Page 1

1

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 376 OF 2010

SWAROOP SINGH                                     Appellant (s)

                VERSUS

STATE OF M.P.                                     Respondent(s)

O R D E R

This appeal is directed against the judgment of  

High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur dated 16.7.2008  

in Criminal Appeal No.301/1994.

2. According to the prosecution on 28.9.19992 at  

12.30 p.m., the prosecutrix P.W.2 was proceeding to the  

field for cutting grass. On the way, the appellant who  

was  roasting  Maize/Bhutta  in  the  field  of  PyareLal,  

blocked P.W.2 and asked her to go alongwith him into the  

field of sugarcane.  When P.W.2 refused, the appellant  

caught hold of her by hand and forcibly took her to the  

sugarcane field, throw her down, gagged her mouth with  

the saree of P.W.2 and forcibly had intercourse with her  

by threatening her life at knife point.  According to  

her by virtue of the said act of the appellant, white  

liquid started oozing out from her private parts, that  

she went to the boundary wall (Mound) where a well is  

situated and where Ram Singh Dada (P.W.4) was cutting

Page 2

2

grass.   P.W.2  informed  Ram  Singh  Dada  as  to  what  

happened, who in turn passed on the information to her  

Kakaji Hari Prasad.  Thereafter, her Kakaji Hari Prasad  

took  P.W.  2  to  home,  where  she  narrated  the  whole  

incident.  She stated to have informed her sister Chain  

Bai as well as her Kaki and Shanta Bai.  She thereafter  

reported the matter to the Vilkis Ganj Police Station  

and after registering the report reached back home.  She  

identified the report as Exhibit P2.

3. Subsequent to the registration of the case, the  

Police inspected the spot, seized the broken bangles and  

prepared a rough sketch.  She was examined by the doctor  

who seized her peticoat and X-ray was also taken.  The  

appellant  was  proceeded  against  in  Criminal  Case  

No.84/1992 for the offence punishable under Sections 376  

and  506  Part  II,  IPC.   The  appellant  having  denied  

comission of the offence, witnesses were examined and in  

his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant  

pleaded  total  ignorance  and  that  he  was  falsely  

implicated.

4. On the side of the prosecution P.W. 1 to 10  

were examined.  P.W.1 Dr. Manju Saxena, who examined the  

prosecutrix  in  her  evidence  stated  that  on  internal  

examination  of  P.W.2,  hymen  was  found  to  be  torn  in  

irregular manner and that two finger could easily be  

inserted in the vagina.  She also stated that there was  

no flow of fresh blood.  Two slides of vagina slabs

Page 3

3

prepared and sealed and were handed over to the police  

for  forwarding  the   same  for  chemical  examination  

alongwith the Peticoat of the prosecutrix on which spots  

were present.

5. In  the  course  of  cross  examination,  P.W.2  

deposed that when the appellant threw her on the ground  

she  did  not  sustain  any  injury;  that  she  was  not  

assaulted  by  way  of  fist  blow,  though  the  appellant  

threatened  her  not  to  raise  any  alarm  by  showing  a  

knife.  She further deposed that when white fluid was  

oozing out from her private parts, blood was also found  

and that she  washed the stains with water when she  

reached the well from the place of occurrence and before  

she  met  Ram  Singh.   She  also  deposed  that  she  had  

swelling in her private parts and was suffering from  

pain for 2-3 days.  A suggestion put to her as to why  

she did not object when the appellant pulled her hand to  

go, she categorically denied the said suggestion.

6. The trial court after detailed analysis of the  

evidence placed before it held that there was no reason  

to disbelieve the version of the prosecutrix, that since  

the  appellant  had  sexual  intercourse  with  the  

prosecutrix  against  her  consent,  the  same  would  fell  

within the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC and  

such a gruesome offence was committed under the threat  

of knife point, the offence of criminal intimidation was  

also made out falling under Section 506 Part II, IPC.

Page 4

4

7. The trial Court after convicting the appellant  

for  the  aforesaid  offences  imposed  punishment  for  7  

years rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.2000/,  

in default, sentence of 2 years rigorous imprisonment  

for  the  offence  under  Section  376(1)  IPC  and  

imprisonment  of  2  years  with  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  in  

default six months rigorous imprisonment for the offence  

under Section 506 Part II, IPC.   

8. The  trial  court  while  reaching  the  above  

conclusion and while convicting the appellant has held  

that the version of the prosecutrix was fully supported  

by the other witnesses namely, Ram Singh (P.W.4), to  

whom she immediately informed, her Kakaji Hari Prasad  

(P.W.5),  Bansi  Lal  (P.W.3)  and  Radhey  Shyam  (P.W.6).  

The trial court has found that those witnesses fully  

confirmed the version of the prosecutrix.  The evidence  

of P.W.10 Dr. V.K. Chaudhary who examined the appellant  

on 17.9.1992 gave his opinion in Exhibit P6 that the  

appellant was capable of performing sexual intercourse.

9. The sole contention of the appellant before the  

trial court was that even as per the evidence of Dr.  

Manju Saxena (P.W.1), who examined the prosecutrix,  it  

was clear that the prosecutrix was approximately 17 to  

18  years  of  age,  that  since  she  was  having  frequent  

sexual intercourse no definite opinion of rape could be  

given  and  therefore,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the

Page 5

5

appellant had any forcible sexual intercourse against  

the wish of the prosecutrix in order to be convicted for  

the offence under Section 376 IPC read with Section 506  

Part II, IPC.

10. The High Court having considered the judgment  

of the trial court in extenso found that there was no  

ground  made  out  to  interfere  with  the  judgment  and  

confirmed  the  conviction  and  sentence  imposed  on  the  

appellant.

11. Heard Mr. Ranbir Singh Kundu, learned counsel  

appearing for the appellant and Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija,  

learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  State.   We  also  

perused the judgment of the trial court as well as that  

of the High Court.  In the course of submission, learned  

counsel for the appellant submitted except the version  

of P.W.2 prosecutrix there was nothing stated before the  

trial court to prove that the appellant committed the  

offence  rape  on  her,  that  even  going  by  the  medical  

evidence  as  the  prosecutrix  was  having   frequent  

intercourse though not married, it cannot be a case of  

rape falling under Section 376 IPC.  The learned counsel  

therefore, submitted that the conviction and sentence  

imposed on the appellant by the trial court as affirmed  

by the appellate court is liable to be interfered with.

12. As against the above submission, Ms. Makhija,  

learned counsel for the State contended that it is a

Page 6

6

case of offence of rape falling under Section 376 IPC,  

the  question  whether  it  was  with  the  consent  of  the  

women  alleged  to  have  been  raped  has  to  be  accepted  

based on her simple statement in the court and proceed  

on  that  basis.   Learned  counsel  contended  that  when  

based  on  the  evidence  of  P.W.2  prosecutrix,  it  was  

demonstrated  before  the  court  that  the  appellant  had  

sexual intercourse with her against her consent, it was  

for the appellant to have proved beyond reasonable doubt  

that either there was no sexual intercourse or was there  

a consent existed in order to relieve the appellant of  

the offence alleged and found proved against him.

13. Therefore, the only question that remains for  

consideration in the case in hand is as to whether the  

sexual intercourse  committed by the appellant on the  

prosecutrix P.W.2 was with her consent in order to hold  

that the appellant cannot be convicted under section 376  

IPC.  In that respect, when we examined the evidence let  

in, what is noted by us hereinbefore and as found by the  

trial court as well as by the High Court, the version of  

the prosecutrix P.W. 2 was unassailable.  She was stated  

to be 17/18 years of age on the date of occurrence and  

she categorically stated that the appellant who was a  

known  person,  performed  the  act  of  forcible  sexual  

intercourse against her wish at knife point.  Except the  

mere  denial  of  the  offence  alleged,  there  was  no

Page 7

7

evidence let in on behalf of the appellant to counter  

the allegation levelled against him by the prosecutrix.  

In such circumstances, the trial court on a detailed  

consideration of the evidence placed before it concluded  

that  the  case  of  the  prosecutrix  was  cogent  and  

convincing and also supported by the evidence of other  

witnesses  in  so  far  as  the  commission  of  offence  of  

forcible sexual intercourse at knife point.

14. In this context it will be worthwhile to refer  

to the principles laid down by this Court as to the  

manner in which the evidence of a rape victim should be  

evaluated to ascertain the truth.  The said decision is  

reported in State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh 1996(2) SCC  

384.  Para 8 and 21 are relevant which reads as under:-

“8.....  The  courts  must,  while  evaluating  evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a  case of rape, no self-respecting woman would  come  forward  in  a  court  just  to  make  a  humiliating statement against her honour such  as is involved in the commission of rape on  her. In cases involving sexual molestation,  supposed  considerations  which  have  no  material  effect  on  the  veracity  of  the  prosecution case or even discrepancies in the  statement  of  the  prosecutrix  should  not,  unless the discrepancies are such which are  of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an  otherwise  reliable  prosecution  case.  The  inherent bashfulness of the females and the  tendency  to  conceal  outrage  of  sexual  aggression  are  factors  which  the  Courts  should  not  overlook.  The  testimony  of  the  victim  in  such  cases  is  vital  and  unless  there  are  compelling  reasons  which  necessitate looking for corroboration of her  statement,  the  courts  should  find  no  difficulty  to  act  on  the  testimony  of  a

Page 8

8

victim of sexual assault alone to convict an  accused  where  her  testimony  inspires  confidence  and  is  found  to  be  reliable.  Seeking corroboration of her statement before  relying upon the same, as a rule, in such  cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why  should the evidence of a girl of a woman who  complains of rape or sexual molestation, be  viewed  with  doubt,  disbelief  or  suspicion?  The Court while appreciating the evidence of  a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of  her  statement  to  satisfy  its  judicial  conscience,  since  she  is  a  witness  who  is  interested  in  the  outcome  of  the  charge  levelled by her, but there is no requirement  of law to insist upon corroboration of her  statement to base conviction of an accused.  The evidence of a victim of sexual assault  stands almost at par with the evidence of an  injured witness and to an extent is even more  reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained  some injury in the occurrence, which is not  found to be self inflicted, is considered to  be a good witness in the sense that he is  least likely to shield the real culprit, the  evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is  entitled  to  great  weight,  absence  of  corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative  evidence is not an imperative component of  judicial  credence  in  every  case  of  rape.  Corroboration  as  a  condition  for  judicial  reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix  is not a requirement of law but a guidance of  prudence under given circumstances. It must  not be over-looked that a woman or a girl  subjected  to  sexual  assault  is  not  an  accomplice to the crime but is a victim of  another persons’s lust and it is improper and  undesirable  to  test  her  evidence  with  a  certain amount of suspicion, treating her as  if she were an accomplice.  Inferences have  to be drawn from a given set of facts and  circumstances  with  realistic  diversity  and  not  dead  uniformity  lest  that  type  of  rigidity  in  the  shape  of  rule  of  law  is  introduced through a new form of testimonial  tyranny  making  justice  a  casualty.  Courts  cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist  upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole,  the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime  strikes the judicial mind as probable....”

“21.  Of late, crime against women in general

Page 9

9

and rape in particular is on the increase. It  is an irony that while we are celebrating  women’s rights in all spheres, we show little  or no concern for her honour. It is a sad  reflection on the attitude of indifference of  the society towards the violation of human  dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must  remember that a rapist not only violates the  victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but  inevitably  causes  serious  psychological  as  well as physical harm in the process.  Rape  is  not  merely  a  physical  assault  -  it  is  often destructive of the whole personality of  the victim. A murderer destroys the physical  body of his victim, a rapist degrades the  very soul of the helpless female. The Courts,  therefore,  shoulder  a  great  responsibility  while trying an accused on charges of rape.  They must deal with such cases with utmost  sensitivity.  The  Courts  should  examine  the  broader probabilities of a case and not get  swayed  by  minor  contradictions  or  insignificant discrepancies in the statement  of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal  nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable  prosecution  case.   If  evidence  of  the  prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be  relied upon without seeking corroboration of  her statement in material particulars. If for  some reason the Court finds it difficult to  place implicit reliance on her testimony, it  may  look  for  evidence  which  may  lend  assurance to  her  testimony,  short  of  corroboration  required  in  the  case  of  an  accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix  must be appreciated in the background of the  entire case and the trial court must be alive  to its responsibility and be sensitive while  dealing  with  cases  involving  sexual  molestations.”

15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties  

and having perused the judgment of the trial court as  

well as of the High Court, we are convinced that the  

judgment  of  the  trial  court  does  not  call  for  

interference.  From what has been let in by way of  

evidence by the court below, the prosecutrix P.W.2 has

Page 10

10

spoken  that  she  knew  the  appellant,  that  she  was  

forcibly taken to the sugarcane bush at knife point and  

was  subjected  to  sexual  intercourse  against  her  

consent.  She revealed the gruesome act committed by  

the appellant immediately after the occurrence to Ram  

Singh  PW  5.   When  she  was  examined  by  the  doctor,  

nothing could be traced about the presence of sperm or  

blood  since  admittedly  before  going  to  the  Police  

Station,  she  washed  herself  in  the  well  which  was  

nearby  the  place  of  occurrence  to  which  place  she  

immediately went where she also reported the incident  

to Mr.Ram Singh Dada who was examined as P.W.5.

16. The  doctor  who  examined  the  prosecutrix  

stated clearly that the hymen of the prosecutrix was  

torn and ruptured.

17. Except simply denying the offence alleged in  

the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant  

did not let in any evidence to contradict the version  

of the prosecutrix.  No motive was either alleged or  

proved  as  against  the  prosecutrix  or  any  of  the  

witnesses to disbelieve the version of the prosecution  

witnesses or to hold that the Appellant was falsely  

implicated.  Broken bangles were also recovered from  

the  place  of  occurrence  at  the  instance  of  the  

prosecutrix.  No previous grudge of the prosecutrix as

Page 11

11

against  him  in  order  to  falsely  implicating  the  

appellant was also suggested.

18. A  careful  reading  of  the  judgment  of  the  

trial court discloses that the reasons adduced by it  

were cogent and convincing and there was no reason to  

disbelieve the same.  The conclusion of the High Court  

is also equally well reasoned and we do not find any  

fault in the same in order to interfere with the same.  

We  find  no  good  ground  to  interfere  with  the  well  

considered conclusion of the trial court as well as  

that of the High court.  In the light of our above  

conclusion, we do not find any merit in this appeal and  

the same is dismissed.

................................J.                     (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

................................J.  (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

NEW DELHI; April 10, 2013.