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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009

TAMILNADU TERMINATED FULL TIME   TEMPORARY LIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION   ………APPELLANT

Vs.   LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF    INDIA & ORS.                         ……RESPONDENTS

                    WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.6951 OF 2009, CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009, CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009, CIVIL APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2009,

AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. This group of appeals has been filed by various  

appellant-Associations questioning the correctness of  

the  common  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

21.03.2007 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 690 of  

2004 along with batch matters by the Delhi High Court  

in dismissing the appeals of the appellant/concerned  

workmen  by  issuing  certain  directions  contained  at

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para 20(a) of the said impugned judgment in affirming  

the  judgment  and  order  of  learned  single  Judge  in  

allowing the Writ Petitions filed by the respondent-

Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short “the  

Corporation”).  The  appellant-Associations  have  filed  

these appeals urging various relevant facts and legal  

contentions with a prayer to restore the Award dated  

18.06.2001 passed by the Central Government Industrial  

Tribunal, New Delhi (for short “the CGIT”) in I.D.  

No.27 of 1991.  

2. The facts of the case are stated here under for  

the  purpose  of  appreciating  the  factual  and  rival  

legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties with  

a view to ascertain whether the appellants/concerned  

workmen are entitled to the relief as prayed for   in  

these appeals:-

The  concerned  workmen  are  the  members  of  the  

appellant-Associations,  Federation  of  Employees  

Association,  Workers  Association  and  other  concerned  

individual workmen who were working in the branches of  

the Corporation at various places in the country have  

raised  the  existing  industrial  dispute  between  the  

concerned workmen and the management of the Corporation

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regarding  their  absorption  as  regular  and  permanent  

service  employees  in  their  respective  posts  of  the  

Corporation. The concerned workmen in all these appeals  

have been working as temporary, badli and part-time  

workmen claiming that they have been appointed by the  

management  of  the  Corporation  on  daily  wage  basis  

against the leave vacancies and other vacancies of its  

employees in Class III and IV posts in various branch  

offices and Divisions of the Corporation. Their claim  

for regularisation were based on two Awards passed of  

the National Industrial Tribunal (for short ‘the NIT’)  

(i)  the  Award  passed  by  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  on  

17.04.1986  with  regard  to  absorption  of  similarly  

placed workmen by the Corporation who had been working  

on temporary/badli/part-time basis in Class III and IV  

category  posts  in  their  respective  branches  of  the  

Corporation and (ii)the Award passed by Justice S.M.  

Jamdar dated 26.08.1988, in pursuant to the reference  

made by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India,  

under Section 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  

(for  short  ‘the  Act’),  where  the  NIT  clarified  and  

affirmed the Award dated 17.04.1986 passed by Justice  

R. D. Tulpule.

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The  present  dispute  that  arose  between  the  

concerned workmen and the Corporation was referred to  

the CGIT by the Ministry of Labour, Central Government,  

in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)

(d) read with Section 2A of the Act vide Order No. L-

17011/107/90-IR-B(II) dated 04.03.1991 on the basis of  

the  report  of  the  Conciliation  Officer  for  its  

adjudication on the following question :-

“Whether the action of the management of  Life Insurance Corporation of India in not  absorbing  Badli/temporary  and  part  time  workmen employed in the establishment of  LIC after 20.5.1985 is justified, if not,  to what relief the workmen are entitled?”

3. The said industrial dispute has been raised by the  

Associations,  Federation  of  workmen  and  concerned  

workmen  in  their  individual  capacity  which  was  

supported  by  the  Unions  and  Associations  of  these  

workmen of the divisions and zones of the Corporation  

across India and workmen who have represented their  

case on individual basis. Apart from the said Unions,  

Associations, Federation of some of the workmen from  

Tamilnadu Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees  

Association and E. Prabhawati and Ors. had also been  

impleaded as parties in the dispute before the CGIT.

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E. Prabhawati and Ors. were impleaded vide order dated  

01.12.1993  and  The  Tamil  Nadu  Terminated  Temporary  

Full Time LIC Association was impleaded in the pending  

reference case vide order dated 06.04.1995.  

4. The  Corporation  is  a  creature  of  the  Statute,  

namely,  Life  Insurance  Corporation  Act,  1956  (for  

short  “the  LIC  Act”).  Section  48  of  the  LIC  Act  

enables the Central Government to make rules to carry  

out the performance of the Act by notification in the  

official  gazette.  Section  49(1)  of  the  LIC  Act  

empowers  the  Corporation  to  make  regulations  not  

inconsistent with the provisions of the LIC Act and  

the rules made there under provide for all matters for  

which provision is expedient for the purpose of giving  

effect  to  the  provisions  of  the  LIC  Act  with  the  

previous  approval  of  the  Central  Government  by  

notification in the gazette of India. Section 49(2) of  

the  LIC  Act  lists  certain  matters  for  which  

Regulations  may  be  made  without  prejudice  to  the  

generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1).  

The LIC Act was amended by the Amendment Act 17 of  

1957 with retrospective effect by incorporating sub-

clause  (bb)  of  sub-section  2  of  Section  49  of  the

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Amended Act, 1957 which was omitted later by Act 1 of  

1981 (w.e.f. 31.1.1981) which provides for terms and  

conditions of service of the persons who have become  

employees of the Corporation under its Section 11 sub-

Section (1) of the Act. By the authority vested in the  

Corporation under clause (bb) of sub-Section (2) of  

Section 49 of the amended Act, the Corporation framed  

Regulations  defining  the  terms  and  conditions  of  

service of the staff of the Corporation known as LIC  

of  India  (Staff)  Regulations,  1960  (for  short  “the  

Staff Regulations, 1960”) which was notified in the  

Gazette of India No. IV dated 23.7.1960 and came into  

force with effect from 1.7.1960. It is pertinent to  

note that although according to the Staff Regulations,  

1960 there are only two types of employment that have  

been provided for in the Regulations (i) regular and  

(ii)  temporary.  The  employment  in  the  capacity  of  

badlis, part-time is not provided thereunder. There is  

no  specific  nomenclature  in  the  Staff  Regulations,  

1960, in this regard, but the said type of employment  

is prevalent in the Corporation both in the Center and  

also  in  various  Divisions,  Zonal  offices  throughout  

India.  The  concerned  workmen  have  been  continuously

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working in different capacities such as peons, hamals,  

watchman-cum-pump  man,  lift  man,  house  attendants,  

sweepers,  cleaners,  assistant  typist  etc.  on  daily  

wage  basis  against  permanent  and  other  vacancies  

during that period.  

5. Between  the  years  1981-85,  a  large  number  of  

employees of Class III and IV posts were employed by  

the Corporation in the capacity of badlis, temporary  

and part-time workers. Their wage, conditions for the  

absorption into the regular cadre and other conditions  

of service were the subject matter of the Industrial  

Dispute. Thus, the reference was made in this regard  

to the National Industrial Tribunal as reference No.  

NTB-I of 1985. At the initial stage, the Western Zone  

Insurance  Employees  Association,  Bombay  and  the  

Central  Zone  National  Life  Insurance  Corporation  

Employees Association, Kanpur were the only parties to  

the reference besides the Corporation. Later on, all  

the Unions of all the Regions and the Zones in the  

country joined as parties and filed their respective  

claim statements before the NIT. During the course of  

said proceedings an interim Award was passed by the  

National  Industrial  Tribunal  on  the  prayer  of  the

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workmen, restricting the Corporation from recruiting  

or absorbing any person in the posts without prior  

permission of the Tribunal. According to the interim  

Award  passed  by  the  NIT,  the  Corporation  was  

restrained  from  making  any  new  appointments  except  

where persons had to be appointed over and above the  

then existing vacancies against which posts the badli,  

temporary or part-time workmen who had been working or  

had worked with the Corporation and those who would be  

concerned in the reference had to be appointed from  

amongst  the  badlis,  temporary  or  part-time  workmen  

against any vacancy continued, provided an undertaking  

is given to the Corporation by such workmen stating  

that no benefit would be claimed.

6. After adjudication of the said Industrial Dispute  

between the parties, the Award was passed by Justice  

R.D. Tulpule on 17.4.1986. The said Award was based on  

the suggestions invited both from the workmen and from  

the management of the Corporation.  The parties had  

given the mandate to the NIT to base its Award on any  

of the suggestions given by the parties after making  

necessary modifications.  

7. In the Award dated 17.04.1986, it was held that

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only those workmen who had worked in the Corporation  

during the period January 1, 1982 to May 20, 1985, the  

date of the reference was to be considered as eligible  

for  absorption.  The  Award  held  that  the  workmen  

claiming  absorption  in  Class  III  posts  should  have  

worked for 85 days in a period of two calendar years  

and the workman claiming absorption in Class IV post  

should have worked for 70 days in a period of three  

calendar years. It was further held by the NIT that  

the calculation of the number of days of work should  

be up to the date of reference. The Corporation was  

further directed to appoint a screening committee to  

consider suitability and desirability of such eligible  

workmen  for  their  absorption  in  the  posts  of  the  

Corporation. It was also directed by the NIT to the  

Corporation that the workmen considered to be suitable  

and desirable for the absorption should be absorbed  

against vacancies which existed in the Corporation as  

on 31.3.1985 and those which may arise subsequently.  

The  Corporation  was  also  directed  not  to  recruit  

outsiders in a particular Division till such lists of  

workmen were exhausted. Directions given in the Award  

on the question of absorptions have been mentioned in

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paras 40 to 60 and 66 of the Award of Justice R.D.  

Tulpule.

8. Aggrieved  by  the  said  Award  of  Justice  R.D.  

Tulpule  dated  17.4.1986,  the  Corporation  filed  Writ  

Petition No. 1801 of 1986 before the High Court of  

Judicature  of  Bombay  challenging  its  legality.  The  

Writ Petition of the Corporation was dismissed by the  

High Court vide order dated 14.8.1986, but at the same  

time,  the  High  Court  gave  a  certificate  to  the  

Corporation  for  seeking  clarification  of  the  said  

Award under Section 36A of the Act. In compliance with  

the  Award  dated  17.04.1986,  the  Corporation,  while  

interpreting the Award with respect to the absorption  

of  the  workmen  as  recruitment,  had  issued  six  

circulars commencing from 17.9.1986 to 25.2.1987. The  

Workers Union and Associations disputed the aforesaid  

instructions issued by the Corporation. Therefore, an  

Industrial Dispute was raised once again. The Central  

Government in the Ministry of Labour made a reference  

under Section 36A of the Act to the NIT being presided  

over  by  Justice  S.M.  Jamdar  and  the  same  was  

registered as NTB(1) of 1987, which reads thus :-

“Can the Award dated 17.4.1986 with special

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reference to paragraphs 44, 45, 46, 48, 49,  51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 64 and 66 and the  interim order dated 14.3.1986 be interpreted  to mean that the Central Office of the Life  Insurance Corporation of India is empowered  to issue instructions/guidelines as contained  in their circular issued in this behalf to  implement  the  directions  of  the  Award.  If  not, what could be the correct interpretation  of  various  directions  covered  by  the  said  paragraphs in the circumstances of the case.  Whether the term “absorption” referred to at  various  places  in  the  Award  can  be  interpreted in mean “recruitment”.

9. During  the  course  of  the  hearing  of  the  said  

reference,  an  interim  order  was  passed  by  the  NIT  

restraining  the  Corporation  to  make  any  recruitment  

from  the  open  market  during  the  pendency  of  the  

proceedings. The NIT, after hearing the parties and  

examining the points of dispute, answered the term of  

reference  and  gave  its  own  interpretation  of  the  

earlier Award passed by Justice R.D. Tulpule holding  

that  the  observations  contemplated  by  the  earlier  

Award  did  not  mean  recruitment.  An  Award  dated  

26.8.1988  was  passed  accordingly  by  Justice  S.M.  

Jamdar clarifying the Award passed by Justice Tulpule  

that absorption of workmen does not mean recruitment.

10.  Aggrieved  by  the  said  Award,  the  Corporation

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preferred SLP No. 14906 of 1988 titled The Management  

of  Life  Insurance  Corporation  of  India  v. Their  

Workmen before  this  Court  urging  various  legal  

contentions. It is the case of the Corporation that  

during the course of the said SLP, a compromise was  

entered into between the Corporation and 8 out of the  

9 Unions of the above SLP. Accordingly, this Court  

passed an order dated 1.3.1989 on the basis of the  

said compromise. The terms and conditions of the said  

compromise  between  the  parties  therein  will  be  

extracted in the reasoning portion of this Judgment.

11.   In pursuant to the said compromise between the  

parties in the SLP, as directed by this Court, the  

Corporation  gave  appointments  to  a  large  number  of  

such workmen working on temporary, badli and part-time  

basis to the posts in the Class III as well as Class  

IV in various Divisions of the Corporation. The said  

appointments were given to the persons recruited on  

temporary  basis  between  1.1.1982  to  20.5.1985.  

Thereafter,  the  employees  who  were  employed  as  

temporary, badli and part-time workers after 20.5.1985  

raised  the  demand  for  their  absorption  and

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regularisation  of  their  service  as  permanent  

employees. When their demands were not accepted by the  

Corporation,  several  writ  petitions  in  this  respect  

were filed before the High Court of Madras between the  

years 1989 to 1991. The writ petition No. 10367 of  

1989 filed between the Terminated Full Time Temporary  

LIC Welfare Association and Senior Divisional Manager,  

LIC,  Khanjawar,  along  with  18  other  writ  petitions  

were listed for hearing before the full bench of the  

High Court of Madras. After hearing the parties of all  

the writ petitions, the High Court dismissed the same  

which decision is reported in 1993 (1) LLJ 1030.   

12.  Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment,  SLP  (C)  

Nos. 10393-10413 of 1992 titled E. Prabhawati and Ors.  

v. LIC of India & Ors. were filed before this Court.  

In the said SLPs, on the direction of this Court, the  

Corporation framed a Scheme for the regularization of  

the employees in their service who were granted ad-hoc  

appointments for 85 days at intervals from time to  

time  and  placed  the  same  before  this  Court.  After  

hearing the parties, this Court by means of an interim  

order  dated  23.1.1992  found  the  Scheme  to  be  

reasonable  and  approved  clauses  (a)  to  (d)  of

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paragraph 1 of the said Scheme and the Corporation was  

directed  to  proceed  to  regularize  the  employees  

eligible in their service in accordance with the said  

Scheme.

13.  It  is  also  pertinent  to  note  that  during  the  

pendency of the writ petitions before the High Court  

of Madras, the industrial dispute that arose between  

the  concerned  workmen  and  the  Corporation  in  these  

appeals were referred to the CGIT by the Ministry of  

Labour vide order dated 4.3.1991. Further, during the  

continuance  of  the  proceedings  of  the  present  

reference  E.  Prabhawati  and  Ors.  their  impleadment  

application  was  allowed  vide  order  dated  1.12.1993.  

However, they did not implead in the above dispute  

proceedings.

14. Thereafter, G. Sudhakar and Ors. (similarly placed  

employees) approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh  

seeking relief for the absorption in their employment  

of the Corporation in the Divisions where they were  

working.  The  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  after  

hearing the parties gave directions to the Corporation  

to  frame  a  Scheme  on  par  with  the  E.  Prabhavathy  

Scheme for regularisation of such workmen. Aggrieved

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by the said order, the Corporation filed C.A. No. 2104  

of 2000 titled  LIC of India & Ors.  v.  G. Sudhakar &  

Ors.1  before  this  Court  which  was  disposed  of  by  

observing that the Scheme as has been passed in the  

case of E. Prabhavati & Ors. case (supra) will also be  

applicable to the case of G. Sudhakar and Ors.  

15.  The  CGIT  conducted  an  inquiry  to  answer  the  

points of disputes arising from the industrial dispute  

raised by the concerned workmen in this case. The CGIT  

on the basis of the pleadings, evidence on record and  

also on the basis of the Award passed by Justice R.D.  

Tulpule which was clarified in the Award passed by  

Justice S.M. Jamdar referred to supra, held that the  

same are applicable to the concerned workmen in this  

dispute. Accordingly, the CGIT passed an Award dated  

18.06.2001  in  terms  of  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  and  

Justice  S.M.  Jamdar,  giving  directions  to  the  

Corporation for their absorption in their respective  

posts.

16.  The  Corporation  being  aggrieved  by  the  Award  

passed by the CGIT filed Civil Writ Petition No. 4346  

of 2001 before the Delhi High Court placing strong  

1  (2001) 2 Suppl.  JT 143

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reliance upon the order passed by this Court wherein  

it accepted the terms and conditions of the compromise  

arrived at between the parties in the  The Management  

of  Life  Insurance  Corporation  of  India  v.  Their  

Workmen (SLP No 14906 of 1988) referred to supra which  

was filed by the Corporation against the Awards of the  

NIT by Justice R.D. Tulpule and Justice S.M. Jamdar  

Awards. Further, reliance was placed on E. Prabhavati  

& Ors. case (supra) which was disposed of as per the  

Scheme worked out by the Corporation pursuant to the  

orders of this Court in that case. The said Scheme was  

as per the decision in the case of State of Haryana &  

Ors.  v.  Piara  Singh  &  Ors.  wherein,  this  Court  

indicated  how  regularisation  of  ad-hoc/temporary  

employees  in  the  Government  and  Public  Sector  

Undertakings should be effected. Thereafter, the case  

of G. Sudhakar & others (supra) was also disposed of  

as per terms in the E. Prabhavathi Scheme. Further, it  

was contended by the Corporation before the learned  

single Judge of the High Court that the CGIT without  

accepting the said order/Scheme which is binding upon  

it under Article 141 of the Constitution of India has  

erroneously answered the points of dispute in favour

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of the concerned workmen. The said contention of the  

Corporation  was  opposed  by  the  Association,  Unions,  

the Federation and concerned workmen involved in these  

appeals.  The  learned  single  Judge  accepted  the  

contention  raised  by  the  Corporation  by  relying  on  

decisions rendered by this Court in the case of  E.  

Prabhavathy  &  Ors.  (supra)  and  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  

(supra) and thereafter, held that on plain reading of  

the above said decisions of this Court, the term of  

reference  before  the  CGIT  stood  answered  when  this  

Court  decided  E.  Prabhavathy  &  Ors.  (supra),  which  

again was concluded and reiterated in the decision of  

this  Court  in  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  (supra).  

Consequently, the Award passed by the CGIT in relation  

to  the  concerned  workmen  of  these  appeals  was  set  

aside by the learned single Judge by assigning his  

reasons in judgment and order passed by him.

17.  Aggrieved by the Judgment and order passed by the  

learned single Judge of the High Court, the concerned  

workmen challenged the same by filing L.P.A. No. 690  

of  2004  and  other  connected  appeals  before  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  inter  alia  

urging that the findings and reasons recorded by the

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learned  single  Judge  in  his  judgment  are  not  only  

erroneous in law but also suffer from error in law as  

the  learned  single  Judge  has  accepted  the  binding  

settlement between the Corporation and the similarly  

placed workmen. It was further contended that Section  

18 (3) and Section 19 (3) & (6) of the Act were not  

properly  examined  keeping  in  mind  that  the  said  

settlement arose out of the Awards of the NIT being  

challenged before this Court in SLP No. 14906 of 1988,  

however  this  Court  at  no  point  set  aside  the  NIT  

Awards in spite of the compromise arrived at between  

the  parties  therein,  therefore,  the  learned  single  

Judge failed to consider that the said Awards were  

still binding upon the Corporation. Therefore, it was  

contended by the concerned workmen before the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  Delhi  that  the  learned  

single Judge was not right in setting aside the Award  

passed by the CGIT in favour of the concerned workmen  

involved in these appeals and prayed for setting aside  

the same by allowing the Letters Patent Appeals. The  

Division Bench of High Court of Delhi examined the  

points  of  dispute  arising  out  of  the  Industrial  

Disputes  raised  by  the  workmen  of  the  Corporation,

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facts and rival legal contentions and the correctness  

of the finding recorded by the learned single Judge in  

setting aside the Award of the CGIT. It was held by  

the Division Bench that the appointment letters issued  

to the various employees specifically stipulated that  

their  appointments  are  temporary  for  a  specified  

period and the same would be terminated on the expiry  

or the period specified therein and that during the  

period  of  the  temporary  appointment  none  of  the  

provisions of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960 would  

apply. It was further held that the appellants had  

accepted  the  aforesaid  terms  of  appointment  and  

therefore,  they  cannot  raise  a  claim  for  their  

regularisation  or  automatic  absorption  in  the  

permanent posts. It was further held that this Court  

in  the  decisions  of  E.  Prabhavathy  &  Ors. and  G.  

Sudhakar & Ors. (supra) also declined regularisation  

of workmen and directed the Corporation for conducting  

selection  process  for  regular  appointment  and  that  

none of the appellants as on the date of raising of  

the  industrial  dispute  were  continuing  in  their  

respective posts as their services stood terminated on  

the expiry of the tenure of their temporary employment

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and even if they had continued to serve it was because  

of orders passed by various courts. It was further  

held by the Division Bench that the reliance placed on  

paragraph 53 of the  Secretary, State of Karnataka  v.  

Uma Devi2 by the appellants was misplaced as the ratio  

laid down in the said case is not applicable to the  

facts of the present case under any circumstance. It  

was further held that in the present cases, there is a  

specific rule which provides as to how recruitment has  

to be made to the vacant posts on regular basis, and  

the workmen herein were recruited under different set  

of  instructions  altogether  which  were  meant  for  

engagement of workmen on temporary basis and permit  

recruitment  of  temporary  staff  who  would  not  be  

entitled for absorption in the posts of Class III and  

IV of the Corporation. Therefore, the Division Bench  

held that none of the cases of the appellants would  

attract  for  issuance  of  the  direction  to  the  

Corporation  to  absorb  them  automatically  in  their  

posts and dismissed the Letter Patent Appeals filed by  

the  concerned  workmen.  Hence,  the  present  appeals  

urging various legal grounds.  

2  (2006) 4 SCC 1

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18.  The  correctness  of  the  said  findings  of  the  

impugned  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  Division  

Bench are challenged by the learned counsel appearing  

on behalf of the concerned workmen in these appeals  

inter  alia, contending  that  the  Award  of  the  CGIT  

passed after adjudication of points of dispute was in  

relation  to  the  concerned  workmen  who  have  been  

appointed by the Corporation as temporary, badli and  

part-time workmen after 20.5.1985. These workmen have  

been appointed by following the procedure under the  

LIC (Staff) Regulations issued by the Corporation from  

time to time and they have been discharging permanent  

nature of work against permanent and regular vacancies  

as  temporary,  badli  and  part-time  workmen  in  the  

various  offices,  Zones  and  Divisions  of  the  

Corporation  across  India.  Further,  it  is  contended  

that  the  Awards  passed  by  the  NIT  by  Justice  R.D.  

Tulpule,  the  same  being  clarified  and  affirmed  by  

Justice S.M. Jamdar vide reference under Section 36A  

of the Act, were passed after determination of the  

points  of  dispute  in  relation  to  the  industrial  

dispute  raised  by  similarly  placed  workmen  of  the  

Corporation who were appointed and had been working on

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such permanent and regular posts on temporary, badli  

and part-time basis in Class III and IV categories of  

employees  of  the  Corporation  between  01.01.1982  to  

20.05.1985. Therefore, the NIT Awards clarified that  

those  similarly  placed  workmen  were  entitled  for  

absorption  in  terms  of  the  direction  given  in  the  

Award  of  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  which  was  clarified  

subsequently by the Award passed in 1988 by Justice S.  

M. Jamdar. Of course, the said Awards by the NIT were  

challenged before this Court in the SLP No. 14906 of  

1988 at the end of which eight out of nine unions  

therein entered into a compromise with the Corporation  

and the same was permitted by this Court by way of an  

interim measure without any prejudice to the rights  

and contentions of the members of the other Union who  

had not entered into such compromise. Accordingly, the  

said  SLP  was  disposed  of  by  this  Court  vide  order  

dated  01.3.1989.  Further,  it  is  contended  by  the  

learned  counsel  that  the  CGIT  has  rightly  placed  

reliance upon the terms and conditions of the Awards  

of Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. Though the said  

Awards  were  challenged  before  this  Court  and  the  

matter  was  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  compromise

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arrived at between the parties therein, the NIT Awards  

were not set aside or terminated by the Corporation or  

by any other Award or order passed by NIT or any other  

Court. Hence, the same will be operative and binding  

between the parties under Section 18(3)(d) read with  

Section 19 sub-section(3) & (6) of the Act. In support  

of  their  contention,  reliance  was  placed  upon  the  

decision of The Life Insurance Corporation Of India v.  

D. J. Bahadur & Ors.3.  

19. It  is  also  contended  by  Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  

learned amicus curiae on behalf of the workmen that  

the industrial dispute was raised under the provision  

of Section 2(k) read with Section 10 and 12 of the Act  

by  the  concerned  workmen  who  have  been  working  as  

temporary, badli and part-time workmen in the posts of  

Class III and Class IV of the Corporation for their  

absorption in the permanent posts. The said claim of  

the concerned workmen was disputed by the Corporation;  

the  Central  Government  referred  the  existing  

industrial dispute to the CGIT for adjudication of the  

points of dispute as it has got the jurisdiction to  

adjudicate  the  said  industrial  dispute.  He  placed  

3  (1981) 1 SCC 315

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strong  reliance  upon  Schedule  IV  of  the  Act  and  

invited our attention to Item No. 6 in Schedule II  

under which matters other than those specified in the  

III Schedule are within the jurisdiction of the Labour  

Court  and  also  Item  No.  11  of  Schedule  IV  which  

provides for Conditions of Service for Change of which  

Notice is to be given by the Corporation in case of  

any increase or reduction (other than casual) in the  

number of persons employed or to be employed in any  

occupation or process or department or shift,  [not  

occasioned  by  the  circumstances  over  which  the  

employer has no control]. Since the Corporation is a  

Statutory Body which has come into existence under the  

LIC Act, 1956, it is required to follow the provisions  

of the Act with regard to service conditions of the  

workmen,  including  better  service  conditions,  

absorption,  regularisation  etc.  He  has  also  placed  

reliance upon the Item No. 10 of V Schedule to the  

Act, wherein it states that it is an unfair labour  

practice on the part of the employer to employ workmen  

as “badlis”, casuals or temporaries and continue them  

as such for years, with the object of depriving them  

of the status and privileges of permanent workmen and

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the same is prohibited under Section 25T of the Act.  

Further, strong reliance was placed by him upon the  

provisions under Section 25T and 25U under Chapter VC  

of the Act, with regard to the Unfair Labour Practices  

on the part of the employer wherein it is stated that  

an employee or a workman and Trade Union shall not  

commit any unfair labour practice in relation to the  

matter as enumerated in the V Schedule referred to  

supra and further Section 25U of the Act contemplates  

that any person either employer or Trade Unions of  

Employers  who  commits  unfair  labour  practice  as  

enumerated in the V schedule shall be punished with  

imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months  

or with fine which may extend to Rs.1,000/- or both.  

Therefore, it is contended that in the case on hand,  

the workmen concerned have been employed on temporary,  

badli and part-time basis for several years, depriving  

them of the privileges of permanent workmen which is a  

clear case of unfair labour practice on the part of  

the Corporation under Item 10 Schedule V, which is  

prohibited  under  Section  25T  of  the  Act  and  the  

Corporation would be liable for penalty under Section  

25U  of  the  Act.  Therefore,  the  CGIT  has  got  ample

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power  to  adjudicate  the  existing  industrial  dispute  

between  the  parties  on  the  basis  of  the  points  of  

dispute  referred  to  it  with  respect  to  the  claim  

raised  by  the  concerned  workmen.  Further,  in  

justification  of  the  Awards  passed  by  the  NIT  in  

giving  direction  to  the  Corporation  to  absorb  

similarly  situated  workmen  from  01.01.1982  till  

20.05.1985, strong reliance was placed by him upon the  

case  of  Bharat  Bank  Ltd.  v. Bharat  Bank  Employees  

Union4 wherein,  this  Court  discussed  the  powers  of  

Industrial  Tribunal  to  override  the  contracts.  

Therefore, the aforesaid Awards passed by the NIT are  

binding between the parties under Section 18(3) of the  

Act. The Awards passed by the NIT in a similar dispute  

are still operative as the same are not terminated by  

either of the parties as provided under Section 19(6)  

of the Act, even after the expiry of the period of  

operation under Section 19(3) of the Act, & therefore,  

the Awards shall continue to be operative & binding on  

the parties until a period of two months has elapsed  

from  the  date  on  which  notice  is  given  by  the  

Corporation intimating its intention to terminate the  

4  AIR 1950 SC 188

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Awards. He further contended that in the case on hand,  

no such notice is issued by either of the parties and  

therefore the Awards are operative and binding in law  

upon the parties.  

20. The  aforesaid  contentions,  are  rebutted  by  the  

learned senior counsel Mr. Kailash Vasdev, appearing  

on behalf of the Corporation, placing strong reliance  

on a series of judgments of this Court to show that  

the  compromise  was  entered  into  between  the  

Corporation and 99% of the employees on behalf of the  

workmen involved in the SLP 14906 of 1988 filed by the  

Corporation questioning the correctness of the Awards  

passed  by  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  and  Justice  S.M.  

Jamdar.  Therefore,  the  said  compromise  is  binding  

between the parties as provided under Section 18(3) of  

the Act. Further, he has urged that the case of D. J.  

Bahadur (supra), upon which reliance has been placed  

by the learned counsel for the appellants, is sought  

to be distinguished by him by relying on paragraphs 43  

and 47 of the said judgment in support of the case of  

the Corporation contending that the said decision does  

not  render  any  assistance  to  the  workmen  in  these  

appeals. He placed reliance on the decisions of this

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Court  in  the  case  of Herbertsons’5,  Transmission  

Corporation,  A.P.  Ltd.  v. P.  Ramachandra  Rao6,  ITC  

Ltd.  Workers’  Welfare  Association  v.  ITC  Ltd.7 and  

Jaihind  Roadways  v.  Maharashtra  Rajya  Mathadi  

Transport & General Kamgar Union8 to contend that the  

said Award of Justice R.D. Tulpule and clarified by  

Justice S.M. Jamdar Award are replaced and merged with  

the compromise arrived at between the parties before  

this  Court  in  SLP  14906  of  1988,  and  the  said  

compromise  is  binding  on  the  Corporation  and  the  

parties  to  the  compromise  that  Awards  are  not  in  

operation, therefore, the CGIT has erred in placing  

reliance upon the same to grant relief in favour of  

the workmen which has been rightly set aside by the  

High Court. It is further contended by him that in the  

SLP filed against the judgment of full Bench of the  

High  Court  of  Madras  by  E.  Prabhavati  and  Ors.,  

wherein, the Scheme was framed by the Corporation in  

these cases on the direction of this Court, which was  

accepted by the parties and the Special Leave Petition  

5  (1976) 4 SCC 736

6  (2006) 9 SCC 623

7  (2002) 3 SCC 411

8  (2005) 8 SCC 51

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was disposed of in the aforesaid terms by this Court  

by  its  order  dated  23.10.1992.  Further,  it  is  

contended that thereafter, the decision of the High  

Court  of  Judicature  of  Andhra  Pradesh  in  the  Writ  

Petition filed by  G. Sudhakar and Ors. (supra) was  

also challenged by the Corporation before this Court  

and disposed of in the same in terms of the Scheme as  

in  E. Prabhavathy & Ors.(supra) case. Further, it is  

submitted  that  the  Award  of  absorption  of  the  

concerned workmen passed by the CGIT has been rightly  

set aside by the learned single Judge and the said  

decision of the learned single Judge has been rightly  

affirmed  in  the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  by  giving  

cogent and valid reasons and therefore, the same does  

not call for interference by this Court in exercise of  

its Appellate Jurisdiction.  

21. In view of the factual and rival legal contentions  

urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the parties  

and the amicus curiae, we have to answer the same by  

recording our reasons as to (i) whether the setting  

aside of the Award passed by the CGIT by the learned  

single  Judge  by  placing  reliance  upon  compromise

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reached between the parties in SLP No.14906 of 1988,  

which was filed against the Award of Justice Tulpule,  

which Award was clarified and affirmed by Justice S.M.  

Jamdar is justified, legal and valid?, (ii) whether  

the judgment and order of the learned single Judge  

being affirmed by the Division Bench of High Court in  

its  judgment  is  legal  and  valid?  and  (iii)  what  

Award/Order the appellants are entitled to in law?  

We answer point (i) and (ii) together as the same are  

interrelated by assigning the following reasons-

22. Undisputedly, the concerned workmen in the above  

references  before  the  CGIT  have  been  working  in  

different offices and Zones, Divisional offices of the  

Corporation  in  various  posts  namely  peons,  hamals,  

watchman-cum-pump  man,  lift  man,  house  attendants,  

sweepers, cleaners, assistant typist etc in different  

parts of the country who were appointed by following  

the Rules and Instructions of the Corporation which  

were relevant at that point of time. The concerned  

workmen  in  industrial  dispute  referred  to  the  CGIT  

have been discharging perennial nature of work against  

the regular permanent posts in the Corporation. The  

industrial dispute raised by similarly placed workmen,

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who were appointed between the period 01.01.1982 till  

20.05.1985 was adjudicated on the points of dispute by  

the NIT with regard to the justification of absorption  

of  the  said  workmen  as  permanent  workmen  in  their  

respective posts by Justice R.D. Tulpule. The relevant  

portion of the Award is extracted as under for better  

appreciation of rival legal submissions made by the  

learned counsel on behalf of the parties with a view  

to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by  

the High Court:-

“65. In the light of the directions above  with regard to observation and creation of  additional post by the Corporation I do not  think that there would be any occasion in  future for the corporation to employ workman  in  the  temporary  and  badlee  categories  existing  for the occasional and temporary  increase  in  work  which  necessitate  employment  of  temporary  staff  in  all  probability  would be only amongst class III  cadre,  in  which  case  there  could  be  no  occasion and there  need not be I think any  case or situation require consideration or  grant of any other benefit apart from the  wage to such workman. 66.I hope and expect that in the light of  what has been said and a past exercise of  the  corporation   situation  where  a  large  number of such employees could be engaged  without  adherence  to  any  formalities  or  procedures by the various local managements  would be completely eliminated and done away  with  and  this  kind  of  employment  in  the  corporation  history  would  be  the  last  occasion. Excepting the temporary employment

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the  corporation  will  have  no  occasion  or  necessity  to  employ  badly  workmen  it  is  hoped in future. Though part time employees  will continue to be in existence for some  more  time  as  I  have  indicated,  the  corporation  will  also  see  its  own  way  to  absorb  the  part  time  employees  in  its  regular employment as far as possible and  reduce the number of part time employees to  the minimum however, whenever, hereafter any  occasion  or  vacancy  arises  of  regular  employment  in  part  time   categories  and  employment, then those who have worked part  time  in  accordance  with  their  seniority  should be given preference for absorption in  the  regular  cadre  of  the  Corporation’s  employment. This should be irrespective of  the  qualifying  age  for  the  entry  into  corporation’s  service  qualification  but  subject to his being found suitable.”        

23. Upon the reference under Section 36A of the Act  

being made by the Ministry of Labour to Justice S. M.  

Jamdar to clarify the Award of Justice R.D. Tulpule,  

it was held that the Award of Justice Tulpule was very  

clear as the same directs only for the absorption of  

the  workmen  concerned  in  the  said  dispute  in  the  

various  offices,  Divisions  and  Zones  throughout  the  

country. Therefore, it does not amount to recruitment.  

24. Aggrieved by the said Award, the Corporation had  

filed SLP No. 14906 of 1988 before this Court urging  

various grounds. In the said SLP, this Court in its  

order dated 1.3.1989 has observed that eight out of

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the nine workmen Unions said to be representing about  

99% of the workers have entered into a compromise with  

the management of the Corporation. This Court further  

in the course of the order has observed and permitted  

the management of the Corporation and the said eight  

Unions to implement the said compromise by way of an  

interim measure without any prejudice to the rights  

and contentions of the members of the other Union, who  

have  not  entered  into  such  compromise  with  the  

Corporation. The relevant terms and conditions of the  

compromise read thus :-

“The  Management  agrees  to  consider  the  temporary/part-tim/badli  workmen  employed  by  the petitioner for 85 days in an two years in  a Class III post and for 70 days in any three  years  in  a  Class  IV  post  in  any  of  its  establishments  during  the  period  1.1.82  to  20.5.85, for regular employment on the basis  and in the manner stated hereinbeloe. … the  selection of the candidate shall be made on  the basis of the folloing qualifications, age,  test, interview and also having regard to the  number of days worked by the candidates. A  panel of selected candidates shall be made and  the selected candidates shall be appointed in  regular employment from the pane in the order  of merit propectivity from the dates to be  notifdies  and  when  vacancies  in  sanctioned  posts for regular employment are filled from  time to time“

Pursuant to the above compromise, this Court passed  

the  following  order  in  SLP  No.  14906  of  1988  on

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1.3.1989 :-

“Special leave is granted. It appears that out  of  nine  Unions  eight  Unions  said  to  be  representing  about  99%  of  the  workers  have  entered into a compromise with the Management.  In  the  circumstances  pending  the  final  disposal  of  the  appeal,  we  permit  the  Management and the members of the said eight  Unions to implement the terms of compromise by  way of interim measure without however, any  prejudice to the rights and contentions of the  members  of  the  other  Union,  who  have  not  entered  into  such  compromise  with  the  management.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

25. From the perusal of the above order of this Court  

in SLP 14906 of 1988, nowhere it has been stated in the  

terms of the compromise between the parties that the  

Award of Justice R.D. Tulpule which was clarified upon  

reference made by the Central Government under Section  

36A of the Act by Justice Jamdar, is either set aside  

by this Court or substituted the compromise terms in  

the place of the Award except the order referred to  

supra passed in the above SLP 14906 of 1988. In fact,  

on  the  other  hand  it  is  clearly  stated  that  the  

compromise terms are between the parties to the said  

SLP  and  that  it  shall  not  prejudice  the  respective  

rights and obligations in relation to the members of  

the other union. Therefore, the effect of the Award of

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Justice  R.  D.  Tulpule  with  regard  to  the  direction  

given to the Corporation regarding absorption of badli,  

temporary employees as permanent employees has not been  

substituted by terms and conditions of the compromise.  

The Award of Justice R.D. Tulpule reiterated by way of  

clarification in the Award passed by Justice Jamdar in  

the dispute subsequently has been operative even after  

the compromise arrived at between the parties to the  

compromise  in  the  SLP  No.14906  of  1988  before  this  

Court. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior  

counsel  on  behalf  of  the  Corporation  that  the  said  

Awards are not in operation and that only the terms and  

conditions of compromise and orders of this Court are  

binding upon the concerned workmen in these appeals is  

not both factually and legally correct. This above said  

argument of the learned senior counsel on behalf of the  

Corporation is not tenable in view of the categorical  

statement made by this Court in its orders passed in  

SLP  referred  to  supra,  wherein,  this  Court  has  

permitted  the  management  and  members  of  the  said  8  

Unions to implement the terms of compromise by way of  

interim measure without any prejudice to the rights and  

contentions of the members of other Union who have not

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entered  into  compromise  with  the  management  of  the  

Corporation. It is not the case of the Corporation in  

these appeals either before the CGIT or before the High  

Court or in these proceedings the concerned workmen  

have also accepted the said terms and conditions of the  

compromise arrived between the parties in the SLP No.  

14906 of 1988. This Court in the order passed in the  

above said SLP which is extracted hereinabove has made  

it very clear that the said compromise entered into  

between unions therein, but it does not prejudice the  

rights and contentions of the concerned workmen whose  

disputes are in relation to their absorption in their  

respective posts who were appointed after 20.05.1985.  

Further, even if some of the workmen are bound under  

the said compromise that arose out of SLP No. 14906 of  

1988, this in no way deters their right to raise the  

industrial dispute and get the same adjudicated vide  

order of reference by the appropriate Government to the  

CGIT. The Award of the CGIT was concluded after rightly  

examining the facts, circumstances of the case and the  

legal  principles  laid  down  in  the  Awards  passed  by  

Justice Tulpule and Justice Jamdar. More importantly  

the CGIT Award was passed after rightly appreciating

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the points of dispute referred to it and on the merits  

of the case.  Furthermore, as per the legal principle  

laid down by this Court in the case of  Bharat Bank  

(supra),  the  Industrial  Court  while  adjudicating  an  

industrial dispute has the right to override contracts  

and  create  rights  which  are  opposed  to  contractual  

rights.   The  CGIT  has  rightly  adjudicated  the  

industrial  dispute  referred  to  it  by  the  Central  

Government at the instance of the concerned workmen on  

the points of dispute, on the basis of pleadings and  

evidence on record and legal principles laid down in  

the Awards passed by the NIT. The relevant para from  

the  above  said  case  upon  which  the  learned  amicus  

curiae has rightly placed reliance reads thus:-

“9. The  first  contention  is  that  the  Industrial  Tribunal  cannot  be  said  to  perform  a  judicial  or  quasi-judicial  function, since it is not required to be  guided by any recognized substantive law in  deciding disputes which come before it. On  the  other  hand,  in  deciding  industrial  disputes, it has to override contracts and  create  rights  which  are  opposed  to  contractual rights. In these circumstances,  it is said that the very questions which  arose before the Privy Council in Moses v.  Parker Ex-parte Moses(1896( A.C. 245: (65  L.J.P.C.  19) arise  in  this  case,  these  questions being:

(1)  How  can  the  propriety  of  the

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Tribunal's  decision  be  tested  on  appeal,  and

(2) What are the canons by which the  appellate court is to be guided in deciding  the appeal? Their  Lordships  of  the  Privy  Council  undoubtedly  felt  that  these  were  serious  questions, but they had no hesitation in  saying that “if it were clear that appeals  ought  to  be  allowed,  such  difficulties  would doubtless be met somehow”. This, in  my opinion, is a sufficient answer to the  difficulty  raised.  The  Tribunal  has  to  adjudicate  in  accordance  with  the  provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.  It may sometimes override contracts, but so  can  a  court  which  has  to  administer  law  according  to  the  Bengal  or  Bihar  Money- lenders  Act,  Encumbered  Estates  Act  and  other  similar  Acts.  The  Tribunal  has  to  observe the provisions of the special law  which it has to administer though that law  may  be  different  from  the  law  which  an  ordinary court of justice administers. The  appellate  court,  therefore,  can  at  least  see that the rules according to which it  has  to  act  and  the  provisions  which  are  binding  upon  it  are  observed,  and  its  powers are not exercised in an arbitrary or  capricious manner. ……..

61.  We  would  not  examine  the  process  by  which an Industrial Tribunal comes to its  decisions  and  I  have  no  hesitation  in  holding that the process employed is not  judicial process at all. In settling the  disputes  between  the  employers  and  the  workmen,  the function of the Tribunal is  not confined to administration of justice  in  accordance  with  law.  It  can  confer  rights and privileges on either party which  it considers reasonable and proper, though  they may not be within the terms of any  existing agreement. It has not merely to

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interpret or give effect to the contractual  rights and obligations of the parties. It  can  create  new  rights  and  obligations  between them which it considers essential  for  keeping  industrial  peace…..  The  Tribunal is not bound by the rigid rules of  law. The process it employees is rather an  extended form of the process of collective  bargaining  and  is  more  akin  to  administrative than to judicial function.

In  describing  the  true  position  of  an  Industrial Tribunal in dealing with labour  disputes,  this  Court  in  Western  India  Automobile  Association  v.  Industrial  Tribunal, Bombay, and others [1949] F.C.R.  321 quoted  with  approval  a  passage  from  Ludwig  Teller's  well  known  work  on  the  subject, where the learned author observes  that

"industrial arbitration may involve  the  extension  of  an  existing  agreement or the making of a new  one or in general the creation of  new obligations or modification of  old  ones,  while  commercial  arbitration  generally  concerns  itself  with  interpretation  of  existing  obligations  and  disputes  relating to existing agreements."

The views expressed in these observations  were adopted in its entirety by this Court.  Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  an  Industrial  Tribunal  formed  under  the  Industrial Disputes Act is not a judicial  tribunal  and  its  determination  is  not  a  judicial determination in the proper sense  of these expressions.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

Therefore, keeping in mind this principle laid down by  

this Court in the above referred case, we are of the

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view  that  the  CGIT  has  rightly  overridden  the  

compromise arising out of SLP No. 14906 of 1988 and  

passed the Award in favour of the concerned workmen.

26. Further, with respect to the  E. Prabhavathy  case  

referred to supra, which was filed before this Court,  

on preliminary hearing of the said case, this Court  

directed  the  Corporation  to  frame  a  Scheme  for  

regularisation of those employees who were granted ad  

hoc appointment for 85 days at intervals from time to  

time. In accordance with the same, a Scheme was framed  

as per the decision of this Court in the case of State  

of  Haryana  v.  Piara  Singh  (supra).  The  relevant  

portion of the Scheme is extracted hereunder:

“(a) All  those  temporary  employees  who  have  worked  for  85  days  in  any  two  consecutive calendar years with the Life  Insurance  Corporation  between  20.5.1985  uptill  date  and  who  confronted  to  the  required eligibility criteria for regular  recruitment on the dates of their initial  temporary appointment will be permitted  to  compete  for  the  next  regular  recruitment  to  be  made  by  the  Life  Insurance Corporation after the regular  recruitment  for  these  posts  currently  scheduled for November, 1992; (b) These candidates will be considered  on their merits with all other candidates  who  may  apply  for  such  appointments,  including those from the open market. (c) These candidates will be given an  age relaxation for applying for regular

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recruitment  provided  that  they  were  eligible  on  the  date  of  their  first  temporary  appointment  for  securing  regular  appointment  with  the  Life  Insurance Corporation. (d)   If these candidates are otherwise  eligible,  they  can  apply  for  regular  recruitment in the normal course.”

Thereafter, this Court granted leave and disposed of  

the Civil Appeals incorporating the essential features  

of the Scheme as a part of its order. Further, this  

Court opined that the said Scheme was also applicable  

to the case of G. Sudhakar & Ors. (supra) and passed an  

order accordingly and disposed of that case also. The  

learned senior counsel for the respondents has made his  

endeavour by taking us through the said scheme which  

was framed on the basis of the decision of this Court  

in the case of Piara Singh’s case (supra) and that the  

same was prevalent in 1992. It is pertinent to note  

that the said Scheme framed in the E. Prabhavathy case  

(supra) was the outcome of the order passed in Writ  

Petition filed by the concerned workmen in those cases  

and not the adjudication of the industrial dispute as  

per points of dispute referred to the CGIT/NIT by the  

Appropriate Government as per Section 10 of the Act.  

Therefore, placing reliance on the above Scheme by the

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learned senior counsel on behalf of the Corporation in  

justification of the impugned judgment and order of the  

High  Court  and  the  said  Scheme  formulated  by  the  

Corporation  being  accepted  by  the  workmen  in  those  

proceedings does not in any way take away the statutory  

and  fundamental  rights  of  the  concerned  workmen  in  

these appeals, who have raised the industrial dispute  

for their absorption into regular permanent posts of  

Class III and Class IV of the Corporation. Further, by  

a careful reading of the said order in the SLP No.  

14906 of 1988, it has been made clear that the Awards  

passed  by  the  NIT  (by  Justice  Jamdar  and  Justice  

Tulpule) after adjudicating the points of dispute in  

the  industrail  dispute  raised  by  similarly  placed  

workmen is not disturbed by substituting the terms and  

conditions of compromise between the parties therein in  

SLP  No.14906  of  1988.   Therefore,  the  Awards  in  

relation to the absorption of the workmen as permanent  

workmen in the Corporation have got statutory force.  

This is what is stated by the CGIT in its Award on the  

basis of pleadings and evidence on record, which was  

erroneously set aside by the High Court by assigning  

erroneous reasons which is sought to be justified by

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the  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  Corporation  by  

placing reliance upon the orders and Scheme framed in  

E. Prabhavathy & Ors. and  G. Sudhakar & Ors. cases  

which scheme has no application to the case of the  

concerned workmen involved in these appeals referred to  

supra. Therefore, the learned amicus curiae Mr. Naphade  

has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of this  

Court  in  the  case  of  D.  J.  Bahadur  (supra)  to  

substantiate  his  legal  contention  that  the  Awards  

passed  by  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  and  reiterated  by  

Justice Jamdar by clarifying the same in the reference  

under Section 36A of the Act are still binding upon the  

parties as the same have neither been set aside nor  

terminated by either of the parties or orders of this  

Court or Scheme framed by the Corporation. The relevant  

paragraphs  of  the  above  said  case  are  extracted  

hereunder:

“138. The court then proceeded to consider  specifically the situation that would obtain  in the 3rd period in relation to an award and  held:

“Quite  apart  from  this,  however,  it  appears to us that even if an award has  ceased to be in operation or in force  and has ceased to be binding on the  parties under the provisions of Section  19(6)  it  will  continue  to  have  its  effect  as  a  contract  between  the

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parties  that  has  been  made  by  industrial adjudication in place of the  old  contract.  So  long  as  the  award  remains  in  operation  under  Section  19(3), Section 23(c) stands in the way  of any strike by the workmen and lock- out by the employer in respect of any  matter covered by the award. Again, so  long  as  the  award  is  binding  on  a  party, breach of any of its terms will  make the party liable to penalty under  Section 29 of the Act, to imprisonment  which may extend to six months or with  fine or with both. After the period of  its operation and also the period for  which the award is binding have elapsed  Section 23 and Section 29 can have no  operation. We can however see nothing  in  the  scheme  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  to  justify  a  conclusion  that  merely  because  these  special  provisions  as  regards  prohibition  of  strikes and lock-outs and of penalties  for  breach  of  award  cease  to  be  effective the new contract as embodied  in the award should also cease to be  effective.  On  the  contrary,  the  very  purpose  for  which  industrial  adjudication  has  been  given  the  peculiar authority and right of making  new  contracts  between  employers  and  workmen  makes  it  reasonable  to  think  that  even  though  the  period  of  operation of the award and the period  for  which  it  remains  binding  on  the  parties — in respect of both of which  special provisions have been made under  Sections 23 and 29 respectively — may  expire, the new contract would continue  to  govern  the  relations  between  the  parties  till  it  is  displaced  by  another contract. The objection that no  such benefit as claimed could accrue to  the  respondent  after  March  31,  1959  must therefore be rejected.”

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                    139. It is the underlined portion of this  paragraph which impelled the High Court to  come to the conclusion that even a notice  under Section 19(6) of the ID Act would not  terminate a settlement (which, according to  the High Court, stands on the same footing as  an award and, in fact is indistinguishable  there from for the purpose of Section 19) but  would have the effect of merely paving the  way  for  fresh  negotiations  resulting  ultimately in a new settlement — a conclusion  which has been seriously challenged on behalf  of the Corporation with the submission that  Chacko case has no application whatsoever to  the  present  controversy  inasmuch  as  the  special law comprised of Sections 11 and 49  of the LIC Act fully covers the situation in  the 3rd period following the expiry of the  1974  settlements.  The  submission  is  well  based. In Chacko case this Court was dealing  with the provisions of the ID Act alone when  it made the observations last extracted and  was  not  concerned  with  a  situation  which  would cover the 3rd period in relation to an  award (or for that matter a settlement) in  accordance  with  a  specific  mandate  from  Parliament.  The  only  available  course  for  filling the void created by the Sastry Award  was a continuation of its terms till they  were  replaced  by  something  else  legally  enforceable  which,  in  the  circumstances  before  the  court,  could  only  be  another  contract  (in  the  shape  of  an  award  or  a  settlement), there being no legal provision  requiring the void to be filled otherwise. In  the  present  case  the  law  intervenes  to  indicate how the void which obtains in the  3rd period shall be filled and, if it has  been so filled, there is no question of its  being  filled  in  the  manner  indicated  in  Chacko case wherein, as already pointed out,  no such law was available. The observations  in that case must thus be taken to mean that  the expired award would continue to govern

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the parties till it is displaced by another  contract  or  by  a  relationship  otherwise  substituted for it in accordance with law.”

In view of the statement of law laid down by this Court  

in the above referred case, the reliance placed upon  

para 43 and 47 of D. J. Bahadur case and other cases  relied  upon  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

Corporation are misplaced and the same do not support  

the case of the Corporation.

27. In view of the law laid by this Court in the case  

referred to supra, both the Award of Justice Tulpule  

reiterated by way of clarification Award by Justice  

Jamdar  are  still  operative  as  the  same  are  not  

terminated by either of the parties as provided under  

Section 19(6) of the Act. The compromise between the  

parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988 and the Scheme formed  

in E. Prabhavathy & Ors. and G. Sudhakar & Ors. (supra)  

do not amount to substitution of the Awards passed by  

Justice R. D. Tulpule and by Justice S. M. Jamdar.  

Hence,  in  view  of  the  aforesaid  reasons,  the  

submissions made by Mr. Naphade, learned amicus curiae,  

in justification of the Award passed by the CGIT is  

based on the terms and conditions laid down in the

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Awards  passed  by  the  NIT  (by  Justice  Tulpule  and  

Justice Jamdar) in favour of the workmen for absorption  

as  they  have  been  rendering  their  service  to  the  

Corporation  in  the  perennial  nature  of  work  for  a  

number  of  years  and  hence,  the  High  Court  was  not  

justified in interfering with the said Award passed by  

the  CGIT.  The  said  contention  urged  by  the  learned  

amicus  curiae  is  accepted  by  us,  as  the  impugned  

judgment and order of the High Court is contrary to the  

Awards  referred  to  supra,  the  provisions  of  the  

Industrial Disputes Act and the law laid down by this  

Court in the aforesaid cases. The Awards passed by the  

NIT  is  binding  upon  the  Corporation  till  it  is  

substituted by another Award or replaced by another  

settlement in relation to the service conditions of the  

workmen of the Corporation in accordance with law as  

provided under Section 12 read with Section 18(3) of  

the Act or another Award that is required to be passed  

by the Jurisdictional CGIT in relation to the above  

subject matter after the Awards which are in operation  

are terminated by either of the parties as provided  

under Section 19(6) of the Act. Until then, the said  

Award passed by the NIT will still be operative in law.

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Therefore, the same has been rightly applied to the  

fact situation on hand in the Award passed by the CGIT  

and it could not have been set aside by the High Court.  

Thus, we are of the opinion that the learned single  

Judge erroneously set aside the Award passed by the  

CGIT and the said judgment of the learned single judge  

has been further erroneously affirmed by the Division  

Bench of the High Court. The said judgments of the High  

Court are clearly contrary to law and legal principles  

laid down by this Court in cases referred to supra.  

Hence, the same are liable to be set aside by allowing  

these appeals and restoring the Award of the CGIT.

28.  The learned amicus curiae rightly placed reliance  

upon  entry  Item  No.10  of  Schedule  V  of  the  Act  in  

employing the concerned workmen as temporary, badli and  

part-time  employees  against  permanent  posts  doing  

perennial nature of work and continuing them as such  

for number of years. This is a clear case of unfair  

labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra) of the  

Act which is statutorily prohibited under Section 25T  

of  the  Act  and  the  said  action  of  the  Corporation  

amounts to penalty under Section 25U of the Act. For  

this reason also, the findings and reasons recorded in

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the  Award  of  the  CGIT  in  answering  the  points  of  

dispute referred to it by Central Government in favour  

of the concerned workmen is legal and valid. The High  

Court  has  erred  in  not  noticing  the  aforesaid  

important, relevant, factual and legal aspect of the  

case of the concerned workmen and has erroneously set  

aside the Award of the CGIT passed in favour of the  

concerned workmen in exercise of its judicial power.  

The High Court has erred in not following the legal  

principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Harjinder  Singh  v.  Punjab  State  Warehousing  

Corporation9, wherein it is held thus:-

“17. Before concluding, we consider it  necessary  to  observe  that  while  exercising jurisdiction under Articles  226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in  matters like the present one, the High  Courts are duty bound to keep in mind  that the Industrial Disputes Act and  other similar legislative instruments  are  social  welfare  legislations  and  the  same  are  required  to  be  interpreted keeping in view the goals  set  out  in  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution  and  the  provisions  contained  in  Part  IV  thereof  in  general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e),  43  and  43A  in  particular,  which  mandate that the State should secure a  social  order  for  the  promotion  of  welfare of the people, ensure equality  

9  (2010) 3 SCC 192

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between  men  and  women  and  equitable  distribution of material resources of  the community to sub-serve the common  good and also ensure that the workers  get  their  dues.  More  than  41  years  ago,  Gajendragadkar,  J,  opined  that  "the  concept  of  social  and  economic  justice  is  a  living  concept  of  revolutionary  import;  it  gives  sustenance  to  the  rule  of  law  and  meaning and significance to the ideal  of welfare State" - State of Mysore v.  Workers  of  Gold  Mines  AIR 1958  SC  923.”

The said principle has been reiterated by this Court  

recently  in  the  case  of  Jasmer  Singh  v. State  Of  

Haryana & Anr. (C.A. No. 346 OF 2015).

    For the aforesaid reasons also, the case of the  

concerned  workmen/appellants  must  succeed  and  the  

impugned  judgment  and  order  must  be  set  aside.  

Accordingly, it is set aside.  

Answer to point (iii) 29. It is needless to mention that since we are of the  

view that the Award passed by the CGIT in I.D. No. 27  

of 1991 is legal and valid, it shall be restored and  

implemented  by  the  Corporation  by  absorbing  the  

concerned workmen in the permanent posts and if they  

have  attained  the  age  of  superannuation,  the

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Corporation will be liable to pay all consequential  

benefits  including  monetary  benefits  taking  into  

consideration the pay scale and revised pay scale from  

time to time by the Corporation.    

    Mr. Shekar Naphade, learned amicus curiae has  

rendered  excellent  assistance  to  this  Court  at  our  

request to arrive at just conclusions in these cases.  

The same is appreciated and placed on record.

    This Judgment and order shall be implemented  

within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy  

of this Judgment and the compliance report of the same  

shall be submitted for perusal of this Court.

    Accordingly, the appeals are allowed in the above  

said terms. All the applications are disposed of. No  

costs.   

                                   …………………………………………………………J.    

                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA]     

                          …………………………………………………………J.      [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi, March 18, 2015

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ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment       COURT NO.9               SECTION XV                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  6950/2009 T.NADU TERMD.FULL TIME TEM.LIC EMP.ASSN.           Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS LIFE INSURANCE CORP.OF INDIA & ORS.                Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 6951/2009 C.A. No. 6952/2009 C.A. No. 6953/2009 C.A. No. 6954/2009 C.A. No. 6956/2009   Date : 18/03/2015 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today. For Appellant(s)                      Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy,Adv.                      Mr. V. Senthil Kumar, Adv.                      Ms. Asha Jain Madan,Adv.

Mr. S. Nandakumar, Adv.  Mr. P. Vasu, Adv.  Mr. M. Soundarasaran Kumar, Adv.

                    Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv.                      Mr. B. K. Pal,Adv.                      Ms. Kusum Chaudhary,Adv.                      Mr. Bankey Bihari Sharma,Adv. For Respondent(s)                      Mr. Ashok Panigrahi,Adv.                                 

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  pronounced  the

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judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.  Justice C. Nagappan.

The  appeals  are  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  Reportable Judgment.

All the applications are disposed of.  

   (VINOD KR.JHA)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)