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REPORTABLE     

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 190 OF 2014

Tara Singh & Ors. …Petitioners

  Versus

Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

In  this  writ  petition  preferred  under  Article  32  of

Constitution  of  India,  the  petitioners,  who  have  been

convicted for the offence punishable under Section 21 of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for

brevity, ‘the NDPS Act’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for more than 10 years and to pay a fine of

Rs.1 lakh and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further

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rigorous imprisonment for six months, have prayed for issue

of  writ  of  mandamus  to  the  respondent  nos.  1  to  3

commanding them to grant remission to them as per the

provisions contained in Chapter XIX of the New Punjab Jail

Manual, 1996 (for short, ‘the Manual’).  

2. This  writ  petition  was listed along with SLP(Crl)  No.

4079 of 2012, wherein at the time of issue of notice,  the

following issue was noted:-

“The point which has been raised today on behalf of the petitioner is whether the remission granted by  the  Governor  under  Article  161  of  the Constitution  has  an  overriding  effect  over  the provisions of Section 32A of the NDPS Act.  The matter needs consideration having regard to the views expressed by this Court in the case of Meru Ram”.

The  special  leave  petition  stood  abated  as  the  sole

petitioner therein breathed his last during the pendency of

the petition.  

3. It is the case of the petitioners that Chapter XIX of the

Manual  lays  down  remission  and  award  to  the  convicts

depending upon good conduct  and performance of  duties

allotted to them while they are undergoing sentence, but the

benefit under the Chapter XIX of the Manual is not made

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available to the convicts under the NDPS Act on the ground

that Section 32-A of the NDPS Act bars entitlement to such

remission.   It  is  asserted  in  the  writ  petition  that  the

constitutional validity of Section 32-A of the NDPS Act has

been  upheld  in  Dadu  @  Tulsidas  v.  State  of

Maharashtra1.  It is contended by the learned counsel for

the petitioners that in  Maru Ram v. Union of India and

others2, the constitutional validity of Section 433-A of Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,  ‘CrPC’) was under

challenge  and the  larger  Bench of  this  Court  has  clearly

held  that  it  does  not  curtail  the  power  of  the  executive

under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.  Relying on

the said decision, it is submitted that this Court can remit

the sentence and the said power cannot be curtailed by any

legislation.  According  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the

petitioners,  a  conjoint  reading  of  Dadu’s case and  Maru

Ram’s case, the legal position is that remission schemes are

effective guidelines for passing orders under Article 161 of

the Constitution and, therefore, they have the force of law

and,  in  any  case,  the  principle  in  Dadu’s case  clearly

1  (2000) 8 SCC 437 2  (1981) 1 SCC 107

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postulates that Section 32-A of the NDPS Act does not come

in  the  way  of  executive  for  exercising  the  constitutional

power under Article  72 or 161 of the Constitution.  On the

aforesaid basis,  it  has  been contended that  the  denial  of

benefit sought for by the petitioner is absolutely arbitrary

and  in  total  misunderstanding  of  the  ratio  laid  down  in

Dadu’s case.  

4. Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  would  further

submit that Section 32-A of the NDPS Act cannot control

the remission schemes which are effective guidelines under

Article 161 of the Constitution and the statutory provision,

by no stretch of imagination, create any fetter in exercise of

the constitutional power.  In the averments, a comparison

has been made on the conviction and sentence under the

NDPS Act and Section 302 of the IPC.   

5. Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer

of the petitioners on the ground that Section 32-A of the

NDPS  Act  curtails  the  statutory  power  of  the  concerned

Government and accordingly the same has been stipulated

in the Manual and hence, no fault can be found with action

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taken by the State Government.  Learned counsel for the

State has further contended that once Section 32-A of the

NDPS Act  has  been held to  be constitutionally  valid,  the

effort to compare the conviction and sentence under Section

302 IPC with that under Section 32-A of the NDPS Act is an

exercise in futility.  

6. We  have  heard  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  Solicitor

General  who  has  contended  that  the  controversy  is

absolutely covered by the decision in Dadu (supra) and the

petitioners  cannot  claim  the  benefit  of  the  Jail  Manual

which is a guidance for exercise of constitutional powers  by

the Governor.  It is his further contention that the exercise

of power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution is

different than the remission granted under Section 433-A of

CrPC.    

7. It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the  petitioners  have  been

convicted  under  the  NDPS Act  and  various  offences  and

sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for more than 10

years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh.  The singular issue is

whether denial of remission under the Manual is justified.

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Chapter  XIX  of  the  Manual  deals  with  remission  and

reward.  Paragraphs 563 to 588 deal with remission system.

Paragraphs 589 and 590 deal with reward.  Paragraph  563

states that  remission can be granted to  prisoners by the

State  Government/Inspector-General/Superintendent  Jails

which is subject to withdrawal/forfeiture/revocation.  It is

not a right and the State Government reserves the right to

debar/withdraw any prisoner or category of prisoners from

the concession of remission.  Paragraph 565 stipulates that

remission  is  of  three  types,  namely,  ordinary  remission,

special  remission  and  the  State  Government  remission.

Paragraph 567 postulates the eligibility criteria for prisoners

who  will  be  eligible  for  earning  the  State  Government

remission.  Paragraph 571 provides what would constitute

non-eligibility  to  get  ordinary  remission.   Paragraph  572

lays  down  that  ordinary  remission  is  not  earnable  for

certain  offences  committed  after  admission  to  jail.

Paragraph  576  deals  with  remission  for  good  conduct.

Paragraph 581 provides for special remission.  It lays down

that special remission may be given to any prisoner except

such  prisoners  who  are  deprived  of  remission  by  way  of

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punishment whether entitled to ordinary remission or not

for  special  reasons.   Certain  examples  have  been

incorporated in special remission.   

8. The  Government  of  Punjab,  Department  of  Home

Affairs and Justice through Governor has issued an order in

exercise of  powers conferred by Section 432 of  CrPC and

Article 161 of the Constitution of India on 13th day of April,

2007 for grant of remission of sentence to certain types of

convicts.   The  said  order  contains  that  instructions

contained  in  the  order  shall  not  apply  to  the  persons

sentenced under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Passport

Act,  1967  and  the  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985.  Similar circulars have been issued

on 1.9.2008, 1.6.2010, 1.4.2011, 12.4.2012, 14.8.2013 and

13.8.2014.  The said orders have been passed keeping in

view the language used in Section 32-A of the NDPS Act and

the judgment delivered in Dadu’s case.  Section 32-A of the

NDPS Act reads as follows:-

“32-A.  No suspension, remission or commutation in  any  sentence  awarded  under  this  Act.— Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for

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the  time  being  in  force  but  subject  to  the provisions  of  Section  33,  no  sentence  awarded under this Act (other than Section 27) shall  be suspended or remitted or commuted.”

9. In  Dadu’s case, the three-Judge Bench scanning the

provisions have laid down that:-

“13. A perusal of the section would indicate that it  deals  with  three  different  matters,  namely, suspension,  remission and commutation  of  the sentences. Prohibition contained in the section is referable  to  Sections  389,  432  and  433  of  the Code. Section 432 of the Code provides that when any person has been sentenced to  punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at  any  time,  without  conditions  or  upon conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of  his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he  has  been  sentenced  in  the  manner  and according to the procedure prescribed therein.”

10. After  so  stating,  the  Court  referred   to  Section  433

CrPC,  which  empowers  the  Appropriate  Government  to

commute the sentence.  Thereafter, deliberation centered on

Section 389 of CrPC.  The Bench referred to the decision in

Maktool Singh v.  State of  Punjab3 and in that  context

opined:-

3  (1999) 3 SCC 321

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“… The distinction of the convicts under the Act and under other statutes, insofar as it relates to the exercise of executive powers under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code is concerned, cannot be termed  to  be  either  arbitrary  or  discriminatory being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such deprivation of the executive can also not be stretched to hold that the right to life of a person has  been  taken  away  except,  according  to  the procedure established by law. It is not contended on behalf  of  the  petitioners  that  the  procedure prescribed under the Act for holding the trial is not  reasonable,  fair  and  just.  The  offending section, insofar as it  relates to the executive in the  matter  of  suspension,  remission  and commutation of sentence, after conviction,  does not,  in  any  way,  encroach  upon  the  personal liberty  of  the convict  tried fairly  and sentenced under  the  Act.  The  procedure  prescribed  for holding the trial under the Act cannot be termed to be arbitrary,  whimsical  or  fanciful.  There is, therefore,  no  vice  of  unconstitutionality  in  the section insofar as it takes away the powers of the executive conferred upon it  under Sections 432 and  433  of  the  Code,  to  suspend,  remit  or commute  the  sentence  of  a  convict  under  the Act.”

11. Thereafter,  the  Court  addressed  to  the  concern

expressed by the learned counsel for the parties with regard

to the adverse effect  of  the Section on the powers of  the

judiciary.  After referring to various authorities, the Court

opined thus:-

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“25. Judged from any angle, the section insofar as it completely debars the appellate courts from the power to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict  under  the  Act  cannot  stand the test  of constitutionality. Thus Section 32-A insofar as it ousts the jurisdiction of the court to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act is unconstitutional.”

12. Thereafter, the Court held:-

“26.  Despite  holding  that  Section  32-A  is unconstitutional  to  the  extent  it  affects  the functioning of the criminal courts in the country, we are not declaring the whole of the section as unconstitutional  in view of our finding that the section, insofar as it takes away the right of the executive  to  suspend,  remit  and  commute  the sentence,  is  valid  and  intra  vires  of  the Constitution. The declaration of Section 32-A to be  unconstitutional,  insofar  as  it  affects  the functioning of  the courts in the country, would not render the whole of the section invalid, the restriction imposed by the offending section being distinct and severable.”

13. The eventual conclusions in the said case are:-

“29. Under the circumstances the writ petitions are disposed of by holding that:

(1) Section 32-A does not in any way affect the powers of the authorities to grant parole.

(2) It is unconstitutional to the extent it takes away  the  right  of  the  court  to  suspend  the sentence of a convict under the Act.

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(3) Nevertheless, a sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the appellate court only and strictly subject to the conditions spelt out in Section  37  of  the  Act,  as  dealt  with  in  this judgment.”

14. Having appreciated the analysis made in the aforesaid

verdict, we may advert to the statutory scheme pertaining to

suspension, remission and commutation of sentence under

the CrPC.  Section 432 deals with power to suspend or remit

sentences.  Section  433  deals  with  power  to  commute

sentences.  Section 433-A lays the postulate for restrictions

on powers of  remission or  commutation in certain cases.

The said provision reads as follows:-

“433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation  in  certain  cases.  – Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for  which  death  is  one  of  the  punishments provided by law, or where the sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section  433  into  one  of  imprisonment  for  life, such  person  shall  not  be  released  from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.”

15. The  constitutional  validity  of  Section  433-A  was

challenged in Maru Ram (supra) and the said provision has

been  held  to  be  intra  vires.  While  dealing  with  the

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constitutional  validity,  Krishna  Iyer,  J.,  speaking  for  the

majority,  distinguished  the  power  conferred  under  the

constitutional authorities under Articles 72 and 161 and the

power conferred under the Code.  In the said case, it has

been held that:-

“59. ..... But two things may be similar but not the  same.  That  is  precisely  the  difference.  We cannot agree that the power which is the creature of  the  Code  can  be  equated  with  a  high prerogative  vested  by  the  Constitution  in  the highest  functionaries  of  the  Union  and  the States. The source is different, the substance is different,  the strength is different,  although the stream may be flowing along the same bed. We see the two powers as far from being identical, and,  obviously,  the  constitutional  power  is “untouchable” and “unapproachable” and cannot suffer  the  vicissitudes  of  simple  legislative processes.  Therefore,  Section  433-A  cannot  be invalidated  as  indirectly  violative  of  Articles  72 and 161. What the Code gives, it can take, and so,  an embargo  on Sections  432 and 433(a)  is within the legislative power of Parliament.

60.  Even  so,  we  must  remember  the constitutional status of Articles 72 and 161 and it is common ground that Section 433-A does not and  cannot  affect  even  a  wee  bit  the  pardon power  of  the  Governor  or  the  President.  The necessary  sequel  to  this  logic  is  that notwithstanding Section 433-A the President and the Governor continue to exercise the power of commutation  and  release  under  the  aforesaid articles.”

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16. After so stating, the Court posed the question, whether

the  Parliament  has  indulged  in  legislative  futility  with  a

formal  victory  but  a  real  defeat?   The  Court  answered

stating ‘yes’ and ‘no’.  Explaining further, the larger Bench

opined:-  

“An  issue  of  deeper  import  demands  our consideration  at  this  stage  of  the  discussion. Wide as the power of pardon, commutation and release  (Articles  72  and  161)  is,  it  cannot  run riot; for no legal power can run unruly like John Gilpin on the horse but must keep sensibly to a steady course. Here, we come upon the second constitutional  fundamental  which underlies  the submissions  of  counsel.  It  is  that  all  public power,  including  constitutional  power,  shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily, guidelines for fair and equal execution are  guarantors  of  the  valid  play  of  power.  We proceed on the basis that these axioms are valid in our constitutional order”.

17. The majority thereafter dealt with the powers conferred

under the constitutional authorities under Articles 72 and

161 and eventually concluded as follows:-

“72. …….

(4) We hold that Section 432 and Section 433 are not a manifestation of Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution  but  a  separate,  though  similar power, and Section 433-A, by nullifying wholly or partially these prior provisions does not violate or

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detract  from  the  full  operation  of  the constitutional power to pardon, commute and the like.

xxxxx xxxxx

(8)  The power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution can be exercised by the Central and State  Governments,  not  by  the  President  or Governor  on  their  own.  The  advice  of  the appropriate  Government  binds  the  Head of  the State. No separate order for each individual case is necessary but any general order made must be clear enough to identify the group of cases and indicate  the  application  of  mind  to  the  whole group.

(9)  Considerations  for  exercise  of  power  under Articles  72/161  may  be  myriad  and  their occasions protean, and are left to the appropriate Government, but no consideration nor occasion can  be  wholly  irrelevant,  irrational, discriminatory  or  mala fide.  Only  in  these rare cases will the court examine the exercise.

18. The aforesaid decision makes it clear that the exercise

of powers under Article  72 or 161 is quite different than the

statutory  power  of  remission.   On  that  fundamental

bedrock,  the  provision  enshrined  under  Section  32-A,

barring  a  part  of  the  provision,  has  been  held

constitutionally valid in  Dadu’s case.  The principle stated

in Dadu (supra) does not run counter to the ratio laid down

in Maru Ram (supra).  It is in consonance with the same.  

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19. The petitioners have invoked the power of this Court to

grant the benefit  of  remission in exercise of  power under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  Speaking plainly, the

prayer  is  totally  misconceived.   It  is  urged in  a  different

manner before us that the power exercised by this Court

under Article 32 and Article 142 of the Constitution cannot

be statutorily  controlled.   Though the argument strikes a

note of innovation, yet the innovation in the case at hand

cannot  be  allowed  to  last  long,  for  it  invites  immediate

repulsion.  Section 32-A of the NDPS Act, as far as it took

away  the  power  of  the  Court  to  suspend  the  sentence

awarded  to  the  convict  under  the  Act  has  been declared

unconstitutional  in  Dadu’s  case.   A convict  can pray for

suspension  of  sentence  when  the  appeal  is  pending  for

adjudication.   The  aforesaid  authority  has  upheld  the

constitutional validity of the Section insofar as it takes away

the right of the executive to suspend, remit and commute

the  sentence.   Negation  of  the  power  of  the  courts  to

suspend  the  sentence  which  has  been  declared  as

unconstitutional, as has been held in Dadu’s case, does not

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confer a right on the convict to ask for suspension of the

sentence as a matter of right in all cases nor does it absolve

the courts of their  legal obligation to exercise the power of

suspension within the parameters prescribed under Section

37 of  the  NDPS Act.   The constitutional  power  exercised

under Articles 72 and 161 is quite different than the power

exercised under a statute.  Recently, in  Union of India v.

V. Sriharan @ Murugan and ors4,  echoing the principle

stated in Maru Ram (supra), it has been held:-

“As has been stated by  this  Court  in Maru Ram (supra)  by  the  Constitution  Bench,  that   the Constitutional   power  of  remission  provided under Articles 72 and 161  of  the  Constitution will always  remain  untouched,  inasmuch  as, though  the  statutory  power  of remission, etc., as  compared  to  Constitution  power   under Articles  72  and 161 looks similar, they are not the same.  Therefore, we  confine  ourselves to the implication of statutory power of  remission, etc.,   provided   under  the  Criminal  Procedure Code entrusted with the Executive  of  the  State as  against  the  well   thought   out   judicial decisions  in  the  imposition  of sentence  for  the related   grievous   crimes   for   which    either capital punishment or a life sentence is provided for.  When  the  said  distinction can be clearly ascertained, it must be held that there is a vast difference  between  an  executive  action  for  the grant  of   commutation,   remission   etc.,  as against a judicial decision.  Time and again, it is held  that  judicial action forms part of the basic

4  2015 (13) SCALE 165

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structure of the Constitution.  We can state with certain amount of confidence and  certainty,  that there  will  be  no match  for  a  judicial  decision by   any   of   the   authority   other    than Constitutional  Authority,  though in the form of an executive action,  having regard to the higher pedestal in which such Constitutional Heads are placed whose action will remain unquestionable except for  lack  of  certain  basic features which has also been noted in the various decisions  of this  Court including Maru Ram (supra)”.

20. What is being urged is as constitutional powers under

Articles  72  and  161  are  different  and  they  remain

untouched even by sentence of this Court, similar powers

can  be  exercised  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of

India.   Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India  enables  a

citizen  to  move  this  Court  for  enforcement  of  his

fundamental rights.   Moving this Court for the said purpose

is fundamental.  The larger Bench of the Court has already

upheld  the  constitutional  validity  of  Section 433-A CrPC.

The three-Judge Bench has declared barring a small part of

Section 32-A of the NDPS Act as constitutional.  The recent

Constitution  Bench  decision  in  V.  Sriharan  (supra)  has

clearly opined that the constitutional power engrafted under

Articles 72 and 161 are different than the statutory power

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enshrined under Section 433-A CrPC.  The petitioners do

not have a right to seek remission under the Code because

of Section 32A of the NDPS Act.  They can always seek relief

either under Article 71 or 161 of the Constitution, as the

case may be.  That is in a different domain.   

21. The issue here is whether a writ of mandamus can be

issued to authorities to grant remission to the petitioners.

In Ramdas Athawale (5) v. Union of India and others5, it

has been held by the Constitution Bench that:-  

“46. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the Constitution  guarantees  the  right  to  a constitutional  remedy  and  relates  only  to  the enforcement of the right conferred by Part III of the  Constitution  and  unless  a  question  of enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32  does  not  apply.  It  is  well  settled  that  no petition under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it  is  shown  that  the  petitioner  has  some fundamental right. In Northern Corpn. v. Union of India6 this  Court  has  made  a  pertinent observation that  when a person complains  and claims that there is a violation of law, it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 is attracted.

47.  We  have  carefully  scanned  through  the averments  and  allegations  made  in  the  writ petition  and  found  that  there  is  not  even  a whisper of any infringement of any fundamental

5  (2010) 4 SCC 1 6  (1990) 4 SCC 239

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right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. We reiterate the principle that whenever a person complains and claims that there is a violation of any provision of law or a constitutional provision, it  does  not  automatically  involve  breach  of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted. It is  not  possible  to  accept  that  an  allegation  of breach of law or a constitutional provision is an action in breach of fundamental right. The writ petition deserves dismissal only on this ground”.

22. The present factual matrix does not remotely suggest

that  there  has  been  violation  of  any  fundamental  right.

There  is  no  violation  of  any  law  which  affects  the

fundamental rights of the petitioners.  The argument that

when a pardon or remission can be given under Article 72

or 161 of the Constitution by the constitutional authority,

this Court can exercise the similar power under Article 32 of

the  Constitution  of  India  is  absolutely  based  on  an

erroneous premise.  Article 32, as has been interpreted and

stated by the Constitution Bench and well  settled in law,

can  be  only  invoked  when  there  is  violation  of  any

fundamental  right  or  where  the  Court  takes  up  certain

grievance  which  falls  in  the  realm  of  public  interest

litigation, as has been held in  Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.

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Union  of  India  and  others7 and  Samaj  Parivartana

Samudaya  and  others  v.  State  of  Karnataka  and

others8.  Therefore,  we  repel  the  submission  on  the  said

score.  It has also been argued that this Court can issue a

direction to do complete justice to grant remission.  In this

context, a passage from  Supreme Court Bar Association

v. Union of India and  another9 is apt quoting:-

“48. The  Supreme  Court  in  exercise  of  its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make  such  order  as  is  necessary  for  doing complete justice ‘between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it’.  The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it  cannot  disregard  a  statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance  the  equities  between  the  conflicting claims of the litigating parties by ‘ironing out the creases’ in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only  dispute-settling.  It  is  well  recognised  and established  that  this  Court  has  always  been  a law-maker  and  its  role  travels  beyond  merely dispute-settling.  It  is  a  ‘problem-solver  in  the nebulous areas’ (see  K. Veeraswami v.  Union of India10)  but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter  of  a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional  powers  cannot,  in  any  way,  be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the

7  (1984) 3 SCC 161 8  (2013) 8 SCC 154 9  (1998) 4 SCC 409 10 (1991) 3 SCC 655

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same  time  these  powers  are  not  meant  to  be exercised when their exercise  may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for  in  a  statute  dealing  expressly  with  the subject.”

[emphasis in original]

23. In  Narendra  Champaklal  Trivedi  v.  State  of

Gujarat11,  a two-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing

with reduction of sentence in respect of mandatory sentence

has held:-  

“…where the minimum sentence is provided, we think  it  would  not  be  at  all  appropriate  to exercise  jurisdiction  under  Article  142  of  the Constitution of India to reduce the sentence on the ground of the so-called mitigating factors as that would tantamount to supplanting statutory mandate and further it would amount to ignoring the  substantive  statutory  provision  that prescribes minimum sentence for a criminal act relating to demand and acceptance of bribe. The amount  may be small  but to curb and repress this  kind  of  proclivity  the  legislature  has prescribed the minimum sentence”.

In view of the aforesaid, the argument to invoke Article

142 in conjunction with Article  32 of  the  Constitution is

absolutely fallacious and we unhesitatingly repel the same.  

11  (2012) 7 SCC 80

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24. Consequently, we do not perceive any merit in this writ

petition and accordingly, the same stands dismissed.  

..............................J.          [Dipak Misra]  

…...........................J. New Delhi [Shiva Kirti Singh]  June 29, 2016