03 January 2014
Supreme Court
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T.S. SHYLAJA Vs ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO.

Bench: T.S. THAKUR,VIKRAMAJIT SEN
Case number: C.A. No.-000051-000051 / 2014
Diary number: 32143 / 2011
Advocates: ANJANA CHANDRASHEKAR Vs NAFIS A. SIDDIQUI


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        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  51 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.850 of 2012)

Smt. T.S. Shylaja …Appellant

Versus

Oriental Insurance Co. & Anr. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The short  question that  falls for  consideration in this  

appeal  is  whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  setting  

aside the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s  

Compensation holding the appellant entitled to an amount of  

Rs.4,48,000/-  towards compensation  with interest  @ 12%  

per annum.   

3. The claim before the Commissioner arose out of a motor  

accident  in  which  the  deceased-Prahlad  lost  his  life  while  

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driving a Toyota Qualis vehicle bearing registration No.KA-

02/C-423. The incident in question, it appears, occurred on  

3rd September  2000  near  Bidadi  Police  Station,  on  the  

Bangalore-Mysore highway involving a head on collision with  

a Tipper Lorry bearing No.KA-02-B-9135.  The deceased was  

removed to the hospital where he died two days after the  

accident.  A  claim  petition  was  then  filed  before  the  

Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Bangalore Sub-

Division-IV,  Bangalore  by  the  appellant,  mother  of  the  

deceased for payment of compensation.  The claim petition  

alleged that the deceased was employed as a driver on a  

monthly salary of Rs.6,000/- by the owner of the vehicle.  

The vehicle being insured with the respondent-company, the  

claimant sought recovery of the amount from the company in  

terms  of  provisions  of  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act,  

1923,  now re-christened as  the  Employee’s  Compensation  

Act,  1923.  The  insurance  company  contested  the  claim  

primarily  on  the  ground  that  the  jural  relationship  of  

employer and employee did not exist between the owner and  

the  deceased.  It  was  also  contended  that  it  was  the  

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negligence  of  the  deceased  that  had  caused  the  accident  

thereby disentitling the claimant to any compensation.   

4. On  the  pleadings  of  the  parties,  the  Commissioner  

framed six issues for determination and eventually came to  

the conclusion that the deceased was indeed working as a  

paid driver of the owner of the vehicle, Toyota Qualis and  

that  the  claimant,  the  appellant  herein  was  entitled  to  

receive an amount of Rs.4,48,000/- towards compensation  

having regard to the fact that the deceased was just about  

20 years of age at the time of accident and was receiving  

Rs.4,000/- per month towards salary.  An award for the said  

amount  was  accordingly  made  by  the  Commissioner  with  

interest @12% per annum against the respondent-company  

who had admittedly underwritten the risk in terms of a policy  

issued by it.   

5. Aggrieved by the award made by the Commissioner, the  

respondent-company preferred an appeal, M.F.A. No. 738 of  

2009 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore which  

has been allowed by a Single Judge of that Court in terms of  

the order impugned order before us. The High Court was of  

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the view that the relationship between the deceased and his  

brother  the  owner  of  the  vehicle  he  was driving was not  

satisfactorily  proved  to  be  that  of  an  employee  and  an  

employer  and  that  the  only  remedy  which  the  appellant,  

mother  of  the  deceased  had,  was  by  way  of  a  claim for  

payment of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

6. Appearing for the appellant Mr. G.V. Chandrashekhar,  

learned counsel, strenuously argued that the High Court was  

in error in entertaining the appeal and in reversing the view  

taken by the Commissioner by re-appraising the evidence on  

record. He urged that the High Court remained oblivious of  

the  provisions  of  Section  30(1)  of  the  Act  which  clearly  

stipulate that  no appeal shall lie against any order  of the  

Commissioner  unless a  substantial  question of  law fell  for  

consideration.  No  such  question  of  law  arose  for  

consideration nor was the same framed or addressed by the  

High Court in the course of the judgment.  The reasoning  

given  by  the  High  Court  was,  according  to  the  learned  

counsel,  vague  and  based  entirely  on  surmises  and  

conjectures hence unsustainable in law.     

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7. Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923  

no doubt provides for an appeal to the High Court from the  

orders  passed  by  the  Commissioner  and  enumerated  in  

clauses (a) to (e) sub-Section (1) of Section 30. Proviso to  

Section 30(1), however, makes it abundantly clear that no  

such appeal shall lie unless a substantial question of law is  

involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than  

an  order  such  as  is  referred  to  in  clause  (b)  unless  the  

amount  in  dispute  in  the  appeal  is  not  less  than  three  

hundred rupees.   Section 30(1) reads as under:

“30. Appeals.—

(1) An appeal shall  lie to the High Court from the   following orders of a Commissioner, namely:—

(a) an order as awarding as compensation a lump  sum  whether  by  way  of  redemption  of  a  half- monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim   in full or in part for a lump sum;

1[(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under   section 4A;]

(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half- monthly payment;

(c)  an  order  providing  for  the  distribution  of   compensation among the dependants of a deceased   workman,  or  disallowing  any  claim  of  a  person   alleging himself to be such dependant;

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(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the   amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub- section (2) of section 12; or

(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of   agreement or registering the same or providing for   the registration of the same subject to conditions:

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order   unless a substantial  question of law is involved in   the appeal, and in the case of an order other than   an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless   the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than   three hundred rupees:

Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case   in  which  the  parties  have agreed to abide by the   decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order   of the Commissioner gives effect  to an agreement   come to by the parties:

Provided  further  that  no  appeal  by  an  employer   under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of   appeal  is  accompanied  by  a  certificate  by  the   Commissioner to the effect  that  the appellant  has   deposited with him the amount payable under the   order appealed against.”

8. What is important is that in terms of the 1st proviso, no  

appeal  is  maintainable  against  any  order  passed  by  the  

Commissioner  unless  a  substantial  question  of  law  is  

involved.  This necessarily implies that the High Court would  

in the ordinary course formulate such a question or at least  

address the same in the judgment especially when the High  

Court  takes  a  view  contrary  to  the  view  taken  by  the  

Commissioner.

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9. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation had, in  

the  case at  hand,  appraised the evidence adduced before  

him and recorded a finding of fact that the deceased was  

indeed employed as a driver by the owner of the vehicle no  

matter the owner happened to be his brother. That finding  

could not be lightly interfered with or reversed by the High  

Court.  The  High  Court  overlooked  the  fact  that  the  

respondent-owner of the vehicle had appeared as a witness  

and  clearly  stated  that  the  deceased  was  his  younger  

brother, but was working as a paid driver under him. The  

Commissioner had, in this regard, observed:

“After examining the judgment of the Andhra   Pradesh High Court relied upon by 2nd opponent it is  seen that  the owner of the vehicle  being the sole   witness  has  been  unsuccessful  in  establishing  his   case but in this proceeding the owner of the vehicle   has appeared before this Court even though he is a   relative of the deceased, and has submitted in his   objections,  even  evidence  that  even  though  the   deceased was his younger brother he was working   as a driver under him, and has admitted that he was   paying salary to him.  The applicant in support of his   case  has  submitted  Hon’ble  High  Court  judgment   reported  in  ILR  2006  KAR  518.   The  Divisional   Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.   Yellappa Bheemappa Alagudi  & Ors.  which  I  have   examined in depth which holds that there is no law  that  relatives  cannot  be  in  employer  employee   relationship.  Therefore it is no possible to ignore the   oral  and  documentary  evidence  in  favour  of  the   applicant and such evidence has to be weighed in   favour of the applicant.   For these reasons I hold   that the deceased was working as driver under first   

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opponent  and  driving  Toyota  Quails  No.KA-02-C- 423, that he died in accident on 03.09.2005, that he   is  a  ‘workman’  as  defined  in  the  Workmen’s   Compensation Act and it is held that he has caused   accident in the course of employment in a negligent   fashion which has resulted in his death”.    

10. The  only  reason  which  the  High  Court  has  given  to  

upset  the  above  finding  of  the  Commissioner  is  that  the  

Commissioner  could  not  blindly  accept  the  oral  evidence  

without analysing the documentary evidence on record. We  

fail to appreciate as to what was the documentary evidence  

which the High Court had failed to appreciate and what was  

the contradiction, if any, between such documents and the  

version  given  by  the  witnesses  examined  before  the  

Commissioner.  The  High  Court  could  not  have,  without  

adverting to the documents vaguely referred to by it have  

upset the finding of fact which the Commissioner was entitled  

to record. Suffice it to say that apart from appreciation of  

evidence adduced before the Commissioner the High Court  

has neither referred to nor determined any question of law  

much less a substantial question of law existence whereof  

was  a  condition  precedent  for  the  maintainability  of  any  

appeal  under  Section  30.  Inasmuch  as  the  High  court  

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remained oblivious of the basic requirement of law for the  

maintainability  of  an  appeal  before  it  and  inasmuch  as  it  

treated the appeal to be one on facts it committed an error  

which needs to be corrected.   

11. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of  

the High Court and restore that passed by the Commissioner.  

We grant three months’ time to the respondent to deposit  

the amount of compensation together  with interest,  if  not  

already paid or deposited failing which the appellant shall be  

free to seek redress before the Commissioner for recovery of  

the amount awarded in her favour. No costs.       

.……………….……….…..…J.         (T.S. THAKUR)

    .…..…………………..…..…J.              (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)

New Delhi January 3, 2014

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