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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   2634       OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.12406 of 2011]

Tej Prakash Pathak & Others   …  Appellants

Versus

Rajasthan High Court & Others    … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2635          OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.18102 of 2012]

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   2636         OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.20706 of 2011]

O R D E R  

Chelameswar, J.

1. Leave granted  

“….the  rules  of  the  game  ….  the  criteria  for  selection  cannot  be  altered  by  the   authorities concerned in the middle or after the process of selection has commenced”1

“…  changing  the  rules  of  the  game  after  the  game  was  played  …is  clearly   impermissible”2

1 Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Others v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve and Others [(2001) 10 SCC 51,  Para 5 2 K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (2008) 3 SCC 512, Para 27

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2. The above,  and statements to  the similar  effect  

have  petrified  into  a  rule  of  law  in  the  context  of  

employment  under  the  State  or  its  instrumentalities.  

Whether such principle of law is immutable, what are  

those  ‘rules  of  the  game’  which  cannot  be  changed  

after the game is either commenced or played, in our  

opinion requires an authoritative pronouncement by a  

larger Bench of this Court.

3. Such a question arises in the case in hand in the  

background of the following facts:-

4. The  respondent  High  Court  undertook  the  

recruitment  process  for  filling  up  of  13  posts  of  

Translators  by  issuing  a  notification  dated  17th  

September, 2009.   It appears that under the Rajasthan  

High  Court  Staff  Service  Rules,  2002,  “eligible  

candidates”  are  required  to  appear  for  a  Written  

Examination  consisting  of  two  papers  of  translation  

from  English  to  Hindi  and  vice  versa  carrying  100  

marks  each  followed  by  a  Personal  Interview  for  50  

marks.   

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5. 21 candidates appeared for the above-mentioned  

examination  of  whom  only  three  candidates  were  

declared  successful  by  the  first  respondent.  Three  

unsuccessful candidates challenged the said decision of  

the High Court by filing a writ petition which came to be  

dismissed  by  the  judgment  under  appeal  dated  11th  

March, 2010.

6. From the reply filed by the first respondent in the  

writ petition as reflected in the judgment under appeal,  

it  appears that after the examination was conducted,  

the  Chief  Justice  ordered  that  the  examination  be  

treated as a Competitive Examination and only those  

candidates who secured a minimum of 75% marks be  

selected to fill up the posts in question.  In view of the  

decision of the Chief Justice, only three candidates were  

found suitable for  appointment and a list  of  selected  

candidates  was  accordingly  published  by  the  High  

Court.  This triggered the instant litigation.

7. Admittedly,  the  requirement  of  securing  the  

minimum qualifying marks of 75% is not a stipulation of  

the  Service  Rules  (referred  to  earlier)  of  the  first

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respondent High Court as on the date of initiation of the  

recruitment  process  in  question  (i.e.  17th September,  

2009). It appears that such a prescription had existed  

earlier under the Rules, but by an amendment, the said  

prescription  was  dropped  with  effect  from  14th July,  

2004.

8. Therefore, the appellants challenged the selection  

process on the ground that the decision of the Chief  

Justice to select only those candidates who secured a  

minimum of  75% marks  would  amount  to  “changing  

the rules of the game after the game is played” – a  

cliché whose true purport is required to be examined  

notwithstanding  the  declaration  of  this  Court  in  

Manjusree’s case  (supra) that  it  is  “clearly  

impermissible”.

9. The  question  whether  the  ‘rules  of  the  game’  

could be changed was considered by this Court on a  

number of occasions in different circumstances.  Such  

question  arose  in  the  context  of  employment  under  

State  which  under  the  scheme of  our  Constitution  is  

required to be regulated by “law” made under Article

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309 or employment under the instrumentalities of the  

State  which  could  be  regulated  either  by  statute or  

subordinate legislation.  In either case the ‘law’ dealing  

with  the  recruitment  is  subject  to  the  discipline  of  

Article 14.

10. Legal  relationship  between  employer  and  

employee  is  essentially  contractual.  Though  in  the  

context  of  employment  under  State  the  contract  of  

employment  is  generally  regulated  by  statutory  

provisions or subordinate legislation which restricts the  

freedom  of  the  employer  i.e.  the  ‘State’  in  certain  

respects.     

11. In the context of the employment covered by the  

regime of Article 309, the ‘law’ – the recruitment rules  

in theory could be either prospective or retrospective  

subject  of  course  to  the  rule  of  non-arbitrariness.  

However,  in  the  context  of  employment  under  the  

instrumentalities  of  the  State  which  is  normally  

regulated by subordinate legislation, such rules cannot  

be made retrospectively unless specifically authorised  

by some constitutionally valid statute.

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12. Under the Scheme of our Constitution an absolute  

and  non-negotiable  prohibition  against  retrospective  

law making is made only with reference to the creation  

of crimes.  Any other legal right or obligation could be  

created,  altered,  extinguished  retrospectively  by  the  

sovereign  law making  bodies.   However  such  drastic  

power is required to be exercised in a manner that it  

does  not  conflict  with  any  other  constitutionally  

guaranteed  rights,  such  as,  Articles  14  and  16  etc.  

Changing the ‘rules of game’ either midstream or after  

the game is played is  an aspect of retrospective law  

making power.

13. Those  various  cases3 deal  with  situations  where  

the State sought to alter 1) the eligibility criteria of the  

candidates seeking employment or 2) the method and  

3 a).  C. Channabasavaih v. State of Mysore [AIR 1965 SC 1293], State of Haryana v. Subash Chander  Marwaha and Others [(1974) 3 SCC 220], P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC 141] and  Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India [(1985) 3 SCC 721], Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa [(1987)   4 SCC 646], State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin and Ors. [1987 Supp. SCC 401], Maharashtra State Road Transport   Corporation v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve [(2001) 10 SCC 51], Pitta Naveen Kumar and Others v. Raja   Narasaiah Zangiti and Others [(2006) 10 SCC 261], K. Manjushree v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2008) 3  SCC 512], Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi [(2008) 7 SCC 11], K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala  [(2006) 6 SCC 395], Ramesh Kumar v. High Court of Delhi [(2010) 3 SCC 104], Rakhi Ray v. High Court of   Delhi [(2010) 2 SCC 637], Hardev Singh v. Union of India [2011) 10 SCC 121] – Where procedural rules   were altered.

     b)  P. Mahendran and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others [(1990) 1 SCC 411], Madhya  

Pradesh Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar [(1994) 6 SCC 293], Gopal Krishna Rath v.  M.A. A. Baig (Dead)  By LRs [(1999) 1 SCC 544], Umrao Singh v. Punjabi University, Patiala and Others   [(2005) 13 SCC 365], Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University and Others [(2009) 4 SCC 555] –   Where the eligibility criteria altered.

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manner  of  making  the  selection  of  the  suitable  

candidates.  The  latter  could  be  termed  as  the  

procedure  adopted  for  the  selection,  such  as,  

prescribing minimum cut off  marks to be secured by  

the  candidates  either  in  the  written  examination  or  

viva-voce as was done in the case of Manjusree (supra)  

or the present case or calling upon the candidates to  

undergo  some  test  relevant  to  the  nature  of  the  

employment [such as driving test as was the case in  

Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (supra)].

14. If  the  principle  of  Manjusree’s  case (supra)  is  

applied  strictly  to  the  present  case,  the  respondent  

High  Court  is  bound  to  recruit  13  of  the  “best”  

candidates  out  of  the 21 who applied irrespective of  

their performance in the examination held.   

15. In  such  cases,  theoretically  it  is  possible  that  

candidates  securing  very  low  marks  but  higher  than  

some  other  competing  candidates  may  have  to  be  

appointed.  In our opinion, application of the principle  

as  laid  down  in  Manjusree  case  (supra)  without  any  

further  scrutiny  would  not  be  in  the  larger  public

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interest  or  the  goal  of  establishing  an  efficient  

administrative machinery.    

16. This Court in the case of  the State of Haryana v.   

Subash Chander Marwaha and Others  [(1974) 3 SCC  

220] while dealing with the recruitment of subordinate  

judges of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) had  

to  deal  with  the  situation  where  the  relevant  Rule  

prescribed  a  minimum  qualifying  marks.    The  

recruitment  was  for  filling  up  of  15  vacancies.   40  

candidates  secured  the  minimum  qualifying  marks  

(45%).  Only 7 candidates who secured 55% and above  

marks  were  appointed  and  the  remaining  vacancies  

were  kept  unfilled.    The  decision  of  the  State  

Government not to fill  up the remaining vacancies in  

spite of the availability of candidates who secured the  

minimum qualifying marks was challenged. The State  

Government defended its decision not to fill up posts on  

the ground that the decision was taken to maintain the  

high standards of competence in judicial service.  The  

High  Court  upheld  the  challenge  and  issued  a  

mandamus.  In appeal, this Court reversed and opined

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that the candidates securing minimum qualifying marks  

at an examination held for the purpose of recruitment  

into the service of the State have no legal right to be  

appointed.  In the context, it was held:-

12. ……In a case where appointments are made by selection from a number of   eligible candidates it is open to the Government with a view to maintain high- standards  of  competence  to  fix  a  score  which  is  much  higher  than  the  one   required for more (sic mere) eligibility…….

17. Unfortunately,  the  decision  in  Subash  Chander  

Marwaha (supra) does not appear to have been brought  

to the notice of their Lordships in the case of Manjusree  

(supra).

18. This Court in the case of Manjusree (supra) relied  

upon  P.K.  Ramachandra  Iyer  and  Others  v.  Union  of   

India and Others [(1984) 2 SCC 141],  Umesh Chandra  

Shukla v. Union of India and Others [(1985) 3 SCC 721]  

and  Durgacharan Misra v.  State of Orissa and Others  

[(1987) 4 SCC 646].   In none of the cases, the decision  

in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) was considered.

19. No doubt it is a salutary principle not to permit the  

State or its instrumentalities to tinker with the ‘rules of  

the  game’  insofar  as  the  prescription  of  eligibility

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criteria  is  concerned  as  was  done  in  the  case  of  C.  

Channabasavaiah  v.  State  of  Mysore [AIR  1965  SC  

1293] etc.  in  order  to  avoid  manipulation  of  the  

recruitment process and its results.    Whether such a  

principle should be applied in the context of the ‘rules  

of  the  game’  stipulating  the  procedure  for  selection  

more particularly when the change sought is to impose  

a  more  rigorous  scrutiny  for  selection  requires  an  

authoritative pronouncement of a larger Bench of this  

Court. We, therefore, order that the matter be placed  

before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate  

orders in this regard.

………..……………………J.            (R.M. Lodha)

………..……………………J.            (J. Chelameswar)

………..……………………J.            (Madan B. Lokur)

March 20, 2013 New Delhi.