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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9095 OF 2013 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No.4757 of 2011)

T.C. GUPTA & ANR.  ...APPELLANT (S)

Vs.

HARI OM PRAKASH & ORS. ...RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. By an order dated 31.01.2011 the High Court of Punjab &  

Haryana  has  held  the  appellants  guilty  of  commission  of  

contempt and had adjourned the matter to a subsequent date  

for hearing on the question of sentence.  Aggrieved, this appeal  

has been filed.

3. The facts, in brief, may be noticed.

The respondents 1 & 2 had filed a  writ  petition (C.W.P.  

No.5104  of  2006)  in  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  Haryana

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challenging the acquisition of land belonging to them under the  

provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (hereinafter  for  

short “the Act”).  By the impugned Notification(s) issued under  

the  Act,  over  500  acres  of  land  belonging  to  different  land  

owners,  including respondents-writ  petitioners,  was sought to  

be  acquired.   According  to  the  respondents-writ  petitioners,  

nearly  80% of  the  acquired  area  was subsequently  released  

from  acquisition.   Consequently,  the  remaining  land  (which  

included  the  land  of  the  respondents-writ  petitioners)  had  

ceased to be viable for the purpose for which the impugned  

acquisition was made, namely, for development of residential  

and commercial  sectors 8-19 at Sonepat.  It was the further  

case of the respondents-writ petitioners before the High Court  

that the release of the land proposed for acquisition was at the  

instance of one Omaxe Housing and Developing Company Ltd.  

which had arrived at some understandings with the land owners  

and had executed agreements of sale with such land owners  

even after publication of the notification under Section 6 of the  

Act.   

4. The writ petition filed by the respondents was resisted by  

the  State  by  contending,  inter-alia,  the  same  to  be  not  

maintainable  on  the  ground  that  the  respondents-writ

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petitioners had not filed their objections under Section 5A of the  

Act.  What happened thereafter is not very relevant save and  

except  that  on  17.01.2011  the  following  order  came  to  be  

passed by the High Court:

“Mr.  Sehgal  seeks  time  to  file  additional  affidavit on the following points:

1.  In  how  many  cases  the  land  of  the  landowners  who  had  not  filed  objections  under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  was  released  through  the  mechanism of collaboration agreements?

2. What  are  the  norms  to  grant  licence  to  construct  a  Plotted Colony/Group Housing  Colony?

3. What are the rules regarding classification  of  zones  i.e.  high  potential,  medium  potential  and  low  potential  zones,  and  when those norms were amended?

4. Whether  the  policy/rules/norms  were  relaxed to grant licence to any of the 11  collaborations in this case?

Adjourned to 19.1.2011.”

5. On the date fixed i.e. 19.01.2011, the first appellant filed a  

duly verified written statement wherein, after  setting out the  

order of the High Court dated 17.01.2011, the appellant had  

submitted the details  of the land owners who had filed their  

objections under  Section 5A of  the  Act  and whose land was  

released  from acquisition.   This  was in  response to  the  first

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query made by the High Court in the order dated 17.01.2011.  

In so far as the second, third and fourth queries are concerned,  

information was duly furnished by the first appellant.  No issue  

with  regard  to  the  said  part  of  the  order  dated  17.01.2011  

having  been  raised  the  same  may  be  understood  as  not  

requiring any further attention.  

6. On consideration of the written statement filed by the first  

appellant,  the  High  Court  took  exception  to  the  information  

placed  before  it  in  response  to  the  first  query.   What  was  

required to be furnished in response to the said query were the  

names of such land owners who had not filed their objections  

under Section 5A of the Act and yet their lands were released  

from acquisition whereas the information furnished by the first  

appellant in the written statement dated 19.01.2011 was the  

reverse.   Consequently,  notice  was  issued  to  both  the  

appellants  to  show  cause  as  to  why  contempt  proceedings  

should  not  be  initiated  against  them  for  not  furnishing  the  

requisite information to the Court.  The case was adjourned to  

24.01.2011 and then to 28.01.2011.   

7. Separate affidavits were filed by both the appellants on  

28.01.2011  wherein  they  had  tendered  unconditional  and

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unqualified apology for not furnishing the necessary information  

as  required  in  terms  of  the  order  of  the  High  Court  dated  

17.01.2011.  In the affidavit of the first appellant, it was also  

stated  that  as  many as  483 land owners had not  filed their  

objections under Section 5A of the Act despite which their lands  

were released and only in  30 instances objections had been  

filed  pursuant  to  which  the  lands  of  such  land  owners  were  

released from acquisition.  All  particulars in this regard were  

also furnished.  The first appellant, in the affidavit filed, also  

sought to explain why the requisite information could not be  

furnished on the earlier date fixed i.e. 19.01.2011 along with  

the written statement filed on the said date.  In this regard it  

was contended that though the first appellant was personally  

present in court on 17.01.2011 he had not fully comprehended  

the order as pronounced in Court.   A copy of the order of the  

court  dated  17.01.2011  was  made  available  to  him  only  at  

about 6.00 p.m. on 18.01.2011 and the written statement was  

filed in the next morning i.e. 19.01.2011.  It was further stated  

by  the  first  appellant  that,  through  hindsight,  it  would  have  

been prudent on his part  to seek further time to furnish the  

information against the first query contained in the order dated  

17.01.2011.  However, as the first appellant was in a position to

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furnish  all  the  requisite  information  in  respect  of  the  other  

queries,  the written statement  dated 19.01.2011 came to be  

filed.  It was further stated by the first appellant that the lapse  

on his part was bona fide and unintentional and he did not have  

the remotest intent to withhold any information from the court.

8. The second appellant  who had filed a separate affidavit  

also  owned  responsibility  for  placing  inaccurate  information  

before the court though, according to him, he was entrusted  

with the duty to collect information pertaining to query Nos. 2, 3  

and  4  made  by  the  order  dated  17.01.2011  whereas  the  

information in  respect  of  query No.1 was to be  gathered by  

another official.

9. The matter was considered on 31.01.2011.  The High Court  

after  noticing  the  terms  of  the  order  dated  17.01.2011;  the  

written statement filed by the appellant No. 1 on 19.01.2011;  

the  order  dated  19.01.2011  passed  by  it  and  the  separate  

affidavits of the appellants filed on 28.01.2011 reiterated that  

the first query raised by it was with regard to the particulars of  

the  land  owners  whose  land  was  released  from  acquisition  

though they had not filed their objections under Section 5A of  

the Act.  According to the High Court as the query raised by it

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was  “simple  and  straight”  it  is  incomprehensible  that  the  

appellants, who are senior officers and were personally present  

in  court,  could  not  have  understood  the  question(s)  raised.  

Placing  reliance  on  the  correspondence  dated  17.01.2011  

enclosed  as  annexure  A2  and  A3  to  the  affidavit  dated  

28.01.2011 filed by the first appellant, the High Court came to  

the  conclusion  that  from  the  said  correspondence  (letters  

issued to subordinate officers) authored by the first appellant  

himself  it  is  evident  that  the  first  appellant  understood  the  

query of the court in clear terms. The projections in the affidavit  

dated  28.01.2011  were  accordingly  understood  by  the  High  

Court to be afterthoughts.  In view of the above, coupled with  

the fact that the first appellant had conducted himself similarly  

on earlier occasions, the High Court took the view that in the  

present case wrong information was deliberately furnished to  

the  Court  which amounted  to  an  “interference  with  the  due  

process  of  law  and  judicial  proceedings.”   Accordingly,  the  

impugned order came to be passed holding that the appellants  

had wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court for which they are  

liable  to  be  punished.   Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  

developments and the order  passed,  the present  appeal  has  

been filed.

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10. We have heard Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel  

appearing for the appellants and Shri S.S. Shamshery, learned  

counsel appearing for the respondents.

11. The material facts indicating the unfolding of the relevant  

events leading to the eventual decision of the High Court has  

been narrated in seriatim in the preceding paragraphs.   The  

information sought for by the High Court; the response of the  

appellants  and their  explanation with  regard  to  the  answers  

provided  in  the  first  instance  and  the  reasons  which  had  

occasioned the errors therein have all  been set out in detail.  

Notwithstanding  the  above,  the  High  Court  has  come to  the  

conclusion that the explanation provided by the appellants is a  

mere  eyewash  and  wrong  information  was  deliberately  

furnished  and  correct  information  was  withheld  by  the  

appellants which make them liable in contempt.  The basis for  

the above conclusion reached by the High Court is the contents  

of annexure A2 and A3 to the affidavit dated 28.01.2011 filed  

by  the  first  appellant,  namely,  the  email  dated  17.01.2011  

alongwith  attachment  sent  by  the  first  appellant  to  his  

subordinate  officials.   The  relevant  part  of  the  aforesaid  

communication which has been extracted by the High Court in  

its order dated 31.01.2011 is as follows:

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“The Hon’ble High Court during the hearing  today has directed to file an affidavit whether  the  landowners,  in  favour  of  whom,  above  land has been released and licence has been  granted, filed objections under Section 5-A or  not.   You are,  therefore,  directed  to supply  this information in following format in respect  of  those  who  had  filed  objections  under  Section 5-A……..”

12. A reading of the above extract would seem to indicate that  

on the very day of the order i.e. 17.01.2011 the first appellant  

understood the said order to be requiring him to lay before the  

High Court information as to whether the land owners in favour  

of  whom land  has  been  released  had  filed  objections  under  

Section 5A of the Act  or not.  This is how the first appellant  

understood the order of the High Court. At that point of time the  

order of the Court was not available to the first appellant.  On  

such  understanding  of  the  order  dated  17.01.2011  the  first  

appellant directed the concerned subordinate official to furnish  

information  in  the  prescribed  format  in  respect  of  the  land  

owners who had filed their objections under Section 5A of the  

Act so that the same could be placed before the Court on the  

date  fixed.   While  it  may be  correct  that  the  first  appellant  

ought to have sought information not only in respect of land  

owners who had filed their objections but also as regards the  

land owners who  had not  filed their  objections,  the  question

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that arises is whether the said lapse, by itself, will make the first  

appellant liable in contempt?  

13. The e-mail  dated  17.01.2011,  extracted  above,  partially  

bears  out  the  stand  taken  by  the  first  appellant  that  he  

understood the order of the Court as requiring him to furnish  

information  in  respect  of  land  owners  who  had  filed  their  

objections.  Admittedly, a copy of the order of the court dated  

17.01.2011 became available to the first appellant only at 6.00  

p.m. on 18.01.2011.  In his affidavit the first appellant had also  

stated that it would have been better if, on 19.01.2011, he had  

sought more time to furnish the requisite information against  

query No.1.  However, he did not do so as the information in  

respect of other queries were available.  The circumstances in  

which the events have unfolded, in our considered view, does  

not lead to the sole conclusion that there was a deliberate or  

wilful attempt on the part of the first appellant not to furnish the  

requisite  information  or  to  furnish  wrong  information  to  the  

Court.  Rather, it appears probable that the failure to furnish the  

requisite information to the Court may have been occasioned by  

a  momentary  error  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  first  

appellant.  For the said lapse he had tendered his unqualified  

apology in the affidavit dated 28.01.2011 along with which he

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had  also  furnished  the  requisite  information  i.e.  name  and  

particulars of the land owners who had not filed their objections  

under  Section  5A  of  the  Act.   The  above  situation,  in  our  

considered view, called for a broad and magnanimous view of  

the  matter  and the  acceptance  of  the  unconditional  apology  

tendered.  Such a course of action, according to us, would have  

better served the dignity and majesty of the institution.  In fact,  

under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act read with  

Explanation thereto an apology ought not to be rejected merely  

on the ground that it is accompanied by an explanation for the  

lapse that had occurred.  

14. Before  parting,  we  consider  it  apt  to  quote  hereunder  

certain observations of this Court in its opinion rendered in the  

Special Reference No. 1 of 19641 (under Article 143(1) of  

the Constitution) made to this Court in the matter arising out of  

notice of breach of privilege of the State Legislature issued to  

two Hon’ble Judges of the Allahabad High Court as, according to  

us  it  is  in  the  aforesaid  spirit  that  the  contempt  jurisdiction  

ought to be viewed and exercised.

“142.   Before  we  part  with  this  topic,  we  would  like  to  refer  to  one  aspect  of  the  question relating to the exercise of power to  punish for contempt.  So far as the courts are  

1 AIR 1965 SC 745

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concerned,  Judges always keep in mind the  warning addressed to them by Lord Atkin in  Andre  Paul  v.  Attorney-General  of  Trinidad,  AIR 1936 PC 141.  Said Lord Atkin, “Justice is  not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed  to  suffer  the  scrutiny  and  respectful  even  though  out-spoken  comments  of  ordinary  men.”   We  ought  never  to  forget  that  the  power to punish for contempt large as it  is,  must always be exercised cautiously, wisely  and  with  circumspection.   Frequent  or  indiscriminate use of this power in anger or  irritation would not help to sustain the dignity  or  status  of  the  court,  but  may  sometimes  affect it adversely.  Wise Judges never forget  that the best way to sustain the dignity and  status  of  their  office  is  to  deserve  respect  from the public at large by the quality of their  judgments,  the  fearlessness,  fairness  and  objectivity  of  their  approach,  and  by  the  restraint,  dignity  and  decorum  which  they  observe in their judicial conduct. ……….”

15. That the power to punish for contempt is a rare specie of  

judicial power which by the very nature calls for exercise with  

great  care  and caution had been reiterated  by this  Court  in  

Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. The State of  

Maharashtra2 whereas in In Re: S. Mulgaokar3,  Justice V.R.  

Krishna  Iyer  while  noticing  the  principles  of  the  exercise  of  

power of contempt had outlined the first of such principles to be  

“wise economy of the use of the contempt power by the court”.  

Reiteration of the aforesaid principle has been made in several  

2 AIR 1971 SC 221 3 (1978) 3 SCC 339

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subsequent pronouncements of this Court, reference to which  

would not be necessary in view of the unanimity of opinion on  

the issue that the power to punish for contempt ought to be  

exercised only where “silence is no longer an option.”

16. For  the  aforesaid  reasons we are  unable  to  sustain  the  

conclusion  reached  by  the  High  Court  in  its  order  dated  

31.01.2011.  We therefore deem it appropriate to set aside the  

order dated 31.01.2011 passed by the High Court and allow the  

present appeal.

…............…………………………CJI. [P. SATHASIVAM]

…..……..........……………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 8, 2013.