IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 831 OF 2010

Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh                                              ...Appellant  

Versus

State of Gujarat & Anr.                                                 ...Respondents

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 832 OF 2010

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Both these appeals have been preferred against the judgment  

and order dated 4.5.2009 passed by the High Court  of  Gujarat  at  

Ahmedabad in Criminal  Appeal No.278 of 2002, by which it  has  

affirmed the judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court dated  

14.12.2001 in Sessions Case No.24 of 2001 in which the appellants  

got convicted under Section 302 read with Section 114 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called “IPC”) and sentenced to life  

imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1000/- each.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are :-

(a) That Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW.1) lodged the  

complaint on 21.9.2000 that the complainant, deceased along  

with both the appellants had gone to see the land in their two  

cars. The complainant (PW.1) and deceased were in one car,  

while  appellant  No.1  in  another  car  being  driven  by  the  

appellant No.2.  Thereafter, they came back and decided to  

meet  the  owner  of  the  land  Smt.   Jadaavben  Ambalal  

Parmar (PW.3).  Thereafter, at about 2.30 p.m.  when they  

were  coming  back  in  their  respective  cars,  both  the  

appellants asked the deceased  and complainant to stop their  

car.   Both the appellants got down from the car with swords  

and  started  giving  indiscriminate  blows  to  Moiyuddin  

Shaikh, deceased, when the complainant and deceased had  

come out from their cars after receiving signal given by the  

appellants.  The complainant got scared and started running  

away.  He was chased by the appellant Rameshbhai Ramlal  

Kahar.

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(b) The  complainant  Bharat  Rajendraprasad  Trivedi  informed  

the brother of the deceased on telephone about the incident  

and also filed the complaint  with Vadodara Taluka Police  

Station vide C.R. No.94 of 2000.  The police reached the  

place of incident and recovered the dead body.  The dead  

body was sent for post-mortem in S.S.G. Hospital Vadodara.  

According to the post-mortem report, a total of 33 injuries  

had been caused on the body of the deceased. In the opinion  

of  the  Doctor,  the  cause  of  death  was  shock  and  

haemorrhage following multiple incised wounds.   

(c) The  Investigating  Officer  had  been  searching  for  the  

appellants.   Both  the  appellants/accused  were  arrested  on  

3.10.2000 while they were travelling in the Car No.GJ-6 JJ-

2408 on the highway.  The car was checked  and in the dicky  

of the car blood stained clothes were found.  Blood stained  

swords were also recovered on the disclosure statements of  

the appellants. One of the swords was not having the handle.  

(d) After  conclusion of the investigation,  the police submitted  

the  charge-sheet  and  the  matter  was  committed  to  the  

Sessions Court, Vadodara. After conclusion of the trial, the  

Sessions  Court  vide judgment  and order dated 14.12.2001  

convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section  

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114  IPC  and  both  of  them  have  been  sentenced  to  life  

imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1,000/- each.       

  3. Being aggrieved, both the appellants preferred appeal before  

the High Court which has been dismissed vide impugned judgment  

and order dated 4.5.2009.  Hence, these appeals.

4. We have heard Mr. Vikas Singh and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi  

learned counsel for the appellants and Mrs. Hemantika Wahi with  

Ms. Jesal, learned counsel for the State.   

5. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  have  submitted  that  

recovery of the blood stained clothes after 13 days from the car of  

the appellants is totally improbable and so is the recovery of blood  

stained swords. Recoveries made after such a long period cannot be  

relied  upon  as  it  can  be  presumed  that  the  incriminating  

articles/materials  had  been  planted.  There  had  been  material  

contradictions/embellishments/improvements  in  the  statements  of  

witnesses which made the case of the prosecution totally improbable.  

Complainant (PW.1), deceased and appellant No.1 were partners in  

the business of sale and purchase of lands. In fact, there is sufficient  

material on record to show that in the sale transaction of land  from  

Smt.  Jadaavben Ambalal Parmar (PW.3), as the entire amount of  

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consideration had not been paid to her by the deceased Moiyuddin  

Shaikh and she had raised hue and cry, a large number of persons  

from the village had gathered and there was a  scuffle,  so,  it  was  

probable that those villagers might have killed Moiyuddin Shaikh,  

deceased.  It was not even possible for two appellants to cause as  

much  as  33  injuries  to  the  deceased.   This  defence  taken by the  

appellants had not been given proper weightage by the courts below.  

The  complainant  who  was  partner  in  the  Firm  along  with  the  

deceased  and  appellant  no.1  herein  could  have  also  created  the  

mischief  as  he  would  be  the  beneficiary  in  terms  of  money  by  

eliminating  one  partner  Moiyuddin  Shaikh  and  getting  convicted  

appellant No.1.    In view of the above, the impugned judgment and  

order is liable to be set aside, and appeals deserve to be allowed.

6. Per contra, Mrs. Hemantika Wahi, learned Standing counsel  

for the State has opposed the appeal contending that the facts of the  

case do not warrant interference with concurrent findings of facts by  

the  two  courts.  The  courts  below  have  rightly  appreciated  the  

evidence  on  record.  Contradictions,  being  trivial  in  nature  had  

rightly been ignored. Recoveries made in the case have rightly been  

believed.   The  appellants  could  be  apprehended  on  3.10.2000.  

Therefore,  the  question  of  recovery  of  blood  stained  clothes  or  

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swords could not arise prior to that.  The appeals lack merit and are  

liable to be dismissed.

7. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

8. The sheet anchor of the argument on behalf of the appellants  

had been the contradictions/improvements  in  the  statement  of  the  

witnesses.  They are most immaterial and irrelevant for the trial. In  

case  the  earnest  deed  had  not  been  seen/examined  by  the  

complainant (PW.1), as deposed by him, it could not be presumed  

that the complainant, who was a partner in the Firm had seen it.  In  

case, the complainant had not been the witness to the said earnest  

deed it  is  quite natural that  though he was present  at the time of  

executing  the  earnest  deed  he  might  have  not  seen  it.   Another  

incident cited is that he did not disclose as to whether he had not told  

the deceased as what was the agreement/understanding in respect of  

sharing the benefit in the transaction of land with Smt.  Jadaavben  

Ambalal  Parmar (PW.3).

9. We are of the view that all omissions/contradictions pointed  

out by the appellants’ counsel  had been trivial in nature,  which do  

not go to the root of the cause.  

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           It is settled legal proposition that while appreciating the  

evidence,  the  court  has  to  take  into  consideration  whether  the  

contradictions/omissions/improvements/embellishments  etc.   had  

been of  such magnitude  that  they may  materially  affect  the trial.  

Minor  contradictions,  inconsistencies,  omissions  or  improvements  

on  trivial  matters  without  affecting  the  case  of  the  prosecution  

should not be made the court to reject the evidence in its entirety.  

The  court  after  going  through  the  entire  evidence  must  form an  

opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate court  

in natural course would not be justified in reviewing the same again  

without justifiable reasons.

(Vide: Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) & Ors. v. State of  

Maharashtra,   (2010) 13 SCC 657).

10. The complainant Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW.1)  

is  the  sole  eye-witness.   It  has  been  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants that being a sole and an interested witness, his evidence  

cannot  be  relied  upon  without  corroboration.   The  submissions  

advanced in this respect had been that Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad  

Trivedi (PW.1) being a partner in the Firm would be beneficiary in  

the transaction of land involved herein in case one partner had been  

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eliminated and other partner landed in jail.  Such an argument is not  

acceptable for two reasons:

(i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering him  

as the interested witness, the court must bear in mind that the term  

‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some direct interest  

in  having  the  accused  somehow or  the  other  convicted  for  some  

other  reason.  (Vide:  Kartik Malhar v.  State of  Bihar,  (1996)  1  

SCC 614; and  Rakesh & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh,  JT  

2011 (10) SC 525).

(ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the  

Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided  

he is wholly reliable.  There is no legal impediment in convicting a  

person on the sole testimony of a single witness.  That is the logic of  

Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about  

the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not  

the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-

honoured  principle  is  that  evidence  has  to  be  weighed  and  not  

counted.  The  test  is  whether  the  evidence  has  a  ring  of  truth,  is  

cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has  

laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than  

on quantity,  multiplicity  or  plurality  of  witnesses.  It  is,  therefore,  

open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary  

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witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused  

in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about  

the  quality  of  evidence.  (See:  Vadivelu  Thevar v.  The  State  of  

Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614; Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of  

Delhi,   (2003)  11 SCC 367;  Namdeo  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  

(2007) 14 SCC 150; and  Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West  

Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 3638).  

11. We do not find any force in the submissions advanced on  

behalf of  the appellants that it was not possible for two persons to  

cause 33 injuries on the person of the deceased and therefore, the  

villagers could have caused such injuries.   Had it  been so, as the  

scuffle took place in the presence of the appellants, they could have  

given  the  full  details  of  the  incident  and  further  disclosed  as  to  

whether those villagers reached the place of occurrence with swords.  

Had it been so, Smt. Jadaavben  Ambalal Parmar (PW.3)  and her  

son  Sureshbhai  Ambalal  Parmar  (PW.5)   could  have  also  been  

involved in the case.   

12. As the courts below have discussed each and every factual  

and legal aspect of the case  elaborately, we do not think it proper to  

re-examine  every  point.   Presence  of  the complainant  along with  

deceased and appellants was natural as being partners, they had gone  

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to  see  the  land.   In  case,  there  was some scuffle  at  the  place  of  

incident for the reason that the entire consideration for land had not  

been paid to  Smt.  Jadaavben Ambalal  Parmar (PW.3), what was  

the occasion for the villagers to chase the deceased and kill him  and  

that is too, without harming complainant and the appellants.  More  

so, in case only agreement to sell  had been executed, question of  

making  payment  of  full  consideration  would  not  arise.  However,  

Sureshbhai Ambalal  Parmar (PW.5) had stated that sale deed and  

agreement  to  sell  had been  executed  simultaneously.   We fail  to  

understand in case the sale deed is being executed,  what was the  

occasion for executing the agreement to sell in respect of the same  

land  in  the  same  transaction.   Shri  Vasimuddin  Jenuddin  Shaikh  

(PW.4), brother of the deceased  has admitted that immediately after  

the  incident  he  received  the  phone  call  from  the  complainant  

regarding the incident.  This very fact makes the prosecution case  

most probable.  FIR had been lodged promptly.  Thus, there was no  

time for any kind of manipulation.   

13. After  appreciating  the  evidence,  the  two  courts  below  

reached the following conclusions:  

(i) Bharat  Trivedi  (PW.1)  is  an  eye-witness.  He  had  

accompanied deceased at the time when the incident had taken place.  

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Though, he was subjected to cross-examination, nothing substantial  

could be elicited.  

(ii) Death of the deceased is proved.  Appellants were arrested  

after 13 days and from the dickey of their car clothes stained with  

blood were discovered.  

(iii) The evidence of Bharat Trivedi (PW.1) is fully  trustworthy  

and he is not an interested witness.

(iv) In  fact,  Bharat  Trivedi  (PW.1)  had  informed  brother  of  

deceased about the incident without any loss of time.  

(v) Bharat Trivedi  (PW.1) stated that he had made phone call  

from  STD,  PCO  booth  whereas  the  relevant  witness  Budhabhai  

Prajapati (PW.6) stated that accused had made call from  his place  

but  this  discrepancy  is  insignificant.  All  the  witnesses  are  

trustworthy.  

(vi) Principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not applicable  

to a criminal trial in India.  

(vii) The assertion by Bharat Trivedi (PW.1) that he was with the  

deceased  could not  be demonstrated  to  be untrue merely  because  

Bharat  Trivedi  (PW.1)  had  not  informed  the  police  first  but  had  

informed brother of the deceased.  

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14. We  had  been  taken  through  the  entire  record  by  learned  

counsel for the parties. We do not find any ground on the basis of  

which we may reach the conclusion that any of the findings recorded  

by the courts below is improbable or does not require affirmation.   

15. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to  

interfere with the impugned judgments and order.  The appeals lack  

merit and are accordingly dismissed.

                                                           ……………………….........J.                                                             ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN )

                                                           ……………………….........J.                                                             ( A.K. PATNAIK ) New Delhi, October 21, 2011

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