  and  the  children

expressed their desire not to go with their father. The Supreme

Court  found the children intelligent  enough to  understand their

well-being and in the circumstances of the case, handed over the

custody to the maternal uncle instead of their father.  

31. In the case at hand, the father is the only natural guardian

12 G. Eva Mary Elezabath v. Jayaraj and Others 2005 SCC Online Mad 472 13 Kirtikumar Maheshankar Joshi v. Pradipkumar Karunashanker Joshi (1992) 3 SCC 573

23

alive and has neither abandoned nor neglected the child. Only

due to the peculiar circumstances of the case, the child was taken

care  of  by  the  appellants.  Therefore,  the  cases  cited  by  the

appellants are distinguishable on facts and cannot be applied to

deny the custody of the child to the father.  

32. The child Shikha went into the custody of the appellants in

strange and unfortunate situation.  Appellants No.1 and 2 are the

sisters  of  deceased  Zelam.  Appellant  No.4  is  the  husband  of

appellant  No.1.  All  three  of  them  reside  at  Mahim,  Mumbai.

Appellant  No.3 is the married brother of  Zelam who resides in

Pune.  During  the  fifth  month  of  her  pregnancy,  Zelam  was

diagnosed with stage 3/4 breast cancer. Zelam gave birth to child

Shikha  on  14-08-2017.  On  29-11-2017,  respondent  No.1

collapsed with convulsions due to illness. Upon his collapse, he

was  rushed  to  hospital  where  he  was  diagnosed  with

Tuberculosis  Meningitis  and  Pulmonary  Tuberculosis.  He  was

kept  on  ventilator  for  nearly  eight  days,  during  which  period,

appellants took care of Zelam and the child. The first respondent

had to undergo treatment in different  hospitals for  a prolonged

period. From 29-11-2017 to June 2018, Zelam and Shikha stayed

at  the  residence  of  appellant’s  in  Mumbai.  During  this  period,

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guardian, child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education

etc. The child Shikha lost her mother when she was just fourteen

months and is now being deprived from the love of her father for

no valid reason. As pointed out by the High Court, the father is a

highly educated person and is working in a reputed position.  His

economic condition is stable.

34. The welfare of the child has to be determined owing to the

facts and circumstances of each case and the court cannot take a

pedantic approach.  In the present case, the first respondent has

neither abandoned the child nor has deprived the child of a right

to his love and affection.  The circumstances were such that due

to illness of the parents, the appellants had to take care of the

child for some time.  Merely because, the appellants being the

relatives took care of the child for some time, they cannot retain

the custody of the child.  It is not the case of the appellants that

the  first  respondent  is  unfit  to  take  care  of  the  child  except

contending that  he has no  female support  to  take  care of  the

child.  The first respondent is fully recovered from his illness and

is now healthy and having the support of his mother and is able to

take care of the child.

35. The appellants submit that handing over of the child to the

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first respondent would adversely affect her and that the custody

can be handed over after a few years.  The child is only 1½ years

old and the child was with the father for about four months after

her birth.  If  no custody is  granted to the first  respondent,  the

court would be depriving both the child and the father of each

other’s love and affection to which they are entitled.  As the child

is in tender age i.e. 1½ years, her choice cannot be ascertained

at this stage. With the passage of time, she might develop more

bonding with  the appellants  and after  some time,  she may be

reluctant to go to her father in which case, the first respondent

might be completely  deprived of  her  child’s  love and affection.

Keeping in view the welfare of the child and the right of the father

to have her custody and after consideration of all the facts and

circumstances of the case, we find that the High Court was right

in  holding  that  the  welfare  of  the  child  will  be  best  served by

handing over the custody of the child to the first respondent.  

36. Taking away the child from the custody of the appellants and

handing over the custody of the child to the first respondent might

cause  some  problem  initially;  but,  in  our  view,  that  will  be

neutralized with the passage of time.  However, till  the child is

settled down in the atmosphere of  the first  respondent-father’s

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house, the appellants No.2 and 3 shall have access to the child

initially for a period of three months for the entire day i.e. 08.00

AM to 06.00 PM at the residence of the first respondent.  The first

respondent  shall  ensure  the  comfort  of  appellants  No.2  and 3

during such time of their stay in his house. After three months, the

appellants No.2 and 3 shall visit the child at the first respondent’s

house from 10.00 AM to 04.00 PM on Saturdays and Sundays.

After the child completes four years, the appellants No.2 and 3

are permitted to take the child on every Saturday and Sunday

from the residence of the father from 11.00 AM to 05.00 PM and

shall  hand  over  the  custody  of  the  child  back  to  the  first

respondent-father before 05.00 PM. For any further modification

of the visitation rights, either parties are at liberty to approach the

High Court.

37. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 06.02.2019

in  Crl.W.P.  No.  5214 of  2018 is  affirmed subject  to  the  above

directions and observations.  The appellants shall hand over the

custody of the child to the first respondent-father on 10.05.2019

at 10.00 AM at the residence of the first respondent.  Keeping in

view the interest of the child, both parties shall co-operate with

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each other in complying with the directions of the Court.   This

appeal is accordingly disposed of.

……………………….J. [R. BANUMATHI]

………………………….J. [R. SUBHASH REDDY]

New Delhi; May 06, 2019

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