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Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.552 OF 2012

Tarabai            Appellant(s)

VERSUS

The State of Maharashtra   Respondent(s)                   

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. This appeal is filed by accused No.1 against the  

final  judgment  and order  dated 30.11.2010 passed  

by the High Court of Judicature at Mumbai in Criminal  

Appeal  No.  145  of  1991  which  arose  from  the  

judgment and order dated 26.02.1991 passed by the  

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5th Additional Sessions Judge at Kolhapur in Sessions  

Case No. 106 of 1990 convicting accused Nos. 1 & 2  

for the offences punishable under Section 498A and  

Section  304-B  read  with  Section  34  of  the  Indian  

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)  

and sentenced them to suffer  simple imprisonment  

for  one year  and to pay a  fine of  Rs.1000/-  under  

Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC with default  

clause  and  to  undergo  simple  imprisonment  for  7  

years  under  Section  304-B/34  IPC.   By  impugned  

judgment,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  in  

respect  of  the present  appellant–accused No.1 and  

allowed  the  appeal  in  respect  of  accused  No.2  by  

acquitting her of the charges.

2. Facts  of  the  case  need  mention  in  brief  to  

appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.  

3. Krishnabai (deceased) was the daughter of Malu  

(PW-1) and Bhagwan Dhavele.  She was married to  

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one  Hanmant  Taralkar  on  12.05.1989.  After  

marriage, Krishnabai was living with her husband and  

parents-in-law at Ichalkaranji, a nearby village.  The  

present appellant (accused no. 1) is the mother-in-

law of Krishnabai (deceased) whereas (accused no.  

2)-Balabai aged around 18 years is her sister-in-law.

4. It is the case of prosecution that the appellant  

(accused no. 1) and Balabai (accused no. 2) used to  

constantly  treat  Krishnabai  with  cruelty  by beating  

or/and ill-treating her because she had not brought  

any gold, cash, new clothes etc.  with her in marriage  

and  also  pressurized  her  to  bring  gold,  cash,  new  

clothes etc. from her parents.  On coming to know of  

this, Malu (PW-1)-mother of Krishnabai had gone to  

meet Krishnabai thrice  and requested the appellant-

accused no.1 to permit Krishnabai to go along with  

her for few days but she did not allow her to go.  

5. However,  on  26.2.1990,  Gangadhar,  father-in-

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law,  took   Krishnabai  (deceased)  to  her  parents  

house.  On  reaching  there,  Krishnabai  started  

weeping and told  her  mother  (PW-1)  about  the ill-

treatment meted out to her by the appellant-accused  

No.1 and her sister- in-law (accused No.2) because  

she did not bring any cash, gold and new clothes in  

marriage.  She  also  complained  that  her  husband  

never  paid  any  attention  to  such  behavior  of  his  

mother-the  appellant  and  sister  towards  her.   On  

03.03.1990,  Malu  (PW-1)  and  the  neighbour-Amirbi  

(PW-2)  took Krishnabai  to  her  husband's  place.  On  

reaching  there,  the  appellant  herein  started  

quarreling with them and began to beat Krishnabai  

with  ‘chappal’.  On  seeing  this,  Gangadhar-the  

appellant's husband intervened and asked her not to  

beat  krishnabai.  The  appellant  did  not  like  the  

interference made by her husband and pushed him  

aside.   Amirbi  also tried to persuade the appellant  

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not to do such things but the appellant did not listen  

to her.  Malu and Amirbai, PWs 1 & 2 respectively,  

then  returned  to  their  village  leaving  Krishnabai  

there.  

6. On  23.03.1990  after  9.00  p.m.,  one  unknown  

person came to Malu's house and informed her that  

Krishnabai is serious. On hearing this news, Malu and  

some  other  people  immediately  left  to  see  

Krishnabai. On their reaching there, they found that  

many people had gathered in  front  of  Krishnabai's  

house.  The  door  of  the  room  was  closed  from  

outside.   Sharda-the  daughter  of  accused  No.1,  

opened  the  door  and  PW-1–  the  mother  of  the  

deceased  went  inside  the  room  and  saw  that  

Krishnabai was lying dead with burn injuries on her  

body.

7. Report  of  the  said  incident  was  lodged  by  

Mhalaba, uncle of  Krishnabai (deceased) and son-in-

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law of accused No.1, who too had accompanied Malu  

that Krishnabai had committed suicide by immolating  

herself.  Thereafter  the dead body of  the deceased  

was  taken  to  nearby  Hospital  where  post-mortem  

examination was conducted.   The autopsy surgeon  

reported that Krishnabai died due to shock because  

of 100% burn injuries.  Malu (PW-1), the mother of  

the  deceased,  then  lodged  another  report  at  the  

police station on 25.03.1990 about the incident. The  

police accordingly registered Crime No. 40/1990 for  

the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B  

read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “IPC”).  The  police  

investigated the case and prepared spot Panchnama  

(Ex-P-11).  The  statements  of  witnesses  were  

recorded.  The  appellant  and  her  daughter  Balabai  

were  prima facie found responsible for the death of  

Krishnabai and hence both were apprehended.  The  

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charge-sheet was then filed against both of them for  

their prosecution.  The case was committed to the  

Court of Session.

8. Both the accused abjured the guilt and claimed  

trial.  The prosecution examined five witnesses and  

filed  documents,  which  were  admitted  by  the  

accused during trial.  

9. The  Session  Judge,  by  judgment  and  order  

dated  26.02.1991, in Sessions Case No. 106 of 1990  

held both the accused guilty of offence punishable  

under Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34  

of IPC.  So far as the offence under Section 498-A/34  

IPC  was  concerned,  both  the  accused  were  

sentenced to suffer one year's simple imprisonment  

and to pay a fine amount of Rs.1000/-  and in default  

of payment of the fine amount, to suffer 3 months  

further  simple  imprisonment  whereas  the  offence  

under  Section  304-B/34  IPC  was  concerned,  the  

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appellants were sentenced to undergo 7 years simple  

imprisonment. Both the sentences were directed to  

run  concurrently.  Felt  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  

conviction  and  sentence,  both  the  accused  filed  

appeal before the High Court.   

10. The High Court, by impugned judgment, allowed  

the  appeal  in  so  far  as  accused  no.  2,  namely,  

Belabai, is concerned and acquitted her of both the  

charges.  So far as the present appellant (accused  

no.1)  is  concerned,  the  High  Court  dismissed  her  

appeal and upheld her conviction.  Challenging the  

said judgment, accused No.1 has filed this appeal by  

way of special leave.

11. Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  while  

challenging  the  conviction  has  raised  five  

contentions.  

(i) Since there was inordinate delay in lodging the  

FIR, conviction based upon such delayed FIR is not  

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legally sustainable.  

(ii) Police  authorities,  after  tearing  of  the  original  

statement recorded under Section 161, prepared any  

other  statement and hence, this action of the police  

authorities vitiates the trial because no reliance can  

be placed on such statement prepared by the police  

to falsely implicate the appellant.  

(iii) No reliance should be placed on the testimony  

of PW-1 because she was not having cordial relations  

with  her  daughter  –  Krishnabai,  who  used  to  live  

separately with her uncle before marriage.  

(iv) There was no evidence to hold that the present  

appellant-an  aged  lady  in  late  seventies,  at  the  

relevant time, could make demand of  dowry or ill-

treat the Krishnabai or beat her.

(v)  If  the other accused was acquitted by giving  

benefit of doubt then on the same set of evidence,  

the present appellant is also entitled for acquittal.

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12. In contra, learned counsel for  the respondent-  

State contended that  no case is  made out for  any  

interference in the concurrent conviction recorded by  

the two Courts  below.  Learned Counsel  urged that  

none  of  the  aforementioned  submissions  of  the  

appellant  have any  substance inasmuch as  all  the  

five submissions pressed in service are against the  

record and settled principle of law laid down by this  

Court.  It was also his submission that the appellant  

did not adduce any evidence in her defence except  

to deny the case of prosecution. It was pointed out  

that the appellant’s husband was the best witness to  

rebut  the  prosecution  story  of  alleged  demand  of  

dowry,  ill-treatment  and  beating  meted  out  to  

Krishnabai  which  persuaded  her  to  end  her  life.  

Learned Counsel urged that non-examination of this  

best  witness  despite  he  being  available  should  go  

against the appellant.

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13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties  

and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no  

merit in any of the submissions of the appellant.

14. Coming first  to the submission relating to the  

delay in filing the FIR, we find no merit in the same  

for more than one reason. In the first place, there is  

no delay in filing FIR.  It has come in evidence that in  

midnight of 23.03.1990 PW-1-Malu along with others  

reached the  house of  Krishnabai  to  find  out  as  to  

what  happened to  her.  Having  seen her  condition,  

naturally they first took Krishnabai to the hospital on  

24th,  where doctors declared her dead.  Since it was a  

case of 100% burn injuries, doctors performed post-

mortem on the same day and declared the cause of  

death. PW-1, the mother of the deceased accordingly  

lodged the FIR of the incident the next day,i.e.,25th.  

15. In our considered opinion, there was no delay in  

filing the FIR of the incident and in fact, it was lodged  

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immediately  after  the  incident  with  specific  details  

mentioning the ill- treatment, beating and demand of  

dowry made by the appellant and her daughter from  

the deceased.

16. Coming now to the second submission that the  

police authorities had torn the original statement of  

PW-1 recorded under Section 161 and prepared the  

second one with a view to file a false case against  

the appellant has also no merit for the reason that  

firstly, the appellant did not raise this plea before the  

Courts  below  and  secondly,  on  perusal  of  the  

evidence of PW-1, it is clear that what was torn off  

was one unsigned paper in which only few lines were  

recorded. This could be due to various reasons and  

no  such  suggestion  was  put  to  witnesses  on  this  

issue  and  lastly,  P.W-1  stated  that  her  signed  

statement was used in trial.

17. We have also perused the recorded statement  

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and the evidence of PW-1 and find no inconsistency  

or/and any conflicting version in both to reject the  

testimony of PW-1 or the statement recorded under  

Section 161.

18. Coming to the third submission that no reliance  

should be placed on the evidence on PW-1 because  

her  relations  with  daughter  were  strained  due  to  

which both used to live separately before marriage  

has no merit for the reason that there is no evidence  

to prove this fact. That apart, even assuming for the  

sake  of  argument  that  Krishnabai  used  to  live  

separately  from  her  mother  (PW-1)  before  her  

marriage could not be made a ground to reject the  

testimony  of  PW-1.   Indeed  the  fact  of  living  

separately could be due to various reasons and one  

could be that PW-1's husband was a drunkard and  

used to create problems in the house due to which  

Krishnabai at times used to live in her uncle's house  

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which was near to their house.

19. We have perused the entire evidence of PW-1  

and  find  that  it  is  consistent  in  all  respects  and  

commands acceptance for proving complicity of the  

appellant in commission of the offence. We cannot,  

therefore, accept the submission of the appellant to  

disbelieve the sworn testimony of PW-1.

20. Coming to the last submission of the appellant  

that  since  benefit  of  doubt  was  given  to  other  

accused, i.e., Belabai by the High Court, on parity the  

same benefit should be extended to the appellant by  

acquitting her has no substance for the reason that  

there was enough evidence to prove the complicity  

of  the appellant  in  commission of  offence whereas  

the  prosecution  failed  to  adduce  any  evidence  to  

prove the complicity of Belabai-accused No.2.

21. This  is  a  case  where  the  death  of  Krishnabai  

occurred within seven years of her marriage. It was  

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within one year because the marriage was performed  

on 12.05.1989 whereas she died on 26.02.1990. In  

view  of  this  admitted  position  emerging  from  the  

case, the basic ingredients of Section 113-A of the  

Evidence  Act,  1872  read  with  Sections  304-B  and  

498-A of IPC stood against the accused persons for  

their prosecution for the offences punishable under  

Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC.  

22. It  has  come  in  evidence  that  soon  after  the  

marriage,  the appellant  started making demand of  

gold,  cash  and  clothes  etc.  from  the  deceased  

coupled  with  beating  and  ill-treating  her  for  not  

satisfying the demands made by her.  

23. A  young girl  in  early  twenties  ending  her  life  

with 100 % burns within 8 months of her marriage  

due to ill treatment, beating and demands made by  

mother-in-law  can  not  be  over-looked  to  show  

sympathy towards the appellant. Indeed, it was the  

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appellant who was responsible for her death.

24. As rightly urged by the learned counsel for the  

respondent, the best person to prove the case of the  

appellant  was  the  appellant's  husband because he  

was living in the same house. He was in a position to  

tell  as  to  what  used  to  happen  in  the  house  and  

whether  relations  between  the  appellant  and  the  

deceased  were  cordial  or  strained.  On  the  other  

hand,  it  has  come  in  evidence  that  sometimes  

husband used to intervene and warned the appellant  

of her behavior towards the deceased.

25. So  far  as  sentencing  part  is  concerned,  the  

Courts  below  have  awarded  seven  years’  simple  

imprisonment to the appellant. The appellant should  

feel fortune to suffer only 7 years because having  

regard to the nature of commission of the offence  

and her complicity in the offence, it could have been  

even  more  than  what  has  been  awarded.  We,  

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however, do not wish to say any thing more on this  

issue except to uphold the conviction and sentence.

26. In the light of foregoing discussion, we have not  

been able to notice any infirmity in the impugned  

judgment of the High Court and hence find no merit  

in this appeal.

27. The appeal thus fails and is hereby dismissed.

               …………….…. ……...................................J.

[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]

                 ………..………………..................................J.

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; January 20, 2015.

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